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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
When and why do politicians introduce minimum income reforms? Traditionally, this 
policy sector has been considered less invested by partisan politics dynamics, in reason of 
low political resources of would be beneficiaries and low weight on overall welfare 
budget. Conversely, this work argues that the non-contentiousness of this policy field is 
result of specific social and political actor preferences and strategies. The emergence of 
social groups opposing targeted benefits and/or the political activation of additional 
cleavages – and in particular the religious and the territorial ones – might make this policy 
field particularly contentious, and partisan dynamics more relevant.   
Empirically, this dissertation focuses on two countries known for long time for the weak 
development of social assistance within their social policy system, and the absence of a 
minimum income scheme: Italy and Spain. In both countries, at the subnational level have 
been recently introduced last resort safety nets, departing from their traditional model: 
why is it so? And why those programs rapidly diffused and gradually consolidated in 
Spain, while in Italy they constituted very often a very brief experience followed by policy 
reversal and the return to the traditional model?  
Through an in-depth reconstruction of the policy-making process in four regional cases – 
Castile and Léon and the Community of Madrid in Spain, Friuli Venezia Giulia and Lazio 
in Italy – this thesis argues that political exchange dynamics between powerful social 
groups, in particular trade unions and faith-based organizations, and political parties are 
crucial to have path departure, gradual institutionalization and/or policy reversal. More 
specifically it is argued that the strategic choices of social groups - the socio-political demand 
– and the key features of the party system – the supply – were conducive to different 
political exchange dynamics, which are ultimately responsible for the different policy 
trajectories of regional minimum income schemes in Italy and Spain. In Spain trade unions 
and faith-based organizations support for Mis (strong demand) under moderate pluralism 
led to gradual institutionalization, while in Italy, a weak demand coupled with the 
activation of the religious cleavage made this policy field contentious, with centre left 
coalitions introducing (often) those programs, and centre-right government displacing 
them. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
When and why do politicians introduce minimum income reforms? Comparative welfare 
state research does not give a proper answer to this question. While the new social risk 
literature has extensively proved that in post-industrial society needs based social 
programs have become a central social protection institution to protect citizens facing 
some rather general life-course and labour market risks, the political dimension of 
minimum income protection has received substantial less attention and remained largely 
under-theorised (cf. Clegg, 2014).  
Yet we should be cautious in applying mechanically theoretical frameworks introduced 
with reference to core social policy area, such as pensions or health care. Those sectors do 
not rest exclusively on a vertical redistribution of resources from the better-off to those at 
the bottom of the income scale, minimum income schemes (Mis) do: they are universal yet 
selective anti-poverty safety nets, financed through taxation, provided automatically to 
citizens in condition of need following a right based approach (Bahle et al., 2011; Marx and 
Nelson, 2012). Therefore, Mis provide political actors with a specific set of incentives, 
which are different from broader programs inspired by different operational logic such as 
social insurance or universal programs. Their selective nature – combined with socio-
demographic characteristics that make recipients propensity to vote significantly lower 
than average - decreases significantly the electoral incentives to introduce these programs 
compared with more comprehensive social protection measures (Madama and Jessoula, 
2015). Differentiating further this policy sector, beneficiaries’ social heterogeneity severely 
restricts their possibility to mobilize efficiently (Bonoli, 2005). 
Relatedly, it is difficult to interpret the political dimension of needs based social policy 
through the lenses of the traditional partisan politics literature. Left parties might promote 
safety net facing the harsh opposition of conservative parties whose constituencies bear the 
burden of financing those policies without expecting to ever receiving those transfers. At 
the same time, social democratic parties may well obstacle, rather than promote, the 
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expansion of means-tested benefits because they might be interpreted as an abandonment 
of the traditional goals of full employment and decent wages as the main road out of 
poverty (Rosanvallon, 1995). Conversely, right wing parties might support Mis as being 
the least expensive type of social intervention, while the contractual nature of those 
policies promises to reduce welfare dependency and consequently lower the cost of the 
welfare state for taxpayers. This scenario is particularly realistic in the age of austerity 
(Schafer and Streek, 2014), in which powerful social groups compete for a declining 
amount of public resources, so that left parties might obstacle the expansion of means-
tested benefits in order to defend the acquired rights of their stronger constituencies, the 
core workers (Rueda, 2007). Conversely, for right parties reinforcing last resort net could 
be a political alibi for the dismantlement of higher-tier social protections schemes (cfr. 
Clegg, 2014).   
Furthermore, political cleavages other than the labour capital might be particular relevant 
in the field of minimum income protection (Jessoula et al., 2014). The political activation of 
the religious cleavage through conservative parties of religious defense, which have a 
strong commitment to traditional families’ values and to the principle of subsidiarity (Van 
Kersbergen, 1995), might prevent public intervention and defend the role of primary 
networks of solidarities. The political activation of the territorial cleavage might hinder the 
viability of national based anti-poverty schemes, especially in countries characterised by 
wide territorial differentiation, as the development of a national scheme would result in a 
significant transfer of resources from rich to poor regions (Jessoula et al.; 2014, Saraceno, 
2006).  At the same time, in the subnational political arena, activism in the social policy 
realm might prove useful for “competitive region building” purpose, since social policy 
are powerful instrument in order to demarcate geographical spaces and to stabilize new 
form of political organization (Banting, 1995, cfr. Ferrera, 2005).  
Finally, the presence of more parties on the right and on the left side of the political 
spectrum, might increase the competitiveness of the political system, thus inducing them 
to propose and/or oppose social safety net strategically, significantly affecting policy 
trajectories. 
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Therefore, patterns of conflict and consensus on Mis can be extremely various. Last resort 
safety nets might constitute the loci of an overlapping consensus between traditional left 
and right wing political parties (Clegg, 2014; cfr. Madama and Jessoula, 2015).  On the 
other hand, Mis might also prompt conflicts not exclusively along the traditional left right 
dimension, but also within the two traditional political camps (Bonoli, 2013).  
This theoretical issue, our lack of knowledge concerning the politics of minimum income 
schemes, constitute the starting point of this dissertation. When and how reforms in this 
policy sectors are undertaken? What are the main drivers and filters in this policy sector, 
which has been for long considered less influenced by political competition dynamics, in 
reason of low political resources of the would be beneficiaries and limited weight on 
overall welfare budgets? 
 
1. Research questions 
Those questions are both theory and empirically driven. Indeed, interest in these questions 
also arises from the difficulty in understanding recent developments in anti-poverty policy 
in the Mediterranean countries. Traditionally, social assistance has been the weakest front 
of achievement of Southern European welfare states (Ferrera, 1996; 2005). At the end of the 
1980s, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain were the only countries in the “old” Europe where 
a fully-fledged minimum income scheme was entirely lacking. In the last twenty years, 
countries in this cluster have witnessed major changes in this policy field (Lalioti, 2016; 
Jessoula, Matsaganis and Natili, 2015). Specifically, since the beginning of the new century, 
Portugal has introduced a national Mis.  In Italy, the introduction of a national safety net 
has been frequently on the political agenda, but even though an experimentation was 
introduced in 1998 – i.e. Minimum Insertion Income (Mii) - it was lately displaced at the 
beginning of the new century (Sacchi and Bastagli, 2005). In Spain a national scheme was 
never established, and in Greece until today no major reform passed in this policy field. 
At the same time, in Italy and Spain spatial policy rescaling processes have collided with 
the dynamics of welfare change, leading sub national units to assume increasing 
importance in this policy field. In Spain, all regions have introduced Mis to the point that 
they currently cover the whole national territory and may be regarded as almost universal, 
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despite significant variation in organization, funding, benefit level and programme design 
(Arriba and Moreno, 2005, Guillén, 2010, Rodríguez Cabrero, 2009). In Italy we observe an 
inconsistent and somehow contradictory evolution of minimum income protection at the 
regional level, with a number of regions having introduced Mis, and most of them having 
subsequently displaced them.  
In light of these developments, our original question can be better specified, since two 
different yet intertwined puzzles emerge. Firstly, the introduction of regional Mis in Italy 
and Spain - similarly to the introduction of a national scheme in Portugal - constitutes a 
significant deviation from the original model of protection of Southern European 
countries, and thus calls for an explanation. Secondly, why in Spain we observe a gradual 
institutionalization of the regional Mis, whereas in Italy those measures knew only a 
limited diffusion, and were often subsequently displaced? 
 
2. Outline of the argument 
My two central research questions are the following: 
1- how do we explain path-departure, i.e. the introduction of minimum income 
schemes in the age of austerity, characterized by strong competition among social 
groups for a declining amount of public resources?  
2- What factors explain the policy trajectory of needs-based social policies, once 
introduced? 
The analytical framework applied in this research assumes that policy changes are by-
products of political competition (Schumpeter, 1942).  In particular, we stress that political 
exchange dynamics between political actors - looking for support - and social groups - 
interested in policies that guarantee them power and resources – are crucial for social 
policy development (Ferrera, 2005; Stoppino, 2001), especially in the minimum income 
protection area, given the low electoral and political resources of would be beneficiaries. 
The political demand for minimum income protection might differ considerably in distinct 
national – but also supranational and local – political arena. The limited mobilization 
potential of would be beneficiaries – not to mention their low electoral relevance –  limit 
their ability to organize and pressure political parties efficiently. However, the role of 
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social actors in the social assistance policy-making cannot be limited to group constituted 
by would be beneficiaries. In fact, relevant groups – in particular trade unions, faith-based 
organizations, third sector organizations and social movements – might support residual 
safety nets in order to broaden their constituencies and/or to increase their organizational 
resources. At the same time, those actors might have good reasons to oppose residual 
safety nets (Hien, 2014; Rueda, 2007). Depending on the strategic choices of interest groups 
the socio-political demand might be strong, weak, or only latent. The presence and the key 
features of the demand is a matter that has to be verified empirically rather than presumed 
theoretically.   
As for the supply side, we stressed that political preferences - especially in this policy field - 
are more diversified than outlined by traditional party politics literature, and therefore it 
would be too simplistic to assume left parties’ efforts to promote minimum income 
protection and opposition by conservatives.  To understand the political dynamics specific 
to this policy field, we propose to distinguish between moderate and fragmented pluralism. 
The former is characterized by the presence of only one political cleavage and limited 
relevance of within pole competition (Sartori, 1976). Conversely fragmented pluralism, 
which can be considered as a sort of heir of polarised pluralism (Sartori, 1976; 1982) in 
absence of anti-system party1, allows the emergence of additional cleavages, competition 
within the right and the left pole, and might be also characterized by the prevalence of 
centrifugal over centripetal drives. 
Against such backdrop, we contend that even though policy changes are moulded by a set 
of intervening factors (Mahoney, 2000), that make impossible to pre-determine 
mechanically the outcome of a policy making process, it appears possible to identify some 
plausible mechanisms – to be tested empirically – that might lead to the introduction and 
or expansion of Mis, or rather hinder its development, in the age of austerity.  
Three hypotheses emerge as particularly relevant. Firstly, the presence of a socio-political 
demand – be it strong or weak – is a necessary condition to have path departure and/or 
institutionalization, given the low electoral relevance of would-be beneficiaries. Secondly, 
the presence of a strong demand and moderate pluralism is very likely to bring path-
                                                          
1 Fragmented pluralism is therefore characterised by high fragmentation, a number of relevant 
parties above five, similarly to the polarised pluralism typology (Sartori, 1976).  
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departure and/or institutionalization, according to a non-contentious competitive credit 
claiming logic. Finally, the presence of a weak demand and fragmented pluralism should lead 
to path-departure / institutionalization or inertia / policy reversal depending on the 
government colour, following a contentious credit claiming logic. 
 
3. Research design, methodology and case selection 
In order to test those hypotheses, this work combines a cross-case comparison and within-
case observations, i.e. a broad comparative historical analysis of both Italy and Spain and a 
detailed process-oriented analysis of selected regional cases in the two Mediterranean 
countries.  
The choice of these two countries is based on a most similar systems research design. This 
strategy requires holding constant systemic characteristics while maximizing the variance 
of the specific factors that are considered relevant to explain the observed outcome 
(Lijphart, 1975, Przeworki and Teune, 1970). Italy and Spain are in fact relatively similar in 
many aspects that other theories use as explicatory factors: political history, socio-
economic conditions, labour market structure, welfare state model and institutional 
configuration of the social assistance system. 
Italy and Spain, together with Portugal and Greece, are very frequently associated in the 
welfare state literature for reasons that go well beyond geographical proximity. The 
cultural and political influence of the Catholic Church shaped both countries’ history, and 
continues nowadays to have a significant impact on Italian and Spanish societies as well as 
on everyday political life. Although there are signs that some of the “collective impulses” 
reflecting axiological and cultural dynamics are indeed separating Italy and Spain (Moreno 
and Marì-Klose, 2013), it is undeniable that the cultural bond between the two countries 
remains strong.  
In addition, both countries had a more or less recent experience of an authoritarian right 
wing regime: Spain from 1936 until 1975, and Italy from 1922 until 1943. Surely, despite the 
differences in the nature of the two regimes, in both countries dictatorship experiences 
have contributed to the construction of a corporatist system of social insurance and to the 
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very weak development of the social assistance sector. Both regimes have also 
intentionally promoted a family model based on a clear gender division of roles that will 
have long-lasting consequences for the life of both countries, as it will be frequently 
underlined throughout this work. According to Ferrera (1996), the authoritarian legacy has 
also undermined state capacity in Southern European countries, causing a low level of 
institutional autonomy of the administrative system with respect to the political system.   
The presence of an authoritarian regime is also associated with a phase of autarkic 
economy that contributed to the delayed process of economic modernization. In terms of 
economic models, in both countries full-scale industrialisation occurred later than in most 
of the other advanced economies. Back in the Fifties Italy and Spain were still 
predominantly based on the agricultural sector and self-employment, and the size of the 
informal and irregular market was comparable to that of a pre-modern economy, 
especially in some geographical areas. Territorial imbalances were present in both 
countries, with some pockets characterized by a remarkable industrial development. 
Despite this slow start, nowadays Italy and Spain are among the fifteen most economically 
developed countries in the world, and actually compete to be the fourth largest economies 
in the European Union.  
The tumultuous and compressed process of industrialization and economic growth of the 
Sixties – more accentuated in Italy than in Spain – contributed to the creation of production 
systems particularly fragmented and characterized by a strong divide between the large 
and the prevailing small-medium firms, the public and the private companies, and the 
most dynamic and the economically backwards part of the countries (Molina and Rhodes, 
2007), at least when compared with Continental and Nordic countries. Full employment 
has never really been achieved in neither country, and a sizeable part of the population has 
traditionally been either inactive or irregularly employed. In 1993, Spain and Italy had a 
comparatively low total activity rate – respectively 51,3% and 56% in 1993, at least ten 
points lower than France (65.9%), Germany (66,7%), the United Kingdom (70,1%) and 
Denmark (74%)2. Even though the employment rate increased through time – particularly 
in Spain - the gap with Continental and Northern countries has not been filled over the 
following twenty years: in 2011 the employment rate was 61,2% in Italy, in Spain 61,6%, in 
                                                          
2 When not specified otherwise, data come from Eurostat online database. 
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France 69,2%, Germany 76,3%, Denmark 75,7% and the United Kingdom 73,6%. Youth and 
women dramatically low levels of participation in the labour market - a phenomenon that 
further accentuated in recent years more in Italy than in Spain - contribute to explain this 
anomaly. 
The delayed industrialization combined with territorial differentiations, in addition to an 
originally restrictive employment regulation - which has been de-regulated over time, 
especially “at the margin” (Berton, Ricchiardi and Sacchi, 2012; Davidsson, 2011) - created 
the condition for segmenting the labour market in three different sectors: a) the regular, b) 
the peripheral and/ or atypical and c) the underground (Ferrera, 1996; Moreno, 2000; 
Jessoula et al., 2009). Working conditions and job security – not to mention entitlements to 
social benefit - differ extensively among these sectors. 
This development and the segmentation of the labour market are only to a certain extent 
able to explain another shared feature of the two countries: the particularly high level – in 
European perspective –of inequality and poverty. In 2013, both countries had a Gini Index 
above the OECD average, and only Greece, Portugal and United Kingdom in Europe were 
more unequal (OECD Online database). On average, in the last two decades relative 
poverty has been respectively 23% (SP) and 18,7% (IT), both higher than the EU 15 
average. High inequality is combined, especially in very recent times, with widespread 
extreme poverty. The severe poverty rate, an index constructed through setting the 
poverty line threshold at 40% of median equivalised income, was in 1995 equal to 8% in 
both countries - against a EU 15 average of 6% - twice as high as France and the United 
Kingdom. These differences slightly declined until the Great Recession, but are now back 
to be quite consistent: in 2014, the severe poverty rate was equal to 8.7% in Italy and 10.6% 
in Spain, against a EU 28 average of 6.3%. Data definitely show a common trend affecting 
both countries in the last twenty years: a relevant share of the population suffers economic 
distress, and the social protection system is unable to provide for increasing social needs.  
In terms of the welfare model, the comparative welfare state literature tends to include 
Italy and Spain in the same welfare regime. In the Nineties a wide debate existed among 
scholars on whether those countries were some sort of “late-comers” within the 
conservative-corporatist regime (Esping-Andersen, 1990; 1999) or if they constituted, 
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together with Greece and Portugal, a distinct type of welfare regime (Ferrera, 1996; 
Moreno and Sarasa, 1996; Rhodes, 1997). Even if most scholars nowadays have recognised 
the existence of a Southern European model, controversies persist on the defining traits of 
this regime (Ferrera, 2010; Gal, 2010; Guillén and Leon, 2012). Most agree on a set of 
distinctive features: the relevance of familism; the presence of a generational bias; the 
existence of a highly fragmented income maintenance system characterized by peaks of 
generosity and coverage gaps; universalism in the health care sector; the very weak 
development of the social assistance sector. Still, the question on whether these countries 
are also characterized by an inefficient public administration and diffused clientelistic 
practices divides Southern European scholars.  
Despite the intellectual relevance of this discussion, the fact that Italy and Spain have a 
relatively similar social assistance model is the crucial trait in order to minimize the within 
case variance, meaning that political actors moved in a set of very similar constraints and 
opportunities. Scholars agree that, at the end of the Eighties, this policy field constituted 
the weakest area of the social protection architecture and it presented very similar 
comparative peculiarities in both countries (Eardley et al., 1996; Gough, 1996; Bonoli, 1997; 
Ferrera et al., 2005). As it is widely explained in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, social assistance 
models in Italy and Spain at the end of the Eighties were characterized by fragmentation 
and absence of a framework law providing coherence to the system; limited and 
territorially differentiated development of social services; the absence of a fully-fledged 
minimum income scheme for the entire working age population. Anti-poverty safety nets 
existed exclusively at the local level, provided on a discretionary basis and with great 
territorial differentiation, and confined to those cases where the extended family – the 
primary network of solidarity - was not able to fulfil its role as a social safety net. In both 
countries the family played a fundamental subsidiary role as a social “shock absorber” 
(Naldini, 2002). Women’s responsibility of guaranteeing care for the weaker members of 
society – children, dependent adults and the elderly – combined with their growing 
participation in the labour market even led some scholars to talk about the “Mediterranean 
superwoman” (Moreno, 2004). Other similarities between the two models include the 
frequently recognized dominant role of catholic organizations and the Church in 
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providing social assistance (Ascoli and Pavolini, 1999; Guillén, 2010; Moreno, 2000; 
Naldini, 2002). 
Also, the institutional architecture of the social assistance sector presented similar 
peculiarities. Over the last 35 years Spain and Italy went from being unitary, centralized 
countries to becoming highly decentralized ones in which sub-national units play an 
essential role in the provision of public services and take up a significant share of public 
revenues (Del Pino and Pavolini, 2015). Despite differences in timing and in the political 
nature of this decentralization processes, when regional safety nets where introduced the 
allocation of social policy responsibilities across levels shared many common features. The 
bulk of social insurance provisions, including the pension system and unemployment 
benefits, rested strongly in the hands of the central government. Conversely, social policies 
with a strong component of service provision, such as health care, active labour market 
and social services, were largely in the hands of the sub-national units. As for minimum 
income protection, in both countries the national level neither established a legislative 
framework, nor it introduced specific funds devoted to the creation of a regional system, 
thus leaving open to the regions the possibility to legislate in the field. 
Spain and Italy are similar in many regards but they also exhibit interesting variations on 
the key variables addressed by this study: party system and interest group – state 
relationship (see Chapter 4). The Italian party system, despite frequent transformations, 
was characterized in the period under consideration by fragmentation and centrifugal 
drives, whereas the Spanish party system featured a moderate pattern of competition and 
a level of fragmentation among the lowest in Europe. As for concertation, in the last 
twenty years a divided trade unions movement and confrontational relationship with the 
government characterized Italy, but not Spain.  
However, the comparative design is complicated by within case variation: in both 
countries innovative anti-poverty measures were introduced at the regional level, and 
with great territorial variation. Therefore, a broad comparative historical analysis of Italy 
and Spain is supported by a detailed process-oriented analysis of four selected regional 
cases. This case study approach entails the selection of few cases over a larger population 
of cases. 
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The regional selected cases are Friuli Venezia Giulia and Lazio in Italy, and Castile and 
Léon and the Community of Madrid. Case selection is driven by an appreciation of their 
relevance for the specific set of hypotheses previously introduced (George and Bennet, 
2005). Three criteria drove the selection choice. Firstly, the research focuses in particular on 
positive cases where the phenomenon – in this case, path-departure and the introduction 
of regional minimum income schemes – is present. This strategy, often criticized by 
quantitative scholars as selecting on the dependent variable, is conversely a quite common 
and legitimate research strategy in case oriented research (Della Porta, 2008; Mahoney and 
Goertz, 2006).  This criterion was not very restrictive in Spain, where all the CAs had 
introduced a regional safety net. For Italy, since only few regions introduced a Mis - 
Basilicata, Campania, Friuli Venezia Giulia, Puglia, Sardegna, Trentino Alto Adige and 
Valle d’Aosta (see Chapter 1) – case selection was restricted among these few regions.  
Secondly, cases are chosen in order to maintain the variance as limited as possible; i.e. case 
selection was driven by the effort to delineate the “typical” Italian and Spanish regional 
cases, mirroring the similarities and differences outlined above with respect to the national 
level.  For this reason, cases characterized by stronger regional cleavages and therefore 
specific patterns of political competition dynamics – such as the Basque Country, Navarra, 
Catalonia, Valle d'Aosta and Trentino Alto Adige – were not considered. For the same 
reason, regions characterized by a very strong problem pressure, i.e. a relative poverty 
well above national average, were not analysed in depth.  
Finally, this work is particularly interested in the different role played by right wing 
parties in the anti-poverty field in Italy and Spain. For those reasons, have been privileged 
cases where right wing parties were in power at a crucial moment, such as that of the 
introduction, institutionalization or conversely the abrogation of regional Mis. For this 
reason, Friuli Venezia Giulia, Lazio, Castile and Léon and the Community of Madrid were 
considered the best possible choices: they are all regions where regional safety nets were 
introduced, with poverty rates below or in line with national average, ruled during the 
period under consideration also by a centre-right party and with regional party systems 
mirroring the characteristics of the national party systems. 
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In these four regions, this thesis conducts a detailed process tracing of the policy making 
process concerning minimum income protection. This method is considered particularly 
suited to identifying the sequencing of events, the causal chains that link possible causes 
and observed outcomes in a particular historical context (George and Bennet, 2005; 
Steinmo, 2008). For this reason, it appears as the best methodological choice in order to test 
whether the hypothesized mechanisms contribute to explain the policy trajectories of 
regional minimum income schemes in the selected cases.  
Qualitative evidence is drawn from a variety of sources: parliamentary archives, 
publications, national and local newspapers, and a very broad number of interviews with 
experts and policy makers. More precisely, beyond the consultation of parliamentary 
archives in all four different regions and an extensive reading of all the documentation and 
regional evaluations over Mis, local newspapers have been consulted focusing on the 
period previous to the adoption of relevant legislation in all four regional cases. In the four 
regions were conducted forty-four interviews with government, key experts, parties and 
trade unions representatives. Furthermore, for the Italian case I took part in fifteen 
interviews realized under the supervision of Pr. Madama in the framework of the 
European Project Combating Poverty in Europe to national political actors and 
stakeholders (Madama et al., 2013), which have deepened my knowledge of the national 
dynamics in this specific field. As for the Spanish case, Profesor Ana Arriba was kind 
enough to allow me to consult her extraordinary archive of interviews realized for her 
Ph.D. thesis (Arriba, 1999) and for subsequent projects.  
Qualitative analysis has many strengths, but it is unable to adequately assess the external 
validity of a theory. Therefore, the aim of this research is not to provide a grand theory 
able to explain the introduction and the institutionalization (or vice versa, policy reversal) 
of minimum income schemes across space and time. Its main purpose is to to explain 
policy trajectories of regional minimum income schemes in Lazio, Friuli Venezia Giulia, 
Castile and Leon and in the Community of Madrid. This allows us to formulate 
hypotheses on the politics of minimum income protection in Italy and Spain that might 
contribute to the overall debate over the politics of needs-based policy in the age of 
austerity. However, we are well aware that the wider relevance of the generalizations 
made should be controlled through further research. 
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4. An overview of the work 
In order to answer the two major questions outlined above, the remainder of the 
dissertation is structured as follows. The first part of the thesis provides with an overall 
description of the key features of the minimum income protection model in Italy and 
Spain. More precisely, Chapter 2 describes social assistance in Italy since the origins until 
the present day, underlining the internal fragmentation and comparative weaknesses, with 
a particular focus on the so called season of regional innovations (Lumino and Morlicchio, 
2013), i.e. the introduction of innovative anti-poverty programs at the sub-national level. 
Chapter 3 provides reconstructs the essential features of the Spain social assistance model, 
from the early days of the Ley General de Beneficiencia (General Law on Charity) in 1822 
until the institutionalization of a regional minimum income system. Chapter 4 set the 
theoretical framework of all the dissertation. After putting into question the explicatory 
ability of the main theories of social policy reforms for the minimum income protection 
field, it introduces an innovative analytical framework to interpret the policy evolution of 
minimum income scheme based on the concept of political exchange (Stoppino, 2001). 
Chapter 5 characterizes the Italian and Spanish political system, underlying the main 
features of the respective party system and of the system of interest representation. The 
central part of this dissertation consists of a theoretically grounded empirical analysis of 
the policy trajectories of regional minimum income schemes in Italy and Spain. Chapter 6 
focuses on the Basic Citizenship Income in Friuli Venezia Giulia and on the Guaranteed 
Minimum Income in Lazio, while Chapter 7 on the regional Mis in Castile and Léon and in 
the Community of Madrid.  Finally, Chapter 8 presents the main result in a comparative 
perspective and discusses their implication for welfare state research. The thesis than 
concludes with a discussion of the political implication of this work, and with the 
theoretical and empirical issues to be addressed in a future research agenda. 
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Chapter 2   
Minimum Income Protection in Italy 
 
 
1 Introduction 
The Italian welfare state combines a hypertrophic occupational pension and 
unemployment compensation system with a citizenship-based national health insurance, 
and a very weak state intervention in the field of social assistance, countervailed by the 
relevance of the family in guaranteeing the wellbeing of its members and by the 
historically established role of the Catholic Church in the sphere of charity.  
Against this background, minimum income protection traditionally had a marginal role. 
Following the Bismarckian path, the Italian welfare state has been structured in order to 
protect, mainly on a contributory basis, male breadwinner workers and their families from 
the typical risks of an industrial society, with implicit reference to a family model based on 
a sharp gender division of roles. Over time, the Italian welfare state expanded extensively 
and, with the exception of the health sector that since the Seventies has had universal 
coverage, mainly along this path. Nowadays, total expenditure as a percentage of GDP 
does not diverge substantially from other European Countries - in 2012 (29%) it was 
slightly above the EU 28 average, though inferior compared to France or Denmark. Yet, as 
figure 1 shows, most social expenditure was absorbed by the function "old age and 
survivors” (59.2% of the total, against a European average of 44.5%), whereas a limited 
share is devoted to other risks and functions.  Key functions as unemployment, family and 
children, and poverty and social exclusion are significantly under-financed and limited in 
their scope.  
These data point at the functional distortion that characterises the Italian welfare state. A 
second distortion characterizing the Italian model – the so-called distributive distortion - 
concerns the protection gap between “insiders” and “outsiders”, who are unemployed (or 
employed in the informal economy) and thus excluded from the social protection system 
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(Ferrera, 2006). The enduring absence of a fully-fledged minimum income scheme 
contributes to fuel both these distortions. 
  
Figure 1 Expenditure by function (%) of total social expenditure, Italy – Eu28, 2012 
 
 Source: Eurostat online database 
Countervailing the low relevance of the State in the field of minimum income protection 
and social services, on the basis of the principle of subsidiarity, families carry almost 
exclusively the burden of caring for their members, and are ultimately responsible for their 
wellbeing (Esping-Andersen, 1999, Naldini, 2002, Saraceno, 2002). Public intervention is 
therefore confined to cases in which primary networks of solidarity prove to be unable to 
respond to those needs, meaning that the extended family "fails" in fulfilling its role as a 
social safety net.  
This chapter provides a general perspective on the Italian minimum income protection 
system, focusing on the origins and the development of state policies concerning 
individuals in condition of poverty and social exclusion. Anti-poverty measures are 
analysed for three distinct historical phases. The main social innovations introduced in 
Italy from national unification to the end of the fascist regime are analysed in the following 
paragraphs. As it will be revealed, this take-off period will have enduring consequences on 
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the fragmented and territorially divided system of social assistance in Italy. The second 
period analysed covers the so-called Italian First Republic (1948 – 1992), characterized by a 
decisive growth of social expenditure for contribution-based social insurance measures, 
especially in the field of pensions, and a much lesser pronounced expansion of targeted 
benefits for the working age population. The final part of the chapter deals with the 
evolution of this policy sector in the last two decades (1992 – 2014), a period in which anti-
poverty measures gained more salience in the policy debate and some policy innovations 
were introduced both at the national and at the regional levels. The fourth paragraph 
focuses on the national level, where we observe an incoherent trajectory made of steps 
going forth and back, with several innovative programs being introduced as pilot schemes 
and never becoming fully institutionalized in the Italian welfare architecture (so far). The 
fifth paragraph delineates similar developments of this policy area at the regional level, 
where the introduction of the national pilot scheme in 1998 constituted an institutional 
seed that in some contexts was gathered - albeit with extensive heterogeneity. In many 
cases, however, regional Mis were short-term experiences rapidly discontinued with the 
change of colour of the regional government. Finally, in the last paragraph, a general 
overlook of the Italian income protection model is combined with an assessment of its 
(low) ability to efficiently protect individuals and families at higher risk of poverty and 
social exclusion. 
 
2.The origins of a weak and fragmented model 
Social assistance has been traditionally a policy sector largely neglected by Italian policy- 
makers. Counterbalancing the low investment of the State in this sector, from its origins, 
however, Italy’s social assistance system has found support in the extensive network of 
private charities, particularly those of the Church.  In the early XIX century, essentially 
three forms and channels of assistance to the poor co-existed in the Italian states (as 
elsewhere in Catholic Europe): municipally funded institutional support; the traditional 
charity of the Opere Pie; and private philanthropies to individuals and families (Stuart 
Wolf, 2000). The ubiquity and the financial resources of the Opera Pie constituted a 
particular characteristic of the Italian territories compared to elsewhere in Europe, 
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including the Catholic France and the Catholic German states. Around 1861, it is estimated 
that there were more than 17,000 opere pie with an annual income equivalent to one sixth 
of the entire Italian state budget (Gozzini, 2000).  
Political unification created no rupture in the charitable system of the former Italian states, 
strongly characterized by the intangibility of the opera pie and dominant role played by the 
Catholic Church, while the central state maintained a secondary role. Law n. of 1862 
limited State control to formal supervision of the economic patrimonies of the opera pie, 
explicitly renouncing any intention of influencing the uses of this vast care institutions. 
Private charity remained the centrepiece of the system, peculiar legacy of the historical 
presence of the Catholic Church in Italy and of the long-standing influence of charity in 
Italian society: practices and rituals of exchange between gift and deference were 
particularly important to maintain social balances (Fargion, 1997, Gozzini, 2000). 
Furthermore, they constitute important sources of power and consent for local elites 
(Stuart Wolf, 2000). 
Alongside these traditional “spontaneous” forms of intervention to mitigate poverty, 
legislative actions in several Italian cities imposed the prohibition and repression of 
begging, up to the forced confinement of “the poor and lazy”.  In Italy as in the rest of 
European countries, social assistance policies in XIX century combine a paternalistic 
approach typical of pre-industrial authoritarian societies with segregating and repressive 
elements. After all, social assistance was still mostly seen as an instrument of social 
regulation, aimed at suppressing and preventing cases of deviance rather than answering 
to solidarity and individual support purposes (cfr. Ferrera and Madama, 2006). 
In absence of a strong intervention of the central state, territorial imbalances constituted a 
defining characteristic of social assistance in Italy in the late XIX century. As shown in 
Table 1, private charities and Opere Pie were in fact more diffused in some geographical 
areas than in others. It is estimated that the value of real estate assets of the charitable 
organizations was 1.126 billion liras in Northern Italy, compared to 341 and 430 
respectively in Central and Southern Italy (Fargion, 1997).  
Furthermore, most municipal charities were situated in Northern Italy (table 1). The model 
of local government finance adopted by the new Italian state contributed to maintain 
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initial territorial heterogeneity intact (Battilani, 2000). While the central State in fact tried to 
standardize local competences, on the revenue side it opted for fiscal decentralization, 
requiring municipalities to finance expenditure mainly through tariffs on consumption 
and land tax (cfr. Battilani, 2000). Lacking any form of (fiscal) equalization scheme between 
the different regions of the country, the richest areas were therefore able to guarantee 
greater municipal expenditure, which overlapped the equally relevant territorial 
differentiation in the services provided by private institutions (Table 1). 
Tab. 1 Spending in Lire pro capita on social assistance, 1880, private and public entities 
Region Opere Pie 
(1880) 
Municipalities 
(1880) 
Mutual Aid Funds 
(1878) 
Total 
Piemonte 3,49 1,24 0,33 5,06 
Liguria 3,25 2,02 0,05 5,32 
Lombardia 3,48 2,40 0,14 6,03 
Veneto  1,57 2,62 0,08 4,28 
Emilia – 
Romagna 
3,17 2,54 0,13 5,84 
Toscana 1,83 2,62 0,08 4,28 
Marche 1,97 2,32 0,09 4,38 
Umbria 2,28 2,19 0,10 4,57 
Roma 2,99 2,35 0,05 5,39 
Abruzzi e 
Molise 
0,48 0,85 0,01 1,34 
Campania 2,69 1,28 0,03 3,99 
Puglia 0,93 1,29 0,02 2,24 
Basilicata 0,39 1,11 0,00 1,09 
Calabria 0,22 1,00 0,01 1,22 
Sicilia 1,34 1,11 0,02 2,47 
Sardegna 0,57 0,69 0,02 1,29 
Source: Battilani, 2000 
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In the last two decades of the nineteenth century, “the social question” entered the political 
agenda also in Italy, becoming object of the first concrete legislative actions. In 1883 a 
National Accident Insurance was introduced, followed in 1898 by old age and disability 
voluntary insurances, limited exclusively to (low income) employees.  As for the social 
assistance sector, the most important legislative intervention - that will have long lasting 
effects constituting the reference law for this policy field until the year 2000 - is constituted 
by Law No. 69772 of 1890, the so-called Crispi law. This law introduced public control and 
uniform discipline for bodies that provided assistance and charity, attempting to convert 
the Opere Pie in Public institutions of charity (Ipab)3. The Crispi law, however, still guided 
by paternalism and social control aims, did not change significantly the configuration of 
the social assistance sector. Firstly, because the State did not assume any financial 
commitment to play at least a subsidiarity role in this policy sector. In particular, the 
failure to envisage any form of direct public intervention and the absence of funding 
equalization mechanism did not allow to solve the problem of territorial differentiation. 
Secondly, because the innovative part of this legislation were rarely and very slowly 
implemented, meaning that for the most part it has been translated into a simple 
outsourcing of social assistance to private charities, and in particular to the Catholic 
Church (Battilani, 2000).  As the Constitutional Court later underlined, the generalized 
public regime regulating the Church Charities, if read in a historical perspective, served 
the purpose of “constituting a system of ‘legal charity’ that otherwise would have been 
wholly lacking” (Sent. no. 396/1988) (cfr. Madama, 2010). Therefore, the Crispi law and the 
subsequent regulations that followed until the First World War decreed the decentralized 
aspect of the nascent Italian welfare state, attributing de facto to municipalities and private 
charities competence over social assistance policies, and leaving to the state an exclusively 
regulative function (Battilani, 2000, Fargion, 1997 Madama, 2010).  
The World War highlighted the inadequacy of the Italian social assistance system. 
Increasing unemployment and a general deterioration of work and life conditions of large 
sections of the population, as well as a decline in health and hygiene conditions, 
characterized in fact the war and the immediate post-war period. In this new socio-
                                                          
3 The new law sought above all to strengthen financial controls, affirm the public liability of 
directors, and promote the concentration of charitable institutions having similar purposes. 
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economic context, on one side public intervention was highly insufficient, and on the other 
Charities and mutual aid associations lacked resources and structures to tackle effectively 
this emergency situation. In response to these deficiencies, from 1917 onwards we observe 
the introduction of centralized institutions dedicated to specific categories of needy, such 
as the National Opera for war invalids (1917) and the National Opera for fighters (1918), 
prototypes of national social assistance bodies that would arise during the fascist period 
(cfr. Madama, 2010).  
The immediate post war years constitute crucial years for the nascent Italian welfare state. 
In 1919 compulsory social insurances against the risk of disability, old age and 
unemployment, were introduced in a context characterized by great social mobilization, 
but also the extension of the suffrage and proportional representation, which guaranteed 
the inclusion of the Socialists and the Catholics in the parliamentary arena. For the first 
time therefore, the creation and extension of social rights in Italy cannot be described as a 
concession on the part of the élites but rather as a response to bottom up pressures and the 
outcome of competitive democratic dynamics (Ferrera et al., 2012).   
Under the fascist regime (1922–43), social policies acquired greater importance both as a 
goal and as a vehicle of the regime. Important measures were introduced mainly in the 
social insurance field, the social policy sector best expressing the corporatist traits of the 
regime. As for social assistance, the state increased its presence setting up many public 
institutions while still allowing the Church much room for manoeuvre (cfr. Sacchi, 2005, 
Fargion, 1997). In 1925 the National Authority for Motherhood and Childhood was 
established, the most relevant public body in this policy sector, instrumental for the 
demographic policies, which became one of the great symbols of the rhetoric of the regime. 
This was soon followed by the establishment of numerous other highly centralized 
entities, each of them taking care of specific categories of needy.  
The economic crisis of 1929 helped create the conditions for the establishment of an 
additional sphere of action of parastatal nature in the assistance realm, directly sponsored 
by the National Fascist Party. The EOA (Enti opere Assistenziali, National Charitable 
Authorities), collateral structures of the Party, become in a few months the organizing 
centre of a series of measures aimed at tackling the unrestrained unemployment. It 
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provided subsidies in cash or kind to the unemployed, benefits which were however 
conditional to holding a special certificate provided by the party and to “be available” to 
work for semi-free to the construction of houses and sport leisure’s (Fargion, 2012). Official 
statistics reveal that in 1934 EOA had more than 2.88 million recipients; more than the 
beneficiaries of the unemployment insurance of the time. As stressed by Fargion (2012), 
the path taken by the regime allowed to cope with an emergency situation at much lower 
cost compared to any social insurance scheme, as discretionary and optional measures do 
not trigger mechanisms of automatic expansion. Furthermore, EOA discretionary benefits 
allowed exercising a tight control on the welfare state by the Party, and guaranteed the 
availability of cheap labour in case of specific needs.  Finally, in 1937, with l. n. 843, Local 
Body of Assistance (ECA) were introduced in all municipalities, with general care 
functions – to help the poor, orphans, abandoned children, the blind and the deaf-mute 
poor – with a complementary role to the Ipab. The most important aspect of the measure, 
however, resided in introducing a compulsory surtax to be applied to most state, 
provincial and municipal taxes: this additional tax in fact represented the first formal 
obligation to fund public social assistance (Madama, 2012). 
In addition to this undeniable quantitative and institutional expansion, fascism impressed 
therefore to the Italian welfare state some traits that would have deeply influenced its 
future development. Firstly, the expansion was pursued through a dense layering of 
different legislation that differed punctiliously entitlements among various occupational 
groups, even around micro categorical lines, setting the stage for the particularistic and 
clientelistic welfare state that would have then developed and intensified after the war 
(Ferrera, 1984, Preti and Venturoli, 2000).  Furthermore, it is precisely under fascism that a 
family model characterized by a clear gender division of roles was established; the 
limitation of female participation to the labor market and the consequent assumption by 
women of a domestic function, which allowed to limit male unemployment and to 
compensate for the deficiencies of the public social services system (Gaeta, 1996). 
Summarizing, the analysis of anti-poverty interventions from unification until the Second 
World War, helps identify some of the characterizing traits of this policy area and the 
policy legacy confronting the nascent Italian Republic. Firstly, we observe a constant use of 
the care sector for purposes that have little to do with the solution of social needs (cfr. 
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Fargion, 1997). The development of this policy sector is deeply affected by the need to 
maintain a delicate balance with the Catholic Church or even, in an increasingly 
exasperated (and systematic) way during the fascist regime, to maintain public order and 
guarantee political consensus. The preservation of discretionary mechanisms to access to 
benefits and services, however, precludes the system to overcome its original charitable 
setting (cfr. Fargion, 1997, Negri and Saraceno, 1996). Secondly, at the organizational level, 
we observe a great pulverization of public and private bodies involved in the field. At the 
forefront there was the plethora of Ipab, which provided assistance to different groups of 
patients depending on resources availability. A number of public institutions at the local 
level flanks these institutions, while the central state maintained a residual role (cfr. 
Madama, 2012). 
 
3 The role of means-tested provisions during the Golden Age 
After the fall of the fascist regime, the Constitution became the new reference point for the 
structuring of the social policies of the Italian Republic. Over the next thirty years, also due 
to strong economic growth after the war and the social dividend that generated, there was, 
in Italy as in the rest of Europe, a progressive development of the welfare state. In Italy, 
welfare state expansion displayed a clear Bismarkian imprints; benefits were broadly 
contributions related and differentiated among occupational groups and categories. 
In the field of social assistance, art. 38 of the Italian Constitution stated that “every citizen 
unable to work and without the necessary means to live has the right to maintenance and 
welfare”. These provisions were at last implemented for the two decades after the end of 
the Second World War, when social assistance continued to be patchily provided by a 
plethora of public institutions at the national and local level, flanked by private and 
Catholic Church-based charities. As for combating poverty, a 1952 law established pension 
minima and related pension supplements. This is a benefit granted to beneficiaries of an 
earnings-related pension aimed at topping their pension benefit up to a statutory 
minimum. It is therefore an hybrid measures, that while subordinating access to 
contribution requirement, aims to ensure minimal resources to beneficiaries.  In the late 
1960s the most relevant Italian safety nets were introduced, the social pension (1969) and 
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the disability pension (1971), targeted respectively to poor elderly and disabled, without 
sufficient contributions to be entitled to the more generous insurance-based benefits. 
“Inability” was thus interpreted as a fragment in its own right and decomposed in 
disability (physical and mental) total or partial, and in old age (for individuals over sixty-
five), while the legislators did not introduce a scheme that protected from poverty as such 
(Pizzolato, 2004). 
In order to fully capture the main features of the Italian system of income support, one has 
to consider the underdevelopment of family benefits too. If social care services have 
resulted to be very poorly developed, also on the side of cash transfer Italy lagged behind. 
The main scheme of income support for families (Assegno al nucleo familiare) was in fact 
informed by a social insurance principle. Introduced during the fascist regime, in the 
postwar period this policy measure underwent several transformations, but following the 
same evolutionary lines: extreme diversification of benefits according to different 
occupational regimes (Fargion, 2012). Moreover, only a marginal importance was 
attributed to family allowances: in 1980 public expenditure for family policies were about 
seven times lower than pension expenditures, one of the widest gaps recorded in 
European countries (Ferrera 1984). Since 1983 family allowances are means tested, 
representing therefore an intervention for purposes of income support addressed to the 
weaker sections of the population, while keeping the contribution requirements that since 
1988 limited the access to cover only employees or retired former employees. Family 
allowances were thus not conceived as universalistic, tax-financed benefits related to 
children burdens, being rather considered as wage supplements, financed through social 
contributions, for employed, unemployed individuals (just if covered by insurance-based 
unemployment benefits) and retired dependent workers only4.  
The national framework to combat poverty and social exclusion appears therefore 
particularly fragmented in Italy. In the legislation implementing the Constitution have 
thus multiplied policies that certainly, in some way, protected from poverty, but never as 
such; the latter resulted in fact always coupled to some other factor (family, age, 
contributory, physical...) of social disadvantage; for this reason, experts have often spoken 
of implicit policies against poverty (Negri and Saraceno, 1996; Sacchi, 2007). To qualify for 
                                                          
4 Only in 1998 also the contract workers will have access to this measure. 
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minimum income protection benefits, an individual must belong to a “protected” category 
in the first instance, and then must pass the means-test. 
The absence of general, tax financed, non-contributory minimum income scheme was one 
of the peculiar features of the underdeveloped Italian social assistance regime, which was 
also characterized by the lack of a national regulatory framework and, as a consequence, 
by a high territorial variation in terms of benefits, beneficiaries and generosity. Actually, 
when ordinary regions were set up in 1970, the administrative responsibility for social 
assistance was decentralised to regions and municipalities, while the State retained 
responsibilities for insurance-based schemes. It has to be noted, in this policy field, 
decentralisation was not accompanied by the definition of guiding principles or general 
standards to be fulfilled by the local and regional levels of government in performing their 
functions. It was simply established that these principles and standards would have been 
fixed by a national law (the first since the legge Crispi of 1890) that would have set out the 
framework of regulations for the other levels of government.  
However, the national social assistance framework law was approved only many years 
later (L.328 of 2000), thus leaving regions much room for manoeuvre and a greater 
autonomy than in other policy sectors. Lacking binding provisions, regional governments - 
sometimes even the municipalities - have structured their welfare system following 
different logics, linked to the social demand expressed in the area but also to political 
sensitivity, institutional capacity and financial constraints.  
In this highly fragmented context, in some local contexts, such as in Turin in 1978 in 
Ancona in 1981, Catania in 1983 and Milan in 1989, the absence of a national minimum 
income scheme was partially overcome by the provision of non-categorical means-tested 
benefit known as minimo vitale. Territorial heterogeneity was very relevant, and many 
other large and important municipalities - such as Bari or Rome - had not introduced those 
policy measures. It has been calculated that in 1990 only 59,9% of Italian municipalities 
provided economic benefits to (poor) families (Negri and Saraceno, 1996). Lacking a 
general framework, even in pioneering municipalities schemes varied greatly with respect 
to eligibility rules, benefit amount and degree of administrative discretion in according the 
benefit. Moreover, the actual payment of the benefit depended on the availability of 
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financial resources within local budgets. It could therefore happen that when the economic 
cycle was particularly negative and therefore the need for financial support increased, 
municipalities did not have enough resources to guarantee these interventions (Bosi, 
Ferrera and Saraceno 1997; Kazepov 1996). 
The high variability emerged from this framework is clearly shown by regional social 
expenditure per capita, which in the Nineties varied from 21.000 liras in Calabria to 
124.000 in Emilia Romagna. Differences in spending faithfully reflected wide differences in 
the availability of local schemes of income support and social care services (Cies, 1997), a 
situation that still characterizes Italy. Moreover, the prolonged absence of a framework law 
on social assistance has resulted in a sprawl of actors and policies not integrated and 
neither coordinated, generating an unequal and inefficient social assistance system (cfr. 
Madama, 2006, p. 260). 
Summarising, at the national level counterbalancing the absence of a comprehensive 
reform of social assistance intervention we observe a progressive proliferation of measures 
of strictly categorical nature, while public assistance continued to play a marginal role; at 
regional and local level developed in an uncoordinated fashion, leading to a system of 
social assistance in which citizens are entitled to benefits that vary considerably and that 
depend not so much on the situation of need per se but, rather, on the place in which the 
person in need lives (Sacchi and Bastagli, 2005). 
 
4 Italian minimum income protection between path departure and policy 
reversal (1992 -2006) 
4.1 The reforms of the Nineties 
As it has been reconstructed in the previous pages, the historical evolution of social 
assistance policies in Italy until the beginning of the Nineties had originated a sector 
marked by a series of endogenous problems which undermined both its efficiency and its 
effectiveness (Madama, 2010). Most notably, public intervention in the field of combating 
poverty and social exclusion was characterized by the lack of an inclusive and organic 
minimum income scheme, while local social services were plagued by the lack of resources 
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and the absence of a legislative framework at national level able to define minimum 
standards for the whole country (Negri and Saraceno, 1996). 
At the national level, the absence of a general framework for combating poverty was partly 
mitigated by the provision of a number of categorical measures addressed to specific social 
groups, as Pension Supplements, Social Pension, Invalidity Pension and Family 
Allowances. In the mid-Nineties more than 80% of the total expenditure for social 
assistance was absorbed by old age and disability function, reproducing in the social 
assistance sector the functional distortion that characterized the Italian welfare state as a 
whole.  
The categorical measures existing in Italy showed a further limitation: they were inefficient 
in terms of vertical redistribution, and not very effective in reducing the poverty risk 
(Madama, 2012). Those schemes had distributive efficiency below 60%, which meant that 
more than 40% of the resources spent on each of them went to families that were above the 
poverty line already before the transfers (Baldini and Toso, 2002). The effectiveness in 
reducing the poverty rate thus was contained: for example, it is calculated that Invalidity 
Pension and Social Pension reduced the poverty risk of 0.2 points (Madama, 2012). 
Furthermore, in absence of an intervention countervailing poverty as such, and not 
associated with further categorical requirements, existing measures were very often 
improperly used. In particular, disability pensions become a sort of functional equivalent 
of a broader anti-poverty policy and very often also exploited for particularistic and 
clientelistic exchange (Ferrera, 1984, 1996), increasing among the élites, the bureaucracy 
and lately also among the population the perceived risk of managing means-tested 
benefits in Italy. 
The severe shortcomings of the allocation of public expenditure on social protection in 
Italy, and in particular its skewed distribution in favour of the elderly and of the insiders 
due to work-based eligibility, and its inability to provide an effective safety net for those 
most in need, for a long time have not even been not considered dysfunctional in Italy 
(Madama, 2010). Indeed, a wide debate over the imbalances of the Italian welfare states 
and the underdevelopment of social assistance and family policy emerged indeed in 1996, 
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when the first centre-left government of the Second Republic led by Romano Prodi made 
the “recalibration” of the Italian welfare state a political priority. 
The following year it nominated a commission of study, the “Onofri Commission” 
(Commission for the analysis of the macroeconomic compatibilities of social expenditure) - 
composed by leading Italian scholars of welfare studies such as Maurizio Ferrera – with 
the ambitious mandate of formulating proposals to reform the Italian welfare state within 
the twin constraints posed by the early EMU participation and that the level of taxation 
and social contributions were considered already sufficiently high. Influenced by the 
inputs coming from the European arena (Jessoula and Alti, 2010) this Commission made a 
clear diagnosis of the weaknesses of the social assistance sector, and at the same time 
advanced a series of proposals to overcome them. On the side of failures, the Commission 
included a notable institutional fragmentation, together with policy overlapping, greater 
emphasis on monetary transfers at the expenses of in kind services, marked territorial 
differentiation and the lack of a social safety net for the economically excluded. Turning to 
remedies, the Commission recommended an increase in expenditure and a rationalisation 
of interventions, a greater emphasis on services in kind in particular in the areas of long-
term care and child care, and the introduction of a minimum income scheme. 
As a result of the debate created by the publication of the works of the Commission, a 
number of innovative measures were adopted in this period. To rationalize the sector were 
introduced two measure. On the side of expenditure, it was established a National Fund 
for Social Policy that should have allowed to overcome the ineffective multiple lines of 
financing that characterized those policies for decades. On the side of selection criteria, it 
was introduced the Economic Situation Indicator (ISE), a new means-test indicator that in 
the intention of the legislator should have finally provided for a unique “gate” for those 
applying to social assistance benefits. 
Improving selection criteria for determining eligibility was regarded as a precondition to 
move towards the innovative principle of selective universalism, according to which 
eligibility to social assistance benefits has to be conditional on citizenship and need only 
(Ferrera 2000). In that direction three new means-tested schemes are worth of mention: the 
allowance to families with more than three children, the maternity allowance for low 
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income mothers not covered by employment-based benefits, and a special social fund for 
supporting low income tenants. However, the two most promising innovation of this 
period were the launch in 1998 of “Minimum insertion income” (Mii) pilot scheme (see 
next paragraph), and the approval of the social assistance framework law in 2000 (L. 328). 
The latter was the first law to provide a regulatory framework to the social assistance 
sector in a comprehensive manner since the introduction of the Crispi Law on 1890. This 
law defined a systematic multi-level model of governance, involving the central state – 
with a regulatory and a supervisory role – regions, and municipalities, and it foresaw a 
new coordination with the third sector5. It also defined the process whereby uniform basic 
standard of public provision and coverage levels should be granted over the whole 
national country. Furthermore, the law entailed a remarkable relaunch of social services 
and the reduction of territorial differences through the establishment of ‘essential level of 
service’ standardized throughout the country. Among the essential level the Law 328/2000 
included the right to a minimum income protection, thus implicitly assuming the 
extension of the Mii to the whole country. The full realization of the programmatic goal of 
the framework law would have implied a great investment and a significant expenditure 
increase in this policy field. At the same time, it would have allowed to overcome most of 
the historical inefficiencies of this policy sector. 
 
4.2. The experimentation of the Minimum Insertion Income 
The Mii, introduced with the Decree Law 237/1998, was designed as a universal and non-
categorical measure targeted to people with an income below a pre-defined poverty 
threshold, and consisted of two elements: a cash transfer and a social integration 
programme. It was initially introduced as a pilot scheme to be tested for 2 years in a 
limited number of selected municipalities in some of the most disadvantaged areas of the 
country. The budgetary law for the year 2000 – the last one of the centre-left government - 
provided for a two-year extension of the experimentation of the Mii and increased the 
number of municipalities involved in the pilot project.  Successive extensions aimed at 
                                                          
5 For further details, see Gori (2004), Kazepov and Genova (2006), Madama (2010). 
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exhausting available resources, made it possible in some municipalities to implement the 
pilot Mii until 30 June 2007. 
Building on the principle of selective universalism, this measure constituted a path 
departure from the traditional social assistance model which, as we have seen, was 
characterized by the presence of mainly categorical benefits. For this reason – in addition 
to the diffused perception among experts and political élites of the risks of managing 
means-testing in a “soft state” (cf. Ferrera, 2000) – it is important to examine in depth 
program design and implementation. 
As for program design, the possibility to access was limited to individuals residing in the 
municipality for at least one year, three years in the case of non-EU immigrants. Benefit 
amount was equal to the difference between household income and a pre-defined poverty 
threshold. It was the least generous social policy program in Italy – slightly below the 
amount of the social pension: in 2000, depending on the family size, it ranged from a 
minimum of € 268 for a single-member household to a maximum of € 660 for a family of 
four. Household income was calculated using earnings declarations made for taxation 
purposes, with a 25% deduction in order to avoid the so-called poverty trap. Furthermore, 
non-contributory social assistance benefits were not taken into consideration in the means-
test. As for patrimonial requirements, the law required to take into consideration all the 
movable assets or properties, with the exception of the property used as household 
residence.  
Since the requirements were considered too stringent, most municipalities introduced 
specific patrimonial exemptions, income disregards, and even ad hoc changes in the 
equivalence scale adopted by the national law, thus creating wide territorial heterogeneity. 
Even though they were sometimes justified by the characteristics of the local contexts, 
there have been also examples of clear misuse (Sacchi and Bastagli, 2005). In general, 
municipalities faced difficulties in verifying applicants’ actual income, and in dealing with 
the problem of undeclared work (Ibidem). To this regard, it is particularly interesting to 
look at the number of beneficiaries over total resident: in the first two-year 
experimentation in some cases almost half of the population accessed the benefit. Orta di 
Atella, a small municipality in Campania, became famous because in 1999 46,7% of the 
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resident population was receiving the Mii. However, this was not the case during the 
second biannual experimentation, when the maximum rate was of 12,3% in Vibo Valentia 
(Ministero della Solidarietà Sociale, 2007). 
The innovative part of the Mii resided non only in the means-test but also in its activation 
component, since no other cash transfers in Italy were complemented by integration 
programs meant to tackle social exclusion and to stimulate recipients’ autonomy. The law 
envisaged, within thirty days from the demand acceptance, the drafting of a customized 
social integration program to be agreed between the social worker and the beneficiary. The 
activation component consisted primarily in a request to be active in the realization of a 
social integration path, and it did not always consist in an immediate commitment to job 
search. Instead, it was favoured the participation in training and/or social rehabilitation 
programs, as well as the taking part in social and/or voluntary work, depending on 
individual characteristics and the territorial socio-economic context. Special attention was 
devoted to children in order to break “the negative cycle of disadvantage”, particularly 
through guaranteeing the completion of compulsory schooling.  
Beneficiaries’ socio-economic conditions differed significantly depending on the local 
context, which is not totally unexpected considering Italian wide territorial imbalances. In 
the South we observe a prevalence, among beneficiaries, of “normal” families, composed 
of working-able parents and children, whose main problem is a precarious employment 
situation. In the Northern regions, need is more frequently associated with extreme 
marginality, and cases of drug addiction and alcoholism are not rare.   
Still, the absence of a stable employment was identified as the main problem by most of 
the beneficiaries. This is precisely the reason why the “activation” component assumed a 
particularly relevant role. Almost 70% of Mii beneficiaries participated in some activation 
programs. Territorial differences were once again relevant, since the number of programs 
effectively realized decreased moving from the North to the South6. In addition to the area 
of residence, the effectiveness of social integration programs depended on the number of 
social workers specifically dedicated to the implementation of the Mii. One of the main 
                                                          
6 In the South in fact, only 62% of the household participated to those programs, whereas in the 
Centre and in the North almost all the households were involved in some activity (Ministero della 
Solidarietà Sociale, 2007). 
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problems found through the monitoring process was indeed the low investment in the 
administrative infrastructure: more that 80% of the municipalities had to implement the 
Mii in addition to their usual workload, with no new resources to hire and train new staff 
(Ministero della Solidarietà Sociale, 2007).  
As for the ability of this scheme to constitute an effective route out of poverty, 15,9% of the 
beneficiaries ceased to receive the benefit because they had overcome their need. These are 
not very satisfying data, although a recent research realized by Sacchi and Natili revealed 
that also in the most developed areas of Continental and Northern Europe a percentage of 
20-25% of job placement among social assistance beneficiaries is considered the norm (see 
Sacchi, 2016). Furthermore, data hide considerable territorial differences: in the North East 
almost half of Mii beneficiaries exit from the program in less than one year, while in the 
North West the exit rate falls to 20,3%, in the Centre 15,2% and in the South to only 12,6% 
(Ministero della Solidarietà Sociale, 2007).  
Low exits in Southern Italy are not surprising. In a context in which over half of the 
working age population is unemployed, as it is in many areas of the Italian South, it is 
unlikely that social insertion and active labour market programs could be able to solve 
such severe and widespread structural problems. These results represent the most 
problematic aspect detected in the evaluation of Mii: without a functioning labour market, 
a minimum income scheme runs the risk of being the victim of a functional overload 
(Sacchi, 2007). To this regard, it is also important to remember that a Mis is not to be 
confused with a labour market policy (cfr. Sacchi, 2005, p. 96) as its overarching goal is 
poverty reduction rather than employment growth. 
To recap, the experimentation of the Mii has confirmed that means-tested benefits are very 
demanding measures requiring administrative capacity and resources that Italian 
municipalities did not always demonstrate to possess. In some area of the South, a more 
carefully designed means test coupled with a clearer guidance on how to comply with the 
presence of a pervasive black economy and illegal sector would have been very useful. 
Also, more collaboration on the part of fiscal administration and police, as well as 
provisions vesting local authorities with the power to undertake controls on income and 
properties would be crucial for the positive realization of a safety net in Italy (cfr. Sacchi, 
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2005, p. 99). It is in any case relevant to point out that the municipalities that participated 
in both experimentations (the 1999 – 2000 and the 2001-2002) have significantly showed 
increased efficiency over time. As an example, the cases that attracted experts’ attention for 
the extraordinary incidence of beneficiaries over residents disappeared in the second 
phase. To this regard, monitoring and evaluation appeared to be useful instruments also to 
reduce some of the problems of managing targeting in Italy. 
The Mii pilot scheme pointed out that the difficulties of implementing a minimum income 
scheme are not only linked to the realisation of the means-test, but also – and perhaps 
mostly – to the realization of the activation component. In particular, it has shown that the 
introduction of a Mis needs to be coupled with a general investment in social assistance, 
and in particular in social enabling services, which might allow to realize the “active 
inclusion strategy” in all its components.  Finally, it has revealed that a Mis cannot solve 
all the structural problems of a territory, and it should be evaluated on the basis of its 
ability to contrast poverty, otherwise it will run the risk of functional overload.  
Highlight difficulties and taking the necessary precautions for its generalization to the 
whole country, were exactly the goals of the pilot scheme. For this reason, for instance, the 
municipalities were selected in the most economically depressed areas of the country, 
where difficulties to implement a Mis would have certainly been higher. Some of the 
above evaluations – and in particular the low exit rates - were used instead to avoid the 
extension of the scheme to the whole country, considered as “costly and ineffective”7.  
 
4.3 Policy reversal and the resiliency of the traditional model (2001 – 2006) 
In the late 1990s, overcoming the traditional imbalances of the Italian social model and 
especially the marginality of social assistance policies seemed a feasible ambition. The 
introduction of the National Framework law on Social assistance, the National Social 
Policy Funds and of the Minimum Insertion Income – in addition to the new means-test 
‘indicator of socio-economic conditions’ (ISE) for those applying for social benefits – were 
already important step forward in the direction of reducing the chronicle underfunding, 
                                                          
7 Declaration of the Ministry of Welfare Maroni, La Repubblica, 19th September 2003. 
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the category-based approach and the impressive territorial and institutional fragmentation 
that constituted its main historical weaknesses.  
Conversely, in the early 2000s three main factors prevented the definitive path departure 
from the original model, so that it has been said that the count of achievements against the 
agenda of the proposals was disheartening (cfr. Gori and Madama, 2007). 
Firstly, in the early 2000s, economic stagnation changed government discourse and 
priorities, which shifted from budget consolidation to economic competitiveness (Jessoula 
and Alti, 2010). The modernization of the Italian welfare state ceased to be therefore a 
priority among political élites and experts, substituted by economic growth, tax reduction 
and a further labour market deregulation as a way to significantly reduce wages and 
labour cost.  
Secondly, the reform of the title V of the Constitution (C. Law 3/2001) in October 2001, 
modified the institutional framework in which the much awaited Law of Social Assistance 
was designed, assigning exclusive competence to the Regions for social assistance and 
social services. This undermined the reform, making it in some respects obsolete. The state 
was in fact no longer in a position to exercise in depth guidance, set standards to be 
guaranteed in the whole territory unless these were defined as “essential levels” (Liveas), 
to be agreed upon the state and the Council of Region, and for which it maintained the 
financial responsibility (Naldini and Saraceno, 2008). This led to a new stalemate situation 
and an unclear divisions of responsibilities between the state and the regions. A new 
regulatory framework has hitherto been delayed, and lack of interest and inter-
institutional conflicts prevented the definition of this “essential levels”. 
Finally, government colour has significantly influenced the policy trajectory of the social 
assistance sector (Madama, Natili and Jessoula, 2013). In 2001 the centre-left cabinets of the 
late-1990s were followed by the new centre-right government led by Berlusconi (2001-
2006), whose view of social protection focused on the centrality of the family. In the White 
Paper on Welfare. Proposals for a dynamic and supportive society (2003) and also in the Pact for 
Italy (2003) - a social pact signed with the employers’ association, and two (CISL and UIL) 
of the three main Italian trade unions – it is emphasized its role as a redistributive and 
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caring agency rather than as a recipient of social provisions (Madama, 2010).  As a 
consequence, we observe a gradual restatement of the traditional social assistance model. 
The only monetary interventions reinforced in the anti-poverty field were the pensions 
supplements (Integrazione al trattamento minimo  delle  pensioni), i.e. a benefit  granted  
to beneficiaries  of  an  earnings-related  pension  aimed  at  topping  their benefit  up  to  a  
statutory minimum. To support the families, the centre-right majority decided to use the 
fiscal lever. The so called No Tax Area was therefore introduced with 2003 Budget Law, an 
exempts from tax payments workers with an income below a certain nationally defined 
threshold, which was soon followed by special tax deductions for dependent children. 
These measures had however a very low effect of poverty reduction, since the poorest 
people have no earnings and therefore they would receive neither fiscal compensation nor 
assistance8. 
The goal of (realizing a) multi-level social service system, with the supervisory and leading 
role of the central state over the organization of social services, was abandoned, and not 
exclusively in reason of the new constitutional framework, since the definition of the 
‘essential levels’ and of minimum national standards in social services was never part of 
the government agenda. Furthermore, central social policy funds were cut significantly 
(Jessoula and Alti, 2010).  
Finally, the minimum insertion income, was at first criticized in the Pact for Italy by stating 
the impossibility of the Italian state to realize an efficient targeting process and then, far 
from being extended to the whole territory, was discontinued, since no more resources 
were allocated for this instrument. Still, this measures under the new constitutional 
framework could have been one of those levels of provision concerning social assistance 
the state was expected to set, and, at least concerning its monetary component, it was one 
of the easiest to craft (cfr. Madama, Natili and Jessoula, 2013, Sacchi and Bastagli, 2005). 
Rather, the government preferred to replace the Mii with the so called Income of Last 
Resort (Reddito di ultima istanza, RUI), introduced in the 2004 Budget Law. This was not a 
national intervention but rather a commitment to re-fund half of the total expenditure of 
                                                          
8 This is because those interventions were not designed as a negative income tax, the only fiscal 
intervention that beneficiate individuals with no earned income. 
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those regions which decided to introduce a regional Mis. However, since the RUI was not 
listed among the essential levels of provision concerning social rights to be guaranteed 
across the whole national territory and the government preferred not to create a new 
special fund to finance this new measure but rather prescribed the use of the ordinary 
resources of the National Fund for Social Policies, this gave birth to an inter-governmental 
conflict and the Constitutional Court declared invalid the proposal (Gambino, 2006). After 
the court intervention, no anti-poverty measures were introduced, and the RUI fell by the 
wayside. 
The reinstatement of a centre-left government in 2006 did not led to a new season of 
modernising reforms. The recalibration of the Italian welfare state was not anymore a 
priority for the politically weak and internally divided centre left government led by Prodi 
from 2006 to 2008, despite the presence of a fully-fledged national minimum income 
scheme in its electoral program.  With the support of all three trade unions confederations 
(see Chapter 4), this government prioritized interventions in the labour and pension fields 
aimed at the protection of the narrow rights of core labour market insiders, whereas social 
assistance never become prominent in the public debate. Some improvements are however 
observable concerning social services; between 2006-2008, the funds dedicated to social 
assistance increased, with a special emphasis on some fronts such as long-term care and 
child-care, through the creation of a new Childcare National Plan and the introduction of a 
Fund for long-term care (Madama, 2010).   
 
5. The Great Recession and the limited anti-poverty interventions 
When the centre-right coalition came back to power in spring 2008 it had to deal with the 
consequences of the economic and (later) sovereign debt crises. The severe poverty rate – 
i.e. the percentage of people with an income below 40% of the median income – increased 
from 6.8% to 8.7% (in EU27 respectively from 5.3% to 6.3%), and the material deprivation 
rate from 7.5 to 11.6 (EU 27 8.5% to 8.9%). National statistics based on consumption 
expenditure confirm this scenario. According to ISTAT (2014) from 2007 to 2014 the 
incidence of absolute poverty in Italy more than doubled – shifting from 3,1% in 2007 to 
6,8% in 2014 –  so that more than four millions of people in Italy live with an income below 
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the absolute poverty threshold. In this context, measures in the field of last resort income 
support remained extremely weak and no social rights were introduced to fight absolute 
poverty (cfr. Madama, Jessoula and Natili, 2014).  
Rather, social assistance was one of the few social policy areas were we observe drastic 
cuts already in the period between 2008 – 2010. National funds for social assistance and 
social services were drastically reduced, and some of them were fully abolished (Fig. 2). 
This fitted well with the Minister of Welfare understanding of a public social service 
system as a cost rather than an investment, and its marked preference for market solutions 
supported by the subsidiary role of civil society and households (Madama, Natili and 
Jessoula, 2013). Also, proposals aimed at defining the essential level of services, advanced 
by the Regions and by the Association of Italian Municipalities (ANCI) were formally 
welcomed, but in practice rejected, since no steps forwards in this direction were taken. 
 
Figure 2 National funds for social assistance and social services, 2006-2012 (millions of €) 
 
Source: Madama, Natili and Jessoula, 2013 
 
As for minimum income protection, the onset of the Great Recession fostered a new debate 
over the weaknesses of the sector in Italy, and spurred the centre-right government to 
intervene in this policy sector, although following a peculiar line of intervention. In 
particular, a Carta Acquisti (Social Card, SC) was introduced as an emergency measure to 
provide a public response to the intense spread of absolute poverty outlined above. This is 
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a debit card to be used to purchase food and pay basic utilities having as a reference model 
the Food Stamps in the U.S. Income eligibility criteria are very tight9 and access 
requirements very stringent; the measure was initially intended to support exclusively low 
income Italian pensioners (over 65), but it was later extended also to children below the 
age of 3, following a debate on the reduction in milk sales during the fourth week of the 
month (cfr. Madama et al., 2013). This strictly categorical approach confirms the Italian 
path of anti-poverty policies which distinguish punctiliously among perceived deserving 
poor and non. The card is financed via general taxation, even though the fund to finance 
the scheme is open to private donations, and the monetary amount is very low. The card is 
in fact flat rate and equal to 40 € per month. Furthermore, there is no activation 
requirement and it does not give access to any active inclusion service. This features 
further reveal charitable orientation and the residual and passive – if not merely symbolic 
– nature of this program (cfr. Madama et al., 2014), conceived to provide an economic 
relief to an extremely limited category of the poor population. 
From an administrative point of view, this card presented more than one interesting 
novelties. It is managed directly by the Finance Ministry in close coordination with INPS 
and the Italian Post Offices. The horizontal coordination between these different 
institutions entail a rapid and efficient means-tested process and enable a rather easy 
management of the card through the Post Offices. The operating cost of the process are 
low, equal to 1.5 million in 2008, and in any case below 1.5% of the total public 
expenditure (Ministero del Welfare, 2009). Furthermore, the main strength of this 
instrument in the Italian context (see below) is its ability to reach the target of most 
deprived: more than half of the recipients belong to the lowest income decile of the 
population, even though only a very meagre proportion of the poor receive the benefit. 
The launch of the Social Card – coupled with the enduring increase of poverty outlined 
above – favoured the (re) emergence of a debate over the conditions of last resort 
minimum income protection in Italy. In 2010 the Catholic Workers Organization (ACLI) – 
supported by leading Italian scholars – initiated a pragmatic reflection over strengths and 
                                                          
9 Households must have a disposable income in 2015 lower than 6.788,61 €. Assets above certain 
amount are also taken into consideration: in 2015 it is required not to have more than one car or 
home, and movable assets higher than € 15000. 
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weaknesses of the Social Card that lead to the proposal to introduce a National Plan Against 
Poverty, a three years plan that foresaw the gradual extension of the coverage and 
generosity of the SC that would end-up being a fully-fledged safety net targeted to the 
entire poor working age population and associated with social inclusion measures (Gori et 
al., 2011).  
The proposal was not considered however in line with government priorities, since it 
envisage the introduction of automatic and subjective social rights for the would be 
beneficiaries.  Rather, the government preferred to launch a proposal for a New Social 
Card. The new measure envisaged some relevant novelties compared to the old SC, not all 
in the same direction of the ACLI proposal. The categorical and extreme residual approach 
was in fact abandoned. Furthermore, it foresaw a certain degree of conditionality and the 
combination of a monetary and an “activating” component. But the main novelties of this 
new instrument was that it envisaged a direct link between the Ministry of Welfare and a 
group of selected charity which had the task to manage the measure, with no role for local 
governments.  
This measure therefore confirmed the adhesion of the Italian centre-right to the principle 
of subsidiarity, and its interest in the defence of community-based welfare institutions.  In 
February 2011 the law envisaging the introduction of this new pilot scheme in the 12 
bigger Italian municipalities passed (L. n. 10/2011), with a dedicated fund of 50 million.   
The fall of the Berlusconi government in November 2011 caused the abandonment of this 
policy project. With the new technical cabinet led by Mario Monti, in office from 
November 2011, Italy entered into a new “national emergence” phase and government 
priorities changed drastically. Austerity and further budget consolidation become the new 
government priorities, and drastic reforms were introduced in the pension and labour 
market field. Welfare recalibration consisted predominantly in retrenchment in the most 
developed social policy sectors, while the expansion of social assistance remained at the 
edge of the political debate. 
Notwithstanding, the presence of some very active stakeholders – primarily, the ACLI – 
and the receptiveness of some policy experts within the Monti government – and in 
particular the Deputy-Minister, Maria Cecilia Guerra, an economist from the University of 
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Modena and key expert in the field – coupled with the availability of the (few) funds put 
aside by the previous government, prevented the complete disappearance of minimum 
income from the policy agenda. 
The project to introduce a new pilot SC was resumed, although the new government was 
much more influenced by the ACLI proposal and by the European active inclusion 
strategy, and less prone to defend subsidiarity and the traditional Italian model. The basic 
feature of the New Social Card changed accordingly. It is primarily targeted to families 
with children, although budgetary constraints forced to introduce some additional access 
priorities; only household with at least one children, with an ISE below 3000 euro, and 
where at least one component have worked in the last 36 months can access to this benefit. 
(Saraceno, 2013). It is more generous, and benefit amount varies according to family size, 
shifting from € 231 to € 404. The cash transfer is combined with social and labour market 
services, and it envisaged also a strong conditionality concerning children school 
attendance. In general, the wellbeing of underage children is a primary concern within the 
new framework. Furthermore, although the basic form of a debit card is maintained, the 
governance is much more complex, as it is foreseen the horizontal coordination between 
INPS, the municipalities, the third sector and even the ACLI and the trade unions. Great 
attention is given to monitoring and evaluation procedures in order – at least, this was the 
original scope - to produce evidence before its generalization to the national territory.  
Beside this, in 2012 the Deputy-Minister of Labour and Welfare proposed to use resources 
coming from the national cohesion fund to support the extension of NSC pilot project to 
four Southern regions (Campania, Puglia, Calabria and Sicilia). This project is later taken 
up by the following coalition government led by Enrico Letta (PD) in 2013. Despite 
rejecting a more ambitious proposal for a fully-fledged minimum income schemes named 
“Support for Active Inclusion”, advanced by key expert and stakeholders, the extension of 
the New Social Card to eight regions in Southern Italy is approved in the 2014 “Stability 
Law” and financed with 167 billion, to be divided in 100 million in 2014 and 67 in 2015 
(Decree Law n. 76/2013). Although several technical problems have so far prevented the 
extension of this measure to the Southern Regions, the 2015 Stability Law has further 
increased the resource for the New Social Card, which – with a fund of 800 million -should 
be finally extended to the whole country starting from 2016 (Agostini, 2015). 
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To sum up, in the last twenty years’ minimum income protection gained salience in the 
political debate in Italy, yet it appeared as a divisive issue, and, differently from most 
other European countries, until 2015 no fully fledged minimum income scheme has been 
introduced. After the pilot experimentation of a Minimum Insertion Income, approved by 
the Prodi government in 1998 and later abandoned by the centre right coalition, since 2008 
three different social cards were drafted. The latter represented an important step forward 
with respect to the Italian tradition of antipoverty policies, as it overcame the passive and 
charitable orientation of the other two versions, by promoting an integrated approach 
between government levels and the involvement of civil society organizations (cfr. 
Madama et al., 2014).  
Without underscoring the relevance of this policy experiment, it is important to underline 
that it presents several relevant weaknesses: it is in fact (again) a pilot project, scarcely 
financed, with no enforceable rights, and easily subject to policy reversal decisions. 
Furthermore, eligibility requirements are really stringent: the only categories accessing the 
benefits are very poor families with children and people very distant to the labour market. 
The path towards the institutionalization of a fully-fledged minimum income scheme in 
Italy appears therefore still long and winding. 
 
6. The season of regional innovations: regional Mis in Italy 
In the mid-2000s, failing a national intervention in the definition of the Liveas, the Italian 
regions were the main, and in many cases the only, public bodies responsible for the social 
assistance sector, although their budget still depends to a large degree on the central state 
– since the so called fiscal federalism, now asserted in the reformed art. 119 of the 
Constitution, was still to be concretely implemented (cfr. Naldini and Saraceno, 2008). In 
this context, the policy dynamics that emerged at the national level in some cases 
replicated also at the regional level, where an inconsistent and somehow contradictory 
evolution of minimum income protection can be observed. 
The absence of an organic and inclusive national minimum income scheme had led 
already in the early 1990s some Special Status Regions of Northern Italy to introduce 
regionally based means-tested income support measures: in 1991 Trentino Alto Adige, the 
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Autonomous Province of Bolzano and the Autonomous Province of Trento did so, 
followed by Valle d’Aosta in 1994. In order to observe a greater diffusion of these 
measures in Italian regions, though, we have to wait until the completion of the 
regionalization process with the devolution of social assistance competences to ordinary 
statute regions (C. Law 3/2001), and the failed extension to the whole Italian territory of 
the Mii pilot scheme. In sharp contrast with the decision of the Berlusconi II government in 
fact, a number of regions governed by centre-left coalitions decided to introduce 
innovative Mis regional programs. In 2004 Campania region did so, soon followed by 
other regions characterized by very different socio-economic contexts. Regionally based 
MIS were in fact launched in some of the richest regions of the North as well as in some of 
the most economically backward regions of southern Italy (Table 2): Basilicata (L.r.n. 
3/2005), Friuli Venezia Giulia (L.r.n. 6/2005), Lazio (L.r.n. 4/2008), Puglia (L.r.n. 19/2006) 
and Sardegna (L.r.n. 23/2005). At the same time, some regional laws transposing law 328 
foresaw the introduction of pilot regional safety net: this is the case of Emilia Romagna 
(art. 13, L.r.n. 2/2003), Toscana (art. 57, L.r.n. 41/2005) and Umbria (L.r.n. 11/2003). 
However, in those regions such legislation has never been acted upon, other than the 
drafting of feasibility studies by Tuscany and Umbria.  Despite this institutional diffusion 
of regional minimum income schemes, in several regions inertia prevailed as they did not 
launch similar schemes and limited their anti-poverty strategy to (weakly) top up national 
funding for social policies targeted to municipalities. As a useful example, in the same 
period the Lombardia Region legislated in the field of anti-poverty policies (L.r.n. 25/2006) 
adopting however a different approach, leaving to municipalities the possibility to 
introduce income support measures in case of need, but directly supporting charitable 
organizations through regional funds, in particular promoting “Banco Alimentare” (Food 
Bank), an association that recovers food surplus and redistributes it to primarily Catholic 
charitable organizations.  
As a result of these developments, in mid-2000s Italian regions could be divided into three 
macro-groups: the autonomous regions of the North which had a longer tradition of 
managing regional minimum income schemes, since they had been introduced already at 
the beginning of the 1990’s; a group of regions which, despite a very differentiated 
institutional and socio-economic context, have introduced pilot regional Mis in the mid-
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2000s; and a larger group of regions that did not implement uniform criteria for income 
support to be applied to their entire territory, and that, in the best cases, limited their anti-
poverty interventions to top up national funding for social policies destined to 
municipalities. 
Table 2 describes the main institutional characteristics of Italian regional safety nets. 
Despite the heterogeneity of their institutional design - in terms of generosity, eligibility 
criteria, coverage and activation measures - and budget limitations they all constituted a 
path departure from the weak original model embodying the “selective universalism” 
principle.  
These measures were in general designed to contrast the most severe situation of absolute 
poverty. Benefit amount was particularly low in the Southern regions, significantly below 
the social pension. Not even low generosity allowed regional Mis ending up being actual 
individual rights held by all citizens in presence of an economic need. With the exception 
of the safety nets in Northern Autonomous Regions, the presence of tight budget 
constraints forced regional administrations to proceed with calls and subsequent rankings 
and waiting list, determining the number of beneficiaries in relation to available funds. In 
the Campania case, for example, of about 120 thousand applications declared admissible, 
only 18900 families have actually received the Citizenship Income. Although those 
percentages were higher in the other regional cases, in Basilicata only about 40% of eligible 
individuals has actually had access to income assistance in 2007, and in Lazio around 15% 
(see chapter 4). Conversely, a measure aimed at combating poverty should be able to 
ensure that all eligible claimants can access to the intervention. Operationally, this requires 
an initial endowment of adequate resources or the explicit possibility of to adapt (i.e. 
expand) the budget in case of higher demand than expected (Spano et al., 2013). 
Regional minimum income schemes have also often highlighted the poor ability of 
regional administration to implement such complex measures. In particular, means testing 
and the introduction of an efficient instrument to estimate the income of potential 
beneficiaries proved to be one of the main weaknesses of the welfare state, and more 
generally of the fiscal system, in Italy. With the exception of Sardinia, all regional 
administration introduced different indexes and ad hoc methods to estimate the income of 
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potential beneficiaries, sometimes integrating estimates of disposable income with more or 
less sophisticated consumption indicators (Table 2). The adoption of innovative means 
testing tools has often resulted in increased administrative difficulties and bureaucratic 
procedures to gain access to the schemes, not sufficiently accompanied by an adequate 
increase of regional staff able to ensure an effective management of the measure.  
Therefore, admission procedures have been particularly long, diminishing the possibility 
of those measures to react rapidly to condition of social need. In Campania and Lazio, 
from the opening of the call to the effective payment of the benefits there is over a year; in 
Basilicata and Friuli Venezia Giulia more than six months. To this regard, regional safety 
nets would have probably benefited from a national framework capable of providing the 
tools and devices needed for the standardization of means testing, as well as more 
guidance on how to deal with the problem of undeclared work (Gambardella, 2007). To 
this regard a definition of protocols at the central level, in particular with INPS or with the 
fiscal police (Guardia di Finanza), in addition to an improvement of the local coordination 
between different institutional actors, can play a positive role in estimating a plausible 
income and in the repression of abuses. 
This aspect is relevant even if it seems that regional schemes were not subjects to 
manipulation and used in a discretionary way for the purpose of political consensus on the 
part of the local elite and government. As complex and sometimes, as in particular in the 
case of Campania, inefficient (Gambardella, 2007), minimum income schemes have 
ensured that eligibility depended exclusively on the presence of a situation of certified 
need determined ex ante through criteria which were questionable but equal for all 
potential beneficiaries. Random ex post controls made by the Guardia di Finanza, e.g. in 
Basilicata, Campania and Friuli Venezia Giulia proved that the number of beneficiaries 
who accessed the measure without the qualification needed to access to those benefits 
were limited. 
Also the implementation of social and labour market inclusion programs has frequently 
proved difficult for regional administrations. Regional minimum income schemes 
inherited from the Mii experimentation the aim to combine economic support with social 
and labour services with the aim to “restore” individual agency in the social life and 
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possibly in the labour market. At least on paper therefore, in most of the cases regional Mis 
represented a breakthrough in the Italian tradition of mainly passive benefit, foreseeing 
horizontal coordination between income support measure, social services and active labor 
market policies, one of the main weakness of the Italian active inclusion system 
(Heidenreich et al., 2014). Important exceptions were in Campania, Lazio and Sardegna 
where it was possible, but not mandatory, to integrate the monetary benefit with social 
inclusion services, with the consequence that its effective implementation was in most 
cases limited to the economic support. Moreover, precisely in Lazio and Campania 
regional laws did not provide additional resources for social inclusion measures and for 
hiring and training professionals in this policy area. The limited capacity, especially of the 
smaller municipalities, to raise the economic and social resources necessary to "activate" 
the beneficiaries, in those cases has severely limited the ability of these tools to be more 
than a mere subsidy, certainly important, but insufficient to overcome the condition of 
social disadvantage. 
In general, in most regional cases, regional minimum income schemes have often caused a 
sharp increase of users of social services, revealing the presence of enclaves of extreme 
poverty unknown to the Italian system of social assistance. If this was a positive 
development since it allowed the surfacing of new situations of poverty, on the other hand 
it constituted a functional overload for (underfinanced) social services which faced serious 
difficulties in providing access to quality and customized services to those “new” users, 
even in those cases where this was required in the regional regulations. Again, it seems 
important to point out that it is necessary to strengthen the administrative structure with 
experienced staff specialized in providing personalized insertion programs, especially if 
the measures are intended as a tool that goes beyond the mere monetary transfer. 
Having said this, it is important to underline that minimum income schemes have first and 
foremost an anti-poverty function, and we should not bear too high expectations on the 
ability of these measures to provide an effective path towards employment (Sacchi, 2007).  
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Tab. 2 – General overview of regional minimum income scheme in Italy 
Region Eligibility conditions Means 
testing 
Index 
Basic  
Amount 
Budget 
constraints 
Active 
Inclusio
n 
Basilicata 
Cittadinanza 
Solidale 
∙ 2 Years Residence 
∙ Household yearly income 
below € 3,961 for one 
member up to € 12,675 for 
six members 
 
ISE +  
Consumption  
Index 
 
300 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Campania 
Reddito di 
Cittadinanza 
∙ 5 Years Residence 
∙ Household yearly income 
below € 5000 
ISEE +  
Consumption 
Index 
 
350 
 
Yes 
 
No 
Friuli Venezia 
Giulia 
Reddito di Base 
per la Citt. 
∙  1 Years Residence 
∙ Household yearly income 
below € 5000 
 
 
CEE 
 
 
540 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
Lazio 
Reddito Minimo 
Garantito 
∙  2 Years Residence 
∙ Household yearly income 
below € 8000 
 
IRPEF 
 
530 
 
Yes 
 
No 
Puglia 
Reddito Minimo 
d’Inserimento 
∙  2 Years Residence 
∙ Income threshold 
 
ISE 
 
(350) 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Sardegna 
Contrasto alla 
Povertà 
∙ Household yearly income 
below € 7.101,00 for one 
member up to € 7.989,00 
for six members 
 
 
ISEE 
 
 
350 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
Trentino Alto 
Adige  
Insufficient household 
income in relation 
with minimum needs 
of all members. 
(ICEF+  
Consumption  
Index) 
 
Bz: 584 
Tr:  540 
 
No 
 
Yes 
Valle d’Aosta 
Minimo Vitale 
∙  Residence 
∙ Income threshold (e.g. 413 
Euro per months in 2005) 
 
IRSEE 
 
542 
 
No 
 
Yes 
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Regional minimum income schemes, as the previous experimentation of the Mii, revealed 
that especially in contexts where almost one third of the workforce is unemployed, as in 
large parts of Southern Italy, it is inconceivable that the social and labour market inclusion 
projects allow by themselves to solve such severe and widespread structural problems. 
The experience of Citizenship Solidarity in Basilicata in this regard is revealing: although 
the region heavily invested in the activation component through the preparation of 
various social integration programs - involving more than 72% of the beneficiaries (Achilli, 
2007) – we observe very few exit from the program due to the overcoming of the condition 
of economic need. In general, it should be stressed that active labour market policies may 
have positive effect only for targeted populations, those who had potential for reinsertion 
that had to be supported and those whose territorial contexts were equipped to provide 
with real possibilities in the actual labour market. 
The most critical aspect is however that the multidimensional nature of poverty requires 
structural long-term policies and interventions. In this perspective, the Italian experiences 
show, as a whole, strong weaknesses, summarized by the fact that until now they have 
often found insurmountable obstacles in going beyond the experimental stage.  
This season of regional innovations (Lumino and Morlicchio, 2013), in fact, was short-lived 
and was followed by a phase in which regionally based minimum income schemes were 
drastically limited. Regions previously characterized by policy inertia continued along the 
same path, and no new initiatives were promoted by sub-national units. Moreover, we 
observe a differentiated development even in the regions that previously introduced pilot 
Mis depending on the result of the following political election (Tab. 3): in all the regions 
where a centre-right coalition succeeded, replacing a centre-left coalition, these measures 
were rapidly discontinued, and Campania, Friuli Venezia Giulia, Lazio and Sardinia 
experienced a neat “policy reversal” path. In the following chapters we will give a closer 
look to the dynamics that lead to this particular outcome in Lazio and Friuli Venezia 
Giulia. As for the Citizenship Income in Campania, despite it was less and less financed over 
time, soon after the entry into office of the new Caldoro (Freedom Party) administration 
the measure was definitely abandoned. 
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Tab. 3 Regional government composition and the evolution of regional Mis in Italy 
Region Period of 
implementation 
Path 
departure 
/Inertia 
(Year) 
Government 
Coalition 
(2005-2009) 
Continuity 
/ Reversal 
(year) 
Government 
Coalition 
(2009 – 2012) 
Basilicata 2007 -  Path  
departure 
(2005) 
Centre Left Continuity Centre Left 
Puglia10 2007 –  
(Only in selected 
municipalities) 
Path  
departure 
(2006) 
Centre Left Continuity Centre Left 
Autonomous 
Province of 
Trento 
 
1991 - 
Path  
departure 
(1991) 
Centre Left Continuity Centre Left 
Valle D’Aosta 1994 -  Path  
departure 
(1994) 
(Regional 
party) 
Continuity (Regional 
party) 
Autonomous 
Province of 
Bolzano 
 
1991 - 
Path  
departure 
(1991) 
(Regional 
party) 
Continuity (Regional 
party) 
Campania 2006 – 2010 Path  
departure 
(2004) 
Centre Left Reversal 
(2010) 
Centre Right 
Friuli Venezia 
Giulia 
2007 – 2008 Path  
departure 
(2005) 
Centre Left Reversal 
(2009) 
Centre Right 
Lazio 2009 – 2010 Path  
departure 
(2008) 
Centre Left Reversal 
(2010) 
Centre Right 
Sardegna 2007 – 2008 Path  
departure 
(2005) 
Centre Left Reversal 
(2009) 
Centre Right 
Source: Author Elaboration 
 
Conversely, where we observe a continuity of centre-left governments, those measures 
were confirmed. In particular, in Basilicata, a small Southern Region characterized by 
unusual political stability, in 2009 the Region approved a new intervention called Program 
to combat poverty and social exclusion (COPES) that, albeit in continuity with the 
previous program, intervened in the structure of governance with the aim of improving its 
activation component. As for the Special Status Regions that had introduced their 
                                                          
10 The case of Puglia appears however a different case, since the law introducing a minimum 
income scheme have not been implemented effectively in the whole region, but only in few 
municipalities. 
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measures already at the beginning of the Nineties, during the crisis the measures were 
maintained in Valle d’Aosta and in the Autonomous Province of Bolzano. In 2010 the 
Autonomous Province of Trento introduced a new program to face the social 
consequences of the crisis that, for its permanent nature, the guarantee of the individual 
right regardless of budget constraints, the governance structure and the presence of a 
constant process of monitoring and evaluation, constitutes a best practice for the Italian 
standard (Spano, Trivellato and Zanini, 2013). 
Basilicata, Valle D’Aosta and Trentino Alto Adige (both the Bolzano and the Trento 
Province) were the only Italian regions in which the Mis remained in place over the entire 
period. In very recent times a number of regions – Emilia Romagna, Friuli Venezia Giulia 
(L.r. 15/2015), Molise (L.r. 9/2015), Puglia, Sardegna (L.r. 7/2014) and Toscana -  are either 
planning or have just introduced a new regional Mis. Once again, this trajectory seems to 
be influenced by partisan politics dynamics, since all these regions are ruled by centre left 
coalitions. However, the well-advertised launch of a Reddito di Autonomia (Autonomy 
Income) – which so far is more of a plan against social exclusion than a minimum income 
scheme - in Lombardia by a LN government might indicate the opening of a new phase. So 
far indeed, the evolution of regional minimum income schemes confirmed the peculiar 
difficulties of the institutionalization of minimum income rights in Italy, since the 
introduction of those policy measures in some regions did not produce spill-over effects 
and/or policy diffusion, as it has been the case in other European countries, such as Austria 
and more recently Spain (Arriba and Moreno, 2005, Fink and Grand, 2009). 
 
7 Italy today: still a fragmented and weak minimum income protection model  
Despite some promising attempts occurred both at the national and regional level, the 
recalibration process of the Italian welfare state towards the less protected categories has 
so far been limited. Public spending for general social assistance (excluding old-age and 
disability benefits), family burdens and unemployment compensation, has remained low 
compared to that of the most advanced European countries. As figure 3 highlights, 
expenditure in Italy (% GDP) targeted to deal with working-age social risks (excluding 
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health care, unemployment and disability) was less than half that of Germany, France, 
United Kingdom, Sweden and EU-15 average. 
  
Figure 3 Social spending on GDP (family, social exclusion and housing functions), 1995-2012, 
selected countries  
 
Source: Eurostat online database 
 
Some measures introduced in the last two decades — such as the maternity allowance 
directed to mothers having no insurance coverage, the benefit to families with more than 
three children, the fund to support low income tenants, regional Mis and the New Social 
Card—partially redirected social assistance expenditure towards the wide group of 
outsiders. Those measures, however, due to their narrow focus and limited budgets, did 
not alter the overall structure of minimum income provision in Italy for working age 
people, that still lacks a coherent and inclusive last resort safety net.  
Table 4 provides a general overview of the structure of social expenditure, with a focus on 
its internal distribution among functions and schemes. As can be noticed, social assistance 
continues to be the Cinderella of the Italian system of social protection. Furthermore, more 
than 80% of the total expenditure for social assistance was attracted by old age and 
disability functions, thus reproducing in the social assistance sector the distortions that 
64 
 
characterizes the Italian welfare state as a whole. Conversely, social expenditure for able-
bodied working age individuals constituted less than 17% of total social assistance 
expenditure, and a large part of these resources allocated to the family allowance scheme, 
that is a hybrid measure of income support structured along contributory lines, thus 
excluding the worse off in society. 
Table 4. Social Protection Expenditure by function in Italy, 2010 
Function Expenditure 
(mln €) 
% on 
GDP 
Old Age 244.840 15,8 
Unemployment  37.978 2,5 
Health Care 105.451 6,8 
Social Assistance 61.900 4 
Family Allowance 6.347 0,4 
Family deduction 10.516 0,7 
Social Card and 
 Benefit for families with 3 or more underage 
children 
800 0,1 
Social Pension 4.001 0,3 
Pension Supplements 12.000 0,8 
Invalidity Pension 16.394 1,1 
Local Services (monetary transfers and services) 8.605 0,6 
Other 3.237 0,2 
Total social expenditure 450.169 29,1 
Source: IRS (2012). 
 
Low expenditure is accompanied with a very low targeting ability: most of the social 
assistance measures in fact do not benefit those at the bottom of the income scale. All the 
authors that have examined the ability of the Italian income support system supports this 
diagnosis (Baldini and Toso, 2000, Sacchi and Bastagli, 2005, Irs, 2012, Ruffini and Toso, 
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2013, Fabrizi, Ferrante and Pacei, 2014). In Italy, a high share of social assistance 
expenditure is not directed towards low income household, nor to families belonging to 
the area of economic poverty in the strict sense: about a quarter of spending (24%) on 
Social Pension, a third (34%) on Family Allowances and almost 60% of expenditure for 
Invalidity Pensions benefit in fact household belonging to the five richest deciles of the 
population (Irs 2011).  
The Social Card(s) introduced in recent years performs far better in addressing resources 
to the poorest sector of the population. Analysis conducted by the Commission of Inquiry 
on Social Exclusion (2010) reveals that more than half of the beneficiary families and about 
56% of total expenditure of the Old Social Card is directed to the poorest decile of the 
population (90% to the first two deciles). However, the categorical approach and the scant 
generosity of this measure limits severely its efficacy: it is estimated that only 18% of 
absolute poor households can access to the measure. Moreover, its low generosity (40 euro 
per month) meant that its impact on absolute poverty is contained, allowing to overcome a 
condition of absolute poverty in 2009 to about 40 thousand families in a million (CIES, 
2010). 
Finally, fragmentation and territorial inequality continue to undermine the efficacy and 
effectiveness of the Italian minimum income protection system. In the last twenty years, 
rather than solve this problem, it become worst, and fragmentation has increased. All the 
schemes of the early Nineties are still entirely in place: the pension minimum and the 
social pension; the civil invalidity pension with its accompanying allowance; the family 
allowance, and the lump-sum benefit provided by the municipalities. Since the end of the 
Nineties, these measures have been complemented with further means-tested benefits; the 
allowance for families with three or more under-age children and the maternity allowance 
for mothers who lack insurance coverage; the Social Card; pension supplements and 
various forms of tax relief. To these, we have also to add the most interesting institutional 
innovations occurred the last decade; the New Social Card, so far implemented only in the 
twelve bigger Italian municipalities; and the regional Mis, with new programs introduced 
in the last months in Emilia Romagna, Friuli Venezia Giulia, Molise Puglia, Sardegna, 
Toscana, beside the more institutionalized experiences in Basilicata, Trentino Alto Adige 
and Valle d’Aosta. In a context of strong budgetary constraints, all the three government 
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level in Italy intervene in the anti-poverty sector with no vertical nor horizontal 
coordination.  
Therefore, the lack of a coherent and systematic approach to combat poverty and social 
exclusion seems clear, where the lack of coordination gave rise, in addition to coverage 
gaps, to functional overlapping. In 2015, minimum income protection in Italy can be seen 
as a puzzle made of several schemes (Madama, et al. 2014) that remain fragmented and not 
able to guarantee a minimum level of protection to the citizens, as revealed by increasing 
relative and absolute poverty rates. 
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Chapter 3  
Minimum Income Protection in Spain 
 
1 Introduction 
Over the last thirty years, only few European welfare states were transformed more 
profoundly than the Spanish system of social protection. The welfare state inherited by the 
Franco regime was a strongly centralized and underdeveloped version of the Bismarckian 
model (Guillén, 2010). The main pillars of this regime consisted in comprehensive but not 
universal social insurances in the field of pensions and health care, while a reduced 
coverage characterized unemployment benefits. The social assistance sector was meager, 
with family and care policies severely underdeveloped and cash benefits independent of 
labor position were totally absent. The Church, benefiting from large state subsidies, and 
the family (namely women’s caring activities) played a crucial subsidiary role in the 
protection of the poor and socially excluded (Arriba and Moreno, 2002). 
 The fall of the Franco’s regime and the peaceful transition to democracy were followed by 
the consolidation of the social security system, and also by an expansion both in generosity 
and in coverage of social rights in the field of health and social care. This process of 
expansion and consolidation was combined with an intense decentralization that changed 
significantly the broad architecture of the Spanish welfare state. 
 The reforms in the fields of pensions and unemployment benefits have been successful in 
terms of coverage and generosity. In the health care sector, paradigmatic reforms lead to 
the creation of a universal national health system and to a progressive decentralization of 
competences and responsibilities to the sub-national governments. Also the social 
assistance sector was improved but to a lesser extent than other social policy sector: in this 
field subjective automatic rights were introduced for the old and the disabled, while we 
observe a gradual expansion - although there is still room for improvement - of social 
services, family policies and minimum income protection for the working age population.  
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Those significant efforts to consolidate a comparatively underdeveloped social protection 
system, were combined with a strong attention towards the maintenance of a viable 
system in a framework of persistent high level of relative poverty and, especially in the last 
two decades, growing social inequalities. Before the onset of the Great Recession, Spanish 
welfare state managed to be consolidated as a medium sized welfare state with social 
spending below the European average, including Italy (Fig. 4) (Rodríguez Cabrero, 2011).  
 
Figure 4 Social spending as a % of GDP, 2008 – 2013, selected countries. 
 
Source: Eurostat Online Database 
A closer look to social expenditure internal composition reveals some of its defining 
features (Fig. 5).  A comparatively higher spending for unemployment benefits shows one 
of the main challenge of the Spanish social system, further exacerbated by the Great 
Recession: a large share of the Spanish citizens faces great difficulties in finding an 
employment, while many others are trapped in temporary and poor quality jobs. Indeed, 
unemployment rate never fall below 20 per cent between 1982 and 2000, and after a 
decreasing phase until 2008 - mainly due to the extensive growth of temporary 
employment - has risen again with the financial and economic crisis: in 2014 24,5% of the 
Spanish were unemployed (Eurostat Online database).  
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Figure 5 Social expenditure (% GDP) by function in 2012, Spain and EU27. 
 
Source: Eurostat online database 
 
A second feature is the result of the locking of the total expenditure for families and 
children, housing and social exclusion, i.e. the expenditure functions that are more directly 
related to social assistance, which is well below the European average (SP 6,8% vs EU 28 
12,4%). Similarly to other Southern European countries, also in Spain the literature has 
stressed how the gaps in the social protection system have been covered by the important 
role played by the family and, especially, by the “Mediterranean superwomen”, who have 
taken care of the children and the elderly, and in general, of all the dependent members 
(Moreno, 2004).  
In particular, minimum income protection for the working age population has been 
traditionally low developed. In the last thirty years however, Spain have witnessed major 
changes in this policy field. In particular, in spite of inertia at the national level, in the 
short period between 1989-95 all Autonomous Communities (ACs) introduced programs 
that – albeit with differences - aimed at tackling poverty and social exclusion through 
universalistic benefits for individuals with incomes below a certain threshold, associated 
with measures to promote social and labour market integration of beneficiaries (Aguilar et 
al., 1995, Arriba and Moreno, 2005).  
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The peculiarity of the Spanish case rests on the introduction of regional safety nets in the 
absence of a national legislative framework setting minimum standards, guaranteeing 
coordination between different instruments, substituting regional governments in case of 
non-compliance and facilitating the diffusion of best practices. Questions arise on whether 
those measures - which were also expanded and consolidated in the last two decades – 
add up to an integrated system. Indeed, on the one hand, they provide a broad economic 
safety net for the poorest sector of the population but on the other hand, these programs 
are characterized by uneven protective intensity, marked institutional differentiation as 
well as a growing tendency to apply the principle of activation to the most vulnerable. 
Against this background, this chapter aims to investigate the consequences of this 
uncoordinated process of decentralization, providing a detailed description of the 
evolution of regional safety nets in Spain, also highlighting the peculiarities of the 
fragmented Spanish system of minimum income protection in a comparative perspective.  
The first paragraph in particular provides an historical description of the first social 
assistance measures from the early XIX century to the end of the Francoist regime. The 
second focuses on the transition to democracy and on the contested construction of a 
multi-level social policy system. The third paragraph describes the process leading to the 
introduction of regional safety nets in all Spanish Autonomous Communities and outlines 
the main features of those regional measures in the initial phase (1988 – 1995). The fourth 
paragraph focuses on the period 1996-2005, characterized by limited development in this 
policy field coupled with increasing territorial differentiation and growing tendency to 
make benefits conditional on job-search activities. The fifth analyses the expansion – in 
terms of generosity, coverage rate and expenditure - of regional anti-poverty measures 
during the economic-financial crisis and the subsequent Great Recession in 2008-15. 
Finally, the sixth paragraph points out the comparative strengths and weaknesses of the 
fragmented Spanish model of minimum income protection.  
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2. Anti-poverty policies in Spain from the origins to democracy 
 
2.1.  The origins of the Spanish Welfare State 
In Spain, the first social policies emerged in a context characterized by high levels of 
political conflict and instability and a retarded and geographically localized 
industrialization process. Throughout this period, the Catholic Church maintained a 
strong influence in the political and social life.  
In the early XIX century, the Church was actually the main actor providing assistance to 
the poor and the needy in Spain, and maintained a set of charitable institutions among the 
most developed in Europe. The earliest public measures for the needy were introduced 
with the 1812 Cadiz Constitution, which entrusted municipalities with “public 
responsibility of social nature”. Accordingly, the Ley General de Beneficiencia (General Law 
on Charity) in 1822 aimed at creating a public system for the “poor and the lazy” through 
the gradual absorption of private entities, which in the original intentions of the legislator 
had to become public bodies.  
Those new public institutions, called Juntas (Assemblies), were formally subordinated to 
the authority of the State, but the influence of the Church remained very strong as its 
administration was in the hand of clergymen. Legislative intervention in this field was 
further developed with a new law in 1849, which confirmed the primary role of 
municipalities and provinces, but for the first time envisaged the creation of a department 
within the national government to coordinate its activities, called Direccion General de 
Beneficiencia, Correcion y Sanidad (General Directorate of Charity, Reformation and Health). 
This name unveils a sort of social control function typical of social assistance measures in 
the nineteenth century11. In Spain as in the rest of Europe, the main purpose of public 
assistance was to isolate beggars in specific institutions, in many aspects similar to prisons, 
rather than responding to solidarity principles. 
As a result of these developments, in the mid-century charity was formally under the 
responsibility of local authorities. However, the almost permanent political and social 
                                                          
11 To this regards, it is also significant its placement within the Ministry of Public Order. 
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convulsion left the Catholic Church as the main - and in some geographical areas the only - 
institution able to provide assistance to the sick, the poor and elderly (Sarasa, 1993). 
In 1883, simultaneously with the creation of the first compulsory social insurance schemes 
in Germany, the "social question" entered in the Spanish debate. A "Commission of Social 
Reforms" was created, recognizing for the first time a state responsibility in the social field. 
This Commission was devoted to the drafting of legislative proposals, and aimed at 
creating a system of public compulsory insurances similar to the one introduced in many 
Western European countries in the late nineteenth century, beginning the slow transition 
from public’s charity services to the new concept of compulsory social insurance.The 
origins of the Spanish welfare state were profoundly influenced by the work of this 
commission (Guillén, 1990). Following its guidelines, the "Law on Workplaces Injuries" 
was approved in 1900, the Social Reforms Institute was created in 1903 and the National 
Insurances Institute (Instituto Nacional de Previsión, INP) was established in 1908. 
Throughout this decade, the INP promoted a private and voluntary system for the 
payment of old age pensions and accidental injuries insurance. With the unfolding of the 
revolutionary movement, which resulted in the general strike of 1917, the Spanish 
government was confronted with the limits of the existing social insurance schemes. It 
subsequently proposed new universal insurance schemes covering the risks of old age, 
sickness, unemployment and maternity. The strong opposition of employers and 
landowners, with the latter group supported by a large sector of the Catholic Church, only 
allowed the introduction of the first compulsory pension insurance scheme, limited to 
industrial workers (Naldini, 2003). These broader insurance proposals were then frozen by 
the advent of the dictatorship headed by General Primo de Rivera (1923– 30), supported by 
traditional oligarchic groups, which however maintained the old age insurance schemes 
and introduced maternity benefits in 192312.  
With the Second Republic it was launched a plan for a unified social insurance scheme. It 
was intended to consolidate existing social insurance schemes (retirement, old age, 
maternity), to introduce new ones (sickness, disability, unemployment), and afterwards to 
unify them into a single scheme. Despite republican policy-makers’ efforts, the only new 
                                                          
12 It established a maternity allowance and medical assistance during pregnancy for those working 
mothers who were paying contributions for old age insurance. 
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scheme introduced was the insurance against occupational injuries (1932), while 
insurances against illness and unemployment remained out of the compulsory system (cfr. 
Naldini, 2002). Few developments invested also assistance to the needy: the decree of 
August 23, 1934 created the Dirección General de Beneficiencia y Asistencia Social (Department 
of Charity and Social Assistance). Formally, this law introduced also an automatic right to 
social assistance, "recurrible ante los tribunales de justicia”. However, during the short-term 
experience of the Republic the fundamental nature of the social assistance sector did not 
change; it maintained its social control function and organizational dispersion, while the 
Catholic Church continued to play a primary role (Moreno and Sarasa, 1993).  
 
2.2 The autarchic phase of the Franco’s regime 
The development of the Spanish welfare state saw an abrupt interruption with the military 
uprising of Franco and the subsequent civil war. The seizure of power of Franco 
inaugurated a period characterized by a strong corporatist orientation, an attempt to 
achieve total autarchy in the economy with no foreign interference and efforts to promote 
a homogenous Catholic society under the auspices of a conservative Church (Pérez-Díaz, 
1993). In the meanwhile, social policy was largely neglected and oriented towards both 
charity and beneficence (Arriba and Moreno, 2002). 
The measures introduced in the early years of the Franco dictatorship are strongly 
influenced by the most reactionary sector of Spanish Catholicism and intended to create, as 
himself declared in 1937, “a State Catholic in the social” (Moreno and Sarasa, 1993). The 
(limited) state interventions aimed at maintaining social status differences and to promote 
a strong division of role based on gender13. The main interventions in the social policy field 
were designed to protect the dependent workers and to pursue the return of women from 
the factory to their household, "taking care of their husband and children". With this 
                                                          
13Even though here we mainly deal with social policies, it is relevant to notice that at the end of 
the civil war in 1939, Franco abolished all the legislative innovation introduced during the Second 
Republic supporting gender equality, including women’s right to vote, divorce by mutual consent, 
equal rights between spouses, and abortion, with the aim of making women completely 
dependent on their husband. 
74 
 
purpose a Family Subsidy14 was introduced in 1938 followed in 1945 by a supplementary 
wage system named Plus de cargas familiars (family bonuses): both measures supported the 
male breadwinner family model, they were paid directly to the father and they mostly 
aimed to encourage women to stay at home (Naldini, 2002). In the subsequent years an 
“Old Age and Disability Insurance” and a “Sickness Insurance” were introduced. Those 
measures provided limited cash transfers and health benefits targeted to a small 
proportion of the population, composed mostly of low-income industrial workers and 
their dependent family members (Guillén, 1990). 
Along with the compulsory social insurance, which has proven to be inadequate, the old 
system based on voluntary mutual insurance (mutualidades laborales)15 was restored, giving 
rise to a fragmented structure with several coverage holes. In combination with a very low 
and regressive taxation, it provided very little space for vertical redistribution. 
Public intervention for the non-working population remained paternalistic and supplied 
along charity lines. Social services were residual in the public sphere and they were 
integrated in the local and/or provincial administration. Monetary assistance to 
beneficiaries was provided in a discretionary manner in context of visible need, and it 
depended on available funds. The main innovation in this field was the creation of an 
authoritarian parastatal body, called Obra de Auxilio Social (Social Relief Work), by the 
fascist Falange, based upon the voluntary female work, in many cases forced by a 
compulsory social service for women along the lines of military conscription for men 
(Arriba and Moreno, 2002). Given the scarce public intervention in anti-poverty programs, 
subsidiary actions were carried out by private organizations, mainly associated to the 
Catholic Church, and by foundations such as the Red Cross and some quasi-public Saving 
Banks (obra sociale de las Cajas de Ahorro). As a resume, we can argue that social protection 
built in the early decades of the Franco regime rested on few mandatory social insurances 
of limited coverage, labour mutual societies and charity. 
 
                                                          
14It consisted of a monthly cash benefit paid directly to the jefe de familia (head of household) with 
at least two children, with the aim of alleviating poverty which was widespread especially among 
numerous families. 
15They consisted of social protection associations rooted in big firms or industrial/services 
branches. 
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2.3 Late Francoism and the roots of the Spanish welfare state. 
At the end of the 50s the autarchic model became untenable for the Franco regime, which 
was forced to promote changes in its economic and social policies. In an attempt to 
integrate the country into the international economy in fact, the Franco regime adopted a 
new deal that tried to combine an authoritarian political system with Keynesian demand 
policies (Rodríguez Cabrero, 2004, cfr. Naldini, 2002). A process of economic 
modernization open to foreign competition (and investments) was promoted in particular 
by a group of Opus Dei technocrats who, after a government reshuffle in 1957, hold key 
posts in Franco’s government. This period of economic ‘desarrollismo’ (developmentalism) 
was open by the implementation of the Stabilization Plan in 1959, which marked the 
turning point for the progressive liberalization of the economy and enabled Spain to gain 
from the expansive cycle in the international economy. In the 1960s we observe a 
substantial growth of the Spanish GDP16 and full employment was reached, although the 
migration of a great proportion of Spanish workers as well as the very limited female 
presence in the regular labour market were essential elements for this achievement. 
This context of rapid economic development and technocratic guidance opened up a new 
wave of social reform led from above that constitutes the roots of the modern Spanish 
social security system (Guillén, 2010; Rodríguez Cabrero, 2004,). With clear references to 
the Bismarckian model, a system of comprehensive compulsory public insurances was 
designed as the centre of the Spanish social system and experienced intense development 
in this period. In 1958 it was finally introduced the Unemployment Insurance; in 1963 the 
Basic Law of Social Security (Ley de Bases de la Seguridad Social), a fundamental law which 
aimed to unify into a single fund the various insurance instruments launched over time 
and to improve their coverage, through the elimination of eligibility requirements that 
made the system accessible only to low-income workers. Even though the mutualidades 
laborales were initially maintained, they withered away in subsequent years (Guillén, 2010). 
This first move towards a greater “universalization” was reinforced in 1972 when a reform 
of the Social Security, the Financing and Improvement Law (Ley de Financiación y 
                                                          
16 Between 1960 and 1974 the Spanish GDP grew at an average rate of 7.1% while industrial 
production increased by 10% annually (Garcia Delgado and Jimenez, 1999). 
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Perfeccionamiento) was implemented with the aim of expanding social protection, 
especially for what concerned temporary labour incapacity, unemployment and old-age 
pensions. The reform of the social protection system materialized also with other 
measures, such as the introduction of the minimum wage, again in 1963. As a consequence 
of those developments, social expenditure grew significantly during the 1960s: from 35.5% 
in 1960 to 55.9% in 1970 of the total public spending. It has to be highlighted, however, that 
this increase corresponded to a meagre 3% point of the GDP, and in 1970s social 
expenditure constituted only 10.2% of the GDP (Rodríguez Cabrero, 2004,). 
In the new architecture of the Spanish welfare state, social assistance maintained its 
secondary and residual role17, even though some legislative changes are observable also in 
this policy field. In 1960, several funds for financing assistance were legally established, 
such as the National Fund for Social Assistance (Fondo Nacional de Asistencia Social, 
FONAS). This Fund aimed to support charity institutions and to distribute subventions to 
develop social assistance services, which were characterized by the simultaneous presence 
of “public” and private charity. “Public charity” had a mandate to care for the needy and 
pretended to articulate, without being achieved in practice, a system of care structured 
along different territorial levels. Its regulation established obligations for public 
authorities, but those obligations remained mostly on paper18.  Moreover, this fund was 
characterized by disorganized and unclear criteria and the absence of a framework law 
that established a uniform regulation. Alongside those funds, from the late 60s social 
services were created within the Social Security, financed through contribution, and 
devoted in particular to retired poor workers.  
Private initiatives, given the scarcity of the public offer, were crucial in this policy field and 
were also affected by relevant changes. In the broad field of disabilities, mutual aid 
organizations had a very strong impulse, and particularly associations of parents of 
                                                          
17 A primary protective role was played by the families, and namely women, who were expected to 
stay home and look after children, the disabled and the elderly. Private initiatives corresponded to 
the second level of protection, with Catholic associations as the main actors. The State intervened 
only occasionally and residually. 
18The citizen had the legitimacy and the right to inform public authority about her circumstances, 
and the administration was obliged to take them into consideration, but she did not have an 
inherent right to demand the provision of the service (Aguilar, 2009). Therefore, differently than 
social insurance provisions, social assistance did not provide citizens with automatic social right.  
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children affected by disorders or disabilities started to play a very important role. In 
general, main changes in the social assistance realm were represented by the progressive 
embracement of the Social Catholicism doctrine by the Spanish Catholic Church and the 
erosion of its alliance with the Francoist state (Pérez-Diaz, 1993). This resulted in a 
reinforcement of its subsidiary role19 and in more modern and comprehensive course of 
action to contrast poverty, away from those traditional charities of mere relief to the needy, 
pursued in particular by the newly formed Caritas (Arriba and Moreno, 2002). 
In the early 70’s, economic growth and progressive industrialization, coupled with the 
opening of borders and the advent of mass tourism, transformed Spanish society, making 
it similar to Western Europe. These phenomena had unintended consequences for the 
regime, which from the Sixties had to deal with strikes and demonstrations of opposition 
emerging in the labour relations, in the universities and even in its relations with the 
Church (Bosco, 2005). 
The Franco’s regime, in search of legitimization, reacted by introducing expansionary 
measures in social protection, especially concerning temporary labour incapacity, 
unemployment and old age pensions. With the implementation of the General Education 
Law (Ley General de Educación) in 1970 and the General Social Security Law (Ley General 
de la Seguridad Social) in 1974, the level of public spending rose significantly. The 
population covered by health care insurance went from 55% in 1968 to 77% in 1973, while 
the number of pensions increased nearly eight times between 1960 and 1973 (Rodríguez 
Cabrero, 1993; 2004). Considerable wage increases also took place between 1974 and 1976. 
These factors set the basis for the subsequent climate of social consensus which allowed a 
peaceful transition to democracy (Arriba and Moreno, 2002; Rodríguez Cabrero, 2004).   
Therefore, at the end of the Francoist period the main bulk of social spending was directed 
to retirement pensions and unemployment benefits, while social assistance was 
                                                          
19While emphasizing the fundamental role of the Catholic Church in providing assistance to the 
more vulnerable sector of the population, it is however important to highlight that the regime also 
contributed all sorts of material resources to the Church, and with great generosity. The subsidies 
from the Francoist state were substantial: endowments to the clergy for the normal functioning 
and personal expenses of the secular clergy, wages and salaries of ecclesiastical personnel 
employed in the public administration; subsidies to church-run education; tax exemptions and 
direct investment in the construction or reconstruction of religious buildings (cfr. Pérez-Diaz, 
1991). 
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characterized by a scarce public financing. Private or non-profit institutions played an 
important role with long-standing consequences for the general coherence of the social 
assistance system and especially regarding its institutional fragmentation. Alongside 
FONAS, the Obra Social de Auxilio began in the 60s a path of gradual decline that would 
lead to its extinction in 1974 and to the creation of the National Institute of Social 
Assistance (INAS), with the aim of transforming the field of public charity in modern 
social assistance. Thus, from the end of the Sixties it started to take hold a conception of 
social assistance as a distinct level of protection complementary to social security. This 
level would encompass actions in the field of minimum income protection (social pensions 
and economic aid for the unemployed), health and social care. This process presented a lot 
of contradictions and it was implemented more on paper than in reality. 
This sector remained poorly developed and severely fragmented. Means-tested economic 
benefits for the elderly poor and the disabled shifted under the responsibility of the 
FONAS, even though they were largely discretionary and numerically insignificant. The 
small supply of social services was provided by a variety of public bodies: there was the 
centrally managed “Social Security System”, financed through contribution and 
institutionally separated both from the National Institute for Social Assistance (INAS)- the 
social services of the municipalities- and from the different national funds financed 
through general taxation (such as the National Fund for Social Assistance) introduced in 
1960. Fragmentation and absence of common standards were coupled with limited 
funding and absence of guaranteed automatic rights (sin garantia de derecho) similar to the 
one developed in other European countries.  
As a result, one could say that the development of social assistance in Spain during late 
Francoism was a half-hearted attempt, especially on paper, to transform public charity into 
a social assistance system complementary to the already established and compulsory social 
insurance system (cfr. Aguilar, 2009).  
To sum up, the Spanish welfare state of the mid- to late 1970s was an underdeveloped 
version of the Bismarckian model (Guillén, 2010). Public expenditure on social protection 
amounted to 17.1 percent of GDP, while the average for the EU15 was of 21.9 percent 
(Ibidem). The authoritarian welfare state (Rodríguez Cabrero, 2004) built during the late 
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Francoism was characterized by the prevalence of social insurance schemes, with a 
reduced coverage of unemployment benefits, and a very meagre system of social 
assistance, with family and care policies severely underdeveloped and absence of targeted 
benefits. The Church, benefiting from large state subsidies, and the family (namely 
women’s caring activities) substituted the state in the protection of the poor and socially 
excluded (Arriba and Moreno, 2002, Guillén, 2010).  
 
3. Transition to democracy and federalization of Mi policy in Spain 
At the time of the transition to democracy, the Spanish welfare state is confronted with 
two significant and tight challenges. In 1979 the oil crisis hit profoundly the Spanish 
economy which entered in a recession that lasted until mid-80, preventing the expansion 
and consolidation of the Spanish social protection system. Secondly, the unsolved problem 
of the relationship between the central state and local autonomies and the growing 
requests for greater territorial autonomy created the necessity for a new territorial model 
and a differentiated distribution of (social) competences among government levels. 
Concerning the first issue, from Franco’s death in 1975 until the victory of the Socialist 
Party (PSOE) in 1982, we assist to the consolidation of the Spanish welfare state, consisting 
in an expansion in terms of coverage and expenditure rather than structural reforms 
(Guillén, 1996). The 1978 Spanish Constitution confirms the centrality of the Social Security 
edifice for the social protection of its citizens, while maintaining the residual role and the 
institutional fragmentation of the social assistance sector. As noted, the institutional space 
of this policy area within the Spanish welfare edifice inherited from the regime is unclear, 
as a result of the fragmentation and the poor coordination between the social services 
connected with the social security system20 - the National Fund of Social Assistance 
financed via general taxation and managed by the central State21, and social services and 
emergency discretionary benefit managed by the municipalities. The Spanish Magna 
                                                          
20 It is in this period we observe a re-structuring of the social services financed through 
contribution and managed centrally within the “Social Security” system, with the grouping of 
services related to old age and disability within the National Institute of Social Services (INSERSO) 
and the creation of the National Institute for Employment (INEM). 
21 It financed mainly the non-contributory old age and disability pensions, which until 1990 (see 
below) were fragmented and not automatic social right. 
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Charta did not resolve this institutional ambiguity but rather confirmed social assistance’ 
juridical subordination: the constitutional provisions neither defined nor regulated the 
non-contributory realm of social assistance and social services. Within the Constitution of 
1978, some individual social rights are listed (social security for all citizens, Art. 41), 
protection of the family (Article 39) as well as protection of disabled persons (Art.49) and 
support to the elderly (Art. 50), while there is no clear definition of the right to social 
assistance, a circumstance that led some authors to consider it a weak and conditional 
right (Aznar, 1994). 
This is also due to the collision of constitutional definition of citizenship right with a very 
complex and politically salient decentralization processes. The VIII title of the Spanish 
Constitution did not establish neither a list of Autonomous Communities22  nor a complete 
index of the functions under the jurisdiction of these new-born institutions, but rather 
provided a range of functions which the meso-governments may choose to exercise, while 
the others would have remained in the hands of the central state. All those powers and 
responsibilities which were not listed as ‘exclusive competences’ of the central government 
could be claimed and exercised by the Autonomous Communities (art 149.3). As a 
consequence of the flexibility of the constitutional provisions and the vague definition of 
the social assistance field, between 1982 and 1993 all ACs claimed in their Statutes of 
Autonomy a large number of services and functions concerning social assistance, and 
welfare policies in general (cfr. Arriba and Moreno, 2002). The only services which 
remained outside the request of the sub-national governments were those internal to the 
Social Security area (the INSERSO).  
The surge of regional laws, despite increasing the fragmentation of the system and 
strengthening the duality between the “solid” encompassing social insurance system for 
dependent workers and their families managed by the State and the residual regional 
social assistance for all those excluded to the Social Security, would however result in the 
overall modernization of the system. 
                                                          
22 The Spanish Magna Charta establishes only the procedures that provinces and municipalities 
must follow to become Autonomous Communities. On the decentralization process in Spain, see 
Aja 2003, Baldi 1998, Börzel 2002, Moreno, 2001. 
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The absence of a clear definition and institutional space of the sector was indeed a source 
of inter-institutional friction, and allowed the introduction of important measures also by 
the central government, especially in the field of disability and old age. In 1982 the Law on 
the Social Integration of Disabled was approved (Ley de Integracion Social de Minusvalido), 
introducing benefits for the working age population with severe disabilities (of more than 
75%). Such a reform constituted a path deviating change from previous policies that left 
responsibilities in this field to charities and private associations, even though it suffered 
from insufficient budget and had a skewed orientation towards economic benefits at the 
expense of social services (Vicente Marban, 2010). 
Alongside this articulated decentralization process, in the period between 1982 and 1992 
the socialist governments undertook a series of reforms to strengthen the protective ability 
of the Spanish welfare state. Particularly relevant was the reform of the unemployment 
benefit23, which reinforced their coverage and generosity and introduced a second 
unemployment assistance pillar24. Moreover, a “third” unemployment benefit (Subsidio 
Agrario) for the agricultural sector was introduced in 1983, with the characteristic that 
eligibility for the program was limited to rural workers in Andalucía and Extremadura25. 
Despite these ambitions and efforts, many needs were left unattended by the Socialist 
reforms. Benefits did not reach part of the unemployed, who either had labour trajectories 
that were too short to meet the eligibility criteria, or had been informally employed in the 
underground economy. While more experienced workers (and the elderly in general) 
                                                          
23Those changes were introduced by Law 31/1984. In 1989 R.D. Law 3/1989 introduced 
amelioration in the second pillar of unemployment benefits, especially for long term unemployed. 
As a result of those reforms, coverage of the unemployed passed from 43.4% in 1984 to 80.3% in 
1992 (Cruz Roche, 1994). 
24In Spain, age and family conditions affects benefit levels and also eligibility to the second pillar. 
Thus, a jobless person over 45 was eligible even without dependents, as long as they had 
exhausted at least twelve months of unemployment insurance. Moreover, the unemployed over 
the age of 52 and those eligible for a retirement pension were allowed to receive unemployment 
assistance for an indefinite period, that is, until they reached the retirement age at 65. In contrast, 
few young people qualified for assistance. Entering the labour market as an unemployed person 
did not constitute benefit eligibility, and only those who had contributed sufficiently could receive 
unemployment insurance, which was key to subsequently receiving unemployment assistance 
under the conditions previously outlined. 
25 Workers who were inscribed in the agricultural social security regime and who had worked sixty 
days in the agrarian sector during the previous year were eligible for an unemployment benefit 
equal to 75 percent of the minimum income for six months of the year. Benefit duration was 
directly related to the number of days worked, but the scale used was more favourable to older 
workers than to young people, unless the latter had dependents. 
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became the main beneficiaries of those reforms, younger workers and families remained 
largely outside from the protective net provided by those social policies. Those 
shortcomings are particularly relevant because the 1984 labour market regulation reform 
contribute to the flexibilisation and progressive segmentation of the Spanish labour 
market, through the liberalization of fixed-terms contract, although the ordinary 
framework for contracting remained untouched. 
Paradigmatic changes were introduced in the health sector with the General Health Law of 
1986, which created a universal national health system, with competences gradually 
devoluted to the Communidades Autonomas (Guillén, 2002). Partially different was the 
policy trajectory in the pension field, where the socialist government introduced in 1985 a 
restrictive reform, aimed to ensure its future financial sustainability (Guillén, 2010). 
Even though the Social Security system continued to be “solid” and well developed, 
important improvements were achieve also regarding social assistance. In particular, in 
1988 it was established the Ministry of Social Affairs, that promoted the modernization of 
the system26, and in 199027 was introduced a flat rate non-contributory pension for the 
elderly and the disabled. Social services were improved especially in the provision of 
childcare, even though they remained underdeveloped in reason of the very low initial 
condition.  
To summarize, in the period between 1982 and 1992, under the socialist governments we 
assist to an expansion both in term of generosity and coverage of the unemployment 
system, the universalization of the health sector, the introduction of flat rate means tested 
benefit for the (poor) disabled and old people, while social services began their thwarted 
path towards modernization. Despite overall improvements, the social protection system 
still lacked a comprehensive safety net directed to all citizens in condition of need. 
 
                                                          
26 In particular, the adoption of concerted plan with the CAs (in disparate field such as Old-age, 
Drug Addiction, Equal Opportunities, or Youth) aimed at creating uniform criteria in the field of 
social services valid in the whole Spain. Moreover, they paved the way for the future transfer of 
the social services of the INSERSO to the regional systems of social services. 
27 The Non Contributory Pensions and Benefits act (1990) guaranteed a pension to the disabled 
unable to work and to those above the age of 65 without means who had not the minimum 
contributions necessary to qualify for contributory pension.  
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4. The introduction of regional minimum income schemes (1988 – 1995).  
At the end of the 1980s, Spain displayed a weak system of minimum income protection for 
the working age population. Public intervention in the anti-poverty field was provided 
locally and with great territorial differentiation, while the family was ultimately 
responsible for the well-being of its member (Naldini, 2002). 
The introduction of the Revenu Minimum d’Insertion (Minimum Insertion Income) in 
neighbouring France and the entry into the European Union, with the consequent 
participation to the Poverty Programs launched by the European Commission, contributed 
to prompt a political debate on poverty and social exclusion. In particular, religious 
associations drew attention on anti-poverty policies and minimum income protection. 
Since January 1986, Caritas Spain officially supported the introduction of a comprehensive 
safety net, a decision followed by an intense advocacy at national and local level. On the 
other hand, social workers’ professional associations assumed a more tepid position 
towards the adoption of a Mis, since they would have preferred to strengthen the structure 
and the organic of the social service system (Aguilar, 2009). 
Requests to introduce a last resort safety net were strongly backed by both Spanish trade 
unions - Comisiones Obreras (CC. OO.) and Unión General de Trabajadores (UGT) which 
included a Minimun Income Scheme (Mis) in the Propuesta Sindical Prioritaria (Union 
Priorities Proposal, PSP) signed on October 1989 (Arriba and Moreno, 2005). This proposal 
was addressed to the national government and to all the Autonomous Communities 
(ACs). Moreover, some parties systematically included a minimum income scheme within 
their electoral programs at national and regional level: with different accents and forms, 
this is the case of left parties such as Izquierda Unida (Maravall, 1990) and of parties of 
Christian Democratic tradition such as Centro Democratico Social (Revilla, 1990), or 
regionalist centrist parties such as Partido Nacionalista Vasco and Convergencia Y Unio in 
Cataluna. Notwithstanding those pressures, the Spanish socialist government opposed 
means-tested benefit against poverty and preferred to focus its initiatives in other policy 
field (Arriba, 1999; see Chapter 5).  
Against this background, in Spain the dynamics of welfare state change collided with 
spatial policy rescaling, leading sub-national units to introduce regional minimum income 
84 
 
schemes. In particular, we observe two distinct paths across ACs, both leading to the 
introduction of regional anti-poverty measures. In the Basque Country, Cataluña and 
Navarra, regionalist centre parties, with strong organizational ties with the catholic 
movement, supported the introduction of regional safety nets, not least with a “region 
building” purpose. In all the other ACs, trade unions were able to negotiate with regional 
governments the introduction of Mis: in the short period between the end of 1989 and 
1991, social partners and subnational government signed social pacts which included 
regional Mis (see Chapter 8).  
As a result of these distinct processes, in the brief period between 1989-95 all Autonomous 
Communities introduced public anti-poverty programs that – despite significant variation- 
combined a monetary support   with measures to promote social and labour market 
integration (Arriba and Moreno, 2005). 
Regional safety nets constituted in Spain a path departure from the weak original model – 
providing protection to all those previously uncovered citizens with an income below an 
established threshold and non-possessing the contribution necessary to access to 
unemployment benefits, embodying therefore the “selective universalism” principle 
(Jessoula and Alti, 2010). Despite the heterogeneity of their institutional design - in terms 
of generosity, eligibility criteria, coverage and activation measures – it is possible to 
identify the main features of the Spanish minimum income protection system at the 
beginning of the Nineties.  
First, entitlement to Mis rested on subjective and judiciable rights as well as on codified 
administrative procedures only in a very limited number of cases; in most regions access 
to these programs largely depended on discretionary administrative decisions, these in 
turn being conditional on both the amount of resources made available in annual budget 
laws and the political will of regional administrations. Given the high regional 
differentiation in terms of budget available for those programs, it was possible that where 
poverty was more widespread, the chances to access were more limited, when not almost 
entirely precluded. 
Secondly, resources allocated for these measures were extremely limited. In 1996, total 
expenditure for regional safety net was below 0.03% of the GDP. Therefore, regional Mis 
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provided a modest economic support to a very narrow segment of the population, i.e. they 
were residual schemes aimed at combating very extreme conditions of poverty. Benefit 
amounts – and, thus, access threshold - were well below 50% of the minimum wage. 
Equivalence scales were regionally differentiated, but with the exception of the Basque 
Country, for a household composed of four persons the benefit amount was significantly 
lower than the minimum wage. This feature had not only the effect that in most regions 
the benefit was inadequate to lift households - especially numerous - above the poverty 
line, but also severely limited the segment of the population that could access. The 
presence of patrimonial and behavioural requirements (see below), as well as strong 
budgetary constraints, further restricted the possibility to access: as a result, in 1993, only 
0.19% of Spanish households, a very limited part of poor Spaniards, had access to these 
measures. 
Thirdly, territorial fragmentation was evident: it regarded available resources, benefit 
generosity, coverage, institutional as well as social inclusion elements. Regional 
expenditure did not only vary greatly from one region to another, it was also frequently 
lower in those regions where poverty rates were higher. Increasing the complexity of the 
system, each region introduced a mosaic of different means-tested benefits rather than a 
unique, inclusive and organic Mis, and it was not unusual that, in addition to these 
measures, other forms of economic support took into account the specific housing and/or 
training needs. Moreover, the system lacked inter-territorial coordination mechanisms 
(Ayala, 2012) both with national and municipal means-tested poor relief measures. 
Fourthly, those measures were not only aimed at alleviating poverty, but also aimed at the 
social and possibly labour (re-)insertion of beneficiaries. Therefore, those measures had a 
contractual nature, requiring the signing, at least on paper, of a concerted plan between the 
social services and the beneficiaries. Especially in a first phase those measures differed 
widely regarding their social integration component (Aguilar, Gaviria and Laparra, 1995): 
broadly speaking, we can divide them between regions providing social and – rarely - 
labour market services and those favouring the direct creation of public jobs in municipal 
or regional government as the main form of social re-integration. Both form of social 
inclusion - but especially the provision of services - were limited by severe implementation 
gaps. The presence of very strict behavioural requirements was another striking 
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characteristic of Spanish minimum income schemes. According to the regional laws, if the 
beneficiary were to make a loosely defined “improper” use of the monetary allowance 
and/or did not guarantee adequate caring of underage children, social workers could 
withdraw the benefit. Since such strong conditionality was rarely accompanied by services 
that allowed to effectively overcome social problems, in many regional cases the threat of 
losing the subsidy appeared as the only social integration measure.  
Finally, to strengthen the introduction and development of new regional systems of 
income protection in most of the regions were introduced new institutional bodies, the 
Comisión de Seguimiento and the Comisión de Coordinación, made of the regional government 
- in particular of the departments of labor and social policies - municipalities and trade 
unions and employers' organizations. The former role was to ensure the proper 
implementation of the scheme, to collect data regarding the number of requests and grants 
awarded, and to provide the regional government with an annual assessment; the latter 
aimed to ensure both vertical and horizontal integration between the different institutional 
bodies deputed to the administration of the measure, i.e. region, municipalities, provinces, 
as well as the various associations that deal with social and professional reintegration. 
Both of these institutions could intervene in the policy-making process advancing 
proposals for improvements. These institutional innovations are relevant since they 
indicate the intention of the CAs to become the main actor in the field of anti-poverty 
policies, expressing the will - at least on paper - to perform a directive and controlling 
function between the various instruments deployed on the territory and encouraging the 
interaction between the different actors potentially active in the fight against social 
exclusion. 
With the approval in the Balearic Islands of Decree 36/1995, all CAs had introduced anti-
poverty measures: path departure from the original model was thus completed. Despite 
the relevance of this institutional innovation for the Spanish welfare state, in the mid-1990s 
the Mip system still appeared strongly residual and comparatively underdeveloped 
(Aguilar, Gaviria and Laparra, 1995). 
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5. A lost decade? Regional Mis between policy inertia and limited activation   
In the mid-1990s the period of expansion of social spending in Spain and creation of 
regional system of social assistance gave way to another characterized by concern for 
rationalization, maintenance and viability of the system of social protection, focused 
especially in securing its financing (Rodríguez-Cabrero, 2004). Meanwhile, during the 
1990s and early 2000s, Spain experienced an (uncompleted) transition towards a “post-
industrial” order, which profoundly altered occupational structures, as well as family and 
gender relations. The emerging service economy opened up new employment 
opportunities for women, the young and other “outsiders” (often migrants), often at a 
heavy cost in terms of the quality of those newly created jobs. In this rapidly changing 
context, a growing number of people struggled against the consequences of intermittent 
labour careers, being stuck in a low-skill low-wage occupation, badly protected against 
unemployment as a result of an unstable career path, unable to balance paid work and 
family responsibilities, becoming a lone parent, reaching old age and becoming frail 
without family support, etc.  
During the late 1990s and early 2000s, the Spanish economy experienced also an intense 
growth: on average, between 1995 and 2005 the GDP grew of 3.9 percentage points per 
year, whereas unemployment decreased from 20.7% in 1995 to 9.2% in 2005. Even though 
this did not translate in a reduction of poverty and social exclusion (Ayala, 2012), those 
trends contributed to remove poverty from the political agenda: the introduction of a 
national Mis was never proposed by any political party in the parliamentary debate and, at 
least at the national level, it did not rank high in trade unions’ bargaining agenda. Despite 
that, in 2000 a new scarcely financed scheme28  - called Renta Activa de Inserción (RAI) – 
was introduced, aiming at labour market re-insertion of long term unemployed, aged 45 
plus, who have exhausted their unemployment benefits and have family dependents. This 
measure strengthened Mip in Spain while contributing to sector fragmentation. 
Also at the regional level inertia prevailed in the field of Mip, leading some authors to 
label this decade as a sort of travesía del desierto (lit. journey across the desert) (Laparra, 
2004). In fact, the most critical nodes of the regional Mip were left almost untouched.  
                                                          
28 In 2004 the total number of beneficiaries of the RAI were 39.253. 
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However, similar to the path departure phase, strong territorial differences existed. In fact, 
few regions – most notably Cataluna, Madrid and Navarra, which transformed their 
residual safety net into a right-based Mis – introduced significant reforms that made 
substantial improvement in their Mip system.  
The majority of the CAs made only incremental legislative interventions, in most cases 
increasing – although limitedly – benefit amount and coverage rate, whereas other regions 
did not intervene at all in this policy field. As a result, total regional expenditure for the 
Mis rose limitedly, from 165 million euro in 1996 to around 350 million in 2005, i.e. the 
0,04% of the Spanish GDP. This growth is inadequate and territorially differentiated - 
caused in particular by the decision of the Basque country to extend the Mis coverage to 
poor elderly in 2000, de facto resulting in an expenditure growth of 114.3% between 2000 
and 2004. Significant expenditure increase affect however also other CAs, in particular 
those who have introduced expansionary reforms and where programs were already more 
developed in the first phase (Cataluna, Madrid, Navarra, but also Galicia and Castile and 
Léon). 
The generosity of regional minimum income schemes increased in almost all regional 
contexts, even though benefit amount remained well below the minimum wage and/or the 
relative poverty threshold. If in 1997 the average amount of the benefit for a single person 
was equal to 235.7 euro - 58% of the minimum wage - in 2004 it was equal to 318 euro. 
Behind those data persisted regional differences, with benefit amounts ranging from 249 
euro in Cantabria to 426 euro in the Basque Country - a striking difference considering that 
those are two neighbouring CAs with very similar cost living standards.  
Since the access threshold became slightly higher, Mis coverage, (slowly) increased: 
household beneficiaries passed from 63.714 in 1996 to 96.899 in 2004. This very slow 
process of increase of coverage was however inadequate vis à vis the needs of the 
population, since only a limited share of the extremely poor could have access to those 
benefit: in 2004, the severe poverty rate – i.e. the percentage of people with an income 
below 40% of the median income – was 7.4%, whereas only 0.6% of the population 
received Mis.  
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Alongside these partial improvements, this phase is characterized by both the 
participation of many CAs to the European OMC process and the diffusion of the 
activation paradigm in accordance with the directives of the Lisbon strategy (Pérez 
Eransus, Arriba and Parrilla, 2009). This resulted in a change of the nature of regional Mis, 
which, similarly to other European countries, are to a greater extent conditional on the 
recipients willingness to work and increasingly assume a “reintegrative” function 
(Moreira, 2008). 
In particular, in most regions the creation of subsidized jobs – i.e. “socially useful jobs” - in 
public offices ceased to be the main social integration tool, even though they remained one 
of the possible activation strategies in some CAs (eg. Galicia, Madrid, Navarra) (Laparra, 
2004). Conversely, since the beginning of the 2000s, many CA’s increased their effort in 
linking economic support with different services, especially devoted to the labour market 
(re) integration of Mis beneficiaries. This process included two different dimensions. On 
the one hand, it is increasingly mandatory for beneficiaries to be active in the job search 
(Perez Eransus, Arriba and Parrilla, 2009). In particular, it becomes common to find in 
regional laws references to the duty of labour market integration, formal requirements not 
to refuse any job, and greater controls over beneficiaries - who are increasingly demanded, 
at least formally, to present themselves to the appropriate offices whenever required. On 
the other hand, we see attempts to facilitate the horizontal integration between 
employment and social services, in an effort to move towards an individualized and 
multidimensional approach that should strengthen individual ability to participate in the 
labour market. Many regional laws include the overarching goal of integrating social 
services and employment centres, sometimes also introducing – at least formally – plans to 
fight the marginalization of Mis beneficiaries through the combined action of housing, 
health, education, labour and social departments. This integrated approach is particularly 
pronounced in the community of Madrid, where access to financial support is tied to an 
intensive take-over by social services, which are required to assess beneficiaries’ 
competencies and social problems, to stipulate a personalized program that included 
measures of physical, mental, social and of family support, and to ensure the effective 
implementation of those measures through time. The Madrid case is not isolated, as many 
AC’s introduces cross-sectoral plans with the specific goal of social inclusion, under the 
90 
 
impulse of the European Union OMC process (Perez Eransus, Arriba and Parrilla, 2009).  
However, implementation gap and the limited financing of employment and social 
services meant that the activation strategy has concretized mostly in its first dimension, 
namely aimed at kick-starting the unemployed’ return to work (Rodríguez-Cabrero, 2009). 
At the same time, the development of insertion programs constitutes a significant novelty 
in the Spanish social service tradition, constituting an important advance in social 
intervention (Ayala, 2012), despite the usual limitation in terms of territorial differentiation 
and implementation difficulties. 
We may therefore conclude that in this decade, the most relevant weaknesses of the 
Spanish Mis system were not overcome. Regional Mis remained mainly discretional, 
highly residual, and in many case also predominantly passive. At the same time, some 
promising seeds were introduced in some front-runners CAs. Moreover, regional anti-
poverty programs changed in many cases their nature and governance structure, moving 
towards an integrated and multi-dimensional approach which, however, in many regional 
cases did not result concretely in an increase in their protective capacity. 
 
6. Facing the crisis: policy expansion of regional minimum income schemes. 
The Great Recession had a tremendous impact on the policy trajectories of regional Mis in 
Spain. At the national level, the onset of the financial and subsequently economic crisis 
deeply influenced the policy trajectories of the Spanish welfare state, which in the first 
years of the new Socialist government experienced a new expansionary period (Guillén, 
2010). In 2006 a major reform of the labour market was introduced which aimed to reduce 
the segmentation and progressive dualization of the Spanish labour market, while in the 
pension field Law 2006 introduced an amelioration of both contributory and non-
contributory benefits. In particular, in the field of new social risks, Zapatero’s governments 
introduced a wide range of measures, including initiatives to facilitate the residential 
autonomy of young people (Gentile and Mayer Duque, 2009), to promote female 
employment and the conciliation of work and family life (through an unprecedented 
expansion of child and elderly care schemes), and to encourage fertility as well as helping 
young families through birth grants. Particularly relevant in the social assistance field in is 
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the introduction in 2006 of the so-called Dependency Law (Law 3/2006), a framework law 
setting minimum standards to be guaranteed throughout the country in the field of social 
services for disabilities29. Also in reason of a very low initial amount, social protection 
expenditure on family/children policies increased beyond the European average between 
2004 and 2010 (36% over this period, only below the Irish growth rate for this area of 
policies within the EU-15) (cfr. Marí-Klose, Moreno-Fuentes and del Pino, 2013). 
The onset of the financial and subsequently economic crisis deeply influenced this 
trajectory and substantially puts an end to these expansive trends. In the short period from 
2008 to 2013, GDP declined of 7.3 points, while the number of unemployed dramatically 
increased from 8.3% in 2007 to 24.5% in 2014. As for poverty and social exclusion, all 
European indicators reveals the dramatic social consequences of the recession: the 
“anchored” poverty rate reached 22.2% of the population in 2013 – with a growth of 1.9% 
from 2008, the third most relevant increase in the Eu28 after Greece and Portugal – 
whereas the “severe poverty rate” reached 9.3% of the population (+ 1.9%) (Jessoula, 
Matsaganis and Natili, 2015). 
The initial reaction of the Socialist government – from March 2008 to November 2011 - was 
to use social protection as an instrument to mitigate the adverse effects of the crisis on the 
population. In 2009 it was introduced a “Temporary programme for unemployment 
protection and integration’ (PRODI) with the aim of expand unemployment benefits to 
those workers whose benefits had already run out30. More in general, no restrictive 
reforms were approved until 2011, when the reform of the pension system was practically 
imposed on the country by the EU and the public debt crisis. In the health care sphere, 
restrictive measures have been approved regarding rationalizing the costs of 
pharmaceutical services (Law 4/2010) (Guillén et al., 2009 and 2010; CES 2010-2011). 
Simultaneously, the crisis actually prompted the re-launch of a debate about the possible 
                                                          
29 Similarly to the Gender Equality Act (2007), the implementation of this Law has been hampered 
by a clear lack of resources. This is in part due to the crisis’s impact on the public budget, but it is 
also because the sources of financing were not clearly defined (Sarasa, 2012, Rodríguez Cabrero 
and Marbán Gallego, 2013). 
30 This program – reformed several times in the last years, and nowadays called Plan Prepara - 
consists of a means tested benefit of 400 euro for the unemployed under 65 who have exhausted 
other benefit rights and whose families have no other source of income. The strong conditionality 
as well as the impossibility to receive twice the benefit severely limits the number of beneficiaries 
(Arriba, 2014). 
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introduction of a national safety net. Trade unions, in particular, made an official proposal 
to the government in 2014; NGO’s – and especially EAPN Spain - backed the proposal by 
Comisiones Obreras. Also some political parties actively called for reinforcing minimum 
income protection: among these, Izquierda Unida – which had failed to create a 
commission aimed at studying the viability of a national minimum income scheme in 2007 
and had traditionally supported trade unions’ proposals in this field – and lately Podemos 
which has included the establishment of a national means-tested safety net in his political 
programme. Despite pressures, mounting unemployment and poverty, national measures 
in the field of last resort income support remained extremely weak and no social rights 
were introduced to fight absolute poverty. 
In this context, despite increasing budgetary constraints and strong pressures towards 
containing sub-national expenditure (Del Pino and Pavolini, 2015), between 2007 and 2014 
a significant – though possibly not sufficient - expansion of regional safety nets is apparent 
in Spain. This was very often the consequence of a political exchange between regional 
governments and trade unions, where the latter obtained the expansion of last resort safety 
nets and the former legitimacy and sharing responsibilities regarding public policies. This 
expansion touched almost all the relevant weaknesses of the Spanish Mip system.  
Many regions introduced in fact ameliorative legislative changes in the definition of the 
subjective right to access to this benefit. Particularly relevant is the approval of Law 4 of 
2005 in Asturias, which marks a turning point for regional Mis paving the way for a series 
of legislative changes aimed at formal recognition of the right to a minimum amount of 
resources necessary to maintain decent living standards. This right has been announced in 
the new Statutes of Autonomies that were approved in 2006 and 2007 in six regions: 
Andalusia, Aragón, Baleares, Castilla y Leon, Catalonia, Extremadura and the Valencian 
Community. More concretely, the legal right to access these measures is afterwards 
recognized in specific laws in Cantabria (Ley 2/2007), Castilla y Leon (Ley 7/2010), 
Extremadura (Ley 9/2014), Galicia (Ley 10/2013) and La Rioja (Ley 7/2009), in addition to 
regions that already did so (Cataluña, Madrid, Navarra and the Basque Country). 
Incremental legislative improvements were introduced in other regions such as Murcia 
(Ley 3/2007), Valencian Community (Ley 9/2007), where it is attenuated the extremely 
residual character of the measure, although those CA’s constitute nowadays in Spain – 
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jointly with the Balearic Islands, Canaries, and Castile La Mancha – the only CA’s where 
the possibility to access is still subject to budgetary constraints (Ministerio de Sanidad, 
Servicios Sociales, e Igualdad, 2015). 
Additionally, beneficiaries more than doubled in the same period and the coverage rate 
increased from 0,6% in 2006 to 1,45% in 2014 (Fig. 3). Although generalized, this growth is 
regionally differentiated: in the Basque Country coverage rate grew of more than 4 
percentage points while in Castilla - LaMancha less than 0.4 and in Murcia of 0.5. These 
developments suggest a trend towards greater fragmentation of minimum protection in 
Spain, which - far from decreasing - has grown since the early-2000s. 
Mis expansion in Spain is not simply a reflection of rising caseloads, since benefit levels 
also increased in real terms. The amount of the average benefit shifted from 353 euros per 
month in 2006 (56% of the minimum wage) to 430 euros (65.7%) in 2014. Regional 
differences remained relevant, since the basic benefits amount ranges from 300 euro in 
Murcia to 666 € in the Basque Country. Those differences are even greater if we consider 
larger households: four-member households receive up to 434 euro in the Valencian 
Community, 945,88 in the Basque Country. 
 
Figure 6 Evolution of total expenditure and household beneficiaries of Mis in Spain, selected years. 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration on Ministerio de Sanidad, Servicios Sociales e Igualdad 
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The combination of enhanced legal guarantees, higher thresholds for accessing the benefit 
and the social consequences of the economic crisis, resulted in a significant expansion of 
total expenditure on Spanish regional Mis, which increased from around €360 million in 
2006 to almost 1.2 billion in 2014 (Fig. 6). Although the total expenditure as well as the 
number beneficiaries increased in all CAs this joint representation hides considerable 
differences, as spending particularly increased in special financing regions (Navarra and 
the Basque Country). However, it is important to underline that those trends are 
generalized: in all CA’s, generosity, coverage and expenditure increased during the Great 
Recession, especially in the period between 2008 and 2012. 
What appears particularly important – especially in comparative perspective - is that 
expenditure for regional Mis grew in a period of strong budgetary constraints. If we 
consider a standard measure of “welfare effort” – i.e. Mis expenditure as a percentage of 
total regional budgets – this increased significantly in all Spanish regions, also limiting our 
analysis to the regions with “ordinary” forms of financing (Fig. 7). Particularly impressive 
is the expansion in some CA’s – such as Aragon, Cantabria, Extremadura and La Rioja – 
that prior to the crisis had very residual safety nets (Fig. 7). 
 
Figure 7 Expenditure for Mis as a % of total regional budget, selected years, ordinary financing CAs 
 
Source: Author elaboration on Ministerio de Sanidad, Servicios Sociales e Igualdad, several years 
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Finally, along with policy expansion, this period is characterized by the introduction of 
some institutional innovations further in the direction of stronger conditionality and 
activation. In particular, we observe the diffusion in all Autonomous Communities of 
complex sanction mechanisms – previously existent in the Community of Madrid and the 
Basque Country only - that intervene in cases in which beneficiaries do not comply with 
the plan agreed with the social services, or commit frauds to gain access to the benefit. In 
the majority of regional Misa gradual curtailment of the monetary benefit depending on 
the severity and/or the cumulative nature of the beneficiary “faults” was in fact 
introduced. 
Besides that, innovations are introduced in certain regions, with the aim of addressing the 
so-called poverty trap and making “more convenient to return to work”. In some regions – 
and especially Aragon and Castile and Léon – income deductions have been introduced 
allowing to combine income from work and minimum income, along the same lines of 
what is happening in many other European countries. In the Basque Country and in 
Castile and Léon alongside the traditional safety net have been introduced special services 
and treatments for workers benefiting of anti-poverty schemes. Moreover, in some CAs the 
regional safety net is nowadays managed by the employment centre rather than the social 
services. Those approaches are in line with the stronger emphasis posed on labour market 
integration typical of many CAs – and European countries -, but are interesting because 
seem to go in the direction of reducing the extremely residual approach typical of regional 
Mis in Spain, and to address the increasingly thorny issue of working poverty. 
 
6. The uncoordinated Spanish Minimum Income Protection Model today 
In the previous paragraphs we analysed the policy trajectories of regional anti-poverty 
safety net in Spain, which from a series of discretionary regional measures aimed at 
relieving the most marginalized and at risk of exclusion segment of the population, have 
become - in most regional cases - a right based income support measure targeted to the 
individuals with an income below a pre-defined threshold, independently from their social 
and labour market situation. What appears particularly significant about this trajectory is 
that expansion of regional safety nets – in term of expenditure, coverage, benefits and 
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welfare effort – has occurred in all Spanish Autonomous Communities, although in a 
differentiated way. Moreover, this trajectory appears uni-directional: in no case - to our 
knowledge - regional Mis have been subjects to severe subtractive reforms, even though 
substantive efforts to control public expenditure are evident in some cases (e.g. Madrid, 
Catalona). The main question is therefore whether Spain has finally overcome the barriers 
that have traditionally impeded the construction of a minimum income protection system 
in Southern Europe, thus finally catching up with “European standards” in this policy 
field. If this is the case, this twenty-five years long trajectory can be actually defined as one 
of a gradual institutionalization (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010) of a minimum income 
protection system. In order to answer this question, in this final paragraph, we highlight 
the peculiarities – both positive and negative - of the Spanish system of minimum income 
protection in comparative perspective. 
 
6.1 Low coverage and territorial inequality: the limits of the uncoordinated Spanish model 
In the previous paragraph, we highlighted that through a series of legislative reforms, 
most of the regional safety nets – with the exception of Balearic Islands, Canaries, Murcia 
and Valencian Community – have removed budgetary constraints, so that nowadays a 
person who is formally entitled to the benefit, yet excluded, has the right to appeal to a 
court. Still, Mis beneficiaries – although increasing – are well below the number of people 
experiencing economic hardship in Spain (Arriba, 2014). Partially this is a trend observable 
in all industrialized countries: a study recently published by Eurofound [2014] concluded 
that all the estimates made over the years - related to various countries and using different 
methodologies - show percentages of not take up greater than 40%, so that it is quite 
normal – although, perhaps, not acceptable - to have more poor than social assistance 
beneficiaries. However, this appears a particularly worrying phenomenon in Spain, since 
the distance between Mis beneficiaries and the share of people experiencing material 
deprivation is among the highest in Europe (Tab.5) 
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Tab. 5 Coverage rate of Mis vs material deprivation rate in 2014, selected countries 
Country Mis Coverage  Material Deprivation 
Rate 
Percentage point 
difference 
 
Austria 2,8% 4% - 1,2% 
Denmark 4,9% 3,2% + 1,7% 
France 5,6% 4,8% + 0,8% 
Netherlands 1,9% 3,2% - 1,3% 
Portugal 1,9% 10,6% - 8,7% 
United 
Kingdom 
3,1% 7,3% - 4,2% 
Spain 1,4% 7,1% - 5,7% 
Source: Author elaboration from National Statistical Offices and Eurostat 
 
Some specific characteristics of the regional anti-poverty measures contribute to explain 
such undesirable record. Firstly, the Spanish Mi system is still among the most complex in 
Europe. The absence of a common regulatory framework allows for very different regional 
requirements and procedures, increasing the asymmetries on information between 
administration and beneficiaries that frequently are among the most frequently cited 
causes of high level of non-take-up of social assistance benefits (Matsaganis et al., 2008). In 
top of that, regions have adopted very unclear and elaborated selection procedures, 
severely undermining the possibility of potential beneficiaries to access to regional safety 
nets, particularly in reason of their socio-demographic characteristics – i.e. low education 
and income levels.  
Secondly, patrimonial requirements are often very stringent in the Spanish case, 
significantly decreasing the number of potential beneficiaries. As an example, in Castile 
and Léon owing a small and non-rentable house in the countryside – which is very 
common in this part of the country – is sufficient to have precluded the possibility to 
access to the regional safety nets. Moreover, migrants have to demonstrate that they do not 
have similar possession in their native countries, so that they have to obtain the necessary 
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documents – often requiring to travel back home - and having them officially translated in 
Spanish, a process so complicated and expensive that frequently discourage them to file in 
an application. Similar procedures – which have the clear goal of maintaining under strict 
control the total number of beneficiaries – exists in most of the regional regulations, 
severely restricting the number of beneficiaries in the Spanish case.  
Thirdly, discouraging procedures are very often – although not always - coupled with low 
administrative capacities, especially in terms of lack of IT infrastructure and adequate 
personnel. Means-tested benefits require the ability to make a plausible estimate of 
applicant’s income. This means that different sources of the public administration – 
municipal social services, regional government, labour and finance ministries, etc. - have 
to be able to communicate through a unified/integrated data processing structure, 
something which has been introduced only in a limited number of regional cases. 
Furthermore, also due to the complexity of the procedures, the exponential growth of 
request in reason of the Great Recessions made necessary to strengthen the bureaucratic 
structure, something which was only randomly done. This resulted in one of the main 
weaknesses of the Spanish Mis: the long waiting time. According to Caritas (2013) the 
average waiting period between the application and the effective payments is six months, 
but in the most extreme case can be more than one year, leaving beneficiaries in a sort of 
dependency limbo, with rights to services and benefits recognized but not receiving them.  
The combined effect of system fragmentation, the presence of very strict and complex 
access requirements and selection procedures, and limited administrative effectiveness 
strongly undermine the possibility to access to the Spanish last resort safety nets, therefore 
reducing the protective capacity of those regional instruments. 
The second most relevant weakness of the Spanish minimum income protection system is 
territorial differentiation (Ayala, 2012). Wide differences exist among regional safety nets 
in terms of generosity, coverage rate and expenditure – not to mention regulation and 
conditionality requirements.  
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Tab. 6 Generosity of regional Mis in Spain, 2014 
Generosity Basic Amount 
 
Maximum Amount 
Least Generous 300 
 
372 
State Average 427,3 
 
683,4 
Most Generous 662 
 
962 
Source: Ministerio de Sanidad, Servicios Sociales, e Igualdad, 2015 
In terms of generosity, benefit amount differs among CAs, and the difference between the 
most and least generous case is impressive (Tab. 6). What appears particularly worrying is 
that territorial differences in this dimensions are increasing: if in 2004 the differences 
among the least and the most generous amount were of 176 euro, ten years later are more 
than doubled, reaching 362 euro. 
Equally relevant are the differences in terms of coverage rate and expenditure. Even 
limiting our analysis to regions which did not enjoy special fiscal treatment – as it is done 
in tab. 7 – Spanish territorial differences are strong and persistent. Perhaps more 
worrisome, rather than decreasing, in the last years policy expansion has been 
accompanied by increasing territorial differentiation. 
Tab. 7 Expenditure and coverage rate of regional Mis in Spain, selected years. 
 Coverage 
(% of regional 
households) 
Expenditure  
(% of total 
regional exp) 
 
Coverage 
(% of regional 
households) 
Expenditure  
(% of total 
regional exp.) 
  2008 2014 
Least 
protective 
0,06% 0,02% 0,32% 0,07% 
State  
Average 
0,68% 0,25% 1,45% 0,67% 
Most  
protective 
1,61% 0,59% 3,37% 2,16% 
Source: Authors elaboration from Ministerio de Sanidad, Servicios Sociales, e Igualdad, 
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In general, territorial differentiation might not be necessarily a problem – after all it might 
be that approaching the level of government to citizens enhance efficiency and 
responsiveness to people' problems, and therefore differentiation is simply a result of 
different conditions. Problems of equality arise however when the least economically 
developed part of the country – where poverty is concentrated - have worst social 
programs.  
Tab. 8 Generosity, Coverage and Expenditure per capita of regional Mis, selected regions. 
Region GDP per 
capita 
Basic 
Monthly 
Amount 
Coverage Expenditure 
per capita 
 
Extremadura 15.500 
 
€426 2,2% €16.3 
Andalucia 16.800 
 
€400 0,7% €11.05 
Castille 
LaMancha 
18.300 
 
€372 0,5% €2.27 
Murcia 18.400 
 
€300 0,6% €4.9 
Spain  
(Average)  
22500 
 
€429 1,4% €25.47 
Aragon 24700 
 
€441 2.4% €22.2 
Basque Country 29.300 
 
€665 5,1% €205.20 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on Ministerio de Hacienda and Ministerio de Sanidad, Servicios Sociales, e 
Igualdad 
 
Actually, if it is not possible to argue that in Spain richer regions have better programs – 
for example, Madrid, the AC’s with the highest GDP per capita in Spain has a less 
generous and protective measure than the Spanish average - it seems that the most 
economically underdeveloped autonomous communities - where the need for effective 
safety nets is higher – often have less protective schemes. As table 8 displays, the four 
regions with the lowest regional Gdp in Spain – Extremadura, Andalusia, Castille La 
Mancha and Murcia – have safety nets which have a far lower protective capacity. 
A national intervention aimed at guaranteeing the diffusions of best practices, setting 
minimum standards, ensuring coordination between different instruments and to 
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substitute regional governments in case of non-compliance and, perhaps more relevant, 
the presence of specific funding lines to ensure a certain degree of horizontal redistribution 
between subnational units thus seem particularly important to avoid the risk that 
decentralization leads to territorial inequalities. Within a national framework, it is possible 
to imagine ameliorative interventions by subnational governments, as well as some degree 
of freedom concerning in particular active inclusion measures that might require taking 
into account the specific characteristics of the local labour market. Conversely, in the 
current scenario - in which subnational units have exclusive jurisdiction with regard to the 
possibility of introducing measures in this field of policy - it seems difficult to limit the risk 
that the poorest regions have less generous and inclusive schemes. 
 
2.5.2. Policy expansion in hard times: decentralization and anti-poverty schemes 
Along with the problems mentioned above, the uncoordinated decentralization of social 
assistance competences in the Spanish case resulted in the introduction of different 
programs that currently cover the whole national territory and may be regarded as almost 
universal (Guillén, 2010). Therefore, it seems plausible to argue that – coupled with 
pressure from relevant interest groups and the absence of veto players at the regional level 
(Lalioti, 2016; see Chapter 8) – it has favoured path departure from the original Southern 
European model of weak public intervention in this policy field. Three factors appear 
particularly relevant in order to understand the positive incentives that regional political 
actors faced compared to the nationals. Firstly, at the regional level it was possible to 
introduce budgetary constraints on access to these measures, therefore allowing 
controlling expenditure, while the absence of a national measure and the support of 
European institutions towards those schemes provided for high visibility to regional 
political entrepreneurs “hungry for votes and recognition”. Secondly, introducing 
minimum income schemes at the regional level did not result in redistribution of resources 
from richer to poorer parts of the country. This was a very salient issue which might have 
been vetoed by powerful regionalist parties – such as the Partido Nacionalista Vasco 
and/or the Catalan Convergència i Unió - in the national political arena. Finally, it is not by 
chance that in Spain the first regional measures were introduced by regionalist parties: in 
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the subnational political arena, activism in the social policy realm was useful for 
competitive region building purposes, since social policy are powerful instrument in order 
to demarcate geographical spaces and stabilize new forms of political organization 
(Ferrera, 2005). As a matter of fact, despite timid efforts by some old - Izquierda Unida - 
and new – Podemos – political parties and by the trade unions, at the national level it has 
been so far impossible to introduce an inclusive and fully fledged anti-poverty measure. 
Therefore, it seems that the uncoordinated decentralization of Mip favoured the 
introduction of a Mip system in Spain, which would be otherwise – also in light of the 
comparative evidences outlined below - probably absent. 
Furthermore, it is important to underline that, despite problems outlined above in terms of 
poorer regions having less protective schemes, there are also some positive trends in the 
direction of greater equality of the system emerging in the last years. In particular, the 
poorest region in Spain (Extremadura) has recently introduced expansionary reforms, 
strengthening significantly its last resort safety net. As a result, the number of beneficiaries 
has increased enormously - from 3195 in 2013 to 25205 in 2014 - resulting in an exponential 
growth of total expenditure from around 3 million to more than 17 million euro. Also in 
Castile and La Mancha beneficiaries increased by more than double from 2013 to 2014. At 
the same time the Basque Country – indisputably the most protective scheme in Spain – is 
among the very few Autonomous Community which have not contributed to the general 
growth of minimum income expenditure from 2013 to 2014, which has been once again 
significant (+12,1%). Despite it is too early to announce an égalisation dans le progrès for the 
Spanish safety nets, those evolutions – coupled with the extraordinary efforts made in 
Asturias, a medium economically developed CA in Spain which has the second most 
protective scheme in Spain in terms of beneficiaries and expenditure – suggest that 
political decisions are at least as relevant as socio-economic conditions to explain the 
policy trajectories of regional Mis, and it is therefore possible to have protective measures 
also in the less economically developed part of the country.   
Such outcome – the progressive amelioration of safety nets in the most economically 
underdeveloped part of the country – is particularly relevant, also because so far no 
subtractive reforms have been introduced in the Spanish Autonomous Communities in 
this policy field. The absence of retrenchment – despite undeniable attempts to control 
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public expenditure – is particularly interesting in light of the policy evolution of minimum 
income protection in other Mediterranean countries. As we have seen in the first chapter in 
Italy, there have been several attempts to depart from the traditional model and to 
introduce innovative last-resort safety nets both at the national and regional level, but they 
were soon followed by policy reversal (Madama, Jessoula and Natili, 2014). Conversely, 
Portugal has introduced a national Mis at the end of the Nineties. However, during the 
crisis, despite the magnitude of the social distress and rapidly increasing poverty rates, the 
centre-right Portuguese government has extensively reduced is anti-poverty effort: the 
reforms undertaken in 2010 and 2012 led to a reduction of beneficiaries by roughly 50%, 
while at the same time the average monthly benefit amount per household decreased from 
€239.70 to €215.21 (Jessoula et al., 2015).  Nowadays, in terms of coverage rate, generosity, 
and expenditure per capita, the Portuguese Mis is less protective than the fragmented and 
uncoordinated Spanish regional model. 
So far – despite similar formal and informal pressures to contain public expenditure – the 
Spanish regional Mis have not been subject to retrenchment and/or policy reversal, but 
rather to policy expansion. This not only constitutes an exception within Southern 
European countries, but it is also remarkable considering the general evolution of social 
policies in Spain during the crisis: pensions, unemployment benefits as well as health care 
have all been subject to severe cuts (Pavolini, Leon, Guillén and Ascoli, 2015). It seems 
therefore plausible to hypothesize that the very weaknesses of the Spanish model – i.e. its 
fragmented and uncoordinated nature – have also affected the policy-making process, 
allowing greater resistance against retrenchment in this policy field. This appears plausible 
as well as in line with the literature on the relationship between federalism and the welfare 
state, which outlined how federalism and institutional complexity make expenditure 
cutbacks more difficult to achieve (Obinger et al., 2005). 
To sum up, the regional system of minimum protection in Spain in the last twenty years 
has seen a steady growth, although territorially differentiated and poorly coordinated, 
becoming an important level of protection for thousands of Spanish citizens. The data 
provided in this chapter highlighted that even though minimum income protection 
remains comparatively underdeveloped in European standards, with low level of 
financing and a great level of fragmentation and weakness in the overall coherence of the 
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system, the decentralization process, in combination with the harsh consequences of the 
severe economic crisis, led in Spain to a significant expansion of the minimum income 
protection system.  
As stressed by León and Guillén (2011), the main present and future challenge of the Spain 
society is the links between social protection and a dualized labour market with recurrent 
high rates of unemployment and a permanently high number of precarious jobs. In this 
sense an efficient system of minimum income schemes, providing income security coupled 
with services that should ensure an easier (re)entry into the labour markets, is crucial. 
Regional anti-poverty schemes, despite strong differentiation in terms of generosity, 
coverage and institutional arrangements, have gradually consolidated to the point that 
they constitute an established last resort safety net for poor Spaniards. However, coverage 
holes in the protection of the most vulnerable coupled with profound territorial differences 
(and inequalities) have frequently led researchers to emphasize inefficiencies and 
comparative weaknesses of this decentralized model of minimum income protection 
(Ayala, 2012, Rodrìguez Cabrero, Arriba, Marbàn and Moreno-Fuentes, 2015). Similar to 
the Austrian case before the recent centralizing reforms (Fink and Grand, 2009) - without a 
national intervention setting minimum standards, providing specific funding lines, 
guaranteeing the coordination between different public agency and to substitute regional 
governments in case of non-compliance, minimum income protection in Spain is 
characterized by limited coverage (and high non take-up) rate, institutional inefficiencies 
and territorial inequalities in the possibility to access to Mi benefits.  
At the same time, it should not be overlooked that these programs have provided – 
especially during the crisis - a broad economic safety net to a relevant part of the poor 
population in Spain. Moreover, so far, the Spanish safety nets have – perhaps too slowly, 
but constantly - ameliorated their protective capacity, and despite strong pressures to 
contain public expenditure especially during the Great Recession neither policy reversal 
nor retrenchment is visible in this policy field, contrarily to what happened in the other 
Mediterranean countries and in all other social policy areas in Spain. In this regard, the 
Spanish uncoordinated and fragmented regional Mi system – especially in a Southern 
European comparative perspective - might not look too bad after all. 
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Chapter 4 
The political dimension of minimum income schemes 
 
 
1.In search for a theoretical framework  
Social assistance and minimum income protection have traditionally been inadequate in 
Southern Europe (Ferrera, 1996 and 2010). Until the early Nineties, Italy, Spain, Greece and 
Portugal were the only EU 15 countries where a nationwide last resort safety net was fully 
lacking. How can we explain this deficiency? Comparative political research has identified 
four key factors that contribute to explain the very meagre developments in this policy 
area (Fargion, 2000, Naldini 2002, Moreno 2004, Ferrera, 2005): the role of family, the 
incidence of underground economy, timing and low administrative capacities. The 
extended family has been historically the main social shock absorber in Southern Europe 
(Esping-Andersen, 1999, Naldini, 2002, Moreno, 2004), responding to a wide range of risks 
and needs, from childcare to unemployment, from elderly care to housing, and 
guaranteeing economic security to all its members. The presence of a well-developed 
underground economy provides in this countries earning opportunities, therefore 
constituting an important, if unsecure, source of income for many families. The 
combination of those two elements allow to understand how poor families in Southern 
Europe were able to cope with monetary poverty, pooling together different sources of 
income resources, such as for instance, the social pension of a grandfather, the seasonal 
earning of the first spouse topped by some undeclared income from the informal economy 
(cfr. Ferrera, 2010). The administrative competences necessaries to implement minimum 
income schemes, which are complex measures that require an ability to realize the means-
test and repersonalized programs that promote beneficiaries “activation”, collide in these 
countries with a low degree of efficiency by the public administration. Furthermore, the 
territorial concentration of material deprivation in areas where the black economy and the 
illegal market is pervasive generates fear of degeneration and particularistic exchange and 
patronage (Ferrera, 2005). Finally, an additional element refers to the moment in which 
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socio-demographic changes have increased the demand for minimum income protection, 
which in Southern European countries - differently from the Nordic countries - coincides 
with a phase of forced containment of social expenditure (Fargion, 2000). The combination 
of these factors affected the possibility of institutionalizing minimum income protection in 
Southern Europe decreasing cogency, since there are available other sources of income to 
mitigate material deprivation, and feasibility, increasing the difficulties in finding the 
necessary resources to finance safety nets and providing incisive arguments to those who 
oppose their institutionalization. 
The introduction of a minimum income schemes in Portugal as well as the more contested 
development of regional minimum income schemes in Italy and Spain constitute 
significant deviation from the original model of protection of Southern European 
countries, which requires a different type of explanation: what are the explanatory factors 
that allows to overcome institutional barriers and to depart from the original path? 
Secondly, despite very similar background (economic, social, institutional) (i.e. most 
similar research design), we observe divergence in the policy evolution of regional safety 
nets: why in Spain we observe a gradual institutionalization of the regional Mis, whereas 
in Italy those measures knew only a limited diffusion, and were often subsequently 
displaced? 
To answer those questions, we refer to the main theoretical approaches that seek to explain 
the introduction of social policies and social policy reforms: functionalism, the power 
resources theory and historical institutionalism. Scope of the next paragraphs is to 
highlight the strengths and the limits of those approaches to explain Mis reforms, in order 
to develop a theoretical framework that could allow interpreting the variation in the policy 
evolution of last resort safety nets. 
 
2. Functionalist theories and the growing demand for Mis 
The institutional structure of the welfare state rests on a social and economic context that 
has undoubtedly contributed to shape its forms in different historical moments. In a 
nutshell, the functionalist approach aims at explaining change as the ability of the system 
to meet the evolving challenges posed by the environment: the inadequate functioning of a 
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structure has repercussions on others, producing widespread dissatisfaction that leads to 
the institutionalization of a more efficient unit. This approach, in its pluralist variant called 
"logic of industrialization", is used by Wilensky (1975) to explain the expansion of Western 
welfare states (1945 - 1975): the growth of social needs - linked with economic 
development and population ageing - generates a request for public intervention in social 
policies.  
In the last thirty years, the intensity and the kind of social needs and risks changed in all 
Western Countries. In particular, demographic and socio-economic transformations, the 
shift to a post-industrial labour market, and the new international political economy 
context have deeply put under pressure existing social arrangements. According to Pierre 
Rosanvallon (1995), those transformations have caused the emergence of a new social 
question – the rise of social exclusion as a stable condition for an increasing size of the 
population and the simultaneous decline of economic growth in western societies - 
requiring the shift from predominantly Bismarckian to selective and inclusive welfare 
states (see also Marx, 2007).   
Effectively, deep socio-demographic transformations have affected European societies. The 
aging of the population generates new types of demands, both by the elderly (long-term 
care, etc.) and by family members (mainly women) with care duties. At the same time 
changing relation between active and inactive population puts under pressure the 
financial sustainability of social protection systems. Major changes have also concerned 
family and gender relations. The post-war traditional family with a single income (male) 
earner constituted the normality has been replaced by a greater variety of families types: 
with two income earners, single-parents, etc.  In this new context, the social protection role 
of the nuclear family, which has traditionally been a highly significant instrument of 
poverty prevention in many welfare states, is under mounting pressure. Women's 
employment reduces the time available to devote to traditional household care activities 
for the weaker members of the family, such as children, elderly and / or disabled. 
Similarly, the greater frailty of the family and the decline in the average size of households 
affect the possibility of relying on the primary solidarity networks to cope with economic 
problems and care needs.  Finally, greater instability of the couple limits nuclear family 
ability to act as a social shock absorber: where the two-parent model allowed families with 
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children to simultaneously earn labour income and meet childcare needs in most 
institutional contexts, the growing number of single parent households – usually single 
mothers – today find themselves at substantial risk of poverty due to the difficulty of 
reconciling childcare and work (Clegg, 2013).  
Also labour markets were deeply transformed in the last decades, as a result of a wide 
number of challenges: to mention few, technological innovation, the transition to a 
predominantly service economy, economic integration and globalization. Standard 
employment contracts – full-time and open-ended - have markedly shrinked, temporary or 
long term unemployment increased significantly as well the share of atypical contracts. To 
enhance the job-creation potential of the service sector, labour market deregulation and/or 
the decentralisation of collective bargaining institutions have been encouraged, resulting 
in contracting wages in particular for low-skilled atypical workers. As a result, the 
protectiveness of the employment relationship – the ability of work to generally offer a 
secure route out of poverty - has come under increasing strain in most European countries 
and many households with someone in work today are today at risk of poverty (Cantillon 
and Vandenbroucke, 2014; Marx, 2007; Saraceno, 2015). 
The transition to a post industrial economy, high rates of temporary or long term 
unemployment, flexible labour markets, the spread of atypical and female employment, 
family instability, and mounting demands for individualization and gender equality, have 
given rise to a whole range of new social needs, many of which welfare states - especially 
in the Mediterranean area - are poorly prepared to meet. Such post-industrial social needs 
and demands typically includes claims for welfare coverage of the atypically employed, 
for gender equality in social insurance schemes, for child and long term care facilities, and 
more generally, for minimum income protection for people with discontinuous 
employment biographies (Bonoli, 2005; Häusermann, 2010). Even though those 
transformations have distinct social repercussions in different European countries 
according to their diverse institutional traditions, the result of these simultaneous 
developments has been similar everywhere: while minimum income provision was once 
concerned mainly with people who were in positions of social marginality – due to, for 
example, homelessness or severe drug or alcohol problems – today it has become a central 
institution for the social protection of people facing some rather general life-course and 
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labour market risks, which may however in certain cases be compounded by complex 
personal circumstances and barriers to social and economic (re)integration (cfr. Clegg, 
2013, Madama et al., 2014). More recently, the Great Recession – with the subsequent 
return of mass unemployment in Europe, cutbacks in first tier social benefit program in 
some places and changed demographics – contributed to make minimum income 
protection even more important as a safeguard against low income and poverty (Marx and 
Nelson, 2012). 
However, the politics of reform depends on the time and the context in which a problem 
emerges in the agenda (Pierson, 2000 and 2004; Bonoli, 2007). Regrettably, the growing 
demands for expanding minimum income schemes are concomitant with a period of 
declining resources to finance social expenditure. Since few decades low growth and 
massive unemployment undermine the financial basis of the welfare states. The financial 
and subsequently economic crisis has put furthermore under severe stress the financial 
viability of national social arrangements in several countries. Those trends highlight the 
conflicting functional pressures that are facing European welfare state, pushing European 
welfare state to a functional recalibration of their social protection systems (Ferrera, 
Hemerijk and Rhodes, 2000), re-directing their social expenditure in favour of those risks 
that are today less protected. Those trends are especially evident looking at disappointing 
poverty trends, with a sizeable part of the European population at risk at poverty and 
social exclusion, particularly in the Mediterranean area (Cantillon and Vandenbroucke, 
2014; Jessoula, Matsaganis and Natili, 2015).  
Functional pressures are not sufficient to understand the scope and direction of policy 
change. European social protection systems facing similar constraints and opportunities 
evolved in different ways and, although this changing structure of needs in European 
societies constituted a pressure for expanding social assistance, European welfare states 
have adapted very differently to these “new” functional pressures. The critics to 
functionalist theories concern their limited capacity to explain variations in the level of 
social spending and in the institutional setting of welfare states in countries with a similar 
structure of constraints and opportunities (Myles and Quadagno, 2002). As in the past 
European states have introduced different kind of social arrangements, today they are 
reacting differently to the challenges of a post-industrial society in the period of 
111 
 
permanent austerity (Pierson, 1994). Functional pressures allow us to identify common 
factors underlying welfare state evolution; nevertheless, in order to understand the scope 
and direction of change it is necessary to include other variables related to the political and 
institutional systems, which are closer to the decision-making process and filter exogenous 
pressures. 
 
3. Class politics and means-tested benefits 
The functionalist approach, considering policies as the result of impersonal pressures, has 
been increasingly questioned from the Seventies, when a large and influential literature in 
comparative politics has outlined the role of political agency and partisanship as 
determinants of political outcome and choices (Myles e Quadagno, 2002). The saliency of 
party politics variables - related to partisan preferences and the balance of power among 
social classes - increased in welfare state research in the early 1980s, when “politics 
matters” became the dominant paradigm in explaining cross-country variations in welfare 
state institutional arrangements. Building on the seminal work by Korpi (1983), the 
traditional power resource theory (PRT) pointed at a direct link between leftist 
governments - jointly with powerful unions - and social policy expansion (see also 
Stephens 1979; Esping-Andersen, 1985).  
The original power resource theory builds from a class interpretation of politics.  
Individuals sharing a similar position on the labour market and in employment relations, 
have analogous opportunities and constraints, similarities generating what has been called 
“the logic of the situation” characterizing socioeconomically delineated classes (cfr. Korpi 
2006).  Classes mobilization through parties and unions allowed individuals with 
unbalanced resources in the market arena to move the distributive struggle into the 
political arena, where their numerical strength could be used more effectively. Studies in 
this strand of research postulates that left parties are representatives of the working class, 
hold strong preference for redistribution through more generous social programs that offer 
protection from the market to workers and weaker segments of society. Consequently, the 
left fights for welfare state expansion in the democratic class struggle. On the other side of 
the political spectrum, right parties and employers’ associations represent high income 
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individuals, who have strong preferences for lower taxation and limited redistribution, 
and therefore prefer reducing state involvement in the economy and limit social 
expenditure.  
Traditionally, this theory deduces the policy preferences of a political party directly from 
its party family, or even from its label, and assume a linear and direct relationship between 
the type of party in power (e.g. social democratic or conservative) and policy output (cfr. 
Häusermann, Picot and Geering 2012). Parties representing specific constituencies have 
different social policy preferences and the party composition of governments are major 
determinants of the timing, substance and expansion of the welfare state (Schmidt, 1996). 
This approach has been widely applied by scholars to interpret overall welfare state 
arrangements and sectoral developments that occurred in core social policy areas, namely 
pensions and health care. Conversely, the political dimension of social assistance policy 
has received substantially less consideration (Clegg, 2014). Policy analyses have largely 
prevailed in this policy field, which has long been considered residual and less 
contentious, due to its limited impact on overall welfare budget and the limited political 
resources of would be beneficiaries.  
More recently, however, the political dimension of means-tested benefits has received 
more attention (Bonoli, 2013; Iversen and Soskice, 2009; Hausermann, 2012; Jessoula et al., 
2014). Scholars in the partisan politics tradition have underlined that in the current 
political economy context powerful social democratic parties allied with strong labour 
movement may well obstacle, rather than promote, the institutionalization of means tested 
safety nets. According to Rueda (2007) in particular, the shift from a situation of full 
employment and manufacturing predominance to the current post-industrial scenario, 
accompanied by rising unemployment and the consequent, in response, development of 
so-called atypical work, have led to a situation in which the possibility of the working class 
to act as a unitary actor pursuing the interests of the weaker segments of the society has 
changed. As a consequence, in the “Silver Age” of the Welfare State (Taylor Goody, 2004) 
the interests of the labour market insiders, core workers with secure employment 
fundamentally diverge from those of the outsiders, long term unemployed and atypically 
employed. The latter no longer benefit from employment protection, have marginal 
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position in the industrial relations system and suffer particularly growing wage inequality. 
Therefore, they would benefit from redistribution through compensating transfers and 
from state funded opportunities for (re-) training. Insiders, who are well positioned in the 
labour market, have an interest in secure their employment and good reasons to oppose 
vertical redistribution through residual safety nets, since they are net contributors. Herein 
lies the well-known insider–outsider dilemma: centre-left parties are pulled in opposite 
directions by two groups of voters – both part of the historical core constituency of the left 
– that have different interests (Rueda, 2007). Rueda’s contention is that left parties in order 
to avoid electoral loss have an incentive to protect their stronger constituency, the insiders. 
In fact, as pointed out by Bonoli (2005), the chances of would be beneficiaries of Mis to 
influence the political arena appear limited when confronted with the post-war industrial 
workers. The selective nature of these programs – combined with socio-demographic 
characteristics that make recipients propensity to vote significantly lower than average – 
significantly decreases the electoral incentives to introduce Mis compared with more 
comprehensive pensions or health care programs (Madama and Jessoula, 2015). Moreover, 
beneficiaries’ social heterogeneity restricts their possibility to mobilize efficiently (Bonoli, 
2005). Among potential beneficiaries we find, in fact, young people looking for a first job, 
single mothers with dependent children, low-skilled workers trapped in irregular jobs and 
precarious contracts, long-term unemployed and migrants, i.e. social groups that can 
hardly identify a common interest.  
In the perspective of the classical partisan politics the presence of a weak demand (cfr. 
Madama and Jessoula, 2015) on the one hand, and the potential opposition of organized 
labour (see below) on the other, may limit the interest of left parties to promote these 
measures, especially in the age of austerity which sees different claims (and social groups) 
competing for scarce resources. 
Several authors have recognized that with the shift from an industrial to a post-industrial 
economy the concerns and interests of a shrinking core workforce are divergent from other 
workers, especially workers outside manufacturing, even though there is less consensus 
regarding its consequences in term of left party constituencies and therefore policy 
preferences (Emmeneger et al., 2012). According to some authors, in the post-industrial 
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society, blue collar workers in continental Europe are increasingly likely to vote for right 
wing, even far right parties (Kriesi et al. 2006; Bornschier 2010; Häusermann and Walter, 
2010; Bornschier and Kriesi, 2013), whereas left parties tend to represent a heterogeneous 
amalgam of workers and middle class individual. As a consequence, Häusermann (2012) 
claims that conservatives parties, and particularly radical right parties, have a clear interest 
in opposing minimum income schemes, whereas left parties are increasingly divided in 
policy reforms, but especially “new” left parties, those considered to be representative of 
the middle class including many labour market outsider, are expected to promote those 
policies because they benefit most directly their electorate.  
These approaches underline that political decisions are not simply the result of 
interpersonal economic forces. However, similarly to the old PRT – at least in its most 
simplified version – most of them, despite having an opposite view regarding who are the 
main constituencies of left and right parties in the post-industrial society, consider parties’ 
policy preferences as a direct consequences of micro level objective interests of their 
constituencies. They have therefore a functionalist view of politics, implicitly considering 
that the presence of a particular social risk affecting a relevant share of a party’s electoral 
constituencies is directly transposed into a policy preference.  
In contrast, political parties have at least some degree of autonomy with respect to the 
social structure, and politics cannot be reduced to power balance and alliance between 
classes (Sartori, 1990; Picot, 2010). Political science literature has stressed that several other 
factors shape the political process, therefore conditioning its result also in term of social 
policy outcomes. Firstly, formal political institution and policy legacies influence the 
policy making process that adjudicate among conflicting interests. Secondly, the main 
interest groups in a policy field have an important role in channelling information, 
aggregating preferences and, mostly, translating new ideas into concrete policy proposals. 
The relations between interest groups and parties and political exchange dynamics are 
therefore crucial in order to understand the political preferences of parties and political 
dynamics as well as their effect on policy change. Thirdly, cleavage constellation deeply 
influences the political process whereas those approaches tend to focus exclusively on the 
labour capital division. Relatedly, the specific configuration of the party system has an 
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autonomous role in shaping party preferences and the policies individual parties advocate 
once in government. The following sections will focus on each of those factors. 
 
 
4. Historical institutionalism and residual safety nets 
Neo-institutionalism challenges the pluralist view that social class (objective) interests are 
efficiently transmitted to political élites via interest groups and political parties; instead, 
neo-institutionalist scholars highlight the role of political institutions in shaping the 
policymaking process. Providing strategically useful information, affecting identities and 
preferences of actors, constitutions and political institutions structure the political process 
(Immergut, 1998; Hall and Taylor 1996). For this reason, neo-institutionalism places at the 
centre of the reflection institutions, or rather, the differential capacity of different political 
systems to produce public policies, and therefore to determine institutional change.  
Historical institutionalism enriches the debate arguing that public policy should be 
considered as institutions, and therefore focuses primarily on policy legacy to analyse the 
evolution of a policy sector (Pierson and Weaver, 1993). Past choices affect subsequent 
policies, encouraging social forces to organize themselves around certain lines rather than 
others, to adopt some identity, or develop an interest in certain policies that are costly to 
change, activating a mechanism known as policy feedback (Pierson, 2000). Social policies, 
in particular, generate strong incentives that reinforce their stability and their further 
development, due to the presence of high fixed costs associated with the introduction of 
new institutions and to the influence of groups interested in their preservation, composed 
not only by the already beneficiaries but also by future beneficiaries who expect to receive 
what previous generations have already had. Within this perspective, it has been 
emphasized that the original configuration of the welfare state, result of specific historical 
struggles and of power relations in a specific historical moment, have long terms inertial 
effects on the policy making process in the social policy area, allowing some actors to have 
access to the policy making process and creating strong constituencies. As a result, the 
“new politics” of the welfare state is not so much the result of partisan politics, but rather 
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structured and informed by the previous choices made during the phase of configuration 
and expansion of the welfare state (Pierson, 1994). 
Policy legacies have a crucial explanatory power. However, we need to consider some 
peculiarities of the minimum income protection field. In general, it appears very likely that 
programs financed via general taxation have different inertial effects than programs 
financed via contribution which tends to produce acquired right. As argued by Korpi and 
Palme (1998), the possibility of creating strong social constituency appears different 
regarding targeted benefits, because those types of social policy programs are directed 
primarily at individuals below the poverty line, which as we have seen have limited 
political and mobilization resources. Targeting might result generating coalitions between 
better-off workers and the middle class against the lower sections of the working class, 
something which can culminate in tax revolts and backlash against the welfare-state. 
Actually, also Castles and Uhr (2005) refers to the different “political potential” of means-
tested benefit and social insurance, hypothesizing that the former, being directed only to a 
limited part of the population, have a lower mobilization potential than the latter. These 
arguments point to the fact that Mis envisage different political dynamics confronted with 
universalistic and/or social insurance programs, and lock in and increasing returns effects 
should be carefully examined and tested in this policy domain.   
More generally, the main critic to historical institutionalism points to its excessive 
emphasis on structural constraints and continuity: if it provides useful instrument to 
understand policy inertia, it is less useful to explain cases of policy change (Jessoula, 2009; 
Streek and Thelen, 2005). In fact, the emphasis posed on the resilience of public policies 
arrangements make historical institutionalism an approach better equipped to explain 
stability rather than processes by which institutions originate and evolve. Change is 
interpreted as a long lasting path dependent process, thus marginal and incremental. In 
order to explain radical ruptures or paradigmatic changes, it refers to external shocks 
(independent from the theory), during “critical junctures”, in which constraint on action 
are lifted or relaxed, allowing actors to pursue policy change. As a result, this approach 
provides useful instruments to explain gradual evolution once policies are introduced, but 
it does not provide equally useful tool for explaining those crucial moments when 
institutional configurations are upended and replaced. These theories tend in fact to be 
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marred by excessive structuralism, therefore underestimating the role of actors in 
processes of institutional change (Hay and Wincott 1998). 
Challenging this dominant view regarding the persistence of institutions, growing 
empirical literature has shown that welfare states are changing considerably, and not only 
due to external pressures pushing in the direction of retrenchment (Bonoli and Natali, 
2012; Hausermann, 2010; Hemerijck, 2012; Palier, 2010). The empirical evidence presented 
in the previous chapters showed that in Italy and Spain there has been a change in their 
social protection system, through the introduction of regional minimum income schemes. 
This policy change is hardly understandable in terms of policy legacy and path 
dependency: moreover, their differentiated evolution – institutionalization vs policy 
reversal - highlights how some institutional changes are difficult to capture through 
historical institutional lenses (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). 
A number of scholars within the historical institutionalist tradition have underlined how 
the expected operation of institutions itself sometimes generates pressures for changes, 
underling that properties of the institutions themselves are actually of crucial importance 
to explain change. The notion of institutional wedge, introduced by Ferrera (1993), outlines 
how even an accidental or partial change of the institutional configuration has unintended 
consequences and might modify the structure of constraints and opportunities in which 
political actors move, opening up new spaces of action and possibility for institutional 
change. This concept has been used by Madama (2010) to show how a sentence by the 
Italian Constitutional Court, ending a public law regime for the Italian Public Assistance 
and Charitable Institutions and creating a regulatory vacuum that needed to be addressed, 
resulted in a new political - institutional configuration that proves to be very important to 
understand the adoption of the Italian Framework Law on Social Assistance Act (D. Law 
n. 328 of 2000). Jessoula (2009) showed how the presence of a particular institution, the 
employee severance pay (TFR), less resistant to change, eased the shift of the Italian 
pension system into a multi-pillar system, acting as an “institutional gate”, a "door" that, if 
forced by the actors involved, allowed and supported institutional transformation. Both 
concepts refer to the fact that institutions can act not only as constraints, but they can also 
represent opportunities for actors. Similarly Obinger et al. (2005), investigating the role of 
federal institutions in shaping the welfare state, challenge the predominant view that 
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federalism is always an institutional constraint on government growth, suggesting that a 
more careful analysis of institutional properties might reveal that, under particular 
institutional conditions, the decentralization of social policy competences might provide 
actors with positive incentives and might therefore be associated with policy innovation 
and welfare expansion (see also Rodden 2003; Fargion, 2000; Bonoli and Champion, 2014).   
Highlighting the potential dynamics for change associated with a specific institutional 
configuration allow to emphasize that institutions can constitute not only constraints but 
also opportunities for actors. However, as highlighted by recent advancement in historical 
institutional literature, we should drive our attention on actors’ possibility of action within 
the structure. An effective explanation of gradual transformative change must be based on 
the interaction between the building properties of an institution and actors, their 
preferences, and their behaviour and strategies. In other words, it is necessary to integrate 
in historical institutionalist theory a satisfactory amount of agency and power resources 
variables to gain explanatory power (cfr. Mahoney and Thelen, 2010).  
 
5. Partisan politics and beyond: the role of political demand, supply and 
exchange  
In modern democracies, political action operates in two distinct arenas. We call them the 
demand side and the supply side of the political system. Both of these arenas provide 
opportunities of exchange and bargaining through the deployment of a wide array of 
resources (Ferrera, 2005). In the political arena – the supply side - political action takes 
primarily the form of a power struggle between party leaders, competing to get more or 
less permanent governmental office in a poliarchic context (Dahl, 1972). In the group arena 
– the demand side - group leaders and lobbyists do not seek power or governmental 
positions for themselves, but have a peculiar interest in the political process and in the 
content of specific policy decision, since they might obtain advantages or suffer substantial 
damages from it. This prompt them to support one or some political parties rather than 
others, in expectation of being able to obtain favourable policy decisions, and is called 
pressure. It is different in nature from the former because it does not seek political power 
per se but it is interested in the content of policy decisions (Stoppino, 2001).  
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The “normal” political exchange process (Stoppino, 2001) is characterized by the 
bidirectional relation between the demand and the supply of the political system. Political 
parties and party leaders compete to obtain support of societal actors – both interest 
groups and individual voters – to hold office, whereas governmental position allows to 
take collectively binding policy decisions which are specifically targeted towards certain 
groups rather than others. On the other hand, different social groups engage in 
competitive pressure - via electoral or financial support – on political groups in order to 
obtain (or to avoid) certain political decisions, which confirm or enhance (or conversely, 
decrease or damage) their power and resources. From this angle, social rights appear 
firstly as political products, as they originate from exchanges between politicians 
interested in offices and social actors interested in the specific content of state policy (cfr. 
Ferrera, 2005; Stoppino, 2001).  
Political exchange dynamics take place also between parties and individual voters. Groups 
however condition structurally and permanently the political process in their area of 
interest, and therefore are more likely to exert permanent pressure on political actors and 
government compared with single voters. This is particularly the case in the minimum 
income field, where beneficiaries are few, with dispersed interests and a low mobilization 
potential (Madama and Jessoula, 2015). 
Next paragraphs are thus devoted to discuss main groups and political parties’ strategies 
in the specific area of minimum income protection. The implicit idea is that both party 
elites and interest groups are faced with specific constraints and incentives in this policy 
area and that a better specification of the structure of opportunities within which actors 
move is a key factor to explain policy outcomes.  
 
5.1 The demand side of political competition: interest groups and Mis 
Social policy reforms constitute an endless battle among social groups. However, potential 
beneficiaries of minimum income schemes are widely known to possess few of the 
resources necessary for group formation (Bonoli, 2005; 2013; Hay, 2001; Olson, 1965). 
Effectively, they are a very heterogeneous group of individuals characterized by different 
biographies, diverse interests, and a wide range of identities and beliefs systems (Bonoli, 
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2005; Esping-Andersen, 1999). Among the potential beneficiaries we observe, in fact, 
young people looking for a first job, single mothers with dependent children, low-skilled 
workers trapped in irregular jobs and precarious contracts, long-term unemployed and 
migrants, i.e. social groups that can hardly recognize in a common interest. Besides, the 
political action of the unemployed and especially the poor might be marginalized since 
they are excluded or very distant from the production process.  Workers in an enterprise 
have already assembled for work and, if they have worked together long enough to have 
established a social network, they have a good chance to organize a union. By contrast, the 
unemployed and very often also the atypically employed are not automatically assembled 
or associated in some ways that can generate selective incentives available through social 
interaction (Cloward and Piven, 1977). Finally, since the demand for minimum income 
protection is frequently connected to phases of the life cycle and therefore is transitional, 
the group of potential beneficiaries is not stable but changes over time, decreasing the 
possibility of group formation.  
The central tenet of this paragraph is that if the beneficiaries do not have the necessary 
resources and face considerable obstacles that constrain their possibility to mobilize 
efficiently, other organized interests might be able to draw policy-makers’ attention, 
potentially hindering or even favouring the introduction of minimum income schemes 
(Hay, 2001).  Empirical and theoretical literature has shown the relevance of three 
particular groups: trade unions, the Church and associated faith-based organizations, anti-
poverty groups and social movements.  
 
Trade Unions 
Historically, trade unions played a major role in welfare state development by promoting 
democratization and the expansion of social rights as a core element of citizenship (Esping 
Andersen, 1992; Streek and Hassell, 2004). Indeed, the function of protecting employees 
against social risks (through mutual aid fund, etc.) has often anticipated the role of unions 
as workers’ representatives in bargaining over wages and work conditions (Brugiavini, et 
al., 2000). This is hardly a surprise, since the working class and especially the industrial 
proletariat were among the social group with the most pressing concern for redistribution 
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and protection against social risk such as old age, unemployment, sickness and work 
injuries. This was not just because workers were especially exposed to the vagaries of (at 
the time) modern economies and technologies, but also because of their low pay (Baldwin, 
1990).  
However, as to the position of the trade unions towards means-tested benefits limited to 
the poorest segment of the income distribution they are far from being clear-cut and have 
to be contextualized both across time and space. At the end of the XIX century, when 
public assistance benefits were occasional, residual, and discretional interventions, 
involving severe stigmatization of the beneficiaries, workers’ mobilization gave the 
decisive impulse for shifting from poor relief and public assistance to the introduction of 
the firsts public compulsory social insurance schemes, although this followed distinct 
paths in relation to different institutional and political context (Alber, 1982). In the post-
World War II period of welfare expansion, despite marked national variations both in term 
of political process and policy output, the development of the welfare state was also result 
of a political exchange between governments and trade unions, entailing wage restraints 
on the side of the unions, and providing for social security expansion by government. This 
resulted in expanding provision that stabilized the income of the male breadwinner and 
their families. Despite the fact that the type of social security provision trade union 
demanded varied substantially with the type of trade unionism and its interaction with 
other political forces (Baldwin, 1990; Ferrera, 1993), quite generally the goal of trade 
unions and their allied social democratic parties was to eliminate the need of the 
traditional poor relief and social assistance measures, in a context characterized by 
economic growth, Keynesian macroeconomic policies that aimed to guarantee full 
employment and the predominance of the industrial sector. In the Scandinavian countries, 
social entitlements were extended to all citizens, including housewives and other non-
active groups; eligibility thus become largely independent from work performance or 
other market participation (Esping Andersen and Korpi, 1987). In Continental countries, 
even if occupationally fragmented, compulsory social insurance benefits were extended to 
all different categories of workers, typically flowing from industrial employees to 
agricultural workers, then to the self-employed and finally to other marginal or inactive 
categories, thus finally resting on a nationwide pooling of risks and standardized rules 
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(cfr. Ferrera, 2005). In both Beveridgean and Bismarckian welfare states, residual social 
assistance schemes were to serve as a residual layer of social support underneath universal 
and/or insurance-based social protection arrangements, providing for the ‘exceptional 
cases’ with unusual needs that in a full employment economy fell through the net of more 
comprehensive programs and remained poor (Clegg, 2013).  
As we have seen above, from the beginning of the 1980s, risk structures have changed 
quite dramatically with respect to early post-war years. The slowdown of economic 
growth was followed by the return of long-term unemployment in Western European 
political economies and the consequent deregulation and flexibilization of employment 
contracts. In addition, employment structures have changed profoundly with the secular 
shift from industrial to service economies, and low-skilled labour has faced a growing risk 
of unemployment, low pay, and precarious employment. As a result, minimum income 
protection has gained new relevance in guaranteeing a minimum standard of living for a 
growing part of the citizenship, including workers with non-standard form of employment 
contract (Bahle et al., 2011; Cantillon and Vandenbrouke, 2014; Clegg, 2013).  
Several reasons, however, decrease trade unions support for means-tested income 
protection measures. Targeted measures might be seen suspiciously because they are not 
specifically directed to workers, i.e. their main constituency (Rueda, 2007). Moreover, they 
divide low income employees from the middle class, creating incentives for a gradual and 
stigmatizing “ghettoization” of social policy beneficiaries (Esping Andersen and Korpi, 
1987), running the risk of a progressive erosion of public support for social policy with the 
consequent risk of welfare backlash (Korpi and Palme, 1998). Furthermore, they are 
financed through general taxation, therefore also by dependent workers which constitute 
trade unions main constituencies, a particularly relevant factor especially in countries 
characterized by a relevant share of autonomous workers and which are not particularly 
effective in tax collection. Finally, minimum income schemes, being interpreted mainly as 
policies for the poor might result in a qualitative decline of services - according to the idea 
that ‘welfare for the poor become poor welfare’ (cfr. Ferrera, 2000) - and, more generally, 
they might constitute an abandonment of the traditional social democratic goal of full 
employment and universal welfare state (Clegg, 2013; Rosanvallon, 1995).  
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From a different angle however, the shift towards a post industrial economy constitute 
also a challenge for trade unions, whose membership is declining in all western 
economies, although with a different intensity across countries. This decline is mainly due 
to the fact that trade unions tend to lag behind the structural changes that have invested 
western economies and societies, and tend to represent the traditional core workforce, 
especially blue collars workers and in the public sector, whereas face mounting difficulties 
in representing workers in the private service sector and in small companies, especially 
younger cohorts and employee with non-standard employment contract (Ebbinghaus, 
2006).  
Trade unions therefore face strategic choices in their response to those structural changes 
and the progressive dualization of the labour force (cfr. Goldthorpe, 1984, p. 149). In the 
industrial relation arena, their traditional reaction has often been to oppose atypical work 
in all its forms and as a consequence, to avoid or exclude precarious workers; however, in 
recent years, most unions have accepted that precarity is a reality that will not disappear 
and have recognised the need to represent the interests of this group of workers (cfr. 
McGormick, 2011).  In the social policy arena, their choice is whether to react to this 
changing structure of risk modifying their traditional attitude of suspicion and introducing 
non-contributive benefits in their bargaining platform, or take a more conservative 
approach, devoted to defend those social right which have been acquired during the 
expansionary phase of the welfare state. The latter approach, which is very often 
underlined in the insider outsider-literature (Saint Paul, 1998; Rueda, 2007), would be 
“sectional”, as trade unions react to protect and narrowly promote the policy interests of 
their remaining core membership, even if their numbers are in decline (cfr. Clegg et al., 
2012). The former approach stresses unions role as leaders of a general movement towards 
social progress, far beyond the economic interest of their core constituencies. The broad 
literature on so-called union revitalisation (e.g. Baccaro et al., 2003; Frege and Kelly, 2003; 
Hyman, 1996) in particular, has extensively documented the attempts of unions to take up 
the causes and interests of workers beyond their core membership, largely for recruitment 
reasons. From the perspective of this literature, promoting minimum income policies that 
provide income security to the so called atypical worker and the unemployed would be 
attractive to unions as part of a more general strategy of agenda broadening. 
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Church and faith-based organizations 
Labour movements are not the only groups that played a relevant role in the development 
of the welfare state and minimum income protection. Churches and religious movements 
have deeply influenced the nation building process with relevant long term consequences 
for the welfare state and have culturally and normatively shaped the definition of what 
should be the proper answer to emerging social risks. In particular, in the field of anti-
poverty policies, in the early days of welfare state formation, religious norms and more or 
less bitter State-Church cleavages have affected the organizing principles of social 
assistance and the timing of its introduction (Manow and Van Kersbergen, 2009). The early 
fusion of state and church in the Scandinavian and Anglophone countries allowed the 
central state to distinguish itself as an autonomous agency for redistribution and facilitated 
a more pronounced penetration of the state in education, poor relief and health care 
systems (Flora, 1986; Ferrera, 2005). In contrast, especially in predominantly Catholic 
countries, harsher conflicts over competences in educational and poverty relief measures 
constituted significant obstacle to the development of public intervention in those policy 
fields. Moreover, as stressed by Kahn (2009), different denominations and religious 
doctrines have different considerations regarding what should be done in order to support 
the individual without any income (if anything), and especially regarding who should be 
in charge of this task (if anybody). In particular, it appeared that the social doctrines of the 
Catholic Church, with its special emphasis on the principle of subsidiarity31 and its long 
tradition of supporting the poor through charities rather than public entitlements, 
contributed to the lack of state provision for the most in need (Kahl, 2009). Effectively, in 
the Catholic world - in countries such as Spain, Italy, France and Portugal - social 
assistance issues remained long core domain of church charity, whereas universal public 
safety net were not introduced neither in the early days of welfare states formation or in 
the Golden Age of welfare state expansion.  
More recently, authors have stressed that, despite being largely unnoticed by scholars, 
churches have massively expanded their involvement in faith-based welfare provisions in 
many modern industrialized country (Fix and Fix, 2002; Bahle, 2003; Harris et. al, 2003, 
                                                          
31 In a nutshell, the subsidiarity principle states that what can be done by a lower level (a private 
organisation, the family) should not be taken over by a higher level (the state).   
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Göçmen, 2013). Hien (2014) argues that under increasing budgetary constraints and the 
spread of neo liberal anti-state doctrines, faith-based organization are increasingly taking 
over welfare tasks from the state, delineating a “reversal path” in an opposite direction 
compared to the evolution of the modern state. 
Generally, therefore, the relevance of the Catholic Church and great diffusion of religious 
associations have been considered detrimental to the development of public intervention 
in this policy field. However, similarly to other group and organization, faith-based 
organizations’ preferences and strategies might change as a reaction of changes in the 
political environment (Warner, 2000). In particular, it appears plausible that church adjusts 
its political strategy to the challenges and opportunities created by an expanding welfare 
state, with relevant consequences for the politics of minimum income protection (cfr. Kahl, 
2009).  At the hearth of this approach there is the idea that it is useful to view the Church 
as an interest group, at least in democratic polities, operating like everyone else in a world 
of scarcity, competing for political support and preferred policies in order to maintain its 
organizational integrity, to survive and to increase resources (cfr. Warner, 2000). 
Considering churches as strategic organizations suggests that there can be as much 
internal variation in preferences and strategies within a given religious body as there is 
among denominations. Shared doctrines do not presuppose the same political strategies or 
influence: as an example, primarily catholic countries, from Poland to Italy to France, show 
very different patterns of Catholic Church political behaviour, and political strategies 
varied across time and across countries. Religious organizations are social actors who 
engage in alliances, support specific political formations, and structure social and political 
cleavages (cfr. Grzymala-Busse, 2012). 
As a consequence, Church traditional opposition towards improving minimum income 
benefits could transform into support, when religious movements and associations 
consider that they could better achieve their ends by using the state as an instrument to 
realize the desired social order (cfr. Kahl, 2009). In particular, two interconnected 
institutional changes might introduce new incentives to change the political preferences of 
religious associations regarding minimum income schemes. Firstly, since the late 1980s 
access to minimum income schemes is associated with, if not conditional to (Moreira, 
2008), participation to social programs that aims at the social reintegration of beneficiaries, 
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paving the way for the increasing prominence of voluntary organizations in the 
implementation of those services. Increasingly, in the governance of minimum income 
protection the state is the main provider of funds and resources, whereas local government 
agencies and voluntary organizations are the implementers. This opens up new space for 
action and for increasing funds for voluntary - and therefore, especially in Southern 
Europe, mostly religious - associations. The discussion over the introduction of the Revenù 
Minimum d’Insertion (Minimum Insertion Income) in France (1988) was actually initiated 
by Church and associated religious associations, which then engaged in the service 
provision within the RMI. 
Secondly, in particular during a harsh social crisis, the Church might call for more state 
involvement in a situation where traditional church institutions are increasingly unable to 
cope with rising and changing needs (Kahl, 2009). Increasing social demand coupled with 
decreasing financing might induce the Church to look state resources, if guaranteed a 
strong voice in the design of the programs and in their implementation.  
 
Anti-poverty groups and social movements 
The main argument advanced so far is that it is useful to consider the strategies of trade 
unions and religious organizations, and therefore also their specific relations with the 
political system, in order to assess the country specific direction and scope of policy 
change in this policy sector. Other interest groups increasingly have a voice in the policy-
making process in this field, both at the supranational, national and subnational level. 
NGOs and voluntary associations, also not of religious origin, may constitute a “poverty 
lobby” whose importance varies extensively in the national political arena, but might be 
relevant especially in sensitizing the public opinion regarding measures that might benefit 
or worsen the condition of the poorest members of the society (Clegg, 2013). As an 
example, the European Anti-Poverty Network and its national branches are active in 
issuing report and analysis regarding minimum income schemes at the national and local 
level. 
Also social movements in the last decades have paid increasing attention to the theme of 
income security. In the past decade, an anti-precarity movement has emerged in Europe, 
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with origins and strongholds in Italy, France, and Spain, though the movement has sprung 
up in several European countries, including Portugal, Germany, Denmark, and Sweden 
(Lee and Kofman, 2014; Choi and Mattoni 2010; Neilson and Rossiter, 2008)32. Within this 
movement precarious, contingent or flexible workers emerged as a new kind of social and 
political subject (Neilson and Rossiter, 2008). The reflection towards the situation and the 
living conditions of this “new” political subject, demands for an unconditional (basic) 
income become part of the bargaining platform of many social movements (Mouchard, 
2002, Mattoni, 2009), that were supported also by international fora such as the Basic 
Income Network. Despite the fact that those movements usually strongly criticized 
European minimum income schemes for their strong conditionality and their workfare 
attitudes, their mobilization might be relevant because they increase public awareness and 
concern about the condition of precarious workers, and raise the issue of income security 
for those citizens who do not have access to stable work contracts.  
To sum up, despite relevant obstacles to the mobilization of would-be beneficiaries, other 
interest groups might pressure for minimum income protection. In different period and 
countries, trade unions, religious associations and social movements have campaigned for 
increasing the protective ability of residual safety net. Consequently, a common platform 
among different interest groups supporting the introduction and/or the expansion of Mis 
attract the interest of political parties in this policy area. Conversely, a more fragmented 
demand run the risk of undermining the possibility of strengthening social safety nets (see 
below). However, in order to understand the specific mechanisms that might link interest 
groups and political parties, we have to introduce also the supply side – i.e. the party 
system structure. 
 
5.2 The supply side of political competition: going beyond the classical partisan politics 
literature  
Social and interest group look to the state and political parties in order to obtain the 
preferred policies, supporting in the electoral arena those parties that are able to guarantee 
                                                          
32 In particular, political action against precarity began to coalesce in mass mobilization of precarious workers 
in the EuroMayDay protests, which spread from Milan in 2001 to 18 European cities by 2005. 
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their influence and organizational survival. Political exchange dynamics are shaped by 
systemic characteristic of the party system, decisive to observe whether a policy proposal 
will become a policy choice.  
In the last decades new ways of conceptualizing the role of political parties have emerged 
(see Hausermann, Picot and Geering, 2012) that – questioning some of the underlying 
assumptions of the PRT – provide fertile insights regarding the politics of minimum 
income protection. In particular, scholars have outlined that political preferences might be 
more complex than outlined so far, and have emphasized the relevance of additional 
cleavages and of political competition dynamics.    
 
Political preferences 
Political parties’ ideological commitments and preferences are more complex and 
diversified than originally foreseen by the traditional welfare state literature. As recently 
stressed by Jensen (2014), taking the partisanship argument seriously requires to go 
beyond the simplified assumption that the “left invariantly wants more and the right 
invariantly wants less government” (Jensen, 2014, p. 127).  
This holds particularly true in the case of social assistance policy and minimum income 
schemes. Right parties should oppose pro-poor policies, as their main constituency finance 
through tax those measures and are very likely to be excluded by the means-test (Jensen, 
2014).  However, right parties might also support Mis as being the less expensive type of 
state intervention to help those affected by market failures, while the contractual nature of 
those policies promises to reduce welfare dependency and consequently lower the cost of 
the welfare state for taxpayers. As Pierson (1994, p. 101) argued: “if conservatives could 
design their ideal welfare state, it would consist of nothing but means-tested 
programmes”.  Moreover, in the age of austerity (Schäfer and Streeck, 2013), introducing 
and/or reinforcing Mis could be a political alibi for the dismantlement of higher-tier social 
protections schemes (cfr. Clegg, 2014).  
Also on the left side preferences might be more complex than often presumed. Targeted 
measures may well resonate with traditional leftist claims to reduce poverty and 
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inequality.  At the same time, sustaining Mis could also be interpreted an abandonment of 
the traditional goals of full employment and decent wages as the main road out of poverty 
and a return to the moralizing age of assistance (Rosanvallon, 1995).  
Therefore, patterns of conflict and consensus on Mis can be extremely various. Last resort 
safety nets might constitute the loci of an overlapping consensus between traditional left 
and right wing political parties (Clegg, 2014, cfr. Madama and Jessoula, 2015).  On the 
other hand, Mis might also prompt conflicts not exclusively along the traditional left right 
dimension, but also within the two traditional political camps (Bonoli, 2013). 
 
Political Cleavages 
Scholars have underlined the relevance of cleavages other than the labour capital for social 
policy evolution. Class conflict has been a reality everywhere, but of course this was not 
the only social struggle translated into the political arena. Political science literature has 
demonstrated the relevance of numerous political cleavages other than class (Rokkan, 
1970), and that additional cleavages shape parties’ identities and policy priorities.  
The presence of different cleavages constellation in the various national political arenas 
has been considered relevant to explain the differentiated policy choices made both in the 
genetic moment and in the crucial phase of expansion in different Western industrialized 
countries. According to Ferrera (1993, 2005) the fragmentation of the political space along 
dimensions different from the class line has hindered the development of universalistic 
policies in those countries where more cleavages were active during the phase of 
introduction and expansion of the welfare state. Ferrera pointed out that the presence of 
ethnic, linguistic or religious cleavages, which crosscut the party system, favoured more 
fragmented programs with occupational coverage. Manow and Van Kersbergen (2009) 
consider the presence of a different cleavage structure fundamental to explain the 
formation of different welfare regimes (Esping-Andersen, 1990). In the Liberal countries 
the absence of cleavage different from labour-capital in the political arena favoured an 
alliance between the middle and the upper class, resulting in a residual welfare state. In 
Northern and Continental countries the middle class had different incentives to coalesce 
with workers because there was an urban–rural cleavage in the North, “activated” by 
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agrarian parties, and a strong state–church cleavage in Continental countries, politically 
activated by parties of religious defence, i.e. Christian Democracy. Social democratic 
parties coalesced with Agrarian in the Nordic countries, which preferred the introduction 
of universal income protection (see also Baldwin, 1990). The Continental regimes was 
instead the results of the preferences towards a status preserving occupational welfare 
state of the Christian Democracy. 
The relevance of cleavages other than the class labour has been therefore used especially in 
macro studies covering the broader issues of welfare types, rather than in explaining single 
policy decisions. However, the political activation of traditional cleavages – i.e. the State - 
Church and Centre – Periphery - might be particularly useful to interpret party policy 
preferences in the field of minimum income protection (Jessoula et al., 2014).  
Religion influences political behaviour both directly, shaping views on political issues 
through doctrinal affinities, and indirectly, implying support for specific policies and 
regimes through the organizational support and mobilization of religious authorities and 
institutions (cfr. Gryzmala-Busse, 2012). In the field of anti-poverty policies, religious 
norms and more or less bitter Church – State conflict have affected the organizing 
principle of modern social assistance policies and the timing of its introduction. In 
particular Van Kersbergen (1995) has deeply studied the long term consequences on the 
welfare state of the political activation of the religious cleavage through conservative 
parties of religious defense (Van Kersbergen, 1995, Manow and Van Kersbergen, 2009). In 
Continental Countries, those parties, which have a strong commitment to both traditional 
families values and to subsidiarity principle, delayed or prevented public intervention in 
certain policy fields in order to defend the role of primary networks of solidarities. 
Madama (2010) argues that in Italy the limited interest of the Christian Democratic party – 
preferring to support the existent broad network of community based charities – 
contribute to explain the absence of a national safety net during the so called First 
Republic.  
Several authors in recent years have also focused on the (re) emergence and politicization 
of Centre Periphery relations, and its relevance for welfare state development (Keating, 
1998 and 2010; Ferrera 2005; McEwan and Moreno, 2005). This is due to the increasing 
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importance of subnational level of government in planning, financing and implementing 
social policies, especially in health care, social assistance and in active labour market 
domain. At the same time, this process has been favoured by the emergence of territorial 
and regionalist political parties in many national political arenas (De Winter and Türstan, 
1998), associated with the emergence of harsh territorially based (re)distributive conflicts 
over the allocation of resources and competences to different geographical area. 
Territorial politics affects Mis since there is a considerable variation across European 
countries in the governance of minimum income protection33 (Clegg, 2013; Eardley et al. 
1996; Kazepov et al. 2008). Furthermore, the political activation of the territorial cleavage 
might hinder the viability of national based anti-poverty schemes, especially in country 
characterised by wide territorial differentiation, as the development of a national scheme 
would result in a significant transfer of resources from rich to poor regions (Jessoula et al. 
2014; Saraceno, 2006).  At the same time, in the subnational political arena, activism in the 
social policy realm might prove useful for “competitive region building” purpose, since 
social policy are powerful instrument in order to demarcate geographical spaces and to 
stabilize new form of political organization (Banting, 1995; cfr. Ferrera, 2005). In fact, as 
highlighted by Banting, “social programs designed and controlled at the regional level can 
become instruments for strengthening regional cultures and enhancing the significance of 
local communities in the lives of citizens” (Banting, 1995, p.271). This implies that the 
political mobilization of regional identities may have a distinct impact in the national and 
in the subnational political arena, constituting a significant obstacle to the introduction of a 
comprehensive national measure, whereas having a positive impact on the development of 
regional minimum income schemes.  
 
 
                                                          
33 In the U.K. and in France, regulation and financing of minimum income benefits are national 
competences, as well as administration, is a responsibility of a central government agency, and 
delivery only is in the hands of local branches. In Sweden, albeit within a national framework that 
guarantees minimum standards, financing and delivering of minimum income schemes is a 
competence of local (municipal) authorities. In Spain and until 2010 also in Austria regional 
minimum income schemes have been introduced in the absence of a national framework law or 
specific national funds. 
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Party competition 
Scholars have looked at competition dynamics created by the various party system 
configurations in order to understand the differences in the development of Western 
welfare states (Ferrera, 1993, Ferrera et al, 2012; Picot, 2012). In particular, Ferrera et al. 
(2012) have looked at the peculiar political dynamics of the polarized multi-party system 
(Sartori, 1976) to explain the roots of the imbalances that still characterize the Italian 
welfare state (see Chapter 1). In this party system, the presence of a bilateral opposition 
and of anti-system - parties, had crucial systemic consequences: ideological divisions, 
centrifugal drives and politics of “outbidding or over promising” (Sartori, 1982, Wolinetz 
2004) are crucial elements to explain the “exceptionalism” of the Italian welfare state, 
which lies in the expenditure structure, much geared towards the protection of ‘insiders’ 
through contributory schemes (so called distributive distortion) and the over-protection of 
old age (functional distortion). In a more general vein, Ferrera (1996, 2010) explains the 
dualistic nature of the income protection for working age people in Southern Europe as the 
result of ideological polarization and the presence of a radical-maximalist and divided left. 
In these countries the reformist forces of the left - facing harsh competition from the centre 
and not supported by the radical “anti-system” parties of the left wanting to protect the 
interest of their constituency (industrial workers) - were not able to introduce more 
universal and less fragmented social protection schemes, finally opting for a dualist policy: 
generous benefits for core workers coupled with a policy of weak subsidization of 
marginal workers.  
As relevant as they have been in the past, with the fell of the Berlin Wall and the declined 
relevance of Marxist and Fascist parties in Western Europe, as Mair (2005) has observed, 
currently there are no case in Western party systems of polarized pluralism, and liberal 
democracies fit increasingly into the category of moderate pluralism. 
Also in non-polarized political system party competition dynamics have been considered 
relevant for social policy formation. Iversen and Soskice (2006) argued that in different 
party systems the middle class has different incentives to forge an alliance with upper or 
lower income group. In a two party system, the middle class fearing an excessive taxation 
will more often vote for right than left parties, whereas multi-party system allows for the 
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formation of a centre middle class party which has higher incentives to coalesce with 
centre left parties because they can together “exploit” the rich while guaranteeing that a 
not excessive tax burden will fall on the shoulder of the middle class. As a consequence, 
under two party system the welfare state remains residual, whereas multi-party systems 
guarantee higher redistribution.  
The main limits of this argument is that, considering political parties as a transmission belt 
of different income groups, it relies on a simplified vision of party politics. Moreover, it 
does not really focus on the systemic properties of different party systems, i.e. on the large 
differences that exist among multi-party systems, in terms of number of parties, degree of 
polarization and number of cleavages activated/represented in the political arena34.  
Kitschelt is among the scholars that have given closer attention to the strategic aspect that 
determines the policy preferences of parties, especially in relation to the new politics of the 
welfare state and the different incentives that political parties have to retrench the welfare 
state (Kitschelt, 2001). Among the four elements that he considers as relevant to improve 
the prospects of (restrictive) social policy reforms35, one in particular appears important for 
our discussion: mild electoral trade-offs, i.e. only weak or no rival parties to the immediate 
extreme of governing parties. His argument relies on the assumption that in order to 
understand party preferences, we have to take into consideration the position of the 
parties they are competing with: the presence of “new social protest” parties or minor 
parties in the centre or on the left of the political spectrum might limit the possibility of 
Christian or Social Democratic parties to introduce restrictive reforms, because in presence 
of niche “neighbouring” parties supportive of the welfare state they run the risk of losing 
voters endangering their office-seeking goals (Kitshelt, 2001). Similar strategic 
considerations are also included in Arndt work (2013). In a nutshell, his argument is that if 
social democratic parties adopt a “third way” strategy and change their social policy 
                                                          
34 Similar problems of oversimplification concern their dependent variable; their distinction 
between generous and residual welfare states, focused on levels of spending only, ignores the 
profound differences in the way spending is organized and targeted in the advanced political 
economies (cfr. Manow, 2009). 
35 The other three are the existence of a strong market-liberal party and the declining credibility of 
parties defending the welfare state, a configuration of competition around economic distributive 
issues rather than socio-cultural ones, and a party organization that minimizes strategic inertia at 
the level of activists and party leaders (cfr. Kitshelt, 2001). 
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preferences to appeal to new segments of the middle class – such as high socio cultural 
professionals, technical specialists and managers (Arndt, 2014) – it might have electoral 
loss only in case a proportional electoral system allows for the entrance in the political 
arena of new parties representing the interest of their traditional core constituencies. In 
this case, serious challengers - both leftist parties and new radical right parties - can exploit 
the window of opportunity opened by Third Way reforms and forge a realignment of 
social democratic core constituents (cfr. Arndt, 2013).  
This argument provides a more dynamic account of party policy preferences, emphasizing 
the relevance of “niche” parties, which are deemed to emerge or to react as a consequences 
of the strategies adopted by “mainstream” left parties. However, Arndt does so only 
considering the ex-post electoral consequences of the party structure, while not 
considering the party system structure relevant to understand the policy preferences of 
parties.  
Some authors have instead included the characteristic of the party system in order to 
understand whether a (left) party will include targeted redistributive measures within 
their policy proposals.  Iversen and Soskice (2009) argue that when social democratic 
parties face strong Christian democratic parties their only viable option is to effectively 
compete with them over the protection of core workers and to abandon “poor” 
constituencies. Conversely, Beramendi and Anderson (2012) contend that the presence of 
minor leftist parties creates incentives for the dominant left party to attract low income 
voters offering targeted benefits36.  
Less attention is given to the social policy consequences of a divided right, which in our 
perspective may be relevant as well, especially in the social assistance field (see also 
Jessoula et al., 2014, Natili, 2015). Given the low political resources of would be 
beneficiaries and the fact that middle and high income individuals finance those policies 
without receiving those benefits, a right party might find convenient to campaign against 
minimum income protection. Moreover, several authors have outlined that radical right 
                                                          
36 Also Picot (2012) - among the authors that have more forcefully argued that parties’ actions 
depend on the other parties they have to compete with - hypothesizes that in non-polarized party 
system, competition within the left pole “will bring policy attention to the preference of social 
constituencies that are neglected in purely centrist competition” (Picot, 2012, p. 166). 
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parties oppose safety nets maintaining a welfare chauvinist attitude, since migrants 
constitute a significant share of Mis beneficiaries (Hausermann, 2012). Therefore, 
competition within the right pole and/or the presence of radical right parties opposing 
Mis, might have relevant consequences for minimum income protection, especially if this 
party is pivotal for forming a governmental coalition. 
Against such backdrop, we contend that politics is crucial to understand developments 
concerning Mip, especially in Southern Europe, where the historically limited 
development of the social assistance sector prevents path dependent dynamics (Pierson, 
2000). In particular, we argue that – especially in this policy field – it is necessary to go 
beyond the traditional partisan politics literature, as political preferences concerning 
minimum income protection are more complex than originally foreseen by the traditional 
PRT, and that the political activation of the above mentioned cleavages in addition to the 
class divide coupled with parties’ competition and coalition dynamics significantly shape 
Mis reforms. 
 
5.3 Political exchange and the politics of Mis in the age of austerity 
The analytical framework applied in this research assumes that policy changes are by-
products of political competition (Schumpeter, 1942).  In particular, we stress that political 
exchange dynamics between political actors - looking for support - and social groups - 
interested in policies that guarantee them power and resources – are crucial for social 
policy development, especially in the minimum income protection area, given the low 
electoral and political resources of would be beneficiaries. 
In the previous paragraphs we have outlined that the political demand for minimum income 
protection might differ considerably in distinct national – but also supranational and local 
– political arena. The limited mobilization potential of would be beneficiaries – not to 
mention their low electoral relevance –  limit their ability to organize and pressure political 
parties efficiently. However, the role of social actors in the social assistance policy-making 
cannot be limited to group constituted by would be beneficiaries. In fact, we have 
underlined that relevant groups – in particular trade unions, third sector organizations 
and social movements – might support residual safety nets in order to broaden their 
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constituencies and/or to increase their organizational resources. At the same time, those 
actors might have good reasons to oppose residual safety nets (Hien, 2014; Rueda, 2007). 
Depending on the strategic choices of interest groups the socio-political demand might be 
strong, weak, or only latent. The demand is strong when powerful social groups coalesce 
and present a unique reform program which aims at introducing and/or strengthening 
social safety nets. But also when all those actors present distinct proposals, and no actor 
opposes the presence of a safety net. It is weak, in various degree, when social actors are 
divided on this issue, and some of them resist its introduction and/or expansion. 
Obviously, depending on which actor sustains what, a weak demand might be more or less 
relevant, and having different influence on the policy-making process. Finally, the demand 
is only latent when it is the result of functional pressures not adequately represented in the 
group arena. Since it depends on the strategic choices of relevant interest groups, the 
presence and the features of the demand is a matter that has to be verified empirically 
rather than presumed theoretically.   
As for political supply, we stressed that political preferences - especially in this policy field - 
are more diversified than outlined by traditional party politics literature, and therefore it 
would be too simplistic to assume left parties’ efforts to promote minimum income 
protection and opposition by conservatives.  In particular, going beyond the traditional 
partisan arguments, we argue that Mis – despite the limited political relevance of would be 
beneficiaries - might be the loci of an overlapping consensus between traditional left and 
right wing parties (Madama et al., 2014). However, the political activation of the religious 
and/or territorial cleavages in addition to the left-right divide may make social assistance 
policy more contentious. In fact, anti-poverty policies are crucially shaped by normative 
considerations that may trigger deep-rooted value-oriented conflicts within both the left 
and the right camp (cfr. Madama, 2015). Finally, the presence of more parties on the right 
and on the left side of the political spectrum, might increase the competitiveness of the 
political system, thus inducing them to propose and/or oppose social safety net 
strategically, significantly affecting policy trajectories.  
Thus, it is useful to distinguish between moderate and fragmented pluralism. The former is 
characterized by the presence of only one political cleavage and the limited relevance of 
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within pole competition. Conversely fragmented pluralism, which can be considered as a 
sort of heir of polarised pluralism (Sartori, 1976; 1982) in absence of anti-system party37, 
allow the emergence of additional cleavages, competition within the right and the left pole, 
and might be also characterized by the prevalence of centrifugal over centripetal drives.  
Moderate pluralism should favour the emergence of an overlapping consensus over Mis. 
This might be instead prevented under fragmented pluralism. In fact, the political activation 
of the State-Church cleavage favour the appearance of an opposition towards public 
intervention in the anti-poverty field. The (re) emergence and politicization of the Center 
Periphery relations might hinder the viability of national based anti-poverty schemes, 
while favouring their introduction at the sub-national level.  
Furthermore, the presence of several parties at the right and at the left side of the political 
spectrum might have opposite consequences for minimum income protection. At the left 
side, the presence of a radical left party might favour the introduction of Mis in the 
political agenda. Conversely, a radical right parties should oppose last-resort safety nets. 
The presence of those parties might have relevant consequences for Mip, especially if they 
are pivotal for forming a governmental coalition.  
Against such backdrop, we contend that even though policy changes are moulded by a set 
of intervening factors (Mahoney, 2000) - between others, socio economic conditions, 
structural conditioning given by the international context, the institutional architecture 
and social policy configuration - that make impossible to pre-determine mechanically the 
outcome of a policy making process, it appears possible to identify some plausible 
mechanisms – to be tested empirically – that might lead to the introduction and or 
expansion of Mis, or rather hinder its development, in the age of austerity (Tab. 9). 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
37 Fragmented pluralism is therefore characterised by a number of relevant parties above five 
(Sartori, 1976). 
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Tab. 9: Political exchange dynamics and minimum income protection 
Type of 
Demand 
Moderate Pluralism Fragmented Pluralism 
Latent Inertia Inertia 
Weak Unpredictable 
(Inertia) 
Left Path Departure –
Institutionalization 
Right Inertia – Policy Reversal 
Strong Path departure – 
Institutionalization 
Unpredictable 
(Path-departure – Institutionalization) 
  
My first hypothesis is that the stronger the socio-political demand, the easier path departure 
and/or the institutionalization of a Mis. Furthermore, given the low electoral relevance of 
would-be beneficiaries, the presence of a demand is crucial to have better Mis. Therefore, a 
strong or a weak demand are a necessary condition to have either the introduction, the 
expansion and/or the institutionalization of a last resort safety net. 
Secondly, in presence of a strong socio-political demand, moderate pluralism, i.e. a party 
system structured along the left-right dimension only, should favour the introduction 
and/or institutionalization of a Mis.  In this context, path departure and/or policy 
institutionalization follows a non-contentious competitive credit claiming logic (see also Bonoli, 
2012). Parties have no reason to oppose minimum income protection, and therefore 
support their introduction/expansion in order to obtain the support of interest groups. 
Thirdly, in presence of a weak demand, fragmented pluralism should lead to path-departure / 
institutionalization or inertia / policy reversal depending on the governing coalition, 
following a contentious credit claiming logic. In fact, competition within left parties affects 
positively the possibility to institutionalize Mis, since it increases the relevance of marginal 
groups with traditionally low political resources. Moreover, it should increase the 
bargaining potential of even residual or not so relevant interest group. Conversely, 
competition within the right might led to policy inertia or even policy reversal, as on the 
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right side preferences appear to be more diversified, with the Catholic right and radical 
right parties potentially opposing minimum income schemes.  
The political logic that characterizes the other cases is more uncertain and unpredictable. 
In party system classifiable in the moderate pluralism type, in presence of a weak demand 
predominance of path dependent dynamics appear plausible. However, also path-
departure / institutionalization is possible, depending on which group sustain or oppose 
Mis and on party-social group linkages. As an example, a centre-left party might introduce 
and/or strengthen a safety net if the trade union movement strongly support it, even if the 
Church opposes it.  
The presence of a strong demand and fragmented pluralism should allow path departure 
and/or policy institutionalization, but also policy reversal is possible in theory. In fact, 
depending on the political system, the political activation of the territorial cleavage and/or 
the presence of radical right parties might lead to a contentious policy making process 
whose outcome depend on coalitional strategies and power balances between different 
parties. 
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Chapter 5 
Party system and organized interests in Italy and Spain 
 
This works builds on the idea that to understand the specific trajectories of Mis in Italy and 
Spain we have to take into consideration the specific configuration of the party system and 
of the organized interest. In order to qualify similarities and differences between the two 
cases, in this chapter we provide a description of the main characteristic of the Italian and 
the Spanish party system and of their system of interest representation. 
The chapter is structured as follows. The next paragraph is dedicated to the parties and 
party system configuration in Italy from the end of the fascist regime until the Monti 
government. Conversely, the third paragraph focuses on the construction of a moderate 
pluralist party system in Spain during the transition and its systemic characteristic. In the 
fourth paragraph our attention shifts to the representation of organized interests in the 
Italian political system, with a specific focus on the role of concertation for social policy 
development. Finally, the fifth deals with trade unions and concertation in Spain, in order 
to delineate key features and differences with the Italian case. 
 
1 The Italian Party System 
1.1 The polarized pluralism of the “First Republic” 
The strong contraposition between different historic political traditions – Christian 
Democracy, Socialism, Communism, Liberalism, but also (post) fascism and Regionalism – 
is one of the key features of the Italian Republican story. This is at least partially explained 
by the enduring consequences of the tumultuous phase that have followed the fall of the 
fascist regime. Indeed, between 1944 and 1946 all the anti-fascist parties - which previously 
comprised the Committee of National Liberation (CLN) - the communists (PCI), the 
socialists (PSI, at the time called PSIUP), the Catholic party (DC), the Actionists – formed 
nine different governments, with a balanced party representation. 
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In the first free elections in 1946 all those parties obtained parliamentary representation 
and they were able to participate to the Constituent Assembly. The results of this elections 
show also in nuce some of the structuring features that characterized the Italian political 
life for almost four decades (1945 – 1992): the emergence of Christian Democracy as a 
prevailing force among the moderate electorate, the small electoral support in favour of 
the Liberal Party, and the competition between the Communists and the Socialists for the 
hegemony inside the left wing – even though, until 1956, those two parties maintained an 
informal alliance known as the “Italian socialcomunism”.  
The defining features of the Italian party system crystallized after 1948 elections. In 
addition to those peculiarities, the well-known religious conflict, and latent territorial 
conflict exacerbated by the presence of strong geographical differences, contributed to 
structure the Italian party system of the immediate post war period. Those socio-economic 
conflicts and the heritage of the democratic consolidation phase coupled with a 
proportional electoral law with a very permissive entrance threshold favoured the 
consolidation of a large number of parties.  Basically, until the Nineties the Italian party 
system was based on seven state-wide parties.  
The Italian Social Movement stood on the extreme right part of the political spectrum. It is 
a neo-fascist political parties pushed to the sidelines of Italian political system until the 
Nineties, with an electoral support that fluctuated around 5 percent, with a peak of 8.7% in 
1972 after the so called “Hot Autumn” and the merge with the monarchists. On the left 
front, after the 1948 defeat’, the “Popular Front” – the electoral coalition between the PCI 
and the PSI -  dissolved. The Italian Communist Party became progressively the second 
largest political party in Italy and one of the strongest communist party in the West, in 
reason of its entrenched mass party organization – i.e. its diffused presence within Italian 
society and internal discipline - and its solid international bonds with one of the 
international superpowers. Conversely, the Italian Socialist party was crossed by deep 
divisions and splits, due in particular to the initial decision to support the Communist 
bloc, which, coupled with lower organizational resources, helped in the determination of 
the progressive hegemony of the PCI. Only after the 1956 Soviet repression in Hungary, 
this party distanced itself from the communists, and started to move slowly to the centre-
left.  
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At the centre of the political system the DC, which could count on the open support of the 
Catholic Church and on its role as a “guarantor” of the democratic system, become the 
largest and dominant political party. In various combination it formed unstable governing 
coalitions with the smaller parties that constituted the broad spectrum of Italian moderate 
parties: on the centre-left the PSDI - a party split from the PSI after the decision to join the 
PCI in the 1948 election - on the centre and on the centre right with the PRI and the PLI.  
The fragmentation of the political supply cannot be considered the main feature of the 
Italian political system. The international Cold War context coupled with the hegemony of 
the Communist Party in the left camp created a party system structured on the 
communist/anti-communist cleavage, rather than along the left/right cleavage as in most 
Western democracies (cfr. Cotta and Verzichelli, 2008). The religious cleavage was clearly 
represented in the political system: while the DC can be explicitly defined as a party of a 
confessional nature, all the other centre left parties presented rather accentuated 
anticlerical stances. Although relevant for some specific policies – for example education, 
divorce and abortion regulation, but also social assistance and family policies (see below) – 
the religious divide has never been crucial for government formation, since the Christian 
Democrats preferred to form an alliance with secular parties in order to contain 
Communism. Similarly, despite the relevance of the left-right cleavage for specific 
economic and social policies, it just had tiny effect on government formation. Minor centre 
and centre left parties (and later, also the Socialist Party) always preferred to form 
government in coalition with the Cristian Democrats rather than gave birth to a left 
government under the supremacy of the PCI. 
The structuring of the party system around this fracture is the source of some of the 
unique characteristics of the Italian party system in a comparative perspective. Between 
the two parties that contended the relative majority of votes in Italy, only one could 
actually access to government positions, therefore there was no alternation in government 
between the two (Galli, 1966). In fact, even though the PCI was able to become the main 
party within the left pole, national and especially international factors prevented it to 
become a serious government alternative. 
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Besides this conventio ad excludendum, contributed to this outcome the fact that the 
Christian Democrats – as most of the European Christian-Democratic parties (Kalyvas, 
1996, Van Kersbergen, 1995) - was not a right-wing or a bourgeois party, but rather, a 
centre interclasses party. This party especially in the Forties and the Fifties could count on 
the open support of the Catholic Church and its extensive network of organizations, but 
over time had also been able to build (if not dominate) an intense relationship with all 
interest groups, including both employer organizations (in particular but not exclusively 
in the agriculture field) and a part of the trade union movement (see next paragraph) 
(Morlino, 1998). Also as a consequence of this organizational strength and its pivotal role 
in the party system, the Christian Democrats remained continuously in power in the forty-
five years of the First Republic life, while other smaller parties of the centre right (PLI) and 
of the centre-left (PRI and PSDI first, then from the beginning of the 1960s also the PSI) 
alternated in government coalitions. Communist remained permanently excluded from 
government coalitions as well as extreme right parties, and in particular the Italian Social 
Movement, heir of the Italian fascist tradition. 
Sartori (1982) defined the systemic features of the Italian Party system after the watershed 
elections of 1948 as “polarized pluralism”. The main distinctive features of this party 
system resided in: a) presence of relevant anti-system parties38 (PCI and MSI) b) stable 
occupation of the centre by a hegemonic party (DC) and the existence of bilateral 
opposition c) high ideological polarization – i.e. a political space characterized by a large 
distance between the two extremes - and therefore an anti-pragmatic mind-set both at the 
mass and especially at the élite level, and d) prevalence of centrifugal drives over 
centripetal competition. Those systemic features had a number of relevant consequences. 
In particular, the impossibility of alternation made irresponsible the opposition, because it 
did not have to “respond” to its electoral promises, but to some extent also the 
government, because it never really run the risk of losing office.  
The party system that we have briefly outlined demonstrated over time a remarkable 
ability to persist to the profound socio-economic and cultural changes that throughout 
                                                          
38 According to Sartori, “a party can be defined as being anti-system whenever it undermines the 
legitimacy of the regimes it opposes” (cfr. Sartori, 2005 p. 118).  
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forty years have deeply turned the country (Cotta and Verzichelli, 2008). However, it is 
possible to observe different political “season” in the history of the First Republic.  
The first phase after the consolidation of the Italian democracy (1948 – 1962) is known as 
centrismo (centrism) since the DC ruled in coalition with smaller centrist parties. In 1963 the 
DC inaugurates a new phase of governing coalition with the Socialist Party, hoping to 
isolate and to weaken the influence of the PCI within the left pole. This new centre – left 
coalition, which prevailed until 1976 with only a small break in 1973, can be considered for 
its length one of the most important of the Italian Republican period.  
However, the strategy to make this alliance between the reformist wing of the Christian 
Democrats and the Socialists the hegemonic fulcrum of a new political system was largely 
unsuccessful. A large part of the trade unions and of the political left remained in fact 
under the influence of the Communist Party. Furthermore, the PSI suffered from a party 
split and several electoral losses, while the PCI in the Seventies continued to increase its 
vote shares, to reach its historic peak (34,4%) in the 1976 election. 
This election was followed by a phase of national solidarity called the “Historic 
Compromise”, in which – in a phase of economic and political crisis - minority 
government of the DC were sustained by the “not-no confidence” policy of the PCI. This 
election was relevant also because it represented the moment of the greatest consensus 
towards the two major parties, which were able to get more than 73.1% of the votes. A 
decade later, they got only 60,9%: historically, Italian politics entered in the phase called 
Pentapartito (Five-party coalition), characterized by greater political fragmentation and five 
parties’ coalitional government.  DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI and PL remained in fact permanently 
in government from 1981 and 1991, while PCI, which lost 4% in its votes between 1976 and 
1980, was once again in opposition.  
In this period, characterized by electoral decline of both PCI and DC, the secular parties of 
the government coalition - and especially the Socialist Party – managed to obtain the so 
called “equal dignity”: for the first time in the Italian Republican history, the Presidency of 
the Council was not a monopoly of the DC. Under the new leadership of Bettino Craxi, the 
Socialist Party increased relevantly its share of power and votes, but it failed its objective 
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to corner the PCI, which maintained, although with some difficulties, its primacy within 
the left. 
According to some scholars, those events - and in particular the “de-radicalization” of the 
Communist Party and, to a certain extent, also the secularization of the Christian 
Democracy since the mid Seventy, had changed the nature and consequently the 
constitutive mechanisms of the Italian party system, which was characterized by the 
prevalence of centripetal rather than centrifugal drives (Farneti, 1983). Moreover, as 
noticed by Di Palma (1978, see also Lange et al., 1982, and Salvadori, 2013 pp. 136 - 140), 
the parliamentary cooperation between the Christian democrats and the Communist Party 
in the Seventies was hardly reconcilable with the ideological patterning and the 
irresponsible opposition theorised by Sartori (1976, 1982).  
At the same time, during the 1980, despite several years of élite-level cooperation and a 
lower degree of polarization, the PCI was still perceived as an anti-system party and the 
party system was still tripolar, with a strong centre (DC) and two bilateral oppositions 
excluded from government offices. As noticed before, the essential features of the party 
system were still the same after forty-five years (Picot, 2012, Sartori, 1982, Cotta e 
Verzichelli, 2008). As outlined in Chapter 2, things were to change with the advent of the 
so called “Second Republic”.  
 
1.2. The “Second Republic” and the fragmented bipolarism 
It is not an exaggeration to define the events of the early Nineties as an earthquake for the 
Italian party system: as a result of both national and international events, it underwent a 
radical transformation which caused the dissolution of the Italian Communist Party and 
the demise of the Christian Democrats, the Socialists and their government allies.  
Three factors in particular led to the collapse of the old political structure: the fall of 
communism in Eastern Europe, the activation of the territorial cleavage and the emergence 
of a separatist challenge, and an escalating succession of corruption scandals. The fall of 
the Berlin wall and the collapse of East European Communism had a strong influence on a 
party system which was mainly structured along the conflict line between “communism 
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and anti-communism”. This event had obvious consequences on the PCI which - after a 
long debate and a congress fraught with tension turned away communist ideology to 
transform itself into a progressive left wing party, later called the Democratic Party of the 
Left (PDS). This caused the split of the party’s left wing, which founded a new party, the 
Communist Refoundation Party (PRC). But – perhaps less obviously - the end of the 
Communist block constituted a challenge also for the Christian Democrats, whose role as a 
safeguards against the communist threat had worked not only as an electoral message – 
inducing many Italians to “hold their nose and vote for the DC”, in the famous words of 
the Italian journalist Indro Montanelli – but also as a glue that held together different 
ideological stances and territorial realities.  
Moreover, this legitimation had insulated the DC against many demands and discontent 
with their government performance (Picot, 2010). Therefore, the fall of the Berlin wall was 
followed by the emergence of new popular demand to reform the political system and to 
challenge national political élites. This comes to surface with the unexpected results of the 
1991 referendum on abolishing multiple preference votes in the open list proportional 
representation system which, despite governmental parties invited voters “to go to the 
beach”, obtained an incredible success39 .  
Resentment against the central Italian government contribute to explain also the explosion 
of a new political party, the Northern League (LN), formed in 1991. This party built its 
support on the disappointment of the Northern middle class electorate with the DC, due to 
the common perception that the central government wasted resources collected mainly 
from their tax burden, since public expenditure grew while public services remained poor 
(Ruzza and Falla, 2006).  The attack on the nature of the Italian state and the way in which 
it drained the resources of the north, was articulated through an innovative radical anti-
establishment discourse (Segatti, 1992, Diamanti, 2003).  
The LN, emerged in 1992 national election as a leading political actor, obtaining 8,7% of 
the votes. Since those votes were all concentrated in the Northern regions, in this area it 
                                                          
39 The result was 95.6% in favour, with a turnout of 65.1%. This positive results paved the way for a 
second referendum which in 1993 repealed the law on proportional representations for Senate 
elections. This shift from a proportional to a majoritarian electoral system for one Chamber was 
followed in1994 by a similar legislation for the other.  
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become the second party, challenging the traditional DC leadership in the most 
economically dynamic area of the country. 
After the signals sent by the 1991 referendum and the 1992 elections, the crisis of the 
Italian “partitocrazia” was accelerated by a new decisive factor: the entry of a judicial 
campaign against bribery (Tangentopoli, lit. “Bribesville”). This enquiry uncovered a huge 
system of corruption and illegal party financing, with many leading politicians and 
parliamentarians especially from the PSI and the DC put under investigation, exposing to 
the public the hidden connections existing between business and politics.  
In the crucial months between 1992 and 1994, the already weakened traditional political 
system have been subjected to a converging attack from several directions - from the 
Northern League, the referendum movement, the judiciary and the media and public 
opinion - resulting in a rapid loss of the political system social legitimacy, and the 
beginning of the transition to the so-called Second Republic, whose start is usually 
associated with the first elections held under a new majoritarian system in the spring of 
1994. Indeed, those elections marked the evaporation of the old parties. PCI and MSI were 
the only parties surviving the political earthquake, but they both had to change their 
names40 and moderate their political stances. 
Despite the extraordinary fluidity of the Italian political framework in the period between 
199641 and 2012 – characterized by the continuous emergence of new parties, movements, 
electoral coalitions, splits, divisions and mergers – it is possible to delineate some defining 
features of the structure and mechanism of a new party system, at least until late 2011, 
when a new institutional crisis and the results of the 2013 election gave birth to a probably 
new party system, which is still in a constitutive phase in the moment of writing 
(December 2015). 
                                                          
40 Also the MSI in fact merged in 1994 with some of the most conservative elements of the DC to 
found a new right party, AN. 
41 In 1994 the party system was tri-polar rather than bi-polar, since the main heir of the DC, the 
Italian Popular Party, and the new Party of the leader of the referendum movement, Mario Segni, 
formed a centre pole not allied either with the right or the left pole. The severe defeat of the 
centre pole in the majoritarian competition led to the decision of centre parties to coalesce either 
with the left or the right parties; especially from the 1996 election, the Italian party system 
become therefore prevalently bi-polar.  
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Its main attribute was the presence of two broad electoral coalitions of parties on the 
centre-left and the centre-right, both internally fragmented and very differentiated 
(Bartolini, Chiaramonte and D’Alimonte, 2004). On the centre right, we observe what is 
probably the major novelty of the new Italian political system, the emergence of Silvio 
Berlusconi’s personal party, Forza Italia (FI).  Especially at the time of its foundation – few 
months before the 1994 election - its political platform was based on an electoral appeal to 
all the centrist and right wing political forces to join a new political project under the 
Berlusconi’s leadership to prevent the rise to power of the post-communist, to defend the 
free operation of the market against the abuses of the State and to reduce taxes (Cotta and 
Verzichelli, 2008). Its electoral message was at the same time traditional and very 
innovative: from one side, it retrieved the old DC strategy to present itself as a champion 
of the moderates and safeguard against the post-communist. On the other side, differently 
from the DC, FI positioned itself clearly at the right side of the political spectrum (Cotta 
and Verzichelli, 2008). Especially in the first electoral campaigns Forza Italia had a neo-
liberal program, promising to defend the market – and especially the small and medium 
enterprises, the autonomous workers and the professionals – against the trade unions and 
the state. As signalled by Fasano and Pasini (2004, 2012) however, within its electoral 
program, “a significant reference to the family, traditionally understood as the privileged 
beneficiaries of all major public intervention, from education to social policy” remained 
(cfr. Fasano and Pasini, 2004, p. 25, Author Translation). In general, it combined an 
innovative mixture of liberalism in the economic sphere with paternalistic and 
traditionalist elements (Ibidem). 
In addition to the innovative nature of the political message - and the wise use of the 
media - FI – also thanks to the leader’s availability of a great amount of resources – was 
capable of attracting part of the old political élite (especially from the Socialist Party, but 
also from the other small centrist parties, PRI, PSDI and PLI) and to build an alliance with 
the new emerging right forces, which included in the North the LN, and in Central and 
South Italy the post-fascist AN. This asymmetrical electoral coalition reflected a mixture of 
anti-state, anti-party mixture and aversion to the First Republic which was hard to 
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reconcile with the structural alliance with one of the heir of the DC the Union of Cristian 
and Centre Democrats (CCD)42  (Raniolo and Tarchi, 2015).  
The Left Democratic Party, one of the two PCI successor, assumed a substantial role on the 
centre-left side.43. The unexpected defeat in the founding 1994 election – which ended up 
with a clear victory of the new formed centre-right pole under the Berlusconi leadership – 
made clear to the party leaders that only seeking an alliance with centre parties would 
allow to win elections. Therefore, from the 1996 election, it formed an alliance with one of 
the succeeding formations of the Cristian Democrats - the Italian Popular Party (PPI)44 - 
located at the moderate left of the political spectrum, with the Federation of the Greens 
and with several smaller centrist or moderate left parties. Moreover, it was also able to 
reach a pre-electoral agreement with its main competitor on the left, the PRC. This 
coalition won the 1996 general election and formed the first cabinet in which the (post) 
communist were present.  
However, the relations with the radical left party remained difficult. After a dispute over 
the Italian participation to the international mission in Kosovo, the PRC withdraw its 
“external support” causing the government fall in 1998. This decision was divisive also in 
the PRC camp, where a group of dissidents split and founded a rival communist outfit 
which supported a new formed centre left government until the end of the legislature in 
2001.  
In general, the left pole – even more than its right counterpart – was invested by 
subsequent splits and mergers of the new parties, that made difficult to give an account of 
its continuous transformations. In order to understand the complexity of the politics of 
alliance within the centre-left it might be sufficient to say that in 2006 general election 
seven different political formations within the left coalition obtained a Parliamentary seat 
and one of them, the Olive Tree, was a confederation of the two major parties (the 
Democrats of the Left and the Daisy).  
                                                          
42 Since 2002 Union of the Centre (UDC). 
43 From 1998 Left Democrats. In 2007, Left Democrats and Margherita merged into the Democratic 
Party. 
44 Since 2000 it merged with other smaller centrist parties in a new center party called Daisy. 
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In this period, we observe the formation of Berlusconi cabinet in 2001 – after a clear victory 
of the right pole, facilitated also by the auto-exclusion of the PRC from the centre left 
electoral coalition – followed in 2006 by a second Prodi government after an election won 
by a very narrow margin of 25,000 votes. 
The new Italian party system emerging from the 1992 – 1994 transition phase assumed 
therefore a predominantly bipolar structure of competition. Distinguishing this phase from 
the First Republic, electoral competition in the period from 1996 until 2013 was between a 
centre-right and a centre left pole, and resulted in alternation in governmental office. The 
second defining feature was the extreme fragmentation: the number of relevant parties 
represented in the Parliament persisted, and even increased compared to the First 
Republic (Morlino, 2013).  
In this fragmented system, the main parties of the two coalitions – FI and DS – never 
managed to impose themselves as a truly majoritarian party, able to steer the policy 
making process in a coherent way. Both parties had in fact to face the open competition of 
their allies45. This is due to the opposite incentives provided by this fragmented bi-polar 
party system: on the one hand, they had to attempt not to leave any space on their 
respective ﬂanks, and on the other hand competed to win over moderate voters and take 
them away from the centrists. This party system created specific incentives for its 
components (Bardi, 2007). Centripetal tendencies are observable especially in the electoral 
arena, due to the bipolarity of the system and to the importance for the election results of 
the centre of the political space. However, the competition is centrifugal in the 
parliamentary arena, where the decision making process took place, because coalition 
parties competed against each other and had electoral incentives to defect on issues 
considered fundamental for their own electorate (Bardi, 2007). The coalitions were thus 
repeatedly challenged by conﬂicting interests and ideological aspirations of each member 
group. 
At least until 2008 election the distinctive properties of this party system were alternation 
and bipolar competition coupled with fragmentation and low coalitional internal 
                                                          
45 In order to win a predominantly majoritarian electoral competition main parties had to form 
encompassing coalition, this in turn providing small parties with strong blackmailing potential 
(Picot, 2012). 
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cohesiveness. Those features were favoured by the revival of some of the old structure of 
cleavages - i.e. State-Church, Centre-Periphery (Ieraci, 2012, Jessoula et al., 2014). The 
emergence of LN, the first territorial party acquiring a national relevance in the republican 
history, contributed to (re) activate the territorial cleavage - introducing in the political 
arena demands for greater autonomy of the (Northern) periphery towards the Centre in 
order to reduce territorial redistribution. 
Besides, despite the disappearance of a strictly confessional party, the catholic values – and 
the Catholic Church – continued to influence the political system, and to structure political 
conflicts (Naldini and Saraceno, 2008).  Centre right parties – especially FI and AN – 
openly endorsed Catholicism and the traditional family (Fasano and Pasini, 2012). In 2003, 
this coalition promoted the role of the family as the core of every welfare programme 
(Ministero del Welfare, 2003). More in general, references to the Catholic family as the 
cornerstone of society – against migration, multiculturalism and secular liberal values – 
were the glue that realized the programmatic convergence of right parties (Diamanti and 
Lello, 2005).   
To some degree, the two revived cleavages overlapped with the traditional left-right 
divide as follows: Left-State-Centre vs Right-Church-Periphery (cfr. Jessoula et al., 2014, p. 
7).  At the same time, on specific occasion and issue they contributed to intra coalition 
conflicts and within pole electoral competition. Within the centre-right, the territorial 
rescaling claims of the LN were frequently a source of conflict with the nationalist AN 
program.  At the left side, religious issues were often divisive, since the coalition was split 
between confessional tendencies (expressed mainly by the Daisy) and more secular and 
modernizing ones, supported by the Left Democrats and the radical left parties. As a 
consequence, its approach to family, Catholic schools, homosexual marriage, and other 
ethical issues, relied very often on contradictory and not very intelligible choices (cfr. 
Fasano and Pasini, 2012, p.12).  
The 2008 election broke again with some of the party system characteristics of the 
preceding years. In the spring of 2007 the DS merged with the Daisy to form a new party, 
the Democratic Party, with the purpose of finally assuming a majoritarian nature within 
the centre-left (Lazar and Giugni, 2015). This was soon followed by the announcement of 
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the creation of a united centre-right party, Partito del Popolo della Libertà (the People of 
Freedom Party, PDL), under the renewed leadership of Silvio Berlusconi, created by the 
merger of FI, AN and other smaller parties. 
The 2008 election was therefore characterized by the victory of the right coalition and by 
an impressive reduction of fragmentation: an imperfect bipolar quadrille was established, 
where the two main parties, the PD and the PDL, were in fact partnered “only” by two 
allies, respectively the Italy of Values (IDV) and the Northern League, whereas the 
centrists of the UDC attempted to survive the siege. Despite the reduced fragmentation, 
political competition was still radicalized, both between the parties and within the ruling 
coalition and the PDL (cfr. Raniolo and Tarchi, 2015, p. 173), confirming the enduring 
relevance of multiple cleavages in Italian politics. On the left side the so called vocazione 
maggioritaria of the PD lasted shortly and it was followed by a phase of difficult coalitional 
engineering both at the national and at the regional level. Therefore, in 2010 regional 
election, the left coalition was mostly composed by the PD, the IDV, the Federation of the 
Greens and the Left Ecology and Freedom Party (SEL). Also the right side the coalition 
was threatened by continuous internal conflict that led to the exit of one of the PDL 
founding leaders, Gianfranco Fini, and the creation of a new party – Future and Freedom 
(FL).  
The bipolar nature of electoral competition coupled with the internal fragmentation and 
competition dynamics, allow us to conclude that the systemic properties of the party 
system in Italy remained rather constant up to the institutional crisis of late 2011 and the 
2013 election. The features of this fragmented bipolar party system were competition and the 
alternation between a centre right and a centre left coalition, both very diversified and 
internally fragmented. Fractionalization and the resilience of the cleavage structure 
ensured limited coalition cohesiveness and that policy making process was characterized 
by centrifugal drives.  
 
3. The Spanish party system 
Especially in comparison with the Italian, the history of the Spanish democratic political 
system – at least until very recent times - appear familiar and reassuring: a story of general 
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stability, long cabinet, with few relevant electoral changes. While the Italian Second 
Republic scored thirteen governments and nine prime ministers in twenty years, Spain has 
had six prime ministers during the last four decades. 
Despite this apparent political stability, the distinct electoral fortunes of the parties, 
coupled with a number of party split and merger have given rise to different electoral 
periods. For this reason, here the recent history of the Spanish political system is divided 
in three distinct phase: the transition to democracy and the return of a competitive party 
system (1977 – 1982), the Socialist predominant phase (1982 – 1992), and the period of 
bipolar competition and alternation (1992 – 2015). 
 
3.1 The peaceful transition and the first (moderate) Spanish party system 
The Spanish transition from an authoritarian regime to a competitive democracy – i.e. that 
ﬂowing and uncertain period when new democratic structures were about to emerge, 
while some of the structures of the old regime still existed (cfr. Morlino, 1998, p. 19) – was 
to many extents exemplar, representative of a pragmatic political élite and of a mass that 
had chosen to support liberal democracy.  
It began shortly after Franco's death on 20 November 1975, or more precisely with the 
appointment of Adolfo Suarez as Prime Minister by King Juan Carlos on July 1976. In spite 
of its undemocratic origin, Suárez government consulted widely with all relevant political 
forces. The transition consisted thus primarily in tough and protracted bargaining between 
political forces and institutions that had been adversaries for long time over the very 
nature that the Spanish political system had to assume in the years to come. 
All actors adopted a pragmatic attitude during the consultations, which allowed to 
overcome the obstacles that come alongside this types of process. In fact, the different 
political groups had to accept compromise: the Communists and the Socialists had to give 
up some of their traditional claims, recognize the monarchy and the national unity, and to 
accept the immunity of the regimes officials (including the torturers). At the same time, 
militaries and most conservative forces had to accept democracy and the recognition of all 
political parties, including the “communist demon” (Bosco, 2005). Despite the difficulties, 
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the transition from an authoritarian regime to a liberal democracy is realized in Spain 
without ousting the government originated from Francoism – so avoiding the roptura 
(breakdown process) originally envisaged by the democratic forces – but agreeing on an 
agenda of reforms and institutional changes – the so called reforma pactada - ruptura pactada 
(negotiated reform-negotiated break) – that led to the successful realization of the first 
competitive elections in 1977 and the proclamation of the Constitution the following  year. 
The agreements were not limited to the political and institutional sphere; the government 
and the social partners in fact signed a social pact – the well-known Moncloa Pacts (see 
section below) - which was able to guarantee a certain level of social stability and 
economic well-being in this turbulent phase.   
This inclination towards moderation and pragmatic confront among élites is also 
explained by the dramatic Spanish history, and the willingness to evoke the conflicts that 
afflicted the Second Republic. In fact, political élites were well aware of the excessive 
parliamentary fragmentation, intense ideological polarization, and chronic government 
instability, and of its dramatic consequences. This effort to avoid past mistakes also led to 
the introduction of a particular electoral system - based on the so called d'Hondt system of 
proportional representation - explicitly designed to avoid excessive fragmentation and to 
encourage stability.   
This peaceful transition was not an élite led process – on the contrary, it was conditioned 
by mass pro-democratic support, i.e. by the emergence of popular pressure and civil 
society in Spain (Pérez-Diaz, 2003). The population strongly supported the referendum on 
the Law for Political Reform that opened the constituent process for creating a liberal 
democracy in Spain and, in the first Spanish general election (June 1977) since the outbreak 
of the civil war in 1936, clearly preferred moderate forces against the more radical ones.  
The main results of the first democratic election were a victory for the reformist right over 
the neo-Francoist right and the prevalence of the moderate left over the radical left, which 
clearly expressed Spaniards’ desire to turn the page of the dictatorship (Chislett, 2012).  
The Union of the Democratic Centre (UCD) - a coalition hastily formed by Adolfo Suarez 
of twelve small variegated centre and centre left political groups, including the more 
progressive segments of the Francoist bureaucracy - won 34.4 percent of the vote and 166 
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of the 350 seat. This party was a sort of Spanish “functional equivalent” of a Cristian 
Democratic party46 and occupied the centre of the political space (Linz and Montero, 1999). 
The main competitor on the right was Popular Alliance (AP), formed by an élite closely 
associated with the Franco regime and leaded by Manuel Fraga. Its ties and its poorly 
disguised appreciation of the past regime, combined with the controversial personality of 
some of its executives’, confined AP in this stage at the far right of the political space – 
receiving 8.2% of the popular votes in 1977.  
PSOE stood on the left side, very close to the UCD both in terms of votes (29,3%) and 
ideological stances.  During the transition and in the first electoral consultation in 1977 it 
was internally divided between those supporting a reformist and responsible approach, 
leaded by Felipe Gonzalez and Alfonso Guerra, and the critìcos sustaining a more radical 
agenda (Mendéz Lago, 2005). This duality dissolved in November 1979 during the so-
called Bad Godesberg of Spanish Socialism (Linz and Moreno, 1999), when an Extraordinary 
Congress eliminated the definition of the party as Marxist and adopted a reformist 
program. After this process of moderation, the PSOE progressively substituted its labour 
tendency with a catch-all image and it was able to present itself as a credible alternative to 
UCD government.  
Finally, the “extreme” left part of the spectrum was occupied by the Spanish Communist 
Party (PCE), legalized just few months before the election, which obtained a share of 9.3% 
votes. As PSOE, this party, had given up “armed insurrection and the dictatorship of the 
proletariat” to embrace a democratic road to socialism (Bosco, 2000). After forty years of 
forced exile and strong anti-communist propaganda, party’s priority was to be accredited 
as a responsible and democratic force. Also for that reason, just before 1977 election, the 
PCE distanced itself from the Soviet Union and launched the Eurocommunist movement 
with the Italian and French communist parties. 
                                                          
46 A number of factors prevented the emergence of a Cristian Democratic party in Spain. Linz and 
Montero (1999) underline one element in particular: differently from the German and to some 
extent also from the Italian case, the Catholic Church in Spain was among the main supporter of 
the Franco regime. Therefore, to move away from close involvement in the Civil War and 
collaboration with the authoritarian regime, it had to emphasize its non-partisan position and 
accept political pluralism, also within the Catholic community (Pérez Díaz 1993, cfr. Linz and 
Montero, 1999). 
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Besides those four major state-wide forces, also a number of regionalist parties obtained a 
parliament representation. Those were especially parties from the ACs with a strong 
nationalist movement, i.e. the Basque Country and Cataluña47, but also from Andalusia 
and Canaries.  
The 1979 election confirmed the trend of the previous election, and allow to define the 
basic features of what has been defined, in Sartorian terms, a moderate pluralist party 
system (Linz and Montero, 1999). Despite a relatively large number of parliamentary 
parties, the number of relevant party was low because of the major differences in their 
parliamentary sizes. The number of state-wide parties was in fact restrained and only four 
of them out of thirty-three which were present in the Cortés in 1936 were also in 1977 
parliament48 (Bosco, 2005).  Besides limited fragmentation, the party system was 
characterized by centripetal competition. The distance between the two main parties, the 
PSOE and the UCD, was actually small. Moreover, bilateral competition from the AP and 
the PCE did not substantially affect the mechanisms of competition, because none of them 
can be defined an anti-system party. In fact, none of them defended regimes other than 
democracy, and both parties were moderating their action in those years in order to 
complete their legitimisation as democratic actors. Moreover, all parties were conscious 
that Spaniards’ striking ideological moderation only permitted a centripetal type of 
interparty competition (cfr. Linz and Montero 2009, p. 19).  
 
3.2 The predominant party system, or the long journey from moderate pluralism to a stable 
bi-polar system (1982 – 1992) 
The 1982 election reshaped drastically Spanish party system. The UCD, which won the 
previous two elections and successfully overseen the transition, lost 28% of its vote share, 
                                                          
47 The most important expression of nationalism in the Basque Country and in Catalua were 
respectively the PNV and PDC (Pacte Democràtic per Catalunya, a Catalan coalition which in 1979 
would stabilize as CiU, formed by Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya (CDC) and Unión 
Democràtica de Catalunya (UCD). 
48 Most of the extreme leftist parties, including the previously very relevant anarchists, the 
extreme right forces associated with the Carlist tradition or with the most conservative faction of 
the Catholic Church, and other smaller groups that have deeply affected the functioning of the 
polarized system of the second republic, disappeared, while the extreme right wing parties 
received less than 1% of the vote and subsequently dissolved. 
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156 of its 168 deputies, and collapsed, thus disappearing from the Spanish political scene. 
Furthermore, the prevailing balance between the left and the right - main feature of the 
first two elections since the combination of UCD and AP vote equalled votes for PCE and 
PSOE both in 1977 and in 1979 – was fundamentally broken.  
The Spanish electorate massively supported a governmental change, giving the PSOE a 
broad majority. The Socialist victory was extraordinary: with 48,1% of the votes and 202 
seats (57.9%), for the first time in Spanish history a party obtained the absolute majority of 
seats. 
The sudden disintegration of the UCD beneficiated the PSOE, and AP, which in coalition 
with the Democratic Popular Party (PDP, a small conservative party), obtained 26,4% of 
votes and emerged as the Spanish main opposition party. AP growth was almost as 
surprising as UCD failure, since it was able to obtain a five-fold increase of 1979 votes, 
although it remained very distant (- 21.7%) from the PSOE. 
Conversely, the PCE’s attempts to emulate the Italian sorpasso – i.e. to obtain the hegemony 
over the left forces – failed. Compared to 1979 election, the PCE lost more than 60% of its 
votes, and the ratio between the PSOE and the PCE reached 12 to 1 in terms of votes 
(compared to 3 to 1 in 1979) (Linz and Montero, 1999). Furthermore, many regionalist 
parties that entered Congress in 1979 disappeared, although the PNV and CiU maintained 
their positions, and became a permanent actor of the national political system. 
The PSOE won the 1982 election with a reformist moderate programme of modernizing 
the countries and consolidate the Spanish democracy. Once elected, its main concern was 
to react to the negative economic outlook. Leaving soon aside the electoral program of a 
supply oriented strategy, the Felipe Gonzalez government introduced a strict programme 
of economic adjustment and structural reforms from 1982 to 1985, which included 
devaluation, a reduction of the money supply, industrial restructuring and greater labour 
market flexibility (cfr. Méndez Lago, 2005, see also Chapter 3).  
The socialist second term (1986-1989) continued along the same path of country 
modernisation and fiscal consolidation. Spain joined the European Economic Community 
and remained in the NATO, despite the PSOE previously had an anti-NATO position. The 
government maintained therefore a very “responsible” and centrist profile also in the 
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economi sphere, which led to increasing tension with the labour movement, and 
particularly with the “sister organization”, the UGT (Gillespie, 1990; see below). The 
unions complained that the benefit of a sustained economic growth were not reaching the 
workers. These tensions led to the proclamation of the first general strike of the Spanish 
history in December 1988 (see below).  
The success of the general strike marked a turning point in the social and economic 
policies of the PSOE. In the following year, social expenditure grew from 17 to 20% of the 
GDP, the coverage of unemployment benefit increased from 34% to 67%, and non-
contributory benefits for the pensioners and the disabled were introduced (Guillén, 2010). 
Pursuing this strategy of modernizing the country – i.e. expanding responsibly the welfare 
state while at the same time ensuring wage restraints and economic growth – and 
strengthening its autonomous organizational resources, this party become a dominant 
party in the Spanish electoral system. The elections of 1986 and 1989 in fact confirmed the 
balance of power established in 1982, albeit with slight variations. The PSOE remained 
firmly the first Spanish party, distancing its main opponent – the AP – of respectively 18 
and 14 percentage points. Moreover, the competition between the PSOE and the PCE 
continued to be extremely unbalanced even after the PCE created in 1986 United Left (IU), 
a coalition with other small and disparate leftist groups which would attempt to channel 
the representation of this new left groups (Linz and Montero, 1999). 
The stabilization of an hegemonic role of the PSOE within the centre left was countervailed 
by the strong confrontation within the centre and right pole. In the summer of 1982, the 
dramatic electoral loss and the chronic internal tensions gave rise to a series of splits in the 
UCD that spawned three parties: the Party of Democratic Action (PAD) with a centre left 
orientation49; the Democratic and Social Centre (CDS), led by the transition leader Suárez 
in the Centre, and the PDP on the right, with a Christian democratic orientation.  
One of those party, the CDS, after the 1986 election became the third political force in 
Spain – obtaining 9,2% of votes in 1986 and 7,9% in 1989 -  even though its strategy of 
becoming a central pivotal position in the Spanish party system failed. In fact, the PSOE 
obtained for three consecutive elections the majority and did not need to form a coalitional 
                                                          
49 This party was later absorbed by the PSOE. 
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government, therefore withholding the pivotal role that the party was looking for (Linz 
and Montero, 1999).  
In the meantime, the AP’s strategy to secure domination of the political spectrum to the 
right of the PSOE would only bear fruit ten years later. The ancestor of the PP in this phase 
faced several difficulties in distancing its image of a post-Francoist party, and, although it 
became the main opposition party, its electoral ceiling remained stable at 25 per cent. 
During this period, the frequent merge and splits of parties – both on the extreme left and 
on the centre and right side of the political spectrum – did not endangered government 
stability. According to the Sartori’s typology, the Spanish party system in this decade 
represented a particular type of moderate pluralism: a predominant-party system. The 
PSOE outdistanced during this decade all its competitors – from a maximum of 27% in 
1982 to a minimum of 19% in 1989 - won three consecutive elections, remaining 
significantly stronger than all the others, therefore conforming with the general 
characteristic of this typology (Sartori, 2005, p. 171 - 178).  
 
4.3.3 Bipolar Alternation and the re-emerging cleavages of the Spanish party system (1992 – 2014) 
During the period 1982–92, Spain was a party system with one main party at the centre of 
the political arena, the PSOE. Later on, in the 1990s, the pattern of competition in Spain 
changed, shifting to a bipolar moderate multiparty system. 
Some factors are particularly relevant to understand this transformation. In particular, we 
have to take into consideration the transformation of the AP. After the bitter and 
consecutives electoral defeats of the 1980s, AP party’s leaders realized that it would have 
been extremely difficult to overcome the 25% electoral ceil without deeply transforming 
the party image50. Thus, the ninth AP Congress of January 1989 approved fundamental 
changes, and lead to the creation of the Popular Party (PP), a predominantly centre 
positioned catch-all party. In the same motion, the party was defined as liberal, 
conservative and Christian Democratic, acknowledging the existence within its own ranks 
                                                          
50 In 1985 65% of the Spanish considered AP an authoritarian political force, while a minority (6%) 
considered AP a modern party, democratic (21%) and able to rule (26%) (Bosco, 2005). 
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of different ideological tendencies (cfr. Balfour, 2005, p. 149). During the congress, the 
young José María Aznar – President of Castile and Léon since 1985 – was appointed 
President of the “new” PP.  
Under his leadership, the PP deeply reorganized into a specialized hierarchical and 
centralised organization and redefined its ideology seeking to be considered as a party heir 
of the UCD (Balfour, 2005, Bosco, 2005). In a famous speech given in the April 1991, Aznar 
defined the PP as a party of the centre whose task was to recapture the spirit of the 
transition to democracy and to launch ‘a common project of democratic renovation’ 
(Balfour, 2005, p. 152). In this way the policy platform of the party assumed decidedly a 
moderate tone. Support of social policy, necessity to fight unemployment, subordination 
of public order to individual liberties become part of party proposals, while reference to 
the dictatorship or to divisive ethical issues were carefully avoided.  
In general, in the run-up to the 1993 and 1996 elections, the PP made frequent reference to 
its vocation as a centre party. This strategy – also in reason of the economic crisis and the 
large numbers of scandals involving the PSOE in the early Nineties –  begun to bear fruit 
in the 1993 election, when the Socialist did not obtain the absolute majority for the first 
time in ten years, and the gap between the centre left and the centre right was reduced to 
only four percentage points. Furthermore, the strategy of conquering the centre allowed to 
defeat the CDS, the centrist rival that vanished altogether in 1993. 
After four consecutive socialist victories, in the 1996 election the PP obtained the relative 
majority. Even though the PP overtook the PSOE of less than 300.000 votes (1,2%), the 
growth of this party under Aznar was rather impressive: in 1996 it won 38,8% of votes, 13 
percentage points more than in 1989. This sustained consensus growth was confirmed also 
in 2000, when for the first time the PP gained the absolute majority, with 44,5% of votes – 
approximately ten points more than its main opponent, the PSOE. Similarly to 1993, the 
1996 election was also characterized by the positive results of IU, which obtained 10,5% of 
votes, consolidating its position of third political party in Spain, although very distant 
from the two other state-wide parties.  
Aznar first government was inspired by moderation and pragmatism, and many of its 
policies merely continued those of the PSOE administration (Linz and Montero, 1999). 
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With the aim to gain legitimacy, the new government made also considerable effort to 
maintain a dialogue with the trade unions and the employers’ organization (Molina, 2011, 
see below). In its XIII National Congress, held in January 1998, the PP depicted itself as a 
“centre and reformist” party, while some of its most important leaders – including Manuel 
Fraga, one of the founder of the AP and first president of the PP - went as far as to identify 
PP’s policies with the ‘third way’ of Blair and Schröder (Balfour, 2005). 
This strategy was electorally efficient and allowed the party to obtain a clear absolute 
majority in 2000. Under this condition, the new Aznar government pursued a more 
confrontational strategy vis à vis the social partners and adopted a more conservative 
agenda (Balfour, 2005, Montero and Gunther, 2013). However, despite the electoral defeat 
in 2004 – especially due to the government choice to support Bush war in Iraq and the 
terrorist attack in Madrid just before the election – the party definitely removed its image 
that resembled a post-Francoist formation and became – with the PSOE – the main 
protagonist of the Spanish political system. The elections of 2004 and 2008 - both won by 
the PSOE under the new leadership of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero – did not 
substantially modify the nature of the Spanish political system. The only changes were the 
slow but constant decline of IU51 and the brief emergence of a new small centrist state wide 
party.52 
To sum up, in the 1990s Spain shift to a stable moderate pluralist party system, characterized 
by bipolar alternation and centripetal competition – features that did not change until the 
very recent election in December 2015. The level of electoral fragmentation during this 
period (1993 – 2012) was among the lowest in Europe, since the disappearance of the CDS 
meant that only four national (IU, PSOE, UPD and PP) state wide parties obtained 
parliamentary representation53. Moreover, the concentration of the vote on the two major 
parties has been very high: it oscillated between 73,4 and 83,8 percent of the votes, and 
                                                          
51 From 1996 to 2008 IU lost approximately 1.7 million of votes, declining from 10,5 to 3,8% in 
terms of vote share.  
52 This is Unión, Progreso y Democracia (Union, Progress and Democracy, UPD), a self declared 
social liberal party positioned at the center of the political spectrum which obtained respectively 
one and five seats in the Congress of Deputies in the 2008 and 2011 election. 
53 In 2011 also Unión, Progreso y Democracia (Union, Progress and Democracy, UPD), a self 
declared social liberal party positioned at the center of the political spectrum obtained five seats 
(1,5%) in the Congress of Deputies. 
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between 84,6 and 93 percent of the seats. This format of the party system, typical of 
moderate pluralism, led to a centripetal logic of party competition.  
Beside the great concentration of votes for the two main electoral parties, the electoral 
system severely restrained the possibility of IU to influence the mechanisms of competition 
at the national level. In addition, another element structurally conditioned political 
competition dynamics in Spain in this phase: the presence of a territorial cleavage, 
activated by a number of regional and nationalist parties both in the national and in the 
regional arena.  
At the national level, this cleavage assumed a crucial role starting from the Nineties. 
Indeed, the formation of both PSOE (in 1993) and PP (in 1996) single party minority 
governments, depended respectively from the external support of the Catalan CiU and 
from a more formal agreement with CiU, CC and the PNV respectively. These agreements 
were particularly expensive for the central governments, which had to cease greater fiscal 
autonomy to sub-national levels. Furthermore, the PP government in order to sign the 
agreement had to deal with the Basque, Catalan and Canarias CAs, which obtained 
noteworthy concessions. 
This territorial cleavage influenced not only national politics, but also regional party 
systems. For this reason, according to Linz and Montero (1999, p.2) Spain’s main 
characteristic is the presence of party systems, rather than a party system. In several CAs 
the presence of regional party deeply influences the mechanism of competition and the 
structure of the party system. In the Basque Country, Catalonia, and Navarre – where for 
historical, cultural and political reasons the territorial cleavage is particularly strong - a 
number of nationalist parties ranging from the extreme left to the centre-right compete 
among themselves and with state-wide parties within the format of distinct regional party 
systems. Nationalist party – at least to some extent – creates specific dynamics also in 
Galicia and in the Canarias Islands. The territorial cleavage is much less relevant in the 
other autonomous communities, where the average votes for nationalist or regionalist 
party is below 5 points - in most cases, significantly below – and electoral preferences are 
generally concentrated between PSOE and PP. Also in those ACs, the main difference 
between the regional and the national party system is the presence of more proportional 
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electoral system, that do not favour a strong concentration of seats and favoured more 
complex coalition engineering processes, involving both regional parties and IU. 
Beside the territorial cleavage, recently we observe also the revival of the religious 
cleavage in Spain (Montero and Gunther, 2012, Sánchez-Cuenca and Dinas, 2012). 
Historically, religion has been a crucial factor in shaping political preferences in Spain. 
However, during the transition, the political élites were well aware of the devastating 
consequence of the polarization of the political conflict in Spain during the Second 
Republic and the role of the secular/religious divide54. Also the Catholic Church, to 
distance itself from the collaboration with the dictatorship (Pérez-Díaz, 1993), preferred to 
emphasize its non-partisan position and adopted a consensual approach aiming to avoid 
religious conflicts. As a consequence, despite the presence of the cleavage, political actors 
were not willing to exacerbate conflicts on the religious-secular divide and refrained from 
mobilizing voters around religious issues (Montero and Linz, 2001).  
Things changed gradually with the institutionalization of a predominantly bi-polar party 
system. When in 2000 the PP formed the first absolute majority government, it sought to 
re-activate and mobilize the religious vote by taking up religious claims both rhetorically 
and in the formulation of public policy (Balfour, 2005, Montero and Gunther, 2012). In 2003 
Aznar government introduced an education reform which (re)made religion a compulsory 
subject in both primary and secondary state schools, a practice that was demised since the 
end of the Franco regime. More in general, the PP adopted positions very close to the 
Church traditions on a wide variety of issues. Conversely, the following Zapatero socialist 
governments enacted a series of secularizing measures – including the legalization of gay 
marriages – that were vehemently contested by the PP leaders and by the Catholic 
hierarchy. According to some authors, the re-emergence of the Church/State cleavage have 
been so important that it is leading to a re-polarization of the Spanish Party system 
(Gunther and Montero, 2012).   
                                                          
54 In Linz and Montero (1999) words “the leaders of the PCE and PSOE, two parties that in the 
1930s had been distinguished by their fierce anticlericalism, now showed an unprecedented 
capacity for moderation and pragmatism. As Linz has put it (1993a, 44), all agreed on a policy of 
never again.”  
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To sum up, in the period between 1992 and 2012 the Spanish political system has 
undergone relevant changes. In particular, we have observed the emergence of a bipolar 
political system characterized by the alternation between a centre-left and a centre-right 
catch-all party. The pattern of competition is moderate, although it is complicated by the 
(re) emergence and political activation of the territorial cleavage (Sanchez-Cuenca and 
Dinas, 2012, Orriols and Balcells, 2012). Not surprisingly, considering the mechanisms of 
political competition outlined so far, the electorate perceive that despite acrimony in 
political debate – which is a characteristic of a competitive democracy - the two main 
contenders, PSOE and PP maintained a consensual view on most of the fundamental 
issues about the economy and the state (Sanchez-Cuenca and Dinas, 2012, Fernández-
Albertos and Manzano, 2012) – although they are increasingly divided on ethical issues.  
Despite relevant electoral changes, it seems the basic features of the party system have 
remained constant over the three periods – the transition (1977 – 1982), the PSOE 
hegemonic period (1982 – 1992), and the bipolar alternation period (1993 – 2012). The party 
system can still be assimilated to moderate pluralism, at least until the very recent 
emergence of new important national political forces such as Podemos and Ciudadanos. 
The level of party fragmentation is among the lowest in Europe, and the concentration of 
votes among the two main parties has remained constantly high. Moreover, the ideological 
moderation of the PSOE - and to a lesser extent of IU - and the PP’s strategy of conquering 
the centre have guaranteed that the dominant pattern of competition is centripetal, since 
parties have tried to attract voters in the centre of the political space. Until 2015, the 
combination of electoral preferences and the effects of the electoral system facilitated the 
formation of single-party governments, centripetal competition and ideological 
moderation – despite some sign of polarization were clearly observable, especially 
concerning the territorial organization of the State and the relationship between the 
Church and the State.   
 
4.Trade unions and policy concertation in Italy  
The dynamics of Italian trade unionism were driven by a complex pattern of political 
identities and cleavages, which somehow parallel the complex and multi – cleavages 
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driven dynamics of political competition in Italy underlined in the previous paragraph. 
Both the socialist – communist and the religious divide, not to mention the international 
context, are in fact particularly important to understand the multi-faceted events that 
resulted in the creation of a complex and fragmented labour movement.     
In June 1944 it was established a single trade union, the CGIL. It was in essence a political 
creation, an expression of the shared commitment of the three main political thoughts in 
Italy – Communism, Socialism and Christian Democracy - to a consensual process of post-
war reconstruction. However, this unity could not survive the international context and 
the re-emerge of the party political competition dynamics previously outlined.  
Therefore, in October 1948, soon after the decisive DC victory in 1948, a small catholic 
fraction of the labour movement formed a non-communist worker organizations called 
“free” CGIL (LGCIL). Another internal split of the CGIL occurred the following year - 
when republicans, social democrats and some ‘autonomist’ socialists formed a new 
federation, initially named FIL. Those unions soon joined into the CISL. A significant 
section of the FIL, disapproving the merger, in particular for the catholic dominance of the 
new born CISL, broke away and constituted the UIL. 
The 1948 split up gave rise to a situation of competitive trade unionism based on party – 
ideological affiliation (Regalia and Regini, 1995). Each of the three organizations belonged 
to distinct trade unions “ideal types” (Hyman, 2001). CGIL, by far the largest 
confederation, dominated by the communists but with a significant left-socialist minority, 
embraced an ideology of militant class struggle. Economic demands were framed more as 
reference points for collective mobilization than as elements in a ‘realistic’ bargaining 
agenda, therefore being particularly suspicious of the idea of negotiations on a sectional 
basis which might undermine class unity. 
CISL was closely associated with the governing party, and its leaders sympathized 
politically with many leading employers. Though dominated by Christian democrats, it 
cannot be explicitly considered a catholic trade union, rather it insisted on its “religious 
neutrality”. Nevertheless, in line with catholic social doctrine, CISL identified its role as 
advancing workers’ interests by strengthening their organized integration in society, thus 
encouraging social and political order. It emphasized the relative autonomy of its sectoral 
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organizations against the greater centralization of CGIL which in turn represent an 
‘economic’ rather than a ‘political’ orientation (cfr. Hyman, 2001 p.145) 
UIL was by far the smallest organization, and it was constituted mainly by republicans 
and social democratics, even though it tried continuously to assert its autonomy from 
political parties. It pretended to distinguish both from the CGIL and from the CISL, 
respectively for its focus on immediate gains for the workers and for its availability to 
support actions that might end up embarrassing the government.  
During the Fifties, fragmentation and confrontation between rival confederations resulted 
in trade union weakness and in a drop of membership. This was exacerbated by the 
particular condition of the Italian labour market after the WWII, characterized by high 
unemployment and the relevance of migrant workers – which very often came from the 
most conservative rural parts of the country – in larger firms. Moreover, Italian labour 
rights were still bluntly protected, and even being a unions’ activist, especially for the 
CGIL, was frequently rather dangerous.  
Under those conditions, strikes were difficult and therefore infrequent. Furthermore, all 
the trade unions were organizationally weak and faced considerable difficulties in 
establishing roots in the workplaces. Weakness in the labour market and in the plants 
accentuated trade unions dependency on political parties (cfr. Regini, 1981, p. 40). This 
was particularly relevant for the CGIL – which did not enjoy government political support 
and therefore was not frequently recognized by the employers – which effectively joined 
PCI and embraced an ideology of militant class struggle, underling its broad political 
action rather than its economic role. Under those conditions, we observe a very weak 
development of concertation, due to the limited interest and the ideological distance 
between the government and the most representative trade union (Regini, 1981).  
In the late 50’s the climate of ideological confrontation in Italy declined – also due to 
economic growth and lower unemployment level - and trade unions adopted a more 
pragmatic approach in industrial relations. In particular, CISL signed a series of company 
agreements – often co-signed by the UIL -  which were appreciated by most of the workers 
since they brought real improvement in working conditions (Hyman, 2001). Initially, this 
approach was severely contested by the CGIL in reason of the segmented and dualistic 
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nature of the Italian labour market (Regalia, 1978): negotiating significant wage increase in 
the most advanced industries of manufacturing meant to leave behind the interests of 
those employed in the traditional sector of the economy. The largest Italian confederations 
therefore initially considered those agreements a betray of broader working class interest, 
and denounced the rival union aptitude to underwrite any proposals made by the 
management. However, also CGIL was gradually forced to embrace CISL approach and to 
shift from a broad political agenda to workplaces issue, also because it was losing ground 
in terms of membership (Hyman, 2001). This process occurred gradually and it allowed 
CGIL to strengthen its organizational resources at the territorial level. Despite the effort, 
until the late Sixties the political role and the condition of dependency of major unions 
from political parties was not questioned (Regini, 1981). 
This system of ‘predominantly political’ industrial relations, characterised by the division 
and the market weakness of the unions, in the late Sixties brought to a period of collective 
mobilization that deeply transformed Italian trade unionism. Despite the so called Hot 
autumn was mainly driven from below55 – attributed to a broad workers discontent over 
labour conditions, intensification of work pressure and to the cost and squalor of city 
living – official confederations rode the strike and were among its main beneficiaries (cfr. 
Hyman, 2001, p. 148, Regini, 1981). Trade unions membership in fact increased 
substantially, and by the mid-Seventies almost half of the workforce was unionized. 
Moreover, in this period the unions strengthened themselves, assimilating the rank and 
file structure in their own organizational machinery. Finally, assuming control and 
discipline functions, trade unions were able to make themselves indispensable as partners 
to both employers and governments (Regalia and Regini, 1998). Therefore, in the mid-
Seventies the Italian unions suddenly found themselves transformed into powerful actors, 
in both economic and political terms (Hyman, 2001). 
This phase of predominant conflict and decentralised action in the market was followed by 
the centralisation and the moderation of economic demands in exchange for benefits in the 
political arena, in order to tackle a period of economic stagnation, and mostly the 
                                                          
55 The weak organizational resources of the trade unions and the consequent limited 
institutionalization of the industrial relation in Italy are among the main factors that explain the 
extraordinary intensification of social conflict in the period 1968 – 1972. 
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simultaneous appearance of low growth, unemployment and inflation (cfr. Regalia and 
Regini, 2001). 
This decade of concertation (1976 – 1984) – which entailed trade unions acceptance of wage 
restraints despite their strength in the labour market in return for greater influence in fiscal 
and social policy (Pizzorno, 1977) – was certainly in line with the new stance of the PCI. In 
fact, as we have seen in the previous paragraphs, in the late Seventies the PCI shifted from 
a revolutionary to a reformist program, and it was even available to sustain the most 
progressive elements of Christian democracy in order to safeguard Italian democracy. 
From the government perspective, trade unions incorporation in the policy making 
process added much needed legitimacy to tough economic choice (Pizzorno, 1977). This 
was the case especially because the trade union emerged after the hot autumn were the 
most popular representative institution in Italy. But from a trade union point of view, it 
was also a strategy that aimed to react to the worsening economic condition ensuring 
public investment and employment increases in the most deprived area of the country, 
even at the cost of risking membership dissatisfaction (especially among the skilled 
Northern industrial workers) (Regini, 1981, Hyman 2001).  
Thus throughout the Seventies, a period characterized by difficult economic and especially 
political conditions in Italy, the CGIL radically re-assessed its union model, from class 
opposition to political exchange and social partnership (Hyman, 2001), a process that had 
invested many European trade unions in that period.   
In the early Eighties, with inflation on the rise and public finance that reached a level of 
criticality in reason of increasing public debts, governments attempted to share with the 
trade unions hard choices in economic and social policy field, targeted in particular to 
interrupt inflationary pressures trough a revision of the wage indexation mechanism (scala 
mobile). Therefore, in 1983 social partners, the five-party coalition government and 
employers’ associations engaged in a protracted and laborious negotiation whose outcome 
has been a tripartite agreement, signed on January 1983. In exchange for a revision of the 
scala mobile and of a very limited flexibilisation of the labour market, the government 
ensured selected benefits both to the employers and to the workers (Regalia and Regini, 
1997). This agreement is particularly important because it represents the first example of a 
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trilateral concertation in Italy, revealing (also) trade unions new reformist strategy and 
openness to dialogue.  
With the PCI returning to a more oppositional stance after the 1983 election and the 
appointment of Craxi (PSI) as first minister, political barriers impeded the 
institutionalization of a stable concertation process in Italy. In 1984 the new Socialist 
government tried in fact to repeat the experience, even though the size of the public debt 
largely prevented the possibility to offset the cost incurred by workers using public 
benefits. Moreover, the majority block of the CGIL, under the pressure of the PCI, refused 
to endorse the agreement. The governmental proposal was therefore accepted only by the 
two minoritarian trade unions, the CISL and the UIL. Confirming the political valence of 
this agreement, the government sought to remedy to CGIL deficiency by introducing its 
content in a decree law, but the PCI – the main opponent to the socialist government, 
which wanted to preserve its hegemony on the left - reacted promoting a referendum 
against the decree. 
Although the referendum failed and the decree law was therefore introduced (Law 
219/1984), this episode marked the end of a period characterized by the unity in the trade 
unions and aborted any further attempt to introduce anti-inflationary social pact for the 
rest of the decade; divergent political goals thus came to predominate again within trade 
unions relationship and cultures (cfr. Regini and Regalia, 1987, p. 211).  
The second half of the 1980s was therefore marked by adversarial relationship between 
government and social partners, and between the CGIL and the other organized interests 
at the national level.  Quite surprisingly, at the local level relationship were instead 
characterised by what has been called “micro concertation”, i.e. a new phase of pragmatic 
company – level decentralised action, with all unions willing to take account of the new 
firms’ need to restructure in a competitive and volatile international market. Despite their 
ideological orientations, unions in this phase can be considered as “a factor of 
modernisation and flexibilisation in the regulation of the economy” (cfr. Regalia and 
Regini, 2000, p. 371). 
National concertation, which ceased after the failed tripartite agreement of 1984, was 
resumed extensively in the 1990s. A number of factors contributed to explain the revival of 
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concertation in Italy in that decade: the collapse of the old political system, with the 
consequent crisis of the traditional party-unions linkages, and a climate of “national 
emergency” as a result of a dramatic fiscal and economic crisis and of external pressures 
from the international and supranational arena (EU) to align Italian economy to European 
norms, despite a record of public debt and inflation far from converging with Maastricht 
criteria. 
The collapse of the DC, the PSI and PSDI brought to the loss of stable political reference 
both for the CISL and for the UIL.  Also the CGIL reinforced the distance with its 
associated party, formally dissolved internal party factions, and clearly adopted a post-
communist identity (Hyman, 2001). This position contributed to restore unions’ unity, 
which was in crisis since the breakdown of the confederal pact in 1984. At the same time, 
the severe loss of legitimacy of the political system as a result of the corruption scandals 
and the international pressures to balance state account – further exacerbated by the “run 
up to EMU” – represented crucial objectives for the “technocratic” governments of Amato 
(1992) and Ciampi (1993) to reach an agreement with the only representative institutions 
still legitimized, the social partners. 
The results were two fundamental tripartite agreements between 1992 and 1993 
concerning income policies and wage bargaining structure. Those agreements abolished 
the scala mobile and introduced a mechanism based on the joint commitment of the social 
partners to conform their behaviour to the expected inflation rate – a much more flexible 
variant of the scala, that would help reduce the inflation rate from 5 percent to 1.9 between 
1992 and 1997. Secondly, a two level collective bargaining system was institutionalized, 
with a better definition of the precise roles of each level in order to avoid overlapping. 
The negotiation of the pension system reform probably constituted the source of the most 
severe social conflict in Italy since the early Seventies. The retirement system was clearly a 
particular sensitive issue for the trade unions since it affected the entitlement of their core 
constituencies. In fact, already in the 1980s pensioners were the largest sections of 
membership in all three confederations and, by 1993, they constituted half of the CGIL 
membership (Baccaro and Pulignano, 2011). Therefore, the plan of the centre-right 
Berlusconi government to introduce unilaterally a pension reform provoked the harsh 
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reaction of the trade unions, the organization of a vast demonstration and of a general 
strike, which ultimately caused government resignation (Jessoula, 2009). 
At the beginning of 1995, the centre-right government was replaced by another 
“technocratic” government, yet sustained by a centre left majority. This was led by 
Lamberto Dini – the Minister of Treasury of the previous government – who involved the 
social partners in a concerted effort to draft the new reform proposal. The final agreement 
– which was not signed by employers’ representative – was transposed into law 335/1995 
and it represented a critical watershed for the Italian pension system, replacing the 
previous earning-related system with a notional defined contribution system. However, 
such a concerted reform protected the unions core constituencies through extremely long 
phasing in periods for the implementation of the new system that basically guaranteed the 
safeguard of “acquired rights” of older workers and retirees, i.e. the trade unions 
membership (Jessoula, 2009).  
A new concertative phase evolved in the late 1990s, when the experience of technocratic 
governments was closed and the Second Republic was structuring around a fragmented 
bi-polar party system. The victory of the centre left coalition in 1996 led to a period of 
tripartite agreements in the area of employment policy. A “Pact for employment” was 
signed in September 1996, aimed at promoting employment especially in the least 
developed area of the country, and it was later reported into the so called “Treu reform” 
which triggered a shift towards a more flexible and deregulated labor market56, not 
adequately accompanied by investments on the security side (Jessoula and Alti, 2009, 
Berton, Richiardi and Sacchi 2009). Like in many other European countries (Davidsson, 
2011), the flexibilisation of the labour market was at the margin, thus it concerned 
essentially the newly employed, while dependent workers – and especially those 
employed in large firms and in the public sector, the most unionized categories - were not 
affected by the reform. The Pact for employment was followed in December 1998 by a new 
tripartite “social pact for development and employment” (known also as “Christmas 
                                                          
56 Law 196/1997, among other things, simplified the procedures for employing part-time workers 
and using fixed-term contracts and apprenticeship contracts. Moreover, it introduced temporary 
agency work, which was previously prohibited in Italy. 
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Pact”) which covered a wide range of issues, including training provisions, reducing 
indirect employment costs, territorial development and vocational training.  
At the end of the 1990s the newly-emerged corporatist system seemed to be directed 
towards its way to institutionalization. From the government perspective, it was 
convenient because it facilitated the introduction of difficult and restrictive reforms, able to 
guarantee the securing of the public finance, the decline of inflation and the consequent 
admission into the EMU. From the trade unions view, social pacts ensured that policy 
reforms – reducing the scope of the pension system and introducing greater flexibility – 
did not harm neither the acquired rights nor the labour market power of their core 
constituency (Simoni, 2010), although they had to pay a price in terms of wage restraints 
(Baccaro, 2002). 
Conversely, in the following years we observe a neat decline of tripartite agreements. 
Several factors contributed to explain this outcome. Italy was by then a member of the 
European Monetary Union, therefore the vincolo esterno (external constraint) (Ferrera and 
Gualmini, 2004) was far less effective in impeding social and political actors to pursue their 
own political agenda (Molina and Rhodes, 2007). Thus the employers’ organization begun 
to question the economic performance of the tripartite agreements and to demand a 
further liberalization of the labour market, concerning also the firing regulation in the big 
firms. Those claims were shared by the centre-right coalition. Facing adversarial demand 
to withdraw concertation, the trade unions front once again broke up on labour market 
issues, with the more centrist UIL and the CISL on one side and the left-wing oriented 
CGIL on the other side57. 
The victory of the right pole in the 2001 election opened up a new phase of adversarial 
relation both within the trade unions movement and between employers and the largest 
trade union, the CGIL. The new centre-right government made clear from the outset, in 
particular in the White Paper on the Labour Market (Ministry of Labour and Social Policies, 
2001), its intention to prompt for deregulation and its willingness to distance itself from 
                                                          
57 This is revealed already in the late 1990s in particular on the opposing positions taken by the 
trade unions in the transposition of the EU directives on fixed term works (EC/1999/70) and on the 
break-up of the unions front in the Milan Employment Pact of February 2000 (Berton, Ricchiardi 
and Sacchi, 2012, Molina and Rhodes, 2007). 
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the concertation attempts made in the previous decade, portrayed as a failure, even if that 
meant clashing with the (divided) unions. In the government plan, policy concertation had 
to be replaced by a much more loosely defined “social dialogue” (Molina and Rhodes, 
2007). 
The government initiated a new negotiation which, facing the CGIL open hostility, 
continued separately with CISL, the UIL and the main employers’ association, 
Confindustria. Discussion broke down due to government proposals to relax the 
protection for worker unfair dismissals (i.e. the famous article 18 of the Workers Statute), 
which led CISL and UIL to join CGIL mobilization, preventing the reform of the art. 18 to 
be ever enacted into law.  
Negotiations between government and the social partners, but without the CGIL, resumed 
some weeks later and lead to the Pact for Italy in July 2002 – a comprehensive plan to 
improve the fortunes of the Italian economy which, among many other issue, tolled the 
bell for the Minimum Insertion Income (Sacchi and Bastagli, 2005). The adversarial relation 
between the government and the CGIL were further exacerbated by the decision to 
unilaterally introduce in 2004 the minimum age for seniority based pension. However, 
despite two general strikes and several mobilizations, the unified trade unions front was 
not able to block government reform. 
Concertation returned at the centre of the political stage with the following centre-left 
government, elected in April 2006. In 2007, the so called “Welfare protocol” signed by the 
centre left cabinet and trade unions prevented the phasing in as of January 2008 of the 2004 
pension reform, and consequently avoided the abrupt increase in retirement age for 
seniority pensions (three years) defined by that reform, the so-called ‘scalone’ (big step). 
This measure favoured a small number of core insiders’ workers, with significant cost for 
the whole pension system (Jessoula, 2009).  
This was the last tripartite agreement signed by all the social partners in Italy. In 2008 the 
centre-right coalition returned to power. The government strategy of divide et impera was 
once again effective, and strategic divisions among the three confederations resurfaced 
and the unions split again. In January 2009 an agreement of the collective bargaining 
structure was signed by the social partners, but with the exception of the CGIL, which 
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claimed that the agreement provided inadequate protection of the wages and salaries’ 
purchasing power (Baccaro and Pulignano, 2011). 
To sum up, two main conclusions might be drawn for what concerns trade unions, 
concertation and its role in the Italian welfare state transformation in the period between 
1994 and 2011 –  before the onset of the economic crisis and the deep political and 
institutional changes that follow the entry into office of the Monti government in 
November 2011 and, especially, the 2013 election.  
Firstly, concertation has followed a rather predictable trajectory: when the centre-left 
coalition was in power, CGIL, CISL and UIL engaged in negotiations that ended up with 
the signing of national agreement. Conversely, with a centre-right coalition, concertation 
shifted to a social dialogue marked by government refusal to accept vetoes, and only CISL 
and UIL signed social pacts.  
Therefore, the transition from a multi polar to a bipolar party system transformed the 
traditional party-unions linkages, but it has not limited the relevance of ideological 
conflict. In particular, the CGIL appeared to have maintained a favoured (although less 
harmonious) relationship with the PDS / DS / PD, while the position of CISL and UIL have 
proved harder to define (Molina and Rhodes, 2007), even though it seems that the CISL 
have maintained a privileged dialogue also with the Catholic area within the centre right, 
well represented by the former Labour Minister Maurizio Sacconi. 
Secondly, trade unions have used their role in the negotiations for welfare reforms 
primarily to protect the narrow rights of their constituency (Culpepper and Ragan, 2014, 
Simoni, 2010). The social rights of the labour market outsiders have not scored high in the 
trade unions agenda, which have followed the strategy of negotiating for their member 
rather than mobilising new groups. Over time, this has undermined seriously trade unions 
legitimacy especially among younger cohorts (Culpepper and Ragan, 2014), resulting in 
declining union membership58 and even in the creation of new groups in all Italian cities, 
                                                          
58 Unions density has declined substantially starting from the Seventies; but in particular from 
early 1990s to 2008, it felt from 40% to 29% of the workers, a decline particularly intense among 
workers below 34 to 19% (cfr. Simoni, 2010)  
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possessing little confidence in union, organising protest and providing free legal advice to 
non-standard workers59.  
 
5. Trade unions and policy concertation in Spain 
Since Spain return to democracy, tripartite social dialogue has played a fundamental role 
as a socio-governance mechanism, although it has gone through several distinct phases. 
However, the trade union movement was born decades before the transition. UGT was 
founded in 1888 as the trade union branch of the PSOE. Until the end of the Civil war it 
was the main trade union in Spain along with the anarcho syndacalist CNT – which still 
exist today, but unlike UGT never recovered the glories of the pre-Franco days. After all, 
the dictatorship marked a deep break in unions’ history. Independent trade unions were in 
fact outlawed, their leaders executed, jailed or sent into exile, their assets seized by the 
state, and employers and workers obliged to join the official state-controlled union. 
Despite being fiercely repressed, the workers’ movement was one of the foremost 
opposition forces to the dictatorship (Hamman, 2001). The Communist Party began to 
infiltrate the regime’s unions during the 1960s and set up “from the inside” a parallel 
organization, creating what would be later known as the Workers’ Commissions (CC.OO.). 
During the Sixties, this organization operated also clandestinely, engaging in different 
illegal activities, such as strikes and mobilizations. As a consequence of those activities, by 
the time Franco died CC.OO. were significantly stronger compared to UGT, which was 
active only in few regions and whose leadership had survived mainly in exile, thanks to 
the support of the International Confederation of Free Trade Union.  
During the transition, trade unions supported democracy acting in close cooperation with 
left parties. Keeping conflict at a low level during this delicate phase, they obtained 
political recognition and organizational benefits (Molina, 2011). The famous Moncloa 
Pacts, were a sort of mirror in the economic sphere of what had been realised in the 
political sphere: a strategy of consensus and social dialogue between unions and 
employers’ representatives allowing to control the mounting economic crisis that 
                                                          
59 San Precario in particular, although not seeing itself as a union, has become a de facto a form of 
representation for atypical workers in Italy.   
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threatened to blow the march to democracy. Accordingly, trade unions obtained legal 
status in April 1977, when also the PCE was legalized, while the right to strike, to form and 
to join a union has been recognized a year later by the Spanish Constitution. 
Despite this formal recognition, industrial relations in Spain were at this stage weakly 
institutionalized and the Spanish trade union movement divided. The political and 
ideological differences between the two main unions that emerged during the transition - 
the CC.OO. and the UGT - had their origins in the strong links between them and the two 
labour parties, the communist and socialist respectively. The divisions were exacerbated 
by the fact that, as a result of their different trajectory during the dictatorship, the CC.OO. 
enjoyed stronger capacity for mobilization and it was much more present at the company 
level, whereas the UGT still had to build its organizational strength: those features, 
coupled with their different ideological affiliation, required the latter to be strongly 
recognized by the state and more available for social pacts with respect to the former 
(Molina, 2010).  
Thus, different associational traditions and party union linkages led the trade unions to 
pursue a variety of strategies both in the political and in the corporate arena. Therefore, the 
1980 Workers Statute, introducing the building block of the Spanish industrial relation 
system, was negotiated between the UGT with the employers’ association, and later 
sustained in Parliament by the PSOE, while CC.OO drafted an alternative proposal, 
backed up by the PCE, which was rejected. Similarly, at the firm level the UGT engaged in 
negotiations with the employers’ organization, while the CC.OO. in this period pursued a 
much more confrontational path (Hamman, 2008). 
As for national comprehensive social agreement, the internal division between the unions 
impeded a vast recourse to concertation. Only one important tripartite agreement was 
signed - the National Employment Agreement of 1981, known also as the Pacto del miedo 
(Pact of Fear) – which is indeed emblematic of trade unions and government interests in 
this particular period. Negotiations were initiated several months after the failed coup 
d’état by a fragile UCD government with the aim to strengthen democratic stability and 
reverse a critic economic situation. This internally fragmented Government in order to get 
CC.OO. support – which was reluctant to commit itself to wage moderation and to restrain 
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from industrial conflict - had to made recourse to parallel pacts, containing a series of 
organizational and financial compensation that allowed to overcome its opposition 
(Molina, 2011, p. 80). As a result of this pact, the social partners obtained important roles in 
the Committees that manage Spanish social security60. 
This situation of very weak institutional presence and confrontational relations changed 
gradually during the long hegemonic period of the PSOE leaded by Felipe González. In 
1984 the Government – facing a difficult economic situation, high inflation and an 
unemployment rate constantly above 20% - initiated a round of talks with the unions, 
hoping to negotiate an agreement over wage moderation. In exchange, unions demanded a 
substantial growth of social protection, and further organizational concessions (Molina, 
2011). The government commitment to fiscal balance and austerity policy split the trade 
unions, with the UGT willing to keep negotiations, and the CC.OO. dropping out. The 
successive agreement with the UGT entailed some possible agreement to expand 
unemployment benefits and minimum pensions, and a series of organizational concessions 
to the unions, which considered – in particular UGT - the consolidation of their 
organizational structure and their recognition as a political actor a priority (Molina, 2011).  
Conversely, the Socialist government conveyed social pacts as a purely legitimizing factor, 
and not as a mean to share economic and political choices with the trade unions. Indeed, 
few months after the agreement, a restrictive pension reform was unilaterally introduced 
despite UGT contestation (Guillén, 2010).  
This reform convinced the UGT leaders, increasingly blamed by their members for their 
alliance with the government (Molina and Rhodes, 2011), that contrary to widespread 
expectations neither the organization nor workers would have experienced any substantial 
improvements of their condition under the PSOE government. This led to a deteriorated 
relationship between the UGT and the PSOE and to the consequent “break-up of the 
Socialist family” (cfr. Gillespie, 1990), which had three fundamental consequences.  
Primarily, from 1987, CC.OO. and UGT abandoned the overtly adversarial positions that 
characterized their relation from the beginning of the transition (Hamman, 2008). Not only 
                                                          
60 Those are the National Social Security Institute (INSS), the National Employment Institute 
(INEM), the National Health Institute (INSALUD), and the National Institute of Social Services 
(INSERSO). 
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the UGT distanced itself from the PSOE, but also the collapse of support for the PCE 
strongly diminished its influence over the CC.OO., so that both unions became much more 
independent from ideological divisions and party strategies.  
Secondly, facilitated by the recovered unity of action, both trade unions refused the new 
government proposal for a broad tripartite agreement for 1988, arguing that those broad 
social pacts had the only effect of legitimizing government policy, without real 
improvements neither for workers nor for the unions. Conversely, the unions demanded 
the government to engage in more specific issues-negotiations aimed at improving 
citizens’ social protection, for example in the area of disability (Hamman, 2008, Molina, 
2011). This was formally outlined in the Propuesta Sindical Prioritaria (Union Priorities 
Proposals, PSP), a programmatic accord between the CC.OO. and UGT over their overall 
strategies and priorities.  
Finally, both unions began to re-emphasize mobilization. A packages of labour market 
proposals launched by the government in late 1987 – which included the introduction of a 
new flexible contract for unexperienced workers - triggered the first general strike in the 
Spanish history, on 14 December 1988. 
The great success of the strike prompted the Socialist government to undertake the so 
called giro social (social turn) in its economic policy and to negotiate union proposals - on 
separate tables for each of the issue negotiated, as demanded by the unions (Molina, 2011). 
As a result of those negotiations a series of social policy measures were introduced, such as 
the non-contributory pensions for the elderly and for the disabled, the indexation of 
pension schemes to past inflation, and the extension of unemployment benefits to some 
particularly exposed groups. Furthermore, spending on unemployment and pensions rose 
sharply, and the universalization of health cover was rushed (Rodríguez Cabrero, 2011). 
The worsening of the economic situation in the early Nineties prompted new efforts by the 
government to get the trade unions involved in a “Social Pact for Progress”, but the unions 
disagreed with the idea of signing an encompassing social agreement – in particular 
because it involved wage moderation in exchange for what was considered an insufficient 
expansion of the unemployment benefits. Failed negotiations led to unilateral introduction 
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by the government of a labour market reform tightening benefits eligibility which resulted 
in drastic cuts (Guillén, 2010). Unions replied by calling a general strike.  
In this worsening economic framework, the relationship between the Felipe González 
government and the social partners – including the employers – continued to deteriorate 
over the years, shifting between failed negotiations, unilateral reforms and the unions 
recurring to mobilization, such as a second general strike in January 1994. Despite conflict, 
a fundamental agreement was reached in 1995, the so called Toledo Pact, which 
consolidated a model of ongoing agreed reform of the pension system resulting in its 
overall rationalization, guaranteeing its financial sustainability but also its redistributive 
nature (Guillén, 2010; Rodríguez Cabrero, 2011). 
The last González governments (1988 – 1995) were therefore characterized by high level of 
conflict and the absence of omni comprehensive social agreement, even though – also in 
reason of narrows social pact – social expenditure had expanded in a universalistic 
direction and overall social policy coverage increased. In general, during the Socialist 
period the trade unions had strongly consolidated their organizational structure and 
became socio-political actors recognized by the State and by the employers (Hamman, 
2008, Molina and Rhodes, 2011). Several bipartite and tripartite pacts had in fact been 
signed during this period. In 1991 the Social and Economic Council (CES) was finally set 
up—called by the 1978 Constitution—as a tripartite consultative body that discusses social 
and economic issues and policies. Furthermore, during this period the unions showed 
their high mobilization potential with successful general strikes and they also increased 
their membership, from 12,2% in 1982 to 17,6% in 1995 (Oecd online database).  
When the Popular Party won the election and formed a minority government, Spanish 
trade unions entered a new political framework. Concerned about the possible 
repercussion for its recently acquired image of a centre party of an enduring tension with 
the trade unions and in need to consolidate its legitimacy – while the PSOE was already 
warning that social rights were under attack (Molina and Rhodes, 2011) - the new 
government recognized that the social partners were essential actors in the policy making 
process and made considerable efforts to maintain a permanent dialogue over economic 
and social policy.  
181 
 
As for the trade unions, in this phase, their main concern was the segmentation of the 
labour market and their failure to attract temporary workers (Molina and Rhodes, 2011). 
Therefore, they reacted to government proposals confirming their preference for narrow 
pacts and functionally separated negotiations over encompassing social pacts. In this way, 
they took advantage of the favourable political framework to sign important agreements 
which would allow to present themselves both as defenders of outsider as well as insider 
workers. In 1996 a new social pact in the pension field was signed consisting in a reduction 
of core workers’ rights and a (modest) amelioration of the conditions for non-core ones 
(Guillén, 2010, p. 196). In the unemployment field, the “Agreement on Employment and 
Social Protection of Agrarian Workers’ of 1996 resulted into the inclusion of Southern 
peasants’ workers into the general unemployment scheme, while “The Interconfederal 
Agreement for Stability in Employment” of 1997 fostered improvements for temporary 
and part-time workers, and to some extent also of the autonomous workers. In general, 
those agreements aimed at the consolidation and rationalization of the Spanish welfare 
state, resulting in overall fiscal savings, while at the same time reducing the gap between 
stable and non-standard workers in the access to the social security system (Guillén, 2010). 
The political context changed significantly when the government obtained the absolute 
majority in 2000. With a stronger government whose primary aim did not consist in 
gaining legitimacy, tripartite concertation weakened significantly (Molina, 2011). In 2002 
the Government proposed to open a dialogue over a labour market reform: since no 
agreement was reached, it unilaterally issued a reform of unemployment benefits (Law 
5/2002). In reaction, the two major unions organized a general strike that led to labour 
minister resignation and a repeal of most of the government proposals (Del Pino and 
Ramos, 2009).  
Revealing the peculiar nature of policy concertation in Spain, failed negotiation in one area 
did not result in automatic drop of concertation in other fields: in 2001 a pension 
agreement was reached with only CC.OO., and a tripartite agreement on collective 
bargaining was signed the following year. Furthermore, for the first time since 1984, an 
agreement on income policy was reached among employers and unions. Those 
developments reveal the vitality and the flexibility of concertation in Spain, but also its 
vulnerability and failure to achieve a complete institutionalization (Molina and Rhodes, 
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2011). Social pacts remained in fact dependent on government’ needs, since “a government 
with a strong majority could afford to embrace a ‘take-it or leave-it’ strategy” (cfr. Molina 
and Rhodes, 2011, p. 189). 
Therefore, even without considering partisan political differences, it is no surprising that 
the minority government led by Zapatero was determined to engage in social dialogue. 
Following the usual pattern, functionally separated negotiating tables were once again 
opened, and more than twenty different agreements were signed in the following years, in 
areas such as employment policies (2006 labour market agreement), pension policies61 (law 
40/2007), and social assistance. In particular, in the latter field a tripartite Agreement on 
Protection of Dependent People, proposed in late 2005 and turned into law in December 
2006, represented one of the most important policy reforms since the return of democracy, 
providing – at least on the initial intention of the legislator62 – universal coverage for all 
people in need of care. Overall, those reforms resulted in a significant increase in the 
coverage of unemployment benefits, in raising real minimum wage and better family 
policies (Hamman, 2013).  
The perception of social dialogue as a useful mechanism to govern economic and social 
policy changed drastically with the economic and especially with the sovereign debt crisis. 
Thus the initial agreement between the social partners and the trade unions in late 2008 on 
proceeding with social dialogue63 were lately disappointed as the government had to face 
the consequence of those two consequent crisis. The rapid worsening of the fiscal position 
of Spain – with the deficit raising from 1.9% in 2007 to an unprecedented 11.1% in 2009 – 
and the (resulting) supranational increasing pressure led the Spanish government to 
introduce a drastic austerity package, which included pension freezing, a 5 per cent cut in 
the salaries of civil servants along with a block on wage  increases  in  the  forthcoming  
years,  removal  of  the check for every new born child called  “cheque  bebé”,  and  a  
significant  reduction  in  public  works  and  investments (Molina and Miguélez, 2013). 
                                                          
61 Focused on an amelioration of both contributory and non-contributory benefits 
62 The following assessments of the Ley de Dependencia have highlighted how its implementation 
has been hampered by a clear lack of resources (Sarasa, 2012, Rodríguez Cabrero and Marbán 
Gallego, 2013). 
63 See the July 2008 Declaración para el Impulso de la Economía, el Empleo, la Competitividad y el 
Progreso Social (Declaration to Stimulate the Economy, Employment, Competitiveness, and Social 
Progress) 
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Besides, also concertation was attacked: since the negotiations over labour market reform 
that primarily aimed to ease restrictions on workers’ dismissal were unsuccessful, the 
government decided to introduce it unilaterally. The trade unions reacted calling a general 
strike, which however was largely ineffective.  
As in the past, a Socialist government, facing economic recession, high unemployment and 
heavy supranational pressures to constrain public debt, failed to reach an agreement with 
the social partners. According to Hamman (2013) this choice depended on electoral 
consideration made by Zapatero which was suffering from an erosion of popular 
consensus and tried to regain it by turning away from concertation. Conversely, Molina 
(2014) points that in a weakly institutionalized context, the available resources determine 
actors’ willingness to engage in a concertative process. Therefore, concertation in this 
phase failed because the costs of legitimizing austerity measures and wage moderation far 
outweighed the benefits unions could obtain, since in a crisis context there were not 
enough resources that could be used for compensating the «sacrifices» made by the other 
actors.  
Under both perspectives, the clear PP majority emerging from the November 2011 election 
and the enduring supranational pressure to contain public expenditure created the 
conditions for unilateral decisions by the government. In fact, the strength of the 
government dissolved need for union legitimization, while persisting external pressure 
strongly limited the possibility for the government to compensate loss through benefits. 
Indeed, no comprehensive social pacts were signed in the last four years. The Rajoy 
government introduced in 2012 a radical labour market reform which significantly eased 
the possibility to fire dependent workers, and the general strike promoted by UGT and 
CC.OO. failed to reverse it. Furthermore, the trade unions were not even consulted in the 
drastic austerity measures introduced afterwards (David Luque and Begega, 2015, 
Hamman, 2013, Molina, 2014).  
To sum up, this trajectory reveals that despite low level of unions density, trade unions 
have been relevant actors in the Spanish policy making process since the consolidation of 
democracy. It is possible to detect some of their defining features and their role in 
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concertation – at least concerning the period previous to the Great Recession, which have 
significantly altered already established equilibria. 
Firstly, in particular from the late 1980s onwards, the relations between the trade unions 
and the government ceased to be politicized, i.e. they stop to depend on established party 
union linkages and strategies. Indeed, from 1987 CC.OO. and UGT, while competing at the 
firm level for workplace representation, began to converge on their strategic goals and on 
a common diagnosis of what was wrong with the Spanish economy. As a consequence, 
they abandoned ideological divide adopting instead a pragmatic approach, and they were 
available to negotiate – on functional separate tables rather than on catch-all social pacts – 
independently of government colour (Molina and Rhodes, 2011).  
This does not mean that politics was irrelevant for the success or failure of the concertation 
process: conversely, during most of Spain’s democracy, social pacts between government 
and unions primarily reflected political contingencies rather than economic necessities 
(Hamman, 2013). The lack of formal channels of representation – the role of the Social and 
Economic Council is limited to consultation – made the specific need and/or strategies of 
the actors and political exchange dynamics crucial to understand the outcome of a 
negotiation between the social partners and the Government (Molina, 2011). Negotiations 
and their outcome depended: primarily, on government possibility to provide with social 
policy benefits in exchange for overall fiscal consolidation and wage moderation policy, 
which depended on the economic situation and supranational pressures; secondly, on 
government necessity for legitimization, which depended on the political context. To this 
extent, we can conclude that tripartite social dialogue is to a large extent subject to the 
political will of the government (Hamman and Kelly, 2011). In particular, social pacts have 
most often been signed with weak governments depending on the support from minor 
parties. 
Finally, two phases are clearly distinguishable concerning trade unions goals in social 
pacts. In the first period, which lasted for all the Eighties, trade unions were concerned 
about their organizational and institutional consolidation, so they were very “sensitive” to 
government offers of involvement in social policy governance and parastatal bodies. Later 
on, once their influence on policymaking had become more or less ascertained, welfare 
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issues moved at the top of their bargaining agenda (Molina, 2011). To this regard, it is 
significant to underline that in the social policy arena they have not only acted to preserve 
the interest of their member. Rather, their request was to expand and strengthen the less 
developed areas of the Spanish welfare state, so that the inclusiveness of unemployment 
benefits, the non-contributory realm of the pension system, as well as the advancement in 
social assistance and social care have been primaries concerns for the trade unions. As a 
result, tripartite agreements brought to the consolidation of the Spanish welfare state in a 
universalistic sense.  
Even though it cannot be completely sustained that those features have prevented Spain 
unions from being perceived as a primarily “pro-insiders” interest group, it is however to 
be noticed that, in contrast to many other Western European union, density in Spain – 
despite it remained one of the lowest level in Europe - have not declined in the last 
decades. Conversely, it has grown since the early 1980s from 8.3% to 14.3% in 2008 
(Hamman, 2013).  
At the same time, in recent years a growing part of Spanish society has begun to criticize 
trade unions pragmatic approach and their availability for social dialogue. In particular, 
civil society protest movements - the 15 March Movement and the Indignados – accused the 
trade unions to have been too accommodating to both the PP and the Socialist Party’s 
reform agenda, also in reason of the extent of their institutionalization and dependence on 
state resources. This had led to a further alignment of trade unions and the adoption of 
common proposals – such as the launch of a Common Popular Legislative Initiative 
(Iniciativa Legislativa Popular, ILP), proposing the introduction of a national minimum 
income scheme – which, so far, have received little attention by the Government.  
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Chapter 6: 
Regional Minimum Income Schemes in Italy.  
The cases of Friuli Venezia Giulia and Lazio. 
 
 
1 Introduction 
Anti-poverty policies in Italy have been following an inconsistent and at times 
'schizophrenic' pathway in the past twenty years. As a matter of fact, Italy is one of the 
very few 28 member states of the European Union where there is no comprehensive 
minimum income scheme. This is not due to inaction or lack of attention, quite the 
opposite. Over the years, faint but ambitious attempts have been made at a national level 
to reform this area, followed by major steps backwards and the introduction of 
supplementary partial or marginal measures, all without ever introducing a coherent and 
inclusive reform that would certify the right of citizens to being protected against the risk 
of poverty (Madama, Jessoula and Natili, 2014). Similarly, innovative measures based on 
the principle of selective universalism have been adopted at a regional level, with the aim 
of effectively tackling poverty and social exclusion. But they were often abandoned 
quickly. 
There has been a lively debate around the reasons behind the paradox affecting Italy, 
where relative and absolute poverty rates are higher than in the rest of Europe, while the 
income support system is weak and fragmented. Ferrera (2005, 2010), in particular, argued 
that the model of extended family solidarity, which is typical of Southern European 
countries, and the presence of an irregular labour market have enabled people in need to 
seek other sources of survival, thus reducing the demand for government support, while 
low institutional capabilities have fuelled (perhaps well-founded) concerns amongst elites 
and the population that these measures might degenerate into exchange networks for 
Italian distributive party élites. Saraceno (2006) hinted that, besides these predominantly 
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institutional reasons, the focus should also be placed on the poor interest of stakeholders, 
and in particular trade unions, in minimum income schemes.  
The introduction of Mis, albeit at a regional level, drive us to investigate the factors that 
have helped overcome the institutional and political barriers that have historically 
hindered the development anti-poverty policies in Italy. Furthermore, the failed 
institutionalisation of such measures - in most cases, at least - raises questions as to 
whether the very same factors identified by literature as helpful to understand the failed 
introduction of such measures can also provide an explanation for policy reversal 
dynamics, or whether it is by contrast necessary to enlarge the theoretical framework and 
consider also additional variables. 
To answer such questions, this chapter will first briefly cover the national debate over 
minimum income protection in Italy, and then focus on the subnational level. Two cases, 
in particular, have been extensively researched: Friuli Venezia Giulia and Lazio. Case 
selection consent to test whether the territorial concentration of poverty and limited 
administration capabilities – both typically associated with Southern regions – are the only 
factors behind the inconsistent trajectory of anti-poverty policies. 
This chapter is organised as follows. The next paragraph deals with the national debate 
around minimum income, with particular regard to early proposals and the introduction 
and removal of a guaranteed minimum income scheme. The third paragraph centres 
around the Reddito di Base per la Cittadinanza (Basic Citizenship Income, BCI) scheme in 
Friuli Venezia Giulia: the dynamics that led to its introduction, the main features of the 
scheme, and its revocation. Finally, the fourth paragraph focuses on region Lazio and its 
short-lived Reddito Minimo Garantito (Guaranteed Minimum Income, GMI) scheme.  
 
2. The national debate and reform proposals 
“In Italy, the topic of the so-called minimum income has left the small context of the very 
few experts dealing with it until a few years ago and is now playing a major role in the 
economic and political discussion”. This statement by Edwin Morley Fletcher, apparently 
coming from some article published in the past few months, was in fact contained in an 
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article by Gaspare Nevola in Stato e Mercato back in 1991. This reveals that for a long time, 
the introduction of a universal yet selective minimum income scheme did not even appear 
as an option in national political debates (cfr. Madama et al., 2014).  The fear of the political 
élites that means-tested benefits would have been too complex to manage in a country 
characterized by the presence of a pervasive illegal sector and a vast black market 
contribute to explain this neglect, which is further exacerbated by the ideological hostility 
of the two main party of the First Republic, the DC and the PCI (see Chapter 3). The former 
(DC) was a party of religious defence which embraced the principle of horizontal 
subsidiarity by emphasising the importance of traditional family ties and supporting the 
existing broad network of religious community-based welfare institutions (Madama, 2010). 
The religious cleavage in the Italian political system prevented a development of the social 
assistance sector: as outlined by Ferrera in fact, during the post war years “it was 
maintained a familistic and male chauvinist approach, confirming the persistent 
ideological stranglehold of Catholicism in Italian society and in particular on family issue” 
(cfr. Ferrera et al, 2012, p. 330. Translation by the author; see also Naldini and Saraceno, 
2008). Besides, also the Italian Communist Party (PCI) had a very limited interest in 
strengthening Mis, yet for different reasons. It was actually far more inclined towards the 
extension of generous social insurance schemes targeted to workers, particularly in the 
most unionised sectors, i.e. large corporations and public employment, rather than 
sponsoring residual Mis (Ferrera, Fargion and Jessoula, 2012).  
But this statement also suggests that at the end of the 1980s, at least among experts, some 
proposals concerning Mis were discussed at congresses and conferences, some of them 
even landing in Parliament64.  
In this respect, of particular relevance was the conference organised by IRES – CGIL on the 
“citizen's salary”, as documented in magazine L’Inchiesta, issue 83-84, January– June 1989. 
Similarly to Spain, the debate in Italy was partly triggered by the interest in what was 
occurring in France, where a Revenu Minimum d’Insertion was introduced by President 
Mitterand in 1988; indeed, it was not by chance that the conference mentioned above was 
                                                          
64 Reference is here made to the various bills somehow considering a guaranteed minimum 
income that were presented between 1989 and 1990 by Democrazia Proletaria and Partito 
Socialista Italiano, as well as the bill introduced by Minister Formica, the bill put forward by PCI, 
and the citizens' initiative promoted by Federazione Giovani Comunisti Italiani.  
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largely dedicated to discussing this measure and was attended by a number of French 
experts (Capecchi, 1989). But the interest in a universal income support system was not 
confined to theoretical and academic debate, as many social and political actors put 
forward a range of proposals in this direction. 
The first of such proposals stemmed from the initial “Commission on Poverty” chaired by 
Ermanno Gorrieri, considering the possible introduction of a “social cheque”, i.e. 
unconditional monetary support for households and elderly people with income below a 
threshold defined as the minimum level (Mirabile, 1989). This was a passive monetary 
benefit, to be funded by reorganising existing benefits. 
Of a different nature were proposals arising from the political and party arena. These 
measures were proposed for the first time between 1988 and 1990. There were relevant 
differences among them, but they all took shape within the parties making up the varied 
Italian leftist landscape, and they all differed from the Gorrieri proposal in that they 
identified single individuals and not households (registered families) as recipients. 
Democrazia Proletaria, a far left political party that was active in Italy between 1978 and 
1991, was one of the first political forces to introduce a well-structured bill at the Chamber 
of Deputies. The bill provided for giving an income equal to the salary of government 
employees to unemployed or never previously employed individuals for at least 12 
months who could not access to unemployment benefits, subject to their availability to 
accept community jobs or to take part to training programs. The proposal developed by 
Partito Socialista Italiano (PSI), called “Scambio di Solidarietà” (solidarity exchange), also 
made access to this income conditional on participation to “social service” activities, i.e. 
activities to be performed within the vast universe of cooperation and volunteering 
(Brunetta, 1989). However, this was a measure directed at individuals with no income, and 
to be initially and experimentally applied only to young people aged between 18 and 24. 
Partito Comunista Italiano (PCI) included the citizenship income theme in the agenda of its 
20th Conference, which ended with a specific motion for the introduction of a minimum 
income scheme as part of a review of the different unemployment subsidies. Unlike the 
other proposals, this was a measure to be implemented as part of labour policies, applying 
190 
 
to unemployed and never previously employed individuals, not subject to means-testing 
but conditional on availability to work or to attend training.   
Parties proposals were therefore different from Gorrieri's proposal, as they developed 
within the context of labour policies vs. that of social assistance policies, and focused on 
individual rather than household transfers. Most importantly, they never got to be voted 
in Parliament and were therefore never implemented. The so-called Formica bill, named 
after the socialist Labour Minister under the Christian Democratic government led by 
Ciriaco De Mita, provided for and income support measure exclusively for young people 
aged between 18 and 29. The premature fall of the government in 1989 caused the project 
to be abandoned, and never recolled by the following DC governments.  
Failure to approve minimum income legislation in the late '80s in Italy was also due to the 
poor interest in such schemes on the part of social partners. In an interview featuring the 
meaningful title “La persona non ha bisogni minimi”65 (The individual does not have 
minimum needs), the then CGIL (Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro, general Italian 
labour confederation) secretary-general Bruno Trentin harshly criticised emerging 
suggestions to introduce a basic income. However, during that interview, CGIL's former 
secretary also expressed his objection to a targeted minimum income scheme, because 
available resources were to be used to create jobs and not to guarantee a safety net. 
Moreover, it emerges quite clearly Italian trade unions fear that a national Mis would 
replace the existing income protection system – and especially the wage supplementation 
fund (Cassa Integrazione Guadagni, CIG). Worthy of note are some of the notions 
expressed during the interview: 
“In modern society, it is not possible to pursue equal minimum income for everyone, however 
targeted. (…). Unless available resources are multiplied, the introduction of a minimum income 
would just end up making the most pressing issue costlier, without solving it - namely, the issue of 
support measures, in terms of income and services, upon achievement of truly universal 
opportunities. Where is the problem? The problem lies in the incompatibility between these forms of 
minimum income and the existing measures, which are better modulated, such as the wage 
supplementation fund, unemployment benefits, (…). Given Italy's current situation, it is difficult 
                                                          
65 L’Inchiesta, January-June 1989, page 103. 
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to reconcile these two approaches, so much so that the most limiting aspect of the two bills regards 
funding sources: They don't have the courage to say that these are replacement measures for all 
other forms of income support.” 66 
The opposition of CGIL's secretary did not certainly facilitate an agreement on the 
introduction of a Mis. In fact, while the Italian left-wing parties were discussing whether to 
introduce citizenship income, unconditional minimum income, or a French-style minimum 
insertion income, Italy was in the early '90s among the few European countries lacking a 
universal safety net. 
Legislative motions did not turn into bills until the election of Romano Prodi's 
government, the first centre-left government of the Second Republic.  As already 
mentioned in the first chapter, upon the initiative of PDS Minister Livia Turco and 
strongly influenced by inputs from the supranational arena (Jessoula and Alti, 2009), this 
government implemented, on an experimental basis, the so-called Minimum Insertion 
Income (Mii), in 1998, only for a few municipalities and for a limited period of time, in 
order to identify and overcome any obstacles to its final institutionalisation (See Chapter 
1). However, the second Berlusconi government, after an agreement with social partners 
which was not signed by the CGIL, decided not to extend the measure to the entire nation, 
and initially envisaged introducing a vaguely defined Income of Last Resort, which was 
however never implemented.  
The failed extension of the Mii was a clear step towards the traditional model, but - 
combined with Constitutional Reform n. 3/2001 giving regions exclusive domain over 
social assistance - it paved the way to the so-called season of regional innovations (Lumino 
and Morlicchio, 2013). The next paragraphs are actually focused on this season, in 
particular on the introduction of Reddito di Base per la Cittadinanza (BCI) in Friuli Venezia 
Giulia and Reddito Minimo Garantito (GMI) in Lazio. 
 
 
 
                                                          
66 L’Inchiesta, January-June 1989, page 103. 
192 
 
 
3. Minimum Income Protection in Friuli Venezia Giulia 
3.1 Economy, labour market and society in Friuli Venezia Giulia 
Located on the border between Latin, Germanic and Slavic traditions and cultures, Friuli 
Venezia Giulia (FVG) is a peculiar region in the Italian context. Article 116 of the 
Constitution sets out that this region, along with islands Sicily and Sardinia, and other 
border regions characterised by the presence of large language minorities, that is Valle 
d’Aosta and Trentino Alto Adige, is to be provided with special forms and conditions of 
autonomy. Its particular geographic position, at the border between the Western bloc and 
the Communist bloc, and failure to define the Trieste issue (which was not solved until 
1953) postponed the establishment of Region Friuli-Venezia Giulia (FVG), which 
eventually took place with Constitutional Law no 1 of 1963. 
Being a special-status region in Italy has always meant having greater jurisdiction and 
enjoying special regional financial privileges. Even though there are considerable 
differences among special-status regions67, it is possible to identify the following three 
financing sources (Ieraci, 2012): shared tax system, earmarked transfers, and autnonomous 
tax system. The first one, i.e. transfer of shares of government tax revenue, is the first and 
most substantial source of financing for Friuli Venezia Giulia. Pursuant to article 49 of the 
Special Statute and subsequent changes68, FVG receives a significantly higher share of 
financial contributions than the other Italian regions, especially as a result of a greater 
share from income taxation on individuals and VAT69. Besides such shared financial 
contributions, there is a number of earmarked transfers, which ordinary-status regions also 
                                                          
67 Financing methods for special-status regions are defined by their respective statute of autonomy 
and related enactment provisions, and they have evolved much differently over time (see Baldi, 
2012, for example). 
68 During the financing evolution of special-status regions, sharing quotas have been extended to 
an increasing number of taxes and brought to increased percentages, at times in accordance with 
statutory provisions, at other times as a result of subsequent statute changes: with regard to FVG, 
see in particular laws 158/1976, 457/1984, 662/1996, 289/2002 and 244/2007.   
69 More in detail, FVG receives from the government: six tenths of revenue from income tax on 
individuals (IRPEF), four tenths and a half of revenue from income tax on legal persons (IRPEF), six 
tenths of revenue from withholding taxes, 9.1 tenths of revenue from VAT, excluding import VAT, 
nine tenths of revenue from state tax on electricity, nine tenths of the fiscal share of state tax on 
regional consumption of tobacco monopoly products. 
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benefit from. These have been decreasing with time, especially with the abolition of the 
National Healthcare Fund and with the introduction of legislative decree no 56/2000, 
which eliminated a large part of restricted transfers in favour of increased application of 
shared financing70.  Finally, as a result of the tax devolution process which started in the 
'90s, regions can have “own” financing sources, i.e. the possibility of introducing specific 
regional taxes. However, this possibility has not been used by regional legislators, so FVG 
did not establish its own distinct and autonomous fiscal system (cfr. Ieraci, 2012). Similarly 
to ordinary-status regions, the main components of “own” regional financing are the 
additional regional income tax on individuals (IRPEF), and IRAP (Imposta Regionale sulle 
Attività Produttive, regional tax on productive activities), introduced upon suppression of 
the National Healthcare Fund, which today constitute the largest financing contribution to 
regional budgets.  
The special financial treatment and, in particular, the transfer of higher shares of 
government tax revenue mean that special-status regions, especially those in Northern 
Italy, enjoy greater financial resources as compared to ordinary-status regions (see Baldi, 
2012), and without having to pay the costs in terms of heavier tax pressure, as FVG has not 
established a separate taxation system (see Ieraci, 2012). Therefore, it is no surprise that 
FVG is one of the regions with higher per capita spending on social service (Fig. 8) and 
with one of the most developed social welfare systems in the country since as early as the 
'90s.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
70 In particular, starting from this moment, ordinary-status regions have been receiving 33% of 
revenue from VAT and excise duty on petrol and diesel. The regional financing system was later 
revised in 2008 with the introduction of the so-called fiscal federalism; regional VAT revenue 
shares were attributed to each region based on parameters defined by the financing discipline 
applied to current healthcare expenditure of ordinary-status regions. 
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 Figure 8 Regional per capita spending on social services (Lira), 1994 
 
Source: Commission of Enquiry on Poverty and Social Exclusion (1997). 
 
In this region, higher spending capacity was coupled with strong economic growth in the 
early 2000s, which continued until the outbreak of the global financial crisis. Showing a 
diverse but in many ways underdeveloped economic structure until the '60s, FVG has 
subsequently experienced a remarkable development. Agriculture, a traditionally 
important sector of Friuli's economy, has progressively lost ground to manufacturing, both 
in terms of employment and income generation. Friuli's industrial structure, particularly 
well developed in the regional provinces, is by now predominant over agricultural 
production, mainly due to a number of robust areas (furniture, household appliances, 
engineering etc.) that are prevailingly directed at exports, and which grew further during 
the '90s by increasing its manufacturing and trade space targeted at Eastern European 
countries (Andreozzi and Panariti, 2002).  
Economy in this region retains however a dual structure, whereby the Friulian area 
dynamism contrasts with a somewhat stagnating Julian area. In the latter, manufacturing 
is indeed less developed, and economic growth is mostly due to a considerable expansion 
of the tertiary sector, in particular banking and insurance (especially in Trieste), and to 
radical trade reorganisation processes. Another important economic sector in this area is 
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tourism, mainly as a result of a constantly increasing number of tourists in the coastal 
areas, accounting for nearly the total seaside tourism and over half of the overall tourism 
in the region. 
Such differentiated economic structure, both from a functional and territorial point of 
view, makes the labour market of Friuli Venezia Giulia one of the most dynamic in Italy. In 
the early 2000s, the employment rate was steadily higher than the Italian average and 
consistently growing, increasing from 58.6% in 1999 (IT 52.5%) to 65.4% in 2007 (IT 58.6%), 
while the unemployment rate in 2007 was as low as 3.4% (IT 6.1%). So it does not come as 
a surprise that the relative poverty rate was low (8.8% in 2004, vs. an Italian average of 
19.1%), as well as the material deprivation rate (FVG 3.3%; IT 6.9%). On the whole, Friuli 
Venezia Giulia was a relatively wealthy region, with per capita GDP slightly above the 
average, a solid and growing economy, a well-performing labour market and relatively 
low relative and absolute poverty rates.   
However, the overall labour context was made less bright at this stage by an increasing 
number of people with unstable careers, suffering from the anxiety and lack of security 
that are typical of precarious employment. A survey conducted for the region by a team of 
experts headed by Fumagalli (2005) revealed an exponential increase in “atypical” work 
(temporary workers, employed persons or temporary agency workers) in the early 2000s, 
rising to account for one fourth of workers in 2005.  
 
3.2 The political system in Friuli Venezia Giulia 
The political system of FVG has been highly stable, at least until 1993. The period from 
1964 to 1993 saw the succession of only four regional presidents, all of them leading 
members of the Christian Democratic Party (DC), with a centre-left coalition mainly 
backed by PSI, PSDI and PRI (Ieraci, 2012). The new phase inaugurated by the collapse of 
the First Republic party system revealed a much more unstable situation, strongly 
characterised by the rise of Lega Nord, the most voted party in the regional elections of 
1993, which was entrusted with the first regional government without the backing of DC 
(coalition government with PRI and PLI). This government did not last long though, less 
than one year, leading to one of the most turbulent political phases in the history of FVG, 
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with as many as six governments within the short period of a legislature, each of them 
backed by a different majority. Elections on 14 June 1998 brought more stability into the 
political situation, with victory by the centre-right coalition made up of Forza Italia, 
Alleanza Nazionale and Unione di Centro, which governed for the entire legislature, initially 
headed by Roberto Antonione and later by Renzo Tondo.  
From that point onwards, the political system of Friuli Venezia Giulia was characterised by 
an alternation between centre-right and centre-left coalitions. Regional elections in 2003 
witnessed the first victory by a centre-left coalition, called Intesa Democratica, which 
included DS, Margherita, PRC, PDCI, Italia dei Valori, Verdi, Popolari Udeur, Partito 
Pensionati, as well as a civic list called Cittadini per il Presidente. The independent Riccardo 
Illy was thus elected president with the backing of Intesa Democratica, beating Alessandra 
Guerra, supported by Casa delle Libertà per il Friuli-Venezia Giulia, by approximately 66,000 
votes, i.e. 10% of voters. 
In 2008, in an electoral climate heavily influenced by national political elections taking 
place at the same time, the centre-right won back the government of the Region, receiving 
53.6% of votes over 46.4% of Intesa Democratica, while Lega Nord obtained broader 
consensus (plus 3.8% compared to 2003). Forza Italia member Renzo Tondo became 
president, backed by Unione di Centro, Lega Nord and Popolo delle Libertà, the newly formed 
party after unification of Forza Italia and Alleanza Nazionale (see chapter 4).  At the end of 
the legislature, this government too was not confirmed at the polls: On 22 April 2013, with 
Movimento 5 Stelle running and thus making the electoral competition tripolar, Debora 
Serracchiani, backed by Partito Democratico and Sinistra e Libertà, won over outgoing 
president Renzo Tondo by a mere 0.4%.  
 
3.3 Introduction of 'Reddito di Base per la Cittadinanza' in Friuli Venezia Giulia. 
Policies against poverty and social exclusion in Friuli Venezia Giulia in the early 2000s, as 
in the rest of Italy, were mostly under the domain of local social services. There was no 
direct intervention by regional authorities in this area, as their task was traditionally 
confined to managing a social fund and directing resources to municipalities. Such funds 
allowed municipalities to finance and provide ordinary (ongoing) and extraordinary 
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(larger once-off subsidies by reason of exceptional events) to citizens in need, with control 
under exclusive domain of municipalities. In Friuli Venezia Giulia, this regional fund was 
originally financed exclusively through regional budget. The framework law reforming the 
sector (Law no 328/2000) provided for the establishment of a national fund for social 
policies (FNPS), i.e. a national source of specific funding for social policies targeted to 
individuals and families. Since then, the budget of municipalities has had a double source 
of financing, the first from regional budget and the second from central government funds. 
The larger resources available to Friuli Venezia Giulia by reason of its special status have 
allowed the region - unlike many other territories in Italy - to guarantee some sort of 
financial assistance in most of its municipalities.  However, while not having the same 
budgetary constraints as other regions, Friuli Venezia Giulia had all the other weaknesses 
of the Italian minimum income support system. As a matter of fact, municipal measures 
were not putting in place subjective rights that citizens could automatically claim, were 
poorly coordinated - thus causing territorial differences and disparities - and there was no 
link whatsoever between benefits and policies to promote social and labour market 
inclusion of recipients. This was also due to the fact that, as argued by Madama (2010), the 
social assistance model did provide for major social spending, but was mostly focussed on 
the elderly population and had a preference for monetary transfers rather than for the 
development of social services.  
The change in regional government, with the election of the first centre-left majority, was 
an important departure for the Friuli social welfare model. Indeed, following appointment 
of Riccardo Illy as Governor, a regional Commission for the reorganisation of the social welfare 
sector was set up, which -- in transposition of law no 328/2000 - led to a framework law for 
social welfare in Friuli Venezia Giulia, namely Regional Law 6 of 2006. Among the various 
provisions introduced by this law, article 59 was particularly important, as it implemented 
a BCI scheme, i.e. a minimum income scheme. The purpose of this paragraph is to try and 
identify the dynamics that led to the introduction of such innovative measure in Friuli 
Venezia Giulia. 
The debate around possible adoption of a universalistic income support scheme began 
immediately after the victory of a large coalition of centre-left parties at the June 2003 
elections. In fact, when the electoral coalition named “Intesa Democratica” was created to 
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support Illy's candidacy for President, which included DS, Margherita, Nuova DC, Italia dei 
Valori, Verdi, Rifondazione Comunista, Partito dei Comunisti Italiani, Partito dei Pensionati, as 
well as a civic list supporting Illy and a local formation called Regional Party 
(incorporating Udeur too), the various forces negotiated a program platform which 
President Illy envisaged as a business plan for the future regional government, in order to 
prevent centrifugal drives within such composite government coalition (see interview with 
Illy). This program outlined the priorities of the future regional government and the seven 
reforms that the coalition was planning to introduce, including a framework law on social 
welfare, also because - as stated in the program - “FVG is the last Northern region not to 
have developed a regional act transposing the welfare reform law (Law 328/2000)”71.   
Therefore, although there was no explicit hint to a minimum income scheme, the reference 
to law 328 raised the issue of poverty in Friuli Venezia Giulia, because among the essential 
levels to be guaranteed nationwide by this law included “measures to fight poverty, 
income support and accompaniment services” (Art.22.a). Interestingly, the program also 
focused on atypical and precarious employment; precarious workers were expressly 
mentioned as a social group needing action by the regional government (Intesa 
Democratica, 2003)72. Although at a very early stage, the program contained the FVG centre-
left coalition's objective to “govern” the so-called “flexibilisation at the margin” of the 
Italian labour market, resulting from the Treu reform, by means of measures favouring 
credit access and ongoing professional updating of precarious workers (see also FVG GVR; 
FVG LPC). 
Following victory by the centre-left coalition, the so-called Third Commission set out to 
reorganise the social welfare area in the Region. Introduction of a region-wide 
unconditional income scheme was a topic included in the discussion thanks to the 
presence of radical left-wing parties inside the government coalition. 
                                                          
71 The program specifically stated “The region should adopt the regulatory and programming 
provisions as defined by Law 328/2000. In this respect, we should mention that FVG is the last 
Northern region not to have developed a regional act transposing the welfare reform law.” 
72  The Region must support the so-called atypical workers, promoting their professional growth 
through permanent measures and favouring investment programs based on subsidized credit and 
surety agreements. The right to work and entitlement to rights in the working place - no matter 
the job - must be pursued through express acknowledgement of the social function of workers and 
consistent enhancement of the dialogue with trade unions and the other social partners, with a 
view to reducing precarious work. 
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In Italy in the late '90s, such measure, proposed in Europe by movements connected with 
the European Basic Income Network73, became one of the claims by certain anti-capitalism 
and anti-globalisation inspired social movements, particularly the so-called Tute Bianche 
(lit. White Overalls) movement (Fumagalli and Lazzarato, 1999, Iglesias Turrión, 2003). 
Two factors helped drive unconditional income into the agenda, at least in its early stage, 
of the Commission working on the reform proposal (FVG DSP; FVG LPC; FVG SPC). 
Firstly, some of the parties making up the left wing of the majority government led by Illy 
had developed over the years a strong connection with some of the above mentioned 
social movements, especially those associated with the Casa della Cultura di Trieste (Trieste 
House of Culture) (FVG GRE). The presence of Parties such as Verdi, Rifondazione 
Comunista and Partito dei Comunisti Italiani meant that there were forces within the 
Regional Council, although a minority, that supported unconditional citizenship income 
(FVG ORW; FVG GRE). 
Secondly, Dr. Franco Rotelli, the General Director of Trieste Healthcare Authority who had 
come back to Trieste after his experience at the ASL (Local Health Service Unit) of Caserta 
during the Bassolino administration, was given the task of drawing up initial proposals 
within the Commission. At the same time, Rotelli was among promoters of an initiative to 
create, thanks to a EU project, a small research centre on social policy transformation 
called Regional Observatory on Social Policies in Friuli Venezia Giulia and Slovenia (OR-
WIN). Pr. Andrea Fumagalli, associate professor in Economic Policy at Pavia University 
and one of the first and most important advocates of unconditional minimum income in 
Italy, as well as a militant and leading theoretical inspirator of the above mentioned social 
movements74, was appointed to lead this research team. This small research group played 
therefore a special role, because it was a meeting place between Dr. Rotelli and 
intellectuals and researchers from the world of social movements, suggesting for the first 
time the introduction of universalistic support measures meant to help overcome some of 
                                                          
73 Today called “Basic Income Earth Network”. 
74 It is worth mentioning, as an example, some of the texts that had already been published or 
edited by Professor Fumagalli by the time he was appointed at OR-WIN: “La democrazia del 
reddito universale” (The democracy of universal income) (1997); “Tute bianche. Disoccupazione di 
massa e reddito di cittadinanza” (White Overalls. Mass unemployment and citizenship income) 
(editing, 1998); “Dieci tesi sul reddito di cittadinanza” (Ten assumptions on citizenship income) 
(1998). 
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the social problems resulting from the transition to a post-Fordist economy and to labour 
market flexibilisation following reforms introduced between the late '90s and the early 
2000s (FVG ORW; FVG GRE; FVG ROT).  
When interviewed, Dr. Rotelli himself underlined the importance, at least from a cognitive 
standpoint, of this small research team and its members: 
 “The starting point, an institutional one I would say, was the Slovenia-Italy Observatory on Social 
Policies (ORWIN). For a certain period of time, this group gathered people who generated a number 
of fruitful thoughts and ideas. Discussion around citizenship income was also important, ranging 
from more radical proposals, like universal citizenship income, to measures like a basic income 
scheme, which later developed into a bill.” (…)  
“That topic had never been raised before. We were a small but close group, and our reflections 
generated the first discussions on minimum income.” (FVG ROT) 
“The idea came up inside and with OR-WIN, that was the incubator. And the idea got to the 
majority through specific channels, through Rotelli and the DS leader, Mr. Zvech. Then, there was 
no discussion within the majority, because it was Illy defining the course of action, and discussions 
were to fall within that course.” (FVG GRE - Green Party leader in the Regional Council of 
Friuli Venezia Giulia 2003 – 2008) 
I remember there was someone, during negotiations, who was really pushing for adoption of a 
citizenship income measure. I clearly remember who first raised this theme, which was then shared 
by many: It was Franco Rotelli, the then General Director of Trieste's Healthcare Authority. He 
was one of the major advocates.” (FVG DSP – Director of Social Policy Department) 
The proposal to introduce a basic income scheme, or other forms of unconditional income, 
was therefore put forward by Dr. Rotelli and some leftist members of the coalition called 
Intesa Democratica, in response to proposals from a number of antagonistic social 
movements to introduce - at a regional level - a citizenship income75 (FVG ROT; FVG GRE; 
FVG DSP).  However, this project had little luck, as it was considered unacceptable by the 
rest of the government majority (FVG GVR; FVG LPS; FVG SPC). Nevertheless, it was 
                                                          
75 Citizenship income is here intended as a transfer to all citizens, and therefore not means-tested 
nor conditional on participation in social and/or work integration activities and/or on acceptance 
of a job.  
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from this proposal that a regional discussion began, triggering the government coalition's 
interest in a minimum income scheme, i.e. a residual and selective measure providing for 
financial support subject to participation in social and labour inclusion programs. Some 
parties, in particular the main government coalition party, DS (Democrats of the Left), 
became a mouthpiece and strong advocate of this kind of measure in Friuli Venezia Giulia, 
eventually obtaining President Illy's consensus (FVG DS; FVG LPC; FVG DSP; FVG ORW). 
Interviews confirm this interpretation: 
Let's say that the initial standing was a position whereby, for example, somebody planning to go on 
a sabbatical, to cultivate new interests that would help them live better, could do that by accessing 
Citizenship Income. Hence the idea of a right that was not conditional on a social income. There was 
also a discussion within the government, and I remember in particular the opinions of DS Regional 
Ministers (myself and Ministers of Healthcare and Infrastructure), who were rather in favour of 
measures more similar to those implemented in other European countries, and social partners were 
also pushing for such direction. (FVG LPC - Regional Labour Policies Counsillor in Friuli 
Venezia Giulia, 2003 – 2008) 
 “There were DS and Margherita, and the former were definitely staunch advocates, but agreement 
on the measure was quite general. Rifondazione Comunista would have preferred an unconditional 
right, but we eventually got to an agreed pathway.” (FVG SPC - Regional Social Policies 
Counsillor in Friuli Venezia Giulia, 2003 – 2008) 
The proposed measure was thus agreed upon by the different majority components, 
including Governor Illy. First of all because central government itself had included it - 
albeit implicitly - in its agenda, as Law 32876 provided for action against poverty and 
income support, as already mentioned. And especially because such scheme was already 
in place in most European countries, and it represented the missing element of the 
flexsecurity triangle, which was the reference model for the social and labour policies of 
Governor Illy and Friuli Venezia Giulia's government coalition. 
Governor Illy himself explained the importance of reforming the income protection system 
in the light of labour market changes: 
                                                          
76 In the course of the interviews, the suggestion also emerged that the introduction of a minimum 
income scheme in FVG was the result of a pre-election agreement between Rifondazione 
Comunista and the rest of the coalition. 
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“Our first observation was that the global market, including the labour market in FVG and more 
generally in Italy, has changed significantly over the past few decades. Major economic as well as 
social changes have taken place. By way of example, lifetime employment is no longer a mantra in 
Japan as it used to be. Even there it is now normal and possible to change jobs, be hired in another 
company, etc. Let alone in other countries where lifetime employment has never existed. 
Nevertheless, the provisions and regulation of Italian social policies were all developed when lifetime 
employment did exist in Italy, therefore they are now unsuited to meet current labour market 
requirements. (…). Based on these assumptions, we asked ourselves which was the country that had 
developed the best social system to ensure employment and security nowadays? The answer was 
Denmark, with its flexicurity model. Then we asked ourselves what could be done in order to create 
here in FVG at least some of the conditions that are in place in Denmark.” (FVG GVR) 
The Councillor of Social Policies Beltrame also confirmed the relevance of the Danish 
model for the introduction of BCI in FVG: 
“In particular, I've also been to Denmark to check out a few things. We tried to steal some ideas, 
while taking account of differences between our bureaucracy and theirs, and the way their social 
services are organised.” (FVG CSP) 
Regional Councillor of Labour Cosolini pointed out that the intention was to build a new 
model for income support policies inspired by the flexicurity model then promoted by the 
European Union and of which Denmark was “the best pupil in class” (Hemerijk, 2012). 
This had also been considered as a way to experiment a possible new “social shock absorber” for 
areas lacking one, because in those years - as a result of the Biagi reform and the discussion about 
flexibility and precariousness - trade unions had seriously started thinking about how to guarantee 
social security to workers with flexible or precarious employment contracts, based on the fact that 
the Biagi reform had at least two faults, at least from my perspective: The first one was that it had 
introduced too many contract types, unnecessarily; the second fault was the failure to reform social 
shock absorbers, which was absolutely required according to the flexsecurity model. (FVG LPC) 
While centre-left parties in Friuli Venezia Giulia were interested in - although with 
different approaches - introducing an innovative measure to help address issues associated 
with an increasingly precarious labour market, the leading Italian trade union 
organisations, namely CGIL, CISL and UIL, were more cautious. 
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“Within the debate about the role of social policies, the minimum income issue came up and found 
support by President Illy and by a part of PD - the then DS party -, while it was met with a cold 
response by trade unions, both CISL and CGIL” (FVG ROT). 
As a matter of fact, trade union organisations declared during interviews not only that 
they were not among the forces promoting minimum income in FVG, but also that they 
were objecting (initially, at least) to the regional government’s project. Interviews are 
particularly interesting, because they also reveal a few differences within the two main 
Italian trade union organisations, namely CGIL and CISL. The latter was the firmest 
opponent to a universalistic public measure against poverty, arguing that income support 
measures should be confined to supporting workers, whereas it is a duty of society as a 
whole, and not of the government, to address poverty. 
It was against this backdrop that the BCI theme was introduced. To be honest, there was no 
agreement inside our trade union organisation. It had been a decision made by Illy based on a policy 
agenda agreed with Rifondazione Comunista. (…) (Like I said, we - as CISL - were not in favour. I 
didn't like the approach at all. It went as far as giving large amounts of money - 800 euros- to 
people without even requiring commitment to seeking a job. It had even been impossible to obtain 
that claimants refusing a job would lose their right to access that money (This is not true, Ed.). It 
was up to the administration to seek jobs: Just think, since when do job centres find jobs in this 
country? It was an ideological measure, with no mechanisms: We had made a few calculations, 
whereby non-EU immigrants with children would have received up to 1,200 euro, not to mention 
the additional money they would get from some undeclared, irregular job, if they decided to seek one. 
Then, in principle, I didn't think it was right to get 800 euros without any obligation in return for 
it.) 
(…) (Furthermore) The vision of CISL is one based on participatory and subsidiary universalism. 
We must abandon the idea that there are public resources for all, and therefore, that we can afford to 
introduce measures such as minimum income. Firstly, because such resources are simply not there. 
Then because society has got to be responsible, so you need to use the good forces of society, also to 
make them responsible. This is why we support the principle of subsidiarity, be it associative, 
family-based, or individual (…).  The idea of CISL is the following: We need to develop subsidiarity 
at all levels to help the public system, that has to remain universal, but let us decide what is 
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universal, what needs to be guaranteed. Definitely healthcare, education and training, but there are 
other areas as well, such as transport and social assistance, which probably need to be changed. Let 
us begin by choosing, in short, what is fundamental and what is not. This is subsidiarity-based 
responsible universalism. This is the vision of CISL. (FVG CISL – CISL regional secretary). 
The CGIL position was less sharp, also because the proposal to introduce a minimum 
income scheme triggered a heated debate between those in favour and those against it.  
“We went through a lively discussion among ourselves, for two reasons: The first was the 
experience in Campania, which had developed a similar scheme but had quickly stepped back since 
there were no financial resources. The second reason was the extensive discussions between those 
who thought that such measure should be bound to employment, and those who maintained that it 
should be universal. It was quite a long-standing debate, as the older ones among us were recalling 
the very first universal income proposal, coming from Margaret Thatcher, that was applicable to 
everyone; so in this respect, it was a complex debate”. (FVG CGIL – CGIL regional secretary) 
At that point, opposition to Mis prevailed within CGIL in Friuli, based on reasons that 
only partially matched those expressed by CISL. CGIL preference was indeed for measures 
favouring “employment” rather than for developing universalistic benefits, which were 
viewed negatively as neo-liberal policies (FVG CGIL; FVG CGIL2). So, at this stage, CGIL 
was strongly opposing the unconditional income proposals put forward by social 
movements77 (FVG CGIL; FVG ROT; FVG GRE; FVG ORW), but also displaying a tepid 
response to a universalistic and selective measure against poverty, suggesting instead an 
instrument to support workers' income over the period of transition from one job to 
another (FVG CGIL2). The DS leader in the Regional Council confirmed the CGIL's 
preference for measures exclusively targeted at workers over universalistic schemes at that 
point: 
“With respect to citizenship income, President Illy had a much more leftist position than CGIL. 
Because they can only conceive income in terms of work. So, they wanted to make this measure 
applicable only in case of job loss: You lose your job, you receive income support for a couple of 
years, until you find a new one. I didn't agree, because we were talking about a charter of rights - 
                                                          
77 Secretary Belci said: “I remember a school of thought, back then, saying that even a 20-year-old 
young man from a well-off family had the right to income support, if he chose to live 
independently. It was disjointed from any income criteria, so we simply could not agree with it.” 
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which sounded subversive at that time - to be applied to anyone without an income. We were to find 
a way to precisely verify personal income, but it was for everyone. This unleashed protests by CGIL, 
with arguments reminding of Northern League's typical words: “You are encouraging idlers, so no 
one is ever going to work any longer” … Maybe they were not aware of this, and were formulating 
this concept differently, but that's when we were faced with a tough political row over eligibility. I 
was saying everyone could have access to it, they insisted on making it conditional on work, 
restricting eligibility to people losing their job. The law came out as the result of mediation, because 
in the end it was President Illy embracing my approach, so we managed to have it approved.” (FVG 
DS) 
Despite initial opposition to universalistic income support systems on the part of leading 
trade unions, the government and the centre-left coalition started a long arrangement 
process in the attempt to strike an agreement with social partners, tertiary sector and 
opposition on the definition of a social welfare system in FVG. This process took place 
within the Third Commission, with participation by over 30 representatives from 
institutions, social organisations and tertiary sector. Unlike the Spanish case, the proposed 
scheme encountered extreme cautiousness on the part of diocesan Caritas in FVG. So, no 
official supporting position was expressed with regard to the planned scheme introduction 
in the region, not even when early drafts made it clear that the regional government was 
going to implement a measure against poverty rather than a basic income scheme (FVG 
ROT; FVG CRT; FVG DSP). When consulted by the Region, Caritas - while not speaking 
out publicly - assessed the scheme ambiguously, judging the action in favour of 
disadvantaged groups positively, but also emphasising that public services could not 
deliver the social accompaniment process that is prescribed by legislation (FVG CRT). This 
ambiguity also emerged from remarks made at the Third Commission on the bill for the 
reorganisation of the social welfare system: 
“BCI is as extremely qualifying as it is extremely dangerous, if implemented without the 
harmonious articulation provided for by the bill. There is a high risk of exponentially increasing the 
number of welfare benefit claimants. It is not correct to speak of income. Income is related to a job 
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and lends itself to “monetising” actions that can be provided as social services. It would be 
preferable to enhance the “life project”, including with financial support”.78 
It was inside the Third Commission that a mediation was reached between the various 
majority positions in favour of a minimum income scheme that could be accessed by all 
individuals with income below a set threshold, subject to underwriting a pact with the 
government whereby they would commit to taking part in a personalised process of social 
and, possibly, labour inclusion. This form obtained the agreement of trade unions as well. 
Even if not entitled to being considered among the scheme promoters, trade unions 
actually decided to sit at discussion tables leading to the regulation that would set out the 
tangible features of the provision (see next paragraph) (FVG SPC; FVG GVR). In particular, 
in order to win their support, a time limit was introduced, i.e. access to income support 
was limited to one year, extendable to maximum one additional year. It was only through 
such condition, set by trade unions to prevent the scheme from degenerating into welfare 
dependency, that an agreement was reached - with trade unions accepting scheme 
implementation only if subject to actual participation to active labour market policies. 
“Thanks to this approach, linking income support to active labour market policies (matching supply 
with demand, training, incentives for new hires, etc.), trade unions eventually overcame their early 
perplexity - which all three organisations had expressed, if I remember correctly. They thus 
reconsidered the issue.” (FVG LPC – Regional Labour Policy Counsillor) 
“To be also noted is that our concerted action with social partners was on rules, and we never found 
any opposition - either by trade unions or industrial representatives - to a model providing for 
strong labour activation. By contrast, there was harsh criticism of the other approach, i.e. the one 
based on unconditional income support.” (FVG SPC – Regional Social Policy Counsillor) 
In particular, once established that income support would be conditional on labour market 
access, CGIL had positive words for the measure on local newspapers, as confirmed by an 
interview with the then secretary Colussi published on Il Piccolo on 1 February 2006:  
                                                          
78 Caritas remarks on the bill for the reorganisation of the social welfare system, Trieste, 17 
October 2005, FVG Archive, 
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“The overall plan on social shock absorbers also includes the minimum income scheme proposal, 
which can prove to be a useful instrument to support income and place dismissed workers into new 
jobs - as long as combined with suitable training.”79 
The decision to make financial support conditional on personalised programs to be agreed 
with social services was initially met with dissent by left-wing parties that had at first 
proposed introducing a citizenship income measure, especially Rifondazione Comunista, 
that would eventually support the scheme proposed by the regional government anyway.  
So, over two years after the creation of the Third Commission entrusted with preparing a 
provision to transpose Law no 328 and reorganise the regional social welfare system, Law 
no 6 was finally approved in March 2006, with article 59 introducing a 5-year long 
experimental implementation of BCI.  
The political origin of this scheme was pointed out by government’s technical experts too, 
revealing that, especially in this early stage, there was mistrust within public 
administration with respect to feasibility of the scheme, and concerns among municipal 
caseworkers, i.e. those responsible for administering the scheme, who feared that a new 
measure would aggravate their administration workload (FVG DSP; FVG SW). 
“Absolutely not: It's a political decision, not a technical proposal. Also because, to be honest, there 
were a few concerns amongst caseworkers like myself. For example, I did sit at preparation tables for 
Law 6, and I was against the scheme.” (FVG DSP) 
The decision to promote minimum income in Friuli Venezia Giulia, therefore, derived 
from a coalition agreement between the various majority components, namely an 
agreement between advocates of an even more innovative measure in Europe, such as 
unconditional income, and supporters of a minimum income scheme comparable with 
measures adopted in the rest of Europe and only shortly experimented in Italy. Despite 
some tension inside the majority, even promoters of the former type of scheme eventually 
recognised the importance of having reached a compromise among the different political 
forces, as shown by majority parties voting unanimously on Law 6 and by interviews: 
                                                          
79 Il Piccolo, “Il segretario Colussi sarà riconfermato fino al 2010”, (Secretary Colussi's mandate to 
be confirmed until 2010), 1 February 2006. 
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“It was not exactly what we wanted. It was a heavily conditional income, whereas we wanted 
unconditional income. However, when you attend political negotiations, you obviously aim at 100, 
but if you then get 70, it can as well be fine. Anyway, we valued this downward mediation 
positively, and judged the agreement reached by the various centre-left parties as positive.” (FVG 
ORW – Director OR-WIN 2003 – 2008) 
“I'm in favour of unconditional income that unleashes energies, forward-thinking, ideas and social 
richness. It's a sort of economy, if you will, that can be set in motion, a universal income without 
means-testing. This was the thrust, even though it was a minority view within the majority. It 
helped keep the majority a little bit on tenterhooks, I don't think it was useless, or simply 
ideological. It was in fact useful to widen the reasoning spectrum. So I'm not claiming ownership of 
BCI nor am I saying that it was optimal, but in those five years of government I think it was one of 
the best actions taken by the administration.” (FVG GRE - Green Party leader in the Regional 
Council of Friuli Venezia Giulia 2003 – 2008) 
So, Rifondazione Comunista leader in the Regional Council, Pio de Angelis - who had said 
during an interview with Il Piccolo on 8 February 2006: “I hope this majority does not have the 
impression or fear of adopting an overly leftist or welfare-oriented provision. The amendment, in 
fact, makes the subjective right to social integration, as ensured by citizenship income, conditional 
on a personalised assessment by municipal social services” - had to accept this approach and 
eventually welcomed the scheme following approval of Law 6 of 2006, describing it as an 
“act that represents an excellent synthesis of the early contrasting positions within the majority”80. 
As for the other stakeholders and their views in this policy area of Friuli Venezia Giulia, 
there was strong opposition by centre-right parties to the Basic Citizenship Income, 
throughout the policy-making process. Already during negotiations within the Third 
Commission, harsh comments were expressed with media by Regional Council members 
from Lega Nord and Forza Italia. An article published by Il Messaggero Veneto81 clearly 
revealed both the dissenting position of these two parties on minimum income and their 
different arguments: 
                                                          
80 Il Piccolo, “Welfare, ok al reddito minimo garantito”, (Welfare, agreement on guaranteed 
minimum income), 3 March 2006. 
81  Il Messaggero Veneto, 9 September 2005, “Forza Italia: il reddito di cittadinanza va bocciato 
Lega: aiuti che giovano solo agli immigrati” (Forza Italia: citizenship income must be rejected; 
Lega: support bound to benefit immigrants only) 
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“With regard to welfare legislation, Forza Italia (…) discloses in advance its strong opposition to 
the proposed creation of a citizenship income scheme, which would drain all available resources for 
social policies. Citizenship income – says a statement – is the outcome of a culture that does not 
belong to Friuli Venezia Giulia and, where implemented, it only increased welfare dependency, as a 
result of populist policy-making. It is moreover evidence of a culture that still believes in state 
supremacy over the individual, that generates the culture of vested rights and that equates people 
making sacrifices and saving money for their future with those that don't, preferring to spend 
everything without worrying about what comes next. 
«The centre-left welfare approach - pouring money onto immigrants and artful dodgers - is even 
dividing Illy's government» echoes Lega Nord Councillor Fulvio Follegot, “A region that is now 
known for the industriousness and initiative of its people, who earn their income by working, runs 
the risk of becoming a place dominated by welfare statism, if the centre-left plan gets implemented. 
«In fact, the much publicised guaranteed minimum income - up to 250 euros a month is the sum 
being considered - would end up almost exclusively in the hands of immigrants – Follegot continues 
–, benefiting not only resident immigrants, but also those who are simply staying here. Even in 
Campania, applicants are required to have resided in the region for at least 60 months, whereas here 
they're planning to introduce an income that is no income at all, but rather an actual subsidy for 
idlers and non-EU immigrants. No workers, one-income households or elderly people are going to 
benefit from it. This is the truth!” 
Already at this stage, opposition by UDC and AN was more moderate and focused on 
amendments to improve some specific issues, showing no objection to the measure per se, 
but rather aiming to set restrictions, particularly a time limit to scheme access82.  
Opposition by centre-right parties was consistently carried on during discussion and 
preparation works and became evident on the Council floor when debating the social 
welfare system reform in Friuli Venezia Giulia (Law no 6/2006). Then again, debate on 
Law 6 was effective in making the different Friulan centre-right positions towards the 
scheme clear. The legislative act covered a number of issues and contained over 60 
                                                          
82 See, for example, the statement released by UDC Councillor Molinari to Il Piccolo on 17 January 
2006, displaying a different register from Forza Italia and Lega Nord statements: “As for a 
guaranteed minimum income, we consider temporariness as essential, in order to avoid 
degenerating into demagogy and taking at all costs a leftist action» 
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different articles, but it was on the Basic Citizenship Income that Forza Italia concentrated 
its opposition, denouncing the lack of sufficient regional resources to implement an 
effective measure, stating its objection - as a matter of principle - to universalistic income 
support policies and, thirdly, stating its support for Italy's traditional familistic welfare 
model. In this respect, a speech by Councillor Massimo Blasoni during a session was 
particularly meaningful. 
“Article 58 basically grants income support to everyone simply by reason of being born or residing 
in Friuli Venezia Giulia. This measure is not applicable: ISTAT ha reported that there are 50.000 
new poor in Friuli Venezia Giulia. It's a demagogic policy, so it's very likely - and not by chance - 
to be approved during the electoral campaign, creating huge expectations that available resources 
cannot objectively meet, unless drastic spending cuts are made on innovation, infrastructure, 
tourism and so forth. Also, it's not a much ethical measure either, because - apart from real 
situations of need - it might benefit cases of laxness or poor disposition to work, or artful 
misrepresentation of incomes.”83 
Roberto Asquini, another Forza Italia Councillor, strongly reiterated its opposition to any 
welfarist income support policy during the proceedings: 
“There is no such thing as citizenship income, because if you look up the word 'income' in the 
dictionary, you'll find that it's money earned from an economic activity or from capital investment. 
This is written in the dictionary and I don't think we can change by law the Italian dictionary. So 
they should at least call things by their proper name: Basic subsidy.” 
More cautious was the minority report submitted by UDC Councillor Molinaro, who was 
not contrary to minimum income policies by principle, while pointing out a few negative 
aspects of the proposed scheme, especially with regard to its financial sustainability: 
The measure is fully legitimate. Having said that, its proposed regulatory formulation is wrong, as 
it contains several contradictions. First of all, there is an intentional conceptual error, lending itself 
to various interpretations, i.e. the name. It's not income in itself, because it's a combination of 
money and social services and/or benefits, and also because it's expressly envisaged as a possible 
supplement to minimum income (paragraph 4, letter c). It's more exact nature is that of being a 
                                                          
83 Friuli Venezia Giulia Autonomous Region Council Proceedings, IX Legislature, Session no 177 of 
1st of March 2006. 
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“project” aimed at preventing and countering poverty and social exclusion (paragraph 1). So, we 
could tune in to the current opinion of our fellow citizens, who have always associated the word 
“income” with the word “work”, which is something different from “welfare”. 
Given the large audience of potential recipients (paragraph 1) - that is all individuals residing in 
Friuli Venezia Giulia, be they Italian citizens or not -, an elementary precaution to safeguard the 
regional budget would be to set some limits and include them in the legislative provision, such as 
considering the entire household as a criterion and expressly specifying the temporary nature of the 
measure” (…). 
Newspapers articles and council proceedings evidence that during the debating stage and 
approval process of Law 6, centre-right parties in Friuli Venezia Giulia were against the 
introduction of minimum income, even if with different tones and arguments: firm 
opposition to minimum income measures by Lega Nord and Forza Italia, concerns over 
financial sustainability by UDC and AN. Considering all the above, it was not surprising 
that Friulan centre-right parties voted differently: AN and UDC decided to abstain, while 
Lega Nord and Forza Italia left the floor. 
Approval of Law 6 was the first step of the regional policy making process in Friuli 
Venezia Giulia. Drawing up the specific rules of BCI was a further source of intense 
conflict lasting about one year, which was followed by a short period of implementation. 
This is the topic of the next paragraph. 
 
 
4.2.3 The BCI scheme and its implementation. 
After the agreement reached by the composite centre-left government majority in Friuli 
Venezia Giulia, adoption of a minimum income scheme was approved, intended as a 
measure combining income support and actions aimed at (re)activating recipients in the 
labour market. Approval of Law 6 in March 2006 was just the first step in the policy-
making process, i.e. the moment when a political agreement was reached by the majority 
to introduce a minimum income scheme. The second step, a more technical one (but 
equally important), was about defining how to implement and govern the scheme, which 
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ended with the approval of the minimum income implementing regulation of 2007, over 
one year after approval of Law 6.  
Such time lapse demonstrates the great administration efforts made by the region during 
this scheme designing stage. To this purpose, a special agreement was signed with a social 
research institute, the Istituto per la Ricerca Sociale (IRS), to identify the best practices in this 
area in Italy and abroad, and special consultations began with potentially involved 
institutions - territorial and municipal authorities responsible for social services in Italy, 
and provincial authorities, responsible for job centres - and with social partners. Three 
major challenges were identified by the region in creating an effective measure against 
poverty and social marginalisation, one that would not be a mere money transfer: I) the 
need to adapt the existing structure or create an infrastructure to help manage a policy 
area that was still scarcely developed in Italy, i.e. that of universalistic income support 
policies; II) the identification of an instrument to provide a plausible estimate of recipients' 
incomes; and III) the integration between social and labour policies.  
With regard to the first challenge, as already mentioned, financial support in Friuli 
Venezia Giulia was under the responsibility of social services run by municipalities, which 
would apply local practices developed over time. Introducing a regional law was certainly 
a challenge for social services, as it was about creating a system to coordinate a range of 
institutions: regional bodies disbursing the money and monitoring the measure, municipal 
social services taking care of the actual organisation, income control and preparation of 
social integration for applicants, and provincial job centres. To this purpose, two certainly 
important actions were taken. The first one was the deployment of a new IT system for 
setting up a welfare records office to collect and provide data about the (different) welfare 
and/or social security benefits received by citizens and to be easily accessed at all 
government levels, thus helping to gather information on poverty in Friuli and to monitor 
the BCI pilot implementation. The second action included the provision of specific training 
to social services personnel, (partial) staff reinforcement and a specific additional fund to 
support territorial offices, if necessary. This was a particularly relevant aspect, given 
concerns arising at this stage about a potential workload increase for social workers as a 
result of the new scheme (FVG DSP; FVG SW). The reason was that the BCI project was 
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not replacing existing benefits provided by municipalities but rather introducing 
additional benefits, to be directly regulated and financed with restrictions by the Region84.  
Achieving a plausible estimate of incomes earned by citizens is a well-known limit of Italy. 
However, this was a conditio sine qua non for proper implementation of the minimum 
income scheme, because such measures are by nature means-tested as they can only be 
accessed by applicants with income below a predefined threshold. The Region decided to 
rely on ISEE, that is Indicatore della Situazione Economica Equivalente (equivalent financial 
situation index), an instrument introduced in 1998 (see chapter 1), while making two 
improvements to address a few shortcomings identified during scheme implementation 
discussions. First of all, as opposed to ISEE - for which only incomes taken into account for 
IRPEF calculation are relevant data for income estimate - it was now decided to consider 
all household earnings, including pensions and social allowances, scholarships, child 
support maintenance in case of separated parents, and any other earning not subject to tax 
return. Secondly, income estimate would be based on the earnings received in the month 
preceding application, and not - as in the case of ISEE - on the previous financial year. So a 
new index was created called “Capacità Economica Equivalente” (CEE) (equivalent 
financial capability), and specific agreements were arranged for with CAFs (tax centres) 
and Guardia di Finanza (tax police) in order to make the selection process easier (FVG SDP; 
FVG SPLC). In order to facilitate this process, the information system included a specific 
simulator to identify access threshold and determine income estimates, which was an 
important tool to reduce social workers’ administrative workload.  
Thirdly, the element judged by many to be the most innovative of the BCI scheme was the 
attempt to horizontally integrate social welfare policies and labour policies. So, for the first 
time, a shared pathway was implemented between the Regional Labour Department and 
Social Policy Department (FVG DSP; FVG DLP; FVG SPC; FVG LPC), and a procedure was 
                                                          
84  Existing benefits were not reorganised. As already mentioned, poverty allowances in Friuli 
Venezia Giulia were paid out by municipalities, to a more widespread and vast extent than in other 
Italian regions due FVG's special status enabling higher social spending. Such benefits and 
allowances were (and still are) financed from two specific funds: National Fund for Social Policies 
and Regional Fund for Social Policies. BCI introduction did not affect these funds but established, 
similarly to what occurred for example in Spain, an additional fund that was nevertheless subject 
to restrictions, i.e. to be specifically used for actions against poverty.    
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established for communications between job centres and social services. Major efforts were 
put in place by the regional administration in this direction: 
“Integration with job centres was an emblematic experience, in my opinion, and from a personal 
point of view as well. Those first meetings trying to get together 30 social workers, covering all 
areas, and 30 people responsible for job centres meant setting up the entire support network. Early 
meetings revealed the total lack of mutual knowledge: Job centres and social services were not even 
aware of each other's work. So it was a very important opportunity for the Region to explain that 
the scheme was not aimed at creating a marginal group meant to receive life-long social service 
benefits. The objective was rather to set up a network and promote a system whereby social services 
would signal cases to job centres or vice versa and active policies would be better integrated. So it 
was truly a time of departure” (FVG SPC – Regional Social Policy Counsillor 2003 - 2008). 
“Social inclusion and labour got integrated, but it was no easy task, because these two areas were 
used to working independently from each other, with each of them focusing on their respective field. 
The extent of success of this integration wasn't clear until afterwards, because even if the scheme 
was suppressed, connection between social services and job centres remained, so integration is 
partly still in place. Even when drawing up the regulation, there were joint directives, so a really 
major integration effort was made” (FVG DSP – Head of Social Policy Department). 
The result of this intense designing task was that the implementing regulation provided 
for the actual integrated management of recipients on the part of social services and job 
centres. So, where prescribed by the Final Pact to be underwritten by applicants and 
municipal social services within 3 months, the recipient (or another household member) 
was required to sign a written agreement with the local job centre, which undertook to 
assist the signatory in actively seeking a job. In a few cases, such as in the Province of 
Pordenone (FVG SW), integration was developed to the extent of creating multi-
professional teams, with experts in social welfare integration and labour placement 
collaborating on individual cases, thus unknowingly replicating on the local territory some 
of the most interesting experiments rolled out in Europe, such as the LAFOS centres in 
Finland (Sacchi, 2016).    
In short, it took more than one year to go from approval of Law no 6 to preparation of an 
implementing regulation, which was necessary for actual scheme deployment. During that 
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time, different institutional and social service bodies attended several consultation tables 
in order to tackle the main obstacles to the creation of an effective income protection 
system, also tapping from previous experiences in the country (FVG SPC), i.e. 
development of an index to quickly and effectively identify real poverty conditions, 
reinforcement of the administrative organisation and integration between the social 
welfare system and active labour policies. At the end of this process, in July 2007, the 
regulation implementing the BCI scheme was officially approved. 
In greater detail, it was a 5-year long pilot project85, whereby the Region budgeted 25.2 
million euros for the first year, split as follows: 22 million for allowances and the 
remaining 3.2 million for reinforcing the organisation and setting up a computerised 
registry. The presence of budget appropriation, while being a generous one, was evidence 
of the greatest limit of BCI in Friuli Venezia Giulia, i.e. it did not introduce a recipient's 
subjective right to access the scheme by virtue of having an income below a predefined 
threshold, as this depended on availability of sufficient funds. The regulation certified the 
presence of budget constraints, while expressly regulating what to do in case of 
insufficient funds. It actually specified that “if the sums allocated to the body managing 
the municipal social service are not sufficient to meet all BCI applications, unmet 
applications will remain valid and be fulfilled according to the chronological order of 
submission, following allocation of additional resources to the Region.” It was thus 
decided that applications for which there were no available funds would be accepted but 
not fulfilled until the next budget allocation. Worthy of note is that there was some 
uncertainty as to the amount of money necessary to guarantee a subjective right, partly 
due to the fact that such scheme was a novelty; there were estimates on potential recipients 
calculated by IRS, OR-WIN and job centres, but they were different from each other.  
Interviews confirmed the lack of certainty as to the number of expected applications and 
                                                          
85  Existing benefits were not reorganised. As already mentioned, poverty allowances in Friuli 
Venezia Giulia were paid out by municipalities, to a more widespread and vast extent than in other 
Italian regions due FVG's special status enabling higher social spending. Such benefits and 
allowances were (and still are) financed from two specific funds: National Fund for Social Policies 
and Regional Fund for Social Policies. BCI introduction did not affect these funds but established, 
similarly to what occurred for example in Spain, an additional fund that was nevertheless subject 
to restrictions, i.e. to be specifically used for actions against poverty.    
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related expenditure, but also the fact that at that stage funds were not the greatest source 
of concern for the Regional Government and Council (FVG DSP; FVG SPC; FVG LPC). 
Municipalities were critical governing bodies to ensure effective scheme implementation. 
Their task was actually to manage the administration and accounting aspects (i.e. 
managing in particular the selection procedure, checking eligibility and assessing 
eligibility extension, as well as determining benefit amounts, expense commitment, etc.), 
but also to contact recipients and perform activation (namely, drawing up pacts and 
personalised plans; taking actions, when necessary, to suspend or even revoke the benefit 
or lower the sum to be paid out); and finally, to create a territorial network, especially by 
synergistically collaborating with job centres in order to coordinate scheme application 
and monitoring, and by developing collaborative relationships with CAF centres 
responsible for CEE index determination. 
As for the extent and access threshold of benefits, the scheme aimed to counter absolute 
poverty rather than relative poverty, as it was applied to households with annual CEE 
income of 5,000 euro. In addition to income, there were residence requirements: The 
scheme was only accessible to individuals who had been residents in FVG for over 12 
months. The amount was about 415 euros a month for a single individual, whereas 
amount determination for households was based on the number of household members 
according to the ISEE equivalence scale. As there was no maximum limit, benefits paid out 
to large families could be quite significant, even exceeding 1,000 euro.  
In order to access the minimum income scheme, recipients had to underwrite a 
preliminary pact with municipal social services, containing mutual commitment to 
defining an agreed process of accompaniment to overcome the difficult conditions of the 
recipient and his/her household.  In addition to this pact with social services, minimum 
income access required applicants to commit to actively seeking a job by signing a so-
called service pact, i.e. a written agreement between the job centre and the working-age 
individual stating availability to work. Based on this pact, the job centre committed to 
supporting the applicant in actively seeking a job, while the applicant committed to taking 
the agreed actions for employment. Besides the adoption of consistent and standardised 
criteria across the regional territory, this was the key difference between BCI and the 
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previous system of financial aid provided by municipalities, as BCI stressed the 
importance of labour market inclusion and promoted coordination between social welfare 
policies and labour policies. The need to activate recipients was further emphasised by the 
application of strict time limits: access to BCI was limited to 12 months and could be 
extended just once to 12 more months.  The introduction of time limits was the 
Government's response to criticism by opposition parties, who had extensively warned 
against a degeneration of welfarism after BCI approval. 
The regulation also provided for scheme assessment and monitoring, whereby a specific 
agreement was signed with IRS, a Milan-based external research organisation. The 
following data and considerations are taken from the final assessment report issued by this 
organisation in April 2009 and refer to the 10-month pilot period between September 2007 
and July 2008 (IRS, 2009). 
The first cheques were paid in October of the same year, only three months after approval 
of the implementing regulation and one month after municipalities started collecting 
applications. This is a very important piece of data, testifying to the good work performed 
during the scheme preparation stage, which allowed to respond quickly to situations of 
need (Spano et al., 2013), as opposed to most regional measures implemented at that time, 
taking even more than one year from application submission to fulfilment.  
All in all, 8,361 applications were submitted, accounting for 1.6% of the total number of 
households residing in the region. It was quite a small number of applications, when also 
considering that, based on the European threshold, the number of FVG residents living in 
material deprivation conditions was 4.3% of the population (Eurostat data). Data seems to 
indicate a fairly high non-take up rate, probably due to less than optimal information - as it 
was the first year of the pilot project -, but also to the stigma associated with this kind of 
aid measures, especially in a region with a deeply-rooted culture of work and where there 
had been quite a strong campaign against “idlers ready to take advantage of citizenship 
income”.  
Overall, applications considered as valid, i.e. with income below the CEE eligibility 
threshold, were 78% of all submitted applications. Nevertheless, only 65% of eligible 
applications were actually accepted, accounting for 4,264 households. According to IRS 
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(2009), however, the reason why a large part of the eligible population did not receive the 
benefit was not due to budgetary constraints, but rather to the fact that they had not 
completed the application procedure, failing to show up at municipal social services by the 
indicated deadline. 
Most recipients were households suffering from severe marginalisation. The majority (42% 
of recipients) was single individuals, followed by lone parents (22%) mainly consisting of 
women under 40 years of age. Households with dependent children, a social group 
traditionally at high risk of poverty, were (only) 18.6% of recipients. The vast majority of 
beneficiaries were Italian citizens, while UE and non-UE immigrants accessing the scheme 
totalled 19.3%.  
Another interesting piece of data was the number of recipients who got actually activated, 
i.e. who took part in labour or social inclusion activities, namely 59.3% of beneficiaries, 
hence a higher percentage than most European experiences considered as best practices 
(Sacchi, 2016). A closer look reveals a different distribution of such activation percentages 
across the region, basically due to administrative overload conditions affecting 
implementation in certain areas. A typical example was Trieste, which had to deal with 
almost 1,300 recipients and managed to activate only 35% of them. Such cases evidenced 
the need to increase staff numbers and boost the organisation of social services in order to 
implement all scheme components, unlike other geographical areas where the existing 
organisation was capable of implementing the entire scheme, including activation (FVG 
SW).  
Secondly, it is worth stressing that, despite major territorial differences, integration with 
job centres was successful, as 45% of recipients were referred to job centres and 
approximately 1,238 of them signed a service pact for labour market inclusion. In most 
cases (partly in consideration of the short pilot duration, see below) this translated into 
supporting and advising beneficiaries in seeking a job, but there were also significant 
numbers of individuals who started professional training (17.9% of service pact 
signatories) and accessed work experience projects (16%). 
On the whole, the way the scheme was run - considering the time it took to collect 
applications, the ability to rapidly perform income estimates and to organise meetings 
219 
 
with recipients and implement activations processes - was by all means positive, especially 
if compared with other regional experiments carried out in Italy in the same period of time 
(Amaturo and Gambardella, 2009, Natili, 2012, Spano et al., 2013). 
Although there is no sufficient data to provide an exhaustive judgement, worthy of note is 
also the fact that inspections by tax police86, where conducted, did not find any significant 
false positive situations, i.e. people accessing the benefits while not meeting requirements. 
Few cases were identified, generally resulting from errors rather than from real frauds 
(FVG DSP).  
 
3.4. BCI abrogation and anti-poverty policies in FVG during the crisis. 
The period of BCI development and early implementation did not attenuate controversy 
between majority and opposition over the scheme. In particular, the regulation approval, 
which officially identified as BCI recipients registered families, triggered new criticism by 
Forza Italia on national newspapers87. In particular, Councillor Blasoni complained that the 
scheme would thus penalise traditional families, besides being addressed to homosexual 
couples as well: 
«The regulation establishes a provision that is not directed at single citizens nor at traditional 
families as intended under the Constitution, but at a more general concept of "registered family". It 
is - he explains - a family consisting of a group of people even simply bound by a generic affective 
relationship». (…) «The concept of family they are referring to – he says – is the registered family, 
namely a group of people bound by affection. This means that the measure is granted, for instance, 
to homosexual couples as well. This is why I'm going to submit a question to the Regional 
Government».88 
                                                          
86 The measure was repealed before completion of the protocol that would have extended control 
over the entire regional territory (FVG DSP). 
87 See for example Il Giornale of 20 July 2007 “Friuli: basta convivere per avere il sussidio da Illy” 
(Friuli: living together is sufficient to get Illy's subsidy). Also see Il Piccolo of 14 July 2007: “Alzetta: 
reddito minimo ai gay, Blasoni sbaglia” (Alzetta: minimum income to homosexuals, Blasoni is in 
error).  
88 Il Piccolo, 13 July 2007: “Primo sì al reddito garantito Contributi anche alle donne vittime di 
violenze e abusi” (First voting in favour of basic income - Women victims of violence and abuse to 
also benefit from it). Similar statements were also published in Il Giornale of 20 July 2007. 
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Upon approval, new regulatory conflicts emerged with regard to minimum income 
protection. Then again, minimum income - despite its limited significance in the regional 
budget - acquired political importance in the context of Friulan politics. LN, in particular, 
did not confine themselves to opposition within the Council and to statements to the 
media, but inaugurated a strategy of “resistance” to BCI at a municipal level, designed to 
limit scheme access to Italian citizens only. So, municipalities governed by LN mayors 
started experiencing numerous delays and different kinds of obstacles to the actual scheme 
application (FVG PD; FVG DSP).  
The conflict between majority and opposition over minimum income protection harshened 
during the campaign for regional elections in Friuli Venezia Giulia in April 2008. 
However, in contrast to what maintained by a large part of political science literature, the 
minimum income theme was used not so much by the government majority for credit 
claiming as by the opposition to criticise the work done by Illy's Regional Government 
(FVG GVR; FVG SPC; FVG LPC). In fact, BCI abolition became one of the campaigning 
pillars used by the candidate from a centre-right coalition consisting of newly formed 
Popolo della Libertà, Lega Nord and Partito dei Pensionati.  Some newspaper headlines were 
indicative of the centre-right communication strategy. For instance, on the day the two 
main candidates launched their electoral campaigns, headlines on Il Piccolo read: “Illy: 
Third A4 lane ready by 2013. Tondo: No to minimum income, support should be given to 
pensioners”89. More generally, pre-electoral debates revealed quite clearly that BCI was 
being used chiefly by the centre-right coalition to criticise Illy's executive, depicted as a 
government that “increases public spending and taxes”, rather than by Illy as an example 
of good governance: 
“Tondo attacks citizenship income: «A provision dictated by Rifondazione that overturns the 
culture of this land, by associating income with citizenship instead of with work. We are going to 
cancel it and allocate those 37 million to families, bringing them back at the heart of government 
action. We have many proposals to put forward, such as reducing VAT to 4% on baby nappies and 
formula». Illy doesn't take the blow: «The opponent has just read the title of the law. Minimum 
income has been designed by Tito Boeri, it is directed at unemployed and elderly people, and lasts 12 
                                                          
89 Il Piccolo, 13 March 2008. 
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months, maximum 24. And unemployed recipients who reject a job offer twice lose access to the 
scheme»90.  
The scarce publicity given to this measure by the Friulan centre-left parties was explained 
as follows by former Democratici di Sinistra secretary Bruno Zvech: 
“We knew that the scheme would not increase our constituencies. To us it was important for it to be 
accepted by our people from and ideal and value perspective, but the audience of reference was not 
our audience, quite the opposite, it was an audience little disposed to voting and engagement.... so it 
was no cunning trick on our part, but rather our conviction that it was an important modernising 
action.” 
While being one of the qualifying actions taken by Illy's government from 2003 to 2008, it 
was not considered as an electoral mainstay by the centre-left, which once again preferred 
to focus the campaign on a government agenda that did not make any reference to BCI 
(Electoral Agenda of Intesa Democratica FVG, 2008).  
Victory by the centre-right coalition led by Tondo was a turning point for minimum 
income policies in Friuli Venezia Giulia. As early as one month after the elections, the 
newly appointed Regional Health Minister hastened to reiterate to media the new 
government's standing on the issue, releasing a statement that helps understand the views 
of the coalition led by the newly created Popolo delle Libertà in this policy area: «Institutions 
cannot take the place of Caritas and vice versa. That's why we are planning to replace minimum 
income with other kinds of measures. »91. In fact, there were contrasting positions even within 
the coalition, with government forces, in particular UDC, proposing a scheme revision 
instead of total abolition, also because technical experts in the administration - after their 
initial scepticism - convinced themselves of the scheme’s effectiveness (FVG DSP; FVG 
SW).  The initial steps taken by the government, and in particular by the Regional Minister 
of Labour of the Alleanza Nazionale party, Alessia Rosolen, seemed geared towards making 
access requirements more stringent by increasing the number of years of residency 
required for eligibility to three and reducing the number of years recipients were entitled 
                                                          
90 Il Piccolo, 03 April 2008: “Duello su debito e reddito di cittadinanza Illy: entrate in crescita.” (Duel 
over debt and citizenship income - Illy: earnings are growing. Tondo: priority to families.) 
91 Il Piccolo, 12 May 2008: “Kosic: Soldi ai poveri? Non siamo la Caritas.” (Kosic: Money to the 
poor? This is not Caritas.) 
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to benefits from a maximum of two years to a maximum of 12 months. In addition, limits 
to the maximum amount of economic aid available to large families were introduced. This 
line of action was deemed too “soft” and saw the opposition of Lega Nord, which called for 
the immediate cancellation of the BCI scheme. The comments published in Il Piccolo on 23 
June 2008 made by Regional Council leader Narduzzi of the Lega Nord party are indicative:  
“We acknowledge that Rosolen and Kosic have tried to correct an unfair and incorrect measure by 
softening its impact. But it is not enough.” Lega Nord wants the measure to be abolished 
immediately: “Citizenship income is merely a rehashing at regional level of the old welfare policies 
of the south that we so harshly criticised. Unsurprisingly, they exist only here and in Campania,” 
attacked Narduzzi. Regional Council deputy leader. Federico Razzini, agreed: “It is a generic, 
counter-educational and often unfair scheme that typically benefits non-Europeans, and it’s not the 
sort of welfare that our citizens want.”92 
The hard position taken by Lega Nord, which was backed by similar statements made 
during the debates and campaign elections by the former Forza Italia of the Partito della 
Libertà, obtained the support of the entire majority. In July 2008, only a few months after 
the centre-right coalition won the elections, Article 9 of Regional Law no 9/2008 abrogated 
Article 59 of the Law on the integrated system of social activities and services. It was thus 
decided to put an early end to the BCI pilot, which was scheduled to last 5 years, but in 
fact lasted less than 9 months (from 7 September 2007 to 31 May 2008). This decision is 
significant because both the initial data obtained from the evaluations and interviews 
revealed that any doubts surrounding the measure on the part of those inside the 
administration and the technical experts had been amply resolved: the decision to end the 
pilot was strongly politically motivated (FVG DSP; FVG SW).   
The reasons leading to the abrogation were politically-based, while on a technical level the initial 
fears had been “overcome.” At first, my focus was more on the drawbacks than the advantages, but I 
had a change of heart; there was certainly room for improvement, but it was undoubtedly a positive 
experience. It was also an opportunity to learn more about the territorial landscape, understand how 
the phenomenon of poverty was changing, so the decision was anything but technical. On the 
                                                          
92 Il Piccolo of 23 June 2008, “Reddito minimo, alt della Lega a Tondo” (Minimum income, Lega 
blocks Tondo). On the dynamics at play within the centre-right coalition, see also Il Piccolo of 23, 
24,25 and, specifically, 27 July 2008. 
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contrary, the decision came out of nowhere and we had a number of challenges dismantling 
everything. The pilot had just been launched, but it had been set up very well and included various 
components, so going back to the way things were was no easy task (FVG DSP – Head of Social 
Policy Department). 
In the same way, it should be noted that in 2008 the economic cycle took a turn for the 
worst. After a phase of strong growth, in the early months of 2008 the economy of Friuli 
started to feel the first effects of the economic crisis. In 2008 the GDP pro-capita fell by 
1.9% compared to the previous year, a 0.8% loss higher than the Italian average. However, 
a link between the decision to interrupt testing in the region to the region’s economic 
challenges is unlikely. The revenue and expenditure trends of the region show that Friuli’s 
revenue grew until 2011 and then halted (but did not fall), not unlike what was happening 
at aggregate level in Italy as a whole (Table 10). As already mentioned, at the time of the 
abrogation not a single politician argued that citizenship income was too expensive or that 
the state of public finances could no longer withstand the burden. Rather, they claimed 
that it was wrong and ineffective.  
 
Tab. 10 Friuli Venezia Giulia, revenues and expenditures, 2003 - 2012 
Rev. 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Friuli 
Venezia 
Giulia 
 
4.163 
 
4.308 
 
4.327 
 
4.257 
 
4.316 
 
4.855 
 
5.720 
 
5.782 
 
5.716 
 
5.451 
Total 
Regions 
146.361 145.295 150.265 158.385 157.955 175.863 182.505 183.409 183.374 183.426 
           
Exp. 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Friuli 
Venezia 
Giulia 
 
4.660 
 
4.744 
 
4.886 
 
4.884 
 
4.912 
 
5.436 
 
7.006 
 
6.378 
 
6677 
 
6.404 
Total 
Regions  
170.706 168227 173.969 173.640 182.471 205.248 209.048 208.418 200149 199.976 
Source: ISSiRFA 
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Additionally, a closer look at the dynamics of social expenditure in Friuli Venezia Giulia 
reveals that budgetary constraints in no way led to the decision to do away with the 
minimum income scheme. Firstly, because certain social assistance measures actually saw 
significant growth. Two such measures were in fact introduced by the Regional 
Government under Illy and saw great expansion during the Tondo presidency. These were 
the Fund for Possible Autonomy and the Family Card. The former, introduced by Illy’s 
government, aimed to support non-self-sufficient individuals and families and doubled its 
funding budget from 15 million to 32 million from 2008 to 2009. The Family Card93 had a 
similar evolution and provided support to middle-low income families with at least one 
minor dependent child. The Family Card gave beneficiaries certain tax benefits (a bonus 
towards electricity bills, among others) and various means of financial support. The 
Regional Government’s goal was to reduce expenditure for low-income families and 
support middle-income families with young children. The words of CISL Regional 
Secretary shed light on this process: 
“Resources were funnelled into the Family Card, so bonuses for electricity, day-care, because 
Regional Minister Molinaro comes from a Catholic area and the measure was very important to 
him. Through the electricity bonus families with incomes of around 50 thousand euros received a 
significant bonus, up to 700 euros, the level was quite high. My daughter’s family, for example, 
earned a total annual income of 60-70 thousand euros and her family received close to 6 thousand 
euros every year after her second child was born. She received strong support, even though she had a 
good income. Resources that had been set aside and were needed as revenue were used in this way” 
(FVG CISL – CISL Regional Secretary). 
Secondly, resources that had already been set aside by the previous administration for the 
BCI scheme for the remaining years were used differently, although they still went 
towards anti-poverty initiatives. On the one hand, the (Old) Social Card introduced in 2008 
by the Berlusconi administration (see Chapter 1) for Friuli residents was increased. The 
Region paid an additional 120 euros to the amount covered by the Central Government. 
Card-holding residents of Friuli Venezia Giulia thus had at their disposal 200 euros on a 
                                                          
93 The Family Card provided benefits by lowering costs and rates or by directly offering economic 
relief for certain goods and services used by families or for certain duties and taxes. The extent of 
benefits was based on the number of dependant children.  
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bi-monthly basis. On the other hand, the Fondo per il contrasto ai fenomeni di povertà e disagio 
sociale (Anti-Poverty and Social Exclusion Fund) was introduced. This was a further fund 
aimed at supporting local municipalities in implementing anti-poverty and social 
exclusion measures. The initiative was in addition to those already put in place at 
Municipal level to prevent, overcome or mitigate the condition of those temporarily in 
need with a view towards rendering such individuals completely autonomous, and could 
be coordinated with other interventions and welfare benefits. In their respective districts 
and within the limits set forth in the Regional Regulations, mayoral assemblies could 
identify specific methods on how to manage these measures. The eligibility criteria laid 
down in the Regulations were straightforward: eligible individuals must have an annual 
income of less than 8,180.87 euros ISEE. The starting amount is 680 euros, plus 100 euros 
for every dependent child. The Regulations also introduced stricter residency 
requirements so that benefits could be extended only to Italian and EU citizens and 
holders of long-term residence permits.  
While the economic crisis did not affect the regional public finance in the short term, it did 
have a devastating impact on the regional economy and in particular on the living 
conditions of very low-income earners in Friuli Venezia Giulia. After ranging between 
4.2% and 3.4% from 2000 to 2007, the unemployment rate spiked to 7.7% in 2013. The data 
on absolute poverty are particularly significant (and worrisome): The severe material 
deprivation rate rose from 3.9% in 2007 to 6.7% in 2013, peaking at 9.2% in 2012 (Eurostat 
data). ISTAT (the Italian Institute for Statistics) does not issue data on absolute poverty 
broken down by region, but we do know that between 2008 and 2013, in northern Italy, the 
rate of absolute poverty rose by 78% to 5.7%.   
And yet, during this difficult phase, in which the living conditions of the Friulian 
population were deteriorating at an alarming rate, the BCI scheme was abrogated and the 
previous model, whereby anti-poverty financing was issued directly to the municipalities, 
was reinstituted. As a result, the Region no longer had any say in the management of anti-
poverty policies, which returned to the hands of the Municipalities, and could no longer 
tackle poverty through a multidisciplinary approach involving the integration of various 
institutions (FVG CRT – FVG DSP – FVG SW). The Fondo per il contrasto ai fenomeni di 
povertà e disagio sociale (Anti-Poverty and Social Exclusion Fund) was, furthermore, less 
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funded than the previous BCI scheme and, compared to this latter, did not have the 
advantage of integrating social and labour policies94. More importantly, as underscored in 
the interviews, the important planning work that made it possible to make significant 
advancements in the sectors in which the Italian welfare system most needed it (such as 
the means-test, the creation of a computerised record system, horizontal integration) was 
lost. The monitoring and evaluation structure put in place through the BCI scheme no 
longer exists, so we have very little information on how the fund was implemented and 
whether or not it was effective. When asked specifically about the future of minimum 
income policies at regional level, President Tondo made the priorities of the new 
administration quite clear: “Regional Minister Vladimir Kosic is working on it and a new tool 
could emerge, but frankly it is not a priority. The tool already exists and it simply entails giving 
more resources to the municipalities so that they can help those who need it most.”95 
Finally, it should be noted that, in this phase, the anti-poverty sector was created and 
strengthened with the strategic cooperation of the diocesan branch of Caritas in Friuli 
Venezia Giulia. The change of the Regional Government took place in conjunction with a 
specific agreement that led to the creation of an observatory on poverty and annual reports 
co-drafted by the Region and Caritas (Zanarolla, 2012), as well as regional funding for 
innovative micro-credit and financial aid initiatives set up by the diocesan branch of 
Caritas in Friuli Venezia Giulia in favour of socially-excluded individuals (FVG CRT). 
It is also important to note that in FVG, just as in other regions, the elimination of the BCI 
scheme did not give rise to any protests on the part of the would-be recipients or any 
mobilisation efforts. Perhaps this is due to the fact that the pilot lasted for such a brief 
time, but it certainly confirms the limited political resources of this social group (Bonoli, 
2005). Not particularly enthusiastic of the measure even at its inception, not even the social 
partners seemed ready to take any decisive action against the new direction social policies 
were taking in Friuli Venezia Giulia. On the contrary, CISL, which from the start had been 
very critical of the introduction of the measure, sided with the Tondo government on its 
                                                          
94 The implementing regulation provided the option of integrating and supplementing financial 
support with professional psycho-social counselling as well as socio-educational and welfare 
services. However, the availablility of this option was left up to the municipality to decide and was 
not a condition for receiving support, as had been the case for the previous regulation.   
95 Il Piccolo, 31 October 2008, “Tondo: Finanziaria, niente tagli Per le famiglie 22 milioni di euro” 
(Tondo: budget law, no cuts. 22 million euros for families). 
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use of social policy resources (FVG CISL) Even though there were no mobilisation efforts 
or specific protests against the measure’s abrogation, CGIL did, however, lament that the 
anti-poverty funds had been drastically reduced without being channelled towards labour, 
the sector towards which CGIL traditionally supports the region’s flow of resources.   
In conclusion, partisan dynamics and electoral competition are key factors in 
understanding the abrogation of BCI in Friuli Venezia Giulia. Indeed, the abrogation came 
on the heels of the change of the government majority that led to a return to the original 
status quo whereby anti-poverty measures were once again regulated and managed by the 
municipalities. Some of Friuli’s centre-right parties expressed their opposition in principle 
to the minimum protection scheme right from the beginning, albeit for slightly different 
reasons. Forza Italia criticized the measure because they saw it as a handout to freeloaders 
and considered financial support to the needy to be the duty of the family or, alternatively, 
the third sector, but not of the government. Lega Nord insisted on the fact that the measure 
benefitted mostly immigrants and for this reason had to be eliminated. Both political 
parties turned the elimination of BCI into a key message during the election. Because it 
had been promised during the campaign, despite the opposition of the administration’s 
technical experts and the (overall) positive assessment of external researchers, Lega Nord 
called for the immediate abrogation of the measure when they took office in FVG.  
The abrogation was facilitated by the lack of mobilisation efforts on the part of social 
and/or civil partners, leaving the minority centre-left parties with few instrument to avoid 
abrogation. Subsequently, the government reinstitute the original model whereby the 
region role was limited to redirecting resources to the municipalities, which could 
ultimately decide on how to proceed. Resources originally directed to the last resort safety 
net were cut and targeted to various categorical measures and other social groups, namely 
medium-income families and non-self-sufficient individuals. 
  
3.5 The introduction of the Active Income Support Measure  
The 2013 elections saw Tondo (Popolo delle Libertà, Lega Nord, Autonomia Responsabile, 
Unione di Centro) battle it out against Debora Serracchiani (Partito Democratico and Sinistra 
Ecologia e Libertà) and Saverio Galluccio (Movimento 5 Stelle) and the issue of MI brought to 
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the forefront by the centre-left coalition. In a phase of limited available resources, the 
victorious centre-left government set its sights on the introduction of an MI scheme, in the 
face of the initial disapproval of its social partners (FVG CISL; FVG CGIL).96  
Faced with economic challenges and the initial doubts of social partners – specifically the 
Labour Plan set up by CGIL in 2013 giving top priority instead to structural measures 
aimed at job creation – President Serracchiani was initially cautious about introducing an 
MI scheme. However, a number of factors contributed to bringing this issue once again to 
the top of the Regional Government’s agenda. Firstly, Sinistra e Libertà, the Partito 
Democratico government’s principal ally and the party of the Regional Minister of Labour, 
a key political figure, reiterated its intention from the start to make good on its promises 
made during the campaign. Working alongside this force, Movimento 5 Stelle – for the first 
time seated on the Regional Council with 13.4% of the vote – echoed the sentiments the 
party was making known on the national stage and declared the introduction of an MI 
scheme to be an important political objective. From the outset, the party was open to talks 
with the Regional Government on the possibility of introducing a universal yet selective 
measure in the fight against poverty97 and in April 2014 presented Draft Law no 47 on the 
introduction of a Guaranteed Minimum Income measure. 
Playing a key role in pushing the government to work in this direction was CGIL, which, 
after watching the job market conditions progressively deteriorate, in December 2014, 
openly called on the region to make a support measure available for workers who no 
longer had access to unemployment benefits98. On its own initiative, the trade union 
committed to a proposal – created in partnership with IRES – to introduce an income 
support scheme that would go hand-in-hand with active labour policies (Stocco, 2015). The 
proposal was reiterated during a convention attended by welfare and trade union 
executives and by CGIL national secretary Susanna Camusso. The government and trade 
unions worked in close consultation with the shared goal of coming up with a measure 
that would foster re-employment (Stocco, 2015). 
                                                          
96 Il Piccolo, 9 October 2013: “I sindacati bocciano la “restaurazione” del reddito minimo in Fvg” 
(Unions give a thumbs down to the “restauration” of minimum income in Friuli Venezia Giulia).  
97 Il Piccolo, 2 February 2014, “I Cinque Stelle sfidano Serracchiani sul reddito di cittadinanza” (The 
5 Stelle party challenges Serracchiani on citizenship income). 
98 Il Piccolo, 8 December 2014, “La Cgil boccia il piano lavoro della giunta”.(CGIL rejects the 
Regional Government’s labour plan). 
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On 29 May, the start of the consultation between the government and the trade unions led 
to the centre-left coalition’s proposal to introduce Active Inclusion and Income Support 
Measures; and on 25 June, not even a month later, the Regional Council approved Law no 
15/2015, with 27 votes in favour from PD, Cittadini, SEL and Movimento 5 Stelle and eight 
votes against from FI, Autonomia Responsabile, NCD, FDI and AN.  
With financing totalling 29.5 million euros, November 2015 marked the start of the 
implementation of an Mis in Friuli. As the experience of the BCI show, it might however 
be to soon to speak about a stable path departure in regards to anti-poverty policies in 
Friuli Venezia Giulia. Favourable political competition dynamics, such as those that seem 
to have contributed to the introduction of Active Inclusion Support measures, may come 
about, but in Italy less favourable dynamics and policy reversal seems to be equally 
plausible. 
 
4 Minimum income protection in Lazio 
4.1 Economy and society in Lazio 
Situated in central Italy, the Lazio region is not the biggest in terms of territorial coverage, 
but counts a population of almost six million and is the second most populated region in 
Italy. Rome, the capital of Italy and Italy’s largest city with more than 2.6 million 
inhabitants, accounts for the region’s high population density and labour structure. 
Tertiary activity makes up the economy of Lazio for around 80%, 10% higher than that of 
the rest of the nation. In addition to commerce, logistics, and transport, the tourism sector 
plays a big role. Compared to the rest of Italy – and particularly to the other regions of the 
centre-north – the least developed sector is the industrial one, more specifically 
manufacturing and building.   
In the early 2000s the economy of Lazio 99 – in terms of GDP, Italy’s richest region second 
only to Lombardia, Valle d’Aosta and Trentino Alto Adige – experienced a period of weak, 
yet steady, growth. Between 2000 and 2005, the region’s GDP in real terms grew by more 
                                                          
99 Unless otherwise specified, the data contained in this paragraph were sourced from the Eurostat 
online database. 
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than 8.5 points, 4.6 percentage points higher than the national average (3.9%). In 2005 
employment showed a favourable trend, with employment rates equal to 58.6% (up by 
6.6% over 2000), but still lower than in the other centre-north regions (-6.8%). The rate of 
unemployment (7.7%) was down over the previous years (-3% compared to 2000), in line 
with the national average, but decidedly higher than the average of centre-north regions 
(4.2%). Female employment in particular saw positive growth, rising more than 10 points 
in the five-year period between 2000 and 2005 and reaching 48.2%, which might help 
explain the region’s good employment performance.   
With regards to poverty and social exclusion, the 2005 poverty rates in Lazio – steady in 
the period leading up to the economic crisis – were significant, but still well below the 
average for the south. People at risk of poverty accounted for 16.2% of the population, a 
percentage higher than the other central (3% higher) and northern (6% higher) regions, but 
definitely lower than in the south (16% lower). The rate of material deprivation (3.9%) is an 
indication of the presence of absolute poverty in the region, even though it is not as 
widespread as in the south (12.8%). Unfortunately, the data provided by ISTAT – which 
uses a very different methodology for calculating absolute poverty – cannot be broken 
down by region, but do reveal a rate equal to 3% in central Italy, just below the national 
average (3.6%). 
 
4.2. The political system in Lazio 
Anyone with knowledge of the electoral history of Lazio during the course of the First 
Republic will notice the continuous changes in the balance of power and the parties that 
have made up the government majority. This phenomenon is unusual in terms of political 
competition in Italy at regional level, which is often characterised by the progressive 
crystallisation of political power, be it Democrazia Cristiana on the right or Partito Comunista 
on the left. But from 1970, the year of the first regional elections in Italy, to 1992, no less 
than 12 different governments were formed in Lazio. The electoral landscape was 
especially competitive in the 1970s when Italy’s first legislature had a Democrazia Cristiana 
majority and the coalition governments (DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI) presided by representatives 
of the DC party were formed. This was followed by a legislature with the relative majority 
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of seats in the hands of PCI, a party that initially supported a coalition government headed 
by the Socialist Roberto Palleschi and then itself held control of the government between 
1976 and 1977, before the government was once again led by the PSI party. The Democrazia 
Cristiana party then reclaimed the relative majority of the seats in the 1980s, a decade 
characterised by (weak) governments led by the Partito Socialista Italiano party, which 
remained in power, with the support of often precarious coalition governments, for the 
entire decade. The 5th Legislature (1990-1995), which began with a return to power of the 
Democrazia Cristiana party, was shaken by the political earthquake that led to the fall of the 
party system of the First Republic, resulting in the succession of no less than four different 
governments.   
From 1995 the electoral competition became bipolar, and we observed an alternation 
between centre-left (1995-2000; 2005-2010; 2013---) and centre-right governments (2000-
2005; 2010-2013). The electoral dynamics were often highly competitive; a coalition 
prevailed over another by only a few thousand votes and the support of minority parties 
was essential. In 1995 the elections were won by the Ulivo coalition backed by no less than 
seven parties including the neo-centrist Popolari party and Rifondazione Comunista, with a 
difference of less than 0.2% of votes. In 2000 the centre-right (Forza Italia, Alleanza Nazionale 
and Centro Cristiano Democratico) obtained the majority and formed a government 
captained by Francesco Storace, a prominent member of the Alleanza Nazionale party. The 
2005 election results swung the other way and the centre-left coalition won the 
government with just over 50% of the vote. Following the elections, in the centre-left alone, 
no less than eight parties were able to obtain at least one seat on the Regional Council, 
without counting that one of these, Uniti nell’Ulivo, is merely an electoral list made up of 
four different political groupings. It is within this highly-competitive and highly-
fragmented context that the debate on the introduction of an MI measure took place.   
 
4.2 Fighting precarity, not poverty: the origins of the Minimum Income Guarantee in 
Lazio 
Income support policies in Lazio have evolved, at first anyway, in a very different way to 
those in Friuli Venezia Giulia. In the early 1990s, lacking a regional framework law on 
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social assistance (Madama 2010), Lazio did not move in any clear direction in the fight 
against poverty (Mirabile, 2001). Measures were scarce and limited to emergency funds for 
the social policies of the various municipalities made available to mayors and councillors 
who had discretional power over where to direct the meagre resources in response to 
emergency situations100. 
The first break from the original model took place at the end of the 1990s when a number 
of municipalities in the Lazio Region were included in a pilot MI scheme. The 41 
municipalities affected were in the area of Frosinone and also took part in the second pilot 
together with the lead municipality. The Berlusconi government's decision not to stabilise 
the project resulted in a sit-in on the part of the beneficiaries, more specifically in the small 
town of Cassino, where the families affected occupied the town hall for a few hours, and in 
isolated protests by regional executives on the left (the DS party) who put pressure on the 
Storace regional government to introduce regional measures in the absence of a national 
one. These were the first voices and the first steps, however isolated and unstructured, 
directed at the regional authorities to take action in regards to poverty and income 
support. Unlike what took place in other regions, the national MI pilot did not lead to any 
policy learning processes in Lazio in the way it did in Basilicata (Ballerini, 2012), or to any 
policy feedback processes as was the case in Campania, where the pilot project affected an 
important city such as Naples and the failure to extend it led to significant mobilisation 
efforts on the part of would-be recipients (Natili, 2012).  
On the contrary, the idea of introducing a regional Mis in Lazio did not come until 2004 
with the election of a new centre-left government101 and the appointment of Alessandra 
Tibaldi of Rifondazione Comunista as the Regional Councillor of Labour. All of the 
interviews conducted stressed the role played by PRC in the introduction of the measure 
and emphasised the pivotal role of Regional Councillor Tibaldi: 
                                                          
100 In this sense, the fact that Rome was one of the few major cities in Italy in the early 1990s not 
providing a minimo vitale is significant (Kazepov, 1995).  
101 A number of political forces were present in the centre-left coalition in Lazio: From the electoral 
list called Uniti nell’Ulivo and made up of Democratici di Sinistra, Margherita and Socialisti 
Democratici Italiani, to Partito della Rifondazione Comunista, Federazione dei Verdi, Partito dei 
Comunisti Italiani, and Popolari dell’UDEUR. 
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The measure is thanks to the Regional Councillor of Labour in office at the time, who worked very 
hard. Her name is Alessandra Tibaldi; and then the trade unions and social organisations got 
involved, then the law was drafted, and finally the financing was obtained. But the initial impulse 
came from the Regional Coucillor of Labour (LZ LPD – Department of Labour Policy Province of 
Rome). 
The proposal essentially came from the Regional Councillor of Labour, Alessandra Tibaldi. (…) 
Let’s just say that the background of Alessandra (Tibaldi) – who was very good, don’t get me wrong 
– and her political affiliation (Rifondazione) ensured that she would follow a certain path, as 
legitimate and wholly valid as it was, irrespective of the real problems at stake. It has to be done, in 
other words (LZ CISL).  
The measure was born from the former area of PRC. The Treasury Regional Minister was Nieri, 
who currently belongs to the SEL party, but started out there, Tibaldi was the Regional Coucillor of 
Labour; most of the left pushed within the area of government, within the Marrazzo majority, which 
was well-coordinated (LZ FI – Councilor of Forza Italia 2005 - 2010). 
The law was supported by PRC, particularly by Regional Councillor Tibaldi. Look, it basically 
started out like this: When the Marrazzo administration took office, this law, the introduction of a 
guaranteed minimum income was part of the programme. When the government came into office 
there was already the start of mediation within the majority for the introduction of a measure of this 
kind. As social partners, the proposal came to us from the Regional Council (LZ CGIL). 
Regional Councillor Tibaldi herself confirmed these accounts: 
“As soon as we took office, it was the first measure I put forward, as the elected official of PRC. We 
began discussions in early 2005” (LZ SPC). 
The reasons behind the decision of the Rifondazione Comunista party to push for the 
introduction of a universal income support measure were more complex. Traditionally, the 
Italian left has supported measures aimed more at the creation of new jobs and forms of 
social protection linked to employment than universal income support measures (Picot, 
2012, Madama et al., 2013). The party’s renewed attention towards social movements as a 
result of the so-called “svolta movimentista” – i.e., the attempt to become a privileged 
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interlocutor of the social movements, proposed by then-Secretary Fausto Bertinotti in the V 
congress (Bertolino, 2004) – may help shed light on the party’s change of policy.  
For some time, a reflection within the antagonist movements was developing as to the 
consequences of the transformations taking place in the last decade in the job market, 
particularly in reaction to the introduction of non standard contracts in Italy for the first 
time by the Treu Reform and the subsequent Biagi Reform. In Italy, as in the rest of 
Europe, these reforms led to reflections on precarity, which in turn led the Italian social 
movements to support a basic income as a tool for reducing the negative consequences of 
flexible working hours for workers and guaranteeing financial safety for workers between 
jobs. Another advantage was that it “freed (workers) from the coercion of precarious, 
bonded and pre-determined employment” (see Fumagalli, 1998).  
The issue of guaranteed income was becoming an important claim, along with the right to 
housing, and one that was brought to the forefront during major events at national 
(primarily during May Day events) and local level. In particular, in Rome, more and more 
conventions and mobilisation efforts were held on the issue of basic income in the late 
months of 2004, with nearly 100,000 people mobilised and ready to occupy the offices of 
the Regional Labour Council (LZ BIN; LZ SPC).  
Former Regional Minister Tibaldi pledged her support to the movements, acknowledging 
their importance from a cognitive standpoint as breeding grounds for innovative ideas and 
from a mainly political point of view, since they attracted the interest on the part of the 
parties:  
The movements pushed hard for a relationship of mutual acknowledgement between the Labour 
Council and areas of social opposition, putting on the table issues such as housing and income 
protection. And even when they occupied the Council there was always an open discussion. Within 
this climate, of acknowledgement even in the presence of discord, an interest was created around 
this issue…initially within Rifondazione and then everyone else followed. In the end, it was a 
majority victory.” (…) 
“So, in part, the measure comes from the fact that social opposition centres have always existed in 
Lazio. I remember that the first meeting (on minimum income) was held in a squat in Rome and 
was attended by people who were actually very competent. Of course, it was a social space rooted in 
235 
 
antagonism, but we had some very important discussions, especially on the issue of guaranteed 
minimum income. I remember well that I chaired the very first meeting as Regional Minister in the 
centre. Some of the people present, like Sandro Gobetti, even became collaborators of mine. These are 
the same people who founded the Basic Income Network Italia. The issue therefore also arises out of 
antagonist movements, which were the first ones to bring the issue of basic income to light.” (LZ 
SPC – Region Lazio Social Policy Councillor (2005 – 2009)  
The movements’ interest in these measures was a factor in the decision of the Regional 
Councillor of Labour, and PRC, to support the introduction of a minimum income within 
the majority coalition (LZ SPC; LZ LSC; LZ BIN; LZ GGIL). Some spokespeople for the 
social movements, particularly Sandro Gobetti, were hired by the Regional Councillor as 
“Responsabile degli studi sul reddito garantito” (Head of Guaranteed Income Studies). The 
introduction of these individuals within the institutions was a result of PRC’s interest in 
the measure and made it possible for the issue of minimum income to have a place on the 
agenda of the centre-left coalition government in Lazio. In this period, mobilisations with 
the Regional Council and the Labour Council were a constant (LZ BIN; LZ LSC; LZ SPC). 
Support for the measure from other interest groups during this initial phase was scarce. As 
a result, the Lazio Regional Council adopted a cooperative approach in an effort to rally 
support for a universal income support measure. The main Italian union confederations 
initially expressed serious doubts on the feasibility of introducing such measures in Lazio 
(LZ BIN; LZ LSC; LZ SPC; LZ CGIL; LZ CISL). From the start, CISL doubted whether the 
measure was financially sustainable and, in general, whether universal measures could be 
viable, preferring to channel resources towards other forms of social protection and in 
particular towards extending social shock absorber in derogation, which in certain sectors 
in had been in force Lazio since 2001:  
We said that if we want to create a universal measure, this will likely require significant economic 
resources. We expressed our perplexities, at least in the beginning (...). When this measure was put 
before us, we said: “Wouldn't it be advisable to extend the derogation in other sectors?" The idea 
did not pass because there was already the idea of minimum income and because it was thought that 
this would have protected those who were already in the job market and that interest would be lost 
in those who were farther away or struggling in the job market. (LZ CISL)    
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While expressing the same doubts as to whether the measure would be financially 
sustainable, CGIL seemed more open-minded about the possibility of introducing this 
measure, provided that it could be coupled with active labour market policies (CISL LZ; 
CGIL LZ): 
“The measure was the result of a political decision on the part of the Region and stemmed from the 
need to take action in an area in which the majority of European countries had already regulated in 
this sense. (...) As a trade union, and I speak for CGIL, which was at the centre of the discussion, 
our priority was not to abandon the idea of active labour market policies. (...) As we saw it, it was 
necessary to offer a response in relation to employment. Not social policies, not welfare, but active 
job promotion.” (LZ CGIL) 
These interviews demonstrate how, as was the case in Friuli Venezia Giulia, CISL and 
CGIL were cautious when it came to introducing a form of guaranteed income, even 
though their reasons were different. In addition to making financially-based 
considerations, CISL doubted the desirability of the measure and preferred to give income 
protection to those who were already present in the job market (LZ CISL; LZ LSC). CGIL 
opposed the proposal of the social movements to introduce an unconditional minimum 
income irrespective of the will of the individual to return to the job market, but was open 
to the possibility of a minimum insertion income scheme similar of those introduced in 
other European countries (LZ CGIL; LZ LSC). 
Despite initial indifference on the part of the social partners, the Regional Councillor of 
Labour, intent on introducing an Mis and having just successfully concluded an agreement 
with the majority of the Regional Government (LZ CGIL, LZ CISL; LZ SPC), adopted a 
cooperative strategy in an effort to gain support for the measure, not only from the social 
partners, but also from key figures in the third sector. More specifically, a permanent 
round table was set up within the Regional Council’s Labour and Social Policies 
Commission attended by social partners and third-sector associations concerned with 
poverty and social exclusion issues. On this occasion, a (hard-won) agreement was reached 
mostly as a result of the staunch will of the Regional Council to introduce the measure 
than of actual support from the various interest groups, including unions. With the 
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exception of antagonist social movements, these interest groups failed to take any real 
action in support of the measure (LZ SPC; LZ CISL; LZ CGIL). 
On the demand side, the social movements took action and maintained constant pressure 
on the Regional Council and the Regional Minister of Labour to ensure that the measure 
would be introduced. On the supply side - the political parties - the dynamics at play are 
interesting. As already mentioned, the pressure exerted by the social movements was 
watched with interest by PRC and especially the Regional Councillor of Labour, who 
became the privileged interlocutor of the social movements. Despite this, the 
fragmentation of the party system in Lazio gave rise to political competition dynamics 
which are crucial to understanding the evolution and features of the GMI system in Lazio. 
On the one side, as suggested by former Regional Minister of Labour Tibaldi, the 
numerous minority parties on the left made it possible to reach a majority in favour of 
introducing an MI scheme:  
At party level, within the majority there was not any opposition, in part because Rifondazione 
initially had 6 Councillors, a good-sized group, and then there were the Verdi and Comunisti 
Italiani and we didn’t have any particular problems with them. With PD…there was some mistrust 
at first on the instrument and especially on economic coverage since in the meantime the hole in the 
health budget had come to light…so we had the approval of the left, then of Partito Democratico, 
and finally of President Marrazzo (LZ SPC). 
On the other side, the fragmentation of the party system made the context in Lazio 
particularly competitive, with different political forces competing to become the privileged 
interlocutors of interest groups, even those without strong organisational resources like 
the social movements102. The Regional Council received the proposal of the Regional 
Government in addition to six legislative proposals all regarding non-contributory income 
support measures103, but differing on how the measures would be effectively implemented. 
An analysis of the various proposals reveals the wide-ranging positions within the 
                                                          
102 Unlike in Friuli Venezia Giulia, the discussions and efforts among the parties were not focussed 
on the features of the measure. Rather, they saw the parties competing for who would get credit 
for approving the measure and obtain public consensus (LZ LSC). 
103 These were proposals for the Establishment of Citizenship Income in the Lazio Region, 
Experimental Establishment of Citizenship Income in the Lazio Region, Experimental Establishment 
of Minimum Income in the Lazio Region, Establishment of Citizenship Income, Introduction of Last-
Resort Income, Income Support Measures for Precarious Workers.  
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Regional Council and the importance of the dynamics of political competition in Lazio. 
Three of these proposals, all entitled Citizenship Income, came from the other left parties 
of the majority government (Federazione dei Verdi, Partito dei Comunisti Italiani, and a 
different proposal from Rifondazione Comunista). While very similar, the proposals 
envisaged unconditioned minimum income measures that provided financial support to 
households with an income below a certain ceiling and privileged access to the 
municipality’s social services. The proposals differed from those of the Regional 
Government in that they were geared towards families rather than individuals. Moreover, 
the municipalities, as opposed to job centres, played a key role in the governance of the 
measures (see section below). The proposal backed by Democratici di Sinistra entitled 
“Istituzione in via sperimentale del Reddito Minimo d’Inserimento nella Regione Lazio” 
(Experimental Establishment of Minimum Insertion Income in the Lazio Region) 
envisioned a measure clearly inspired by the pilot project introduced by Minister Livia 
Turco in 1998. So, it differed from previous measures insofar as beneficiaries were required 
to take part in social integration programmes, training and active labour market policy 
activities.   
The parties competing to introduce an income support measure were mainly from the 
centre-left. Some proposals came also from the centre-right, but they were vastly different 
to those presented by the centre-left majority. More specifically, Councillor Robilotta, an 
adherent of the “Sacconi” faction104 in Forza Italia (LZ FI; LZ SPC; LZ LSC; LZ BIN), 
pledged support for a measure aimed at extending certain rights105 to workers subject to 
separate national insurance and pension schemes (the so-called parasubardinate workers). 
The proposal, which is in no way comparable to an Mi scheme, served mostly to prolong 
the debate and throw a spanner in the approval of the measures of the centre-left rather 
than to provide any real contribution (LZ FI; LZ SPC; LZ LSC; LZ BIN). Councillor 
Robilotta stated in the interview that he was firmly opposed to the introduction of a 
measure targeted to all citizens living in poverty. In his view, such a measure would serve 
as a strong disincentive for recipients to seek employment and would go against the 
                                                          
104 Maurizio Sacconi was at that period Labour and Social Policy Minister with Forza Italia. In that 
period, he become one of the leader of the Christian Democratic faction of this party. 
105 The measure provided recipients access to subsidised credit, rent support, job services, training 
courses and special tax benefits for payments to external supplementary pension funds. 
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policies undertaken by the national centre-right government. Lastly, an anti-poverty and 
social exclusion proposal was also initially presented by UDC called “Reddito di Ultima 
Istanza” (Last-Resort Income) and reserved exclusively for the municipalities that took 
part in the pilot MI project.  
The introduction of a Mi project in Lazio fuelled competition among the various political 
forces, which showed interest in the measure despite the different policy agendas, 
ideologies and pressure groups at play (LZ LSC). To simplify, the “minority left” parties 
(Rifondazione Comunista, Partito dei Comunisti Italiani, Verdi) proposed means-tested MI 
measures not conditional upon social inclusion and/or employment measures, which were 
optional in some of the proposals106. The majority party (Democratici di Sinistra) instead 
supported an MI measure more similar to those present in Europe and more in line with 
the preferences of the trade unions, particularly CGIL, which, as already mentioned, 
promoted measures that would go hand-in-hand with active employment policies. The 
more centre-leaning party of the coalition (Margherita) expressed limited interest and did 
not actively participate in the debate, although it did support the introduction. Yet this 
was more out of its obligation to the coalition than to its true conviction (LZ FI; LZ CISL; 
LZ  BIN).   
Inside the centre-right, interest in the measure was undoubtedly limited, partly because 
the employer (and third sector) associations also showed little interest (LZ SPC; LZ CGIL; 
LZ CISL). For this reason, too, during the debates, the strong opposition that was present 
in Friuli Venezia Giulia was not observed in Lazio and the voices against (re) distribution 
measures were less loud, even though there were shared doubts as to whether Lazio could 
financially sustain a universal measure such as this one. The mayor of Rome Alemanno 
and a prominent figure within the Alleanza Nazionale party commented in Il Tempo that 
                                                          
106 The remarks made by the President of the Labour Commission Giuseppe Mariani of the Verdi 
party underscore this position: “When we assign this money we surely cannot force, as happens in 
other European countries, an applicant to take up an offer by some agency or job centre and then 
exclude him from social income. To this, I say ‘no.’ The principle of fairness tells us that if there are 
no favourable measures greater than social income, the individual cannot be forced to accept 
measures that are a kind of harassment or blackmail, which the central points of this law seem to 
be.” 
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“the principle of the measure is fair, but it must be sufficiently financed” 107. A less positive 
stance was taken by a key official of the centre-right backed by Councillor Robilotta, a self-
proclaimed “Sacconi supporter” who staunchly opposed the measure. For PDL leader 
Antonio Cicchetti the law is “harmful because it entitles people to salaries simply for being 
members of a community.” The UDC, however, had a more optimistic outlook: Augusto 
Pigliacelli (UDC) stated that the measure “is only the first step in meeting the needs of our 
disadvantaged citizens and a sign that those in need have the support of the institutions.”108 
The seven different proposals and diverging positions are a testament to how strongly this 
sector of policy is politicised in Italy. It should also be underscored that in Lazio, in a 
manner very different to the situation in Friuli, the dissimilar positions did not lead to a 
process of collective reflection, a learning opportunity on the various experiences at 
regional, national and international level, or to mediation among the various actors. As we 
will see later more in detail, the measure approved by the Council was very similar to the 
measure initially put forward by the Regional Minister of Labour, in other words it echoed 
the preferences of the social groups that initially took action to get the measure adopted. 
The introduction of a Mis in to the Region’s policy agenda gave rise to competition among 
the various majority parties who were vying to get credit as representatives of an interest 
group, rather than to a process of collective reflection and learning, whatever 
disadvantages this might have entailed for the sceme. A quote by Sandro Gobetti is useful 
to understanding the dynamics underlying Lazio’s policy-making: 
The seven different proposals were not the result of political clashes, but were due to the fact that 
everyone wanted to put their mark. At that time there was a lot of interest in the issue of minimum 
income, and demonstrations were frequent. And yes, PD wanted to take up where Law no 328 had 
left off and create a social assistance benefit for the poor…we had a completely different perspective 
that valued autonomy and was youth-based. In the end we achieved our goal. (LZ BIN).109 
                                                          
107 Il Tempo, Il reddito minimo un esempio per il Paese (Minimum Income: An example for the 
country), 6 March 2009. 
108 Ufficio Stampa Consiglio Regionale del Lazio.   
109 A statement along the same lines was made by the President of the Labour Commission: “As 
often happens in politics, when you come up with a highly-appealing proposal, immediately it’s cut 
and pasted or embellished and in one way or another still deals with the issue of the crisis or the 
difficulties experienced by thousands of people, and everyone wants in on the action. The words 
minimum income were often in the title, but usually the proposals were merely a way to block the 
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Rather than analysis and collective reflection, the different positions both within the 
parties and among the main interest groups affected the duration of the discussion. The 
Regional Government’s initial proposals came just as the formation of the Government 
was reaching completion and by the end of 2005 a number of proposals had been 
presented to the Labour Commission. However, the approval of a shared measure wasn’t 
obtained until four years later, on 4 March 2009, just under a year from the end of the 
legislature. Confirming the differences within the two coalitions, Law no 4 of 2009, which 
introduced GMI to the Lazio Region, was approved not only with the favourable vote of 
the entire centre-left majority, but also that of UDC. As for the rest of the opposition, 
worthy of note is the abstention of certain members of Forza Italia and the contrary vote of 
Alleanza Nazionale and Robilotta (PDL). The introduction of the law was accompanied by a 
special line of financing for the GMI scheme, beginning with the allocation of 40 million in 
three years (20 million for 2009, 10 for 2010, and 10 for 2011), later expanded in the 2009 
Budget Law to 135 million for the three-year period 2009-11 (15 million in 2009, 60 million 
in 2010 and 60 million in 2011). 
The measure approved in Lazio through Regional Law no 4 of March 2009 was one-of-a-
kind at both national and international level and the result of the political dynamics 
described earlier and of the social forces that pushed for it to be introduced. On its part, 
the region’s bureaucratic and administrative structure failed to promote the measure and 
did nothing to contribute to its planning. The administration’s technical staff and experts 
also had a virtually insignificant role in the planning of the measure, which was entrusted 
to an external expert hired for the task and previously involved in the social movements. 
The implementation of the measure was assigned to a small ad hoc department staffed 
mostly with external personnel hired for the occasion.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                 
debate and had no intention of improving the measure. It had become a competition. So, to move 
forward, as a group or a councillor you had to present a proposal with that title. And maybe the 
structure of the proposal was completely different and it contained a mish-mash of things, but you 
had to compete. When there are many proposals on the table, it’s no longer just my proposal that 
has a sort of political domain, but it becomes mine, yours, his, theirs, so everyone has a slice, but in 
the end it is a single text so anyone can claim the merit and say they took part.”  (LZ LSC) 
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4.3 The Guaranteed Minimum Income 
What set the measure in Lazio apart from the other MI policies introduced in the rest of 
Europe were the objectives the measure set out to achieve (Gobetti, 2011). While European 
measures intended to fight poverty and social exclusion, the aim in Lazio was to 
counteract the negative effects of precarity, in other words offer a “reservation wage” to 
low-income workers hired with non-standard contracts. This in an effort to guarantee 
workers an independent income source so that they would not be forced to be subjected to 
unfair and/or degrading employment offers. In the words of Gobetti:  
The basic idea that should have been the pillar of this law was that guaranteed income would help 
workers subjectively increase their options, manage their own time (even more so in times of 
precarious living conditions): guaranteed income as a tool for getting out from under the burden of 
obligation, the uncertainty of employment, and the risk of poverty. (see Gobetti, 2011). 
The idea that inspired the legislator was to equate the right to income to the right of citizenship, and 
free precarious workers, the unemployed, and the inactive from the obligation of having to accept “a 
job, any job.” This objective was firstly pursued through direct and indirect income support and 
then through the creation of service arrangements more flexible than those envisioned in the laws 
governing shock absorbers (see Faranda, 2011). 
The underlying difference of the experience in Lazio when compared to the Mis 
introduced in other regions of Italy and across Europe, and underscored by those who 
conceived and promoted the law (Gobetti, 2011, Santini, 2011; LZ BIN; LZ LSC), lies in the 
existence of four key elements: the beneficiaries of the law, governance of the service, 
coordination with social services and labour policies, and the relationship between the 
beneficiary and the public institutions vested with providing the service. 
As for the first element, Law no 4 of 2009 established that the beneficiaries of the measure 
must be unemployed, inactive or precariously employed individuals110, with a personal 
taxable income of less than 8,000 euros in the fiscal year prior to the filing of the 
application. The measure is therefore aimed at individuals and not households. In other 
                                                          
110 According to the law, these are individuals who, irrespective of the nature of the employment 
relationship, earn an income that does not determine the loss of status of unemployment as 
provided for under Articles 3, 4 and 5 of Legislative Decree no 297 of 19 December 2002.   
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words, access to this measure depended only on the condition of the individual in the job 
market. An individual who was unemployed, looking for their first job, or employed 
under an atypical employment contract with a duration of less than 8 months in the 
previous year, could benefit from the measure, regardless of the income position of their 
partner and/or parents. The generosity of the measure, which paid such individuals 7,000 
euros per year (equal to 580 euros per month) is noteworthy. As already underlined, the 
idea was to help individuals become independent of the need to work. Surprisingly, the 
existence of dependent minors did not entitle the individual to a higher income amount.   
With regards to the governance of the measure, GMI schemes in Lazio were organised by 
job centres and not, as is the case in most regions and throughout Italy (and Europe), by 
the social services of the municipalities. This decision is understandable if you consider 
that the MI measure was introduced as a labour policy rather than as an anti-poverty one. 
However, understanding the reason for this decision given the small number of job centres 
present in the territory and the notorious challenges these centres face in Italy in carrying 
ordinary intermediary functions between job supply and demand is more difficult. 
Imagining, with equal resources, the possibility of assigning a new function to job centres 
in Italy similar to the one given to job centres in the Netherlands is also difficult. 
Unsurprisingly, all the other proposals presented to the Regional Council gave the 
municipalities a much more important role; on this point, however, the Regional Minister 
of Labour would not budge.    
Moreover, if the Region had set up another special line of financing, the law (Article 3.6) 
would have given beneficiaries the possibility to take advantage of a series of indirect 
benefits, such as free transportation on local public transport, free cultural, recreational 
and sporting activities and services and free school books. In reality, this never happened. 
“Indirect” benefits, to use the term used by the legislator, did not include privileged access 
to the Region’s welfare services, not even in areas where education systems and active 
labour market policies were in place. This is in part due to the fact that the goal was to 
create an unconditional income protection system, i.e. a system that did not require 
participation in any social and/or work inclusion programmes. On the other hand, the fact 
that privileged access to social services was not even an option was no doubt due to the 
fact that the measure was created, sought after, and promoted by the Regional Minister of 
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Labour and not the Regional Government in its entirety. As a result, integration with the 
Regional Minister of Social Policies or that of Education, for example, did not take place. If 
it had, it would have undoubtedly resulted in a wider range of services available to 
beneficiaries. The law, therefore, was limited to providing rather generous financial 
support, comparatively speaking, and other specific deductions, even though for this latter 
funding was never provided. In other words, very little ended up being taken away from 
the debate between experts and policy-makers. Situations of need were interpreted simply 
as a lack of economic resources. There was no room for socio-health policies that could 
help remove some of the barriers that create obstacles for those re-entering the working 
world nor for education and/or labour policies able to facilitate cooperation between 
supply and demand and render recipients more qualified to meet the needs of the job 
market. 
Finally, as stated several times, beneficiaries whose applications were accepted were not 
required to sign any agreements with the administration. They were, however, required to 
register with the job centres in order to file the applications in the first place. Not being 
required to participate in any social or employment inclusion programmes, beneficiaries 
were instead required to be immediately available for employment. This requirement was 
loosened with Articles 6.5 and 6.6, which specified that the benefit lapsed if the beneficiary 
refused a job offer from the competent job centre, “in which the centre takes into account 
the previous salary earned by the interested party, the acquired professional skills, 
education and recognition of formal and informal competences in his/her possession.” 
Beneficiaries were required to accept job offers only if the positions were in line with their 
skills and previous employment level. According to Spano et al. (2013), Lazio’s law on the 
theme of conditionality was as ambitious as it was unrealistic, an opinion that can be 
espoused. While it is laudable to protect workers from being forced into compulsory 
employment, this is a fairly unlikely risk when one considers how job centres actually 
work in Italy. Instead, efforts should have been directed at making job centres better 
equipped to efficiently bridge the gap between the unemployed and employers (i.e., 
provide job searching assistance) and provide a good diagnosis of the skills and training 
needed for workers to effectively compete in the job market.       
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While differences emerge when comparing the experiences of other regions, in one 
context, the experience in Lazio had the same challenges faced in other regions in Italy and 
in Spain: the existence of budgetary constraints and inadequate resources. The resources 
provided under Law no 4 of 2009 were limited to 40 million for a three-year period and 
subsequently increased to 130 million for another three years (15 million for 2009, 60 
million for 2010 and 60 million for 2011) in the following Budget Law. What is surprising is 
that the amounts available for the pilot were not in any way based on an estimate of the 
costs needed to finance the measure. Indeed, the issue of resources appeared not to have 
been a part of the discussions on the pilot since the matter of funding was deemed 
insignificant when it came time to decide on the features of the measure. This is why an 
estimate of the possible cost and the possible recipients of the measure were not 
considered necessary. No doubt this was due to the fact that during the early forecasts 
made at the beginning of the legislature it was hoped that the regional measure would be 
at the very least co-financed by the national government (LZ SPC; LZ BIN). In any case, 
despite the firm opposition of the national government, and in particular of Minister 
Sacconi (LZ SPC; LZ BIN), the issue of resources was not taken into consideration when 
the law was being prepared and an analysis of the costs was not made.   
The measure implemented in Lazio of course contains many ambitious and innovative 
aspects, especially with regard to an individual’s right to income and strengthening the 
individual’s presence in the job market, or, to use a concept dear to Esping-Andersen 
(1990), increasing the degree of de-commodification of the individual in an increasingly 
flexible job market. It is worth noting that while attention to this theoretical notion was 
important, a reflection on the effective capabilities and possibilities of the Lazio Region 
was not equally relevant. As a result, the draft law envisaged a (predictably weak) 
structure of governance reliant on job centres, resources insufficient to cover the entire 
population of would-be recipients in Lazio (not just limited to people in relative or 
absolute poverty, but including a wider range of individuals: the unemployed, the 
inactive, and even the precariously-employed), and not enough services to enable 
individuals to overcome their disadvantaged condition, even beyond the economic aspect.   
The introduction in the agenda and approval of the law were only the first steps in the 
policy change process. The creation of an implementing regulation, and its actual 
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implementation were subsequent steps, though no less important. The next section is 
dedicated to these policy developments and aims to show the importance of political 
dynamics in understanding the content of the measure in Lazio and the administration’s 
ineptness at putting an effective anti-poverty and social exclusion system in place.  
 
4.4. The onset of the crisis and the (difficult) implementation of GMI  
The Council’s approval of the introduction of a GMI scheme was only the initial step in the 
policy process that led to the introduction of a regional safety net in Lazio. The second 
crucial moment was the consultation process that took place between the Regional 
Government and the social partners to define the implementing regulation of Law no 4 of 
2009. In this phase, the social partners, and in particular CGIL, took steps to change the 
measure from an unconditional income to counteract precarity to a minimum income to 
tackle poverty. The result was the introduction of a hybrid measure in which the draft law 
aimed to create a system that would protect individual income, while the implementing 
regulations, still within the framework of reference established by the law, aimed to create 
a measure against poverty for families who risk being marginalised and socially excluded.  
In this phase, CGIL played a key role. The trade union took active steps during the 
consultation process to change the formulation of the law according to its preference and, 
at the same time, ensure financing additional to that provided for under regional law, 
which it considered absolutely insufficient. Surely, the approval of the law and the 
concurrent onset of the crisis, which had a particularly damaging effect on Lazio’s 
productive and social fabric, heightened CGIL’s interest in the measure and led to the 
trade union’s commitment to bring the measure more in line with its interests. From the 
beginning, CGIL had been somewhat mistrustful of the measure prepared by the Regional 
Minister of Labour, but had not been totally closed to the idea of the introduction of an 
Mis. During this time, the other trade unions took a step back, as they were less interested 
in an effective anti-poverty measure (LZ SPC; LZ CISL; LZ UIL). The statements of a CGIL 
member reveal CGIL’s interest starting from 2009 in the law and the mistrust of the other 
trade union organisations: 
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You must bear in mind that 2009 was the year of the separate agreements, so there was tension even 
among the trade unions…this led to the absence of a shared definition. In short, there wasn’t a place 
where CGIL, CISL and UIL could discuss the issue amongst themselves. We talked around tables, 
and the various positions of the parties emerged…but, like I said, we tried to make this measure less 
unfair, less removed from reality, because at that time a measure such as the one that was being 
planned risked being totally detached from reality, (…) we tried to help create a system that was in 
keeping with reality, with the problems we were facing, but this took place around tables…the other 
trade unions had a more, let’s say, passive approach… (LZ CGIL). 
In an interview, CISL also confirmed that it was more firm and critical in its approach to 
the measure than CGIL:   
With the other social partners there were no differences regarding the cost estimates, the differences 
were that we said look, we can’t do this; we have to stand steadfast, while CGIL took a more lenient 
approach, in the sense that it said let’s not stand in the way and let’s not ask ourselves what will 
happen when the people go to claim their rights and there isn’t any money (LZ CISL). 
Within this context, after the approval of Law no 4 of 2009, the Regional Government 
began working in cooperation with the social partners and various administrations that 
potentially had a role in the implementation of the law, the provinces, and the job centres, 
which according to the legislative framework had the task of selecting the recipients and 
distributing the income. This process of cooperation, which for the first time saw the 
involvement of issuing entities, was actually short-lived, lasting only two months. During 
this brief time, however, a specific problem was addressed: How was it possible to 
implement the measure in light of the tight budgetary constraints? An initial check 
revealed that the number of people registered with job centres in Lazio, and who would 
have been entitled to benefit from the law, exceeded 500,000. This was too large a number 
for the Region’s meagre resources. Consequently, it was decided to introduce a point-
based grid that would make it possible to give priority to certain social groups over others 
(Table 11). Given the Region’s budgetary limitations, it was decided that a specific 
announcement would be called every year indicating the resources assigned to each 
territorial area and the indices for selecting beneficiaries. This system also sought to avoid 
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the errors that had been made during the selection process in Campania (Amaturo and 
Gambardella, 2009).  
Tab. 11: Selection procedure in Lazio  
Condition Points 
 Unemployed/Precariously employed worker 9 
 Inactive 4 
 Unemployed for more than 24 months  2 
 Woman 2 
 Single-income family  1 
 Single-parent family with dependent children  3 
 Family with a dependent child who has reached the age of 
majority  
1 
 Family with a dependant minor child 2 
 Family with a dependant disabled member 3 
 Recipient with disability 3 
 Person in declared emergency housing  2 
 
Introduced after the cooperation process with the trade unions and approved with 
Resolution no 426 of 24 May 2009, these criteria marked a move in the opposite direction of 
the law111. Higher points were given to the long-term unemployed, women, single-parent 
families with dependents, and families with disabled members or members with a clear 
need for emergency housing. Priority was thus given to individuals living in a clear 
                                                          
111 With the approval of Resolution no 426 of 24 May 2009 additonal points were awarded to 
families, women, the disabled, persons in declared emergency housing, and the long-term 
unemployed (more than 24 months). 
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condition of absolute poverty and social emergency. While the decision is understandable 
and reasonable on many levels, it went against the original purpose of the measure. Most 
of all, if the intended recipients of this policy were socially-marginalised individuals, all 
the more reason then to combine economic support with privileged access to social 
services. But, as we saw earlier, social services had no role in the measure. What’s more, 
the monthly amount of 570 euros was the same regardless of the condition or size of the 
family – a strange restriction, especially if you consider that the grid was introduced to 
reward large-sized families (and rightly so). 
The introduction of new conditions for eligibility rendered the bureaucratic process 
(collecting applications and selecting candidates) particularly complex, long, and 
cumbersome112. The law established that job centres would function as organisational 
centres and entrusted them with the selection process. As a result, job centres were 
suddenly tasked with a new function, without having received any preparation, given that 
the procedure was decided at the last minute, and without the provision of any additional 
human or organisational resources (LZ LPD). Furthermore, the province also found itself 
saddled with new responsibilities. Firstly, all of the applications had to be catalogued, the 
documentation verified, and income returns filed. Secondly, the administration had to add 
up the points for each application based on the grid and arrange a ranking system for the 
recipients. The job centres were left to grapple with these entirely new functions, in 
addition to having to do their usual work. In many provinces, ad hoc commissions were 
set up to establish and certify the selection process (LZ LPD). Finally, once the provisional 
rankings were published, any claims made by citizens had to be dealt with and the 
administration had to carry out new checks. Another aspect that should not be 
underestimated is that because of their new duties, the job centres had specific needs 
which not all of the job centres had the tools and skills to cope with.  
In view of these circumstances, the selection process had become, in the words of a 
technical expert of the province, an “enormous job. Because of the way it was proposed, the 
                                                          
112 Because of the decision to introduce new criteria, the public administration was required to 
collect new information. Had the decision been clear from the beginning, it would have been 
possible to use the ISEE for means testing. While the indicator has its drawbacks, because of the 
way it is set up, it takes into account the number of family members and problems present within 
the family nucleus, making the selection process much simpler.     
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measure created serious organisational problems for us. If it is possible to re-do the experience, as I 
hope it will be, it will have to be done completely differently. This was an experimental measure, and 
as such many situations were not taken into account.”  (LZ LPD). 
If it was possible for an innovative measure to cause organisational problems, perhaps it 
was thus possible to learn more from other past experiences implemented at national and 
regional level of which, at least from the interviews conducted, the technical experts and 
political staff charged with the measure had no knowledge. Moreover, though it was not 
possible to think that the administration could undergo a complex policy learning process, 
it was, however, possible to imagine that the selection process would have caused serious 
problems for the job centres, which were already struggling to cope with the tasks they 
had originally been set up for, and that the tender procedure would have made 
implementation times much longer. The fact of the matter was that the provinces took too 
much time drawing up the initial provisional rankings; after these were published, some 
citizens who had been excluded filed complaints and the documentation had to be re-
checked before the final rankings could be issued. Depending on the area, the final 
rankings were completed at different times: in certain areas, particularly the province of 
Rome, the final rankings were available “only” nine months after the term for the 
collecting of applications, i.e., March 2010. In other areas, like those of Frosinone or Rieti, 
the process took even longer and final rankings weren’t ready until September 2010. 
Payment of MI was also effectively issued at different times depending on the area, but in 
any case, even in the most efficient areas, payment wasn’t received until at least one year 
after the application was collected. Paradoxically, some payments weren’t made until after 
the measure had been eliminated, and some beneficiaries received payment given their 
condition as citizens in need which had been certified almost two years earlier in the 2008 
fiscal year.  
The region had anticipated receiving around 50/60,000 applications (Gobetti, 2012) when, 
in fact, the number was closer to 110.000, of which 70.000 were declared admissible. In the 
end, given the resources set aside for the first year of the pilot, only 10.000 applications 
were accepted, i.e., roughly 14.3% of those entitled and 0.17% of the population in Lazio.  
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The high number of applications certainly exacerbated the burden of the administration, 
but the selection process via tender procedure and the fact that the job centres received no 
training and/or additional staff or had any computerised tools at their disposal to complete 
the task, undoubtedly contributed to increasing the workload for the job centres and 
worsening the long wait times for beneficiaries.     
Moreover, under pressure from exasperated citizens and in an effort to make up for the 
lengthy delays, the administration decided to pay the amounts out in fewer instalments, in 
some cases in only two, instead of in 12 monthly payments (LZ SPD). This decision also 
drew a lot of criticism and went completely against the logic of a Mis. In so doing, support 
was not provided to individuals during times of need, but ended up being a one-off 
payment to meet a situation of crisis, which, incidentally, had been declared two years 
earlier.   
As it was easy to foresee given the structure of the law, once the beneficiaries had been 
informed that they had a right to financial support, their contact with the administration 
was strictly limited to collecting the cheque every month from the post office. Once they 
had received the letter informing them that they had a right to GMI for 12 months, the 
beneficiaries had no further contact with the job centres or the social services of the 
municipality, which, as already mentioned, had no role in the governance of the measure. 
This procedure led to paradoxical results. In the event that the beneficiary did not appear, 
the administration put the monthly cheque back into circulation every month. So, in 2013, 
an official of the region was still putting into circulation every month an uncollected 
cheque. Even more absurd was the fact that the cheque could be collected four years after 
the individual’s situation of need had been certified, regardless of his/her current 
condition (LZ SPD). 
Unfortunately, not much information is available on the results of the pilot. Partly on 
account of the new political situation (see the section below), the monitoring activity never 
actually took place, despite it having been envisioned in the law. Unlike as for other 
regional pilot projects, we, therefore, do not know the characteristics of the recipients of 
the measure or anything about the impact Lazio’s GMI scheme had on their living 
conditions. The change of government majority in May 2010 drastically shifted the region’s 
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interest on the measure. Except for a minor department created ad hoc and staffed less and 
less over time, no one in Lazio saw to the implementation of the GMI scheme. If 
implementation was weak, any monitoring and/or assessment activities were completely 
absent, to the extent that there are no data on which to base the effects (whether negative 
or positive) of the GMI measure on recipients. However, a very small rate of coverage, 
lengthy delays, a wide time lapse between certification and payment, and an almost total 
absence of complementary measures aimed at improving the living conditions of 
recipients were all factors that drastically limited the ability of the measure to be 
something more than simply a one-off cheque handed over to a part of the population who 
was left to bear the brunt of the social and economic crisis.     
 
4.5 Policy reversal and the resilience of the traditional model in Lazio  
The GMI scheme in Lazio was officially introduced with the enactment of Law no 4 of 2 
March 2009. In the following months, on the one side, the Regional Minister of Labour, in 
conjunction with the social partners and the Province, issued an implementing regulation. 
On the other side, the Regional Government signed an Anti-Crisis Agreement with CGIL, 
CISL and UIL establishing a series of expansionary measures, so that the budgetary 
manoeuvre of August of 2009 increased the resources allocated to GMI from 40 to 135 
million in the three-year period from 2009 to 2011 and earmarking a budget of 60 million 
euros for 2011. GMI was one of the defining features of the actions of the Marrazzo 
government’s response to the economic crisis, and, more specifically, the Regional Minister 
of Labour Tibaldi proudly claimed responsibility for the introduction of an innovative 
income support measure at a time of dramatic social crisis.   
The political scene in Lazio was, however, poised for a drastic change in the first months of 
the implementation of the GMI. Only a few months after the measure was introduced, 
Regional Governor Marrazzo was caught up in a private scandal and forced to step down, 
triggering the early end of the centre-left legislature in Lazio. A subdued election 
campaign came in the months that followed, with the centre-left on the defensive as a 
result of the Marrazzo scandal. The issue of GMI inevitably took a back seat. During the 
campaign, left coalition candidate Emma Bonino reiterated that the introduction of this 
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law should be considered as one of the main merits of the centre-left in the last five years 
and that the coalition intended to keep the regional safety net alive, defining it a “one-of-a-
kind measure in Italy that must be refinanced.”113 In Bonino’s presidential electoral 
programme, Mi was defined as a “qualifying element of the commitment undertaken by the 
previous centre-left government, which should be further strengthened,” though with changes 
given that “income support measures must also be coupled with re-employment services for 
recipients and conditional on these latter’s willingness to accept an appropriate job or professional 
training programmes.” 
Contrary to what took place in Friuli Venezia Giulia, the issue of GMI was not used by 
centre-right candidate Renata Polverini of Alleanza Nazionale to criticise the previous 
government. It was not included in the electoral programme and no mention was made of 
a possible refinancing of the measure. In Polverini’s programme, in addition to 
maintaining that “the family must be at the centre of social policies,” in regard to anti-poverty 
policies, she held that it was necessary to introduce “a net against fragility” by building a 
system able to transversally connect social services, but there was no mention of income 
support and/or anti-poverty instruments.  
The victory of the centre-right coalition in March 2010 opened up a new phase in Lazio’s 
regional policies. While the policies during the final phase of the Marrazzo government 
were expansive in nature, thanks in part to an agreement with the social partners, the first 
years of the Polverini government introduced restrictive budgetary policies. As a result of 
the Stability Pact and a partial tightening of out-of-control healthcare spending, in 2011 
and 2012, the region’s revenue was, for the first time, higher than its expenditure (ISSiRFA, 
2012). GMI, which accounted for 0.26% of the region’s budget, was one of the first 
measures that the Polverini government eliminated.  
The manner in which this took place was different to that in Friuli Venezia Giulia, where 
the Lega Nord party and the regional media pushed to repeal the law. In Lazio, beyond 
Regional Minister Zezza’s statement that “income should be guaranteed by work, and not by 
                                                          
113 La Repubblica of 22 February 2010, Bonino e i costi della politica "Taglierò autoblu e 
portaborse" (Bonino and the costs of government “I’ll cut official cars and bag-carriers“). 
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public institutions”114, the government majority did not openly oppose last resort safety net, 
nor did it repeal the law. Instead, in the first Budget Law passed by the Polverini 
government, the roughly 60 million euros set aside by the previous government were 
redirected to other priorities. Formally, Law no 4 of 2009 remained in force, but without 
funds the tender procedures for 2011 and the following years were no longer realised. In 
this way, the Polverini government avoided the difficulty of having to pass through the 
Regional Council to get the law repealed. The decision was strongly political and had very 
little to do with any evaluations on the actual realisation and implementation of GMI, of 
which very little was known up to that point, also because in some areas it was just being 
implemented, while in others it was not yet assigned. Furthermore, the region’s technical 
and administrative staff had not been consulted115 (LZ SPD).  
The government’s decision not to re-finance the GMI measure was in line with its aim to 
contain public spending and adopt a series of restrictive policies, which concerned 
especially the area of healthcare. Despite this, the policy decision cannot be based solely on 
the need to reduce spending in social assistance policies. In the first year of government 
the Social Policies and Family Regional Government Departments launched the first 
regional family plan (Primo Piano Famiglia) funded with 60 million euros. The plan 
introduced a baby bonus116, early childhood services, and an innovative tagesmutter (day 
mother) service. In terms of anti-poverty policies, the newly-instituted government 
abandoned the notion of a public income support system and instead strengthened its 
relations with the third sector, particularly Catholic and religious organisations. A few 
months into the new government’s term, it entered into a memorandum of understanding 
with Comunità di Sant’Egidio for the creation of a “Regional Pilot Observatory for the 
Study and Development of Anti-Poverty and Anti-Social Exclusion Policies.” 
Subsequently, the first Budget Law signed by the Polverini government invested a portion 
of the funds originally earmarked for GMI, equal to 10 million euros, into the so-called 
Piano contro la Povertà (Anti-Poverty Plan). Rather than pursuing strategic objectives, the 
                                                          
114 Declaration reported on the website www.adnkronos.it, on 8 December 2011, found at: 
http://www1.adnkronos.com/IGN/ext/printNews.php?cat=Politiche&sec=Lavoro&loid=3.1.137377
8457 
115 The administration would have been in favour of eliminating or overhauling the law (LZ LPD). 
116 A monthly cheque of 500 euros for all children born and/or adopted in 2011 into families with 
an ISEE annual income less than 20,000 euros.   
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plan made available lines of financing to third sector organisations providing social 
assistance. The agreement was concluded with 18 different Catholic non-profit 
organisations117 and sought to finance a range of services (day centres, night care, food 
assistance provided through an agreement with Banco Alimentare and Emporio della 
Solidarietà, and canteens) offered to certain categories at risk of poverty and social 
exclusion (non-self-sufficient elderly people, youth in distress, mothers with young 
children). It is worthy to note that the unveiling of the anti-poverty plan was attended by 
the director of the diocesan branch of Caritas in Rome, who had offered little support to 
the introduction of GMI when it was decided not to re-finance the measure and who now 
was at Polverini’s side for the launch of the anti-poverty plan118. As reported by the local 
and national media, during the presentation, which was also attended by the Regional 
Minister of Social Policies, the director of the diocesan branch of Caritas in Rome had this 
to say: “On behalf of those in need and who will benefit from the plan, I thank you. It is my hope 
that a roundtable can come from this that goes beyond and see what is happening in our region and 
in our city.”   
The Polverini government took steps to reduce public spending, especially in regard to 
Lazio’s hypertrophic healthcare system, but in the anti-poverty sector the government’s 
action included eliminating GMI and limiting its involvement in favour of third-sector 
organisations. This approach was criticised (unsuccessfully) by the Regional Council 
opposition. After the new Regional Government’s enactment of the first Budget Law, the 
centre-left Regional Council wasted no time in condemning the non-refinancing of the 
measure. Especially significant were the remarks of Sinistra e Libertà Councillors Luigi 
Nieri and Filiberto Zaratti: “Important welfare resources and support to the most vulnerable 
social groups have been eliminated and at the same time seemingly unlimited appropriations are 
                                                          
117 Specifically: Caritas, Centro Astalli, Centro Don Orione, Comunita' di Sant'Egidio, Fondazione 
Don Luigi Di Liegro, Centro Elis, Capodarco, Opera Don Calabria, Opera Don Guanella, Don Bosco, 
Centro italiano Opere Femminili Salesiane Lazio, Acse, Unitalsi, Frati Minori Onlus, Casa dei Diritti 
Sociali, Acli, Agop onlus and Associazione Salvamamme.  
118 See Secolo d’Italia of 28 December 2011, Lazio, dalle parole ai fatti: 10 milioni per il “Piano 
povertà” (Lazio puts its money where its mouth is: 10 million for the “Poverty Plan”). 
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handed out to the municipalities without any logical programming. The worst decision is without a 
doubt that of cancelling the guaranteed minimum income.”119 
In addition to the political parties, the social movements that had mobilised to introduce 
GMI went up in arms with equal intensity when the measure was not re-financed, but 
with a very different outcome. On 25 November 2010, during the discussion of the new 
Budget Law and the elimination of GMI, some social movements reacted with strong 
waves of opposition and came together to create “United Anti-Crisis Movements” 
(“Movimenti uniti contro la crisi”) and even occupied the roof of the headquarters of the 
Lazio Regional Council. As reported in Il Messaggero, the mobilisation had the objective of 
scoring a meeting with President Polverini to “discuss various social issues, such as living, 
waste and the question of guaranteed minimum income funds.”120 Sandro Gobetti effectively 
describes the little luck the mobilisation efforts had:  
One of the first things that President Polverini did was to completely de-finance the law and 
redirect the funds towards incentives for companies that were hiring. I don’t remember what the 
name was, l’Italia del fare, I think. At that point, the movements protested the issues of income, 
employment and housing and for 11-15 days occupied the Regional headquarters. There were 
moments of high tension, which only led Polverini to tell the occupiers to get down or they would 
hurt themselves. It was unbearably sad…and although the issue of income was always put on the 
table by the movements, the government turned a deaf ear. 
The social movements were not the only group taking action to defend Mis. CGIL, which 
had contributed to creating the measure, particularly when the methods for 
implementation were being defined, mobilised some of its organisation resources in an 
effort to counter the regional government’s decision. More specifically, a campaign 
entitled “Precarity does not pay, guaranteed minimum income does” worked to collect 
100,000 signatures in favour of the re-financing of Law no 4 of 2009. In addition to 
                                                          
119 La Repubblica, 26 December 2010, Regione, opposizione all'attacco tagliato il reddito minimo 
garantito (Region, opposition on the attack. Guaranteed minimum income cut). 
120 Il Messaggero, 7 December 2010, “Precari protestano sul tetto della Regione” (The precarious 
protest on the roof of the Region’s headquarters). On the re-financing of GMI as a request to open 
a dialogue with the movements, see also La Repubblica of 8 December 2010, I precari restano sul 
tetto della Regione (The precarious still on the roof of the Region’s headquarters).  
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signatures, protests were held against the measures approved by the Polverini government 
that included among their objectives the reinstatement of GMI121 (LZ CGIL).  
CGIL’s mobilisation efforts did not have any significant effect on the evolution of the 
income support policy in Lazio. Perhaps this was due in part to the fact that little support 
was offered by the other trade union confederations, which did not join in the signature 
collection campaign or the protests against the policies of the centre-right coalition.  
The position of CISL was, in fact, removed from that of CGIL. CISL was for the decision to 
abandon GMI, especially given that the social shock absorbers in derogation (CIG in 
deroga) were being extended, which was viewed as a sort of functional equivalent (LZ 
CISL). Without joint mobilisation efforts among the social actors, and with the centre-right 
coalition in favour of the traditional model, financing to Law 4 of 2009 effectively ended 
and the only ones to have benefitted from the measure remain the roughly 10,000 
individuals who filed their applications in September 2009. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
121 See also Repubblica of 31 March 2011, Sfida alla Polverini, Cgil in piazza "Impedisce ogni 
confronto" (Polverini challenged, CGIL demonstrates “She prevents any discussion”). 
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Chapter 7: 
Regional Minimum Income Schemes in Spain.  
The cases of the Community of Madrid and Castile and Léon. 
 
1. Introduction 
Historically, social assistance – intended both as last resort income protection for the needy 
and social services for the entire population – was one of the least developed social policy 
sector in Spain. Especially during the “modernization phase” of the Franco dictatorship, a 
late Bismarckian type of welfare state was developed, protecting the male breadwinners 
and their family from the main risks of an industrial society, and the task of sustaining 
those who were not able to access the labour market, be it for physical weakness – such as 
children, elderly people and disabled – or for the vagaries of life, was left to the family – 
especially to women unpaid work. 
After the transition to democracy, Spain has known profound social, economic and 
political transformations, which have deeply influenced this policy sector. Perhaps, one of 
the most relevant factor which has conditioned its development in Spain can be attributed 
to the importance of decentralisation (Moreno, 2001; Gallego, Gomà and Subirats, 2005). 
For this matter, the 1978 Constitution conceived the Autonomous Communities (ACs) as 
governmental level exerting major – and sometimes exclusive - responsibilities in many 
social policy areas, whereas the central state has withheld exclusive competence only in 
some policy areas set out in Article 149 – and in particular concerning the main bulk of 
social insurance provisions, including pensions and unemployment benefits. As for social 
assistance, the constitutional provision has established that it is a matter of “exclusive 
competence” of the regions, even though it does not define its specific role and function 
nor regulates the provisions that have to be guaranteed throughout the country. Moreover, 
the “flexibility” of the Spanish Constitution entailed that all the matters that were not 
expressly assigned to the central state by the Constitution could be requested and exerted 
by the ACs (Arriba and Moreno, 2005) 
259 
 
This process of devolving competences has been asymmetrical and complex, a result of an 
ongoing process of negotiation of political nature between state and regional government, 
and it has led to the attainment of different levels of power at different points in time for 
each Comunidad Autónoma (Gallego, Gomà and Subirats, 2005; Moreno, 2005).  
According to Arriba and Moreno (2005), this institutional configuration and the 
constitutional entitlement of the CA to exercise their political autonomy is at the basis of 
the introduction of the main institutional innovation in the social assistance realm in the 
last decades: the introduction of regional minimum income schemes. According to these 
authors indeed, the flexibility of the Constitutional provisions – coupled with the historic 
ethnoterritorial concurrence that characterizes Spanish territorial model (cfr. Moreno, 2001) – 
provides with positive incentives the regional government and it is ultimately responsible 
for the diffusion of regional Mis in Spain: since “no regions wanted to be left behind” (cfr. 
Arriba and Moreno, p. 150) policy innovation in one subnational unit – and namely, the 
Basque Country – was followed by institutional mimesis, the reaction of the other units and 
the introduction of innovative programs in the whole country. 
While agreeing that the particular institutional configuration of the social assistance sector 
contributes to explain path-departure and the introduction of means-tested benefits at the 
regional level in Spain, the specific preferences and choices of political actor are equally 
relevant to understand the policy evolution of this specific policy sector. It appears, 
therefore, useful to provide a detailed analysis of the policy trajectories of regional Mis in 
some specific Autonomous Communities, in order to qualify the distinct roles of the 
regional government and of political actors through time in this specific policy sector. 
With this aim, in this Chapter we follow the trajectories - from their introduction at the end 
of the 1980s until their differentiated response to the challenge posed by the Great 
Recession - of regional Mis in two specific Autonomous Communities, the Community of 
Madrid and Castile and Léon. This analysis will be conducted on two distinct levels: on 
the one hand we will describe the policy evolution of those regional measures, aiming at 
revealing the most relevant changes through time, their impact on the (poor) population 
and the most relevant strengths and weaknesses of those programs in providing an 
adequate protection against monetary poverty. On the other, we will observe the politics 
260 
 
of minimum income protection in this two regional cases, i.e. the preference of different 
social and political actors, their strategies, and their mode of interaction in the distinct 
regional social assistance arenas. 
The chapter is organised as follows. In the next paragraph, we describe the emergence of a 
national debate concerning poverty and social exclusion in Spain, and the failed attempt to 
introduce a national minimum income schemes. In the third paragraph, our attention 
shifts to the sub-national level, and in particular to the Community of Madrid. After a brief 
description of its socio-economic and political characteristics, we observe the dynamics 
that led to path-departure and to the introduction of the Ingreso Madrileño de Integración, 
and the subsequent evolution of this policy sector until the (weak) implementation of the 
new Renta mínima de inserción during the Great Recession. Whereas, in the following 
paragraph, we focus on Castile and Léon, describing the different social condition of this 
less economically developed region, and revealing the distinct dynamics that were 
responsible for the introduction of a particular measure, the Ingresos Mínimos de Inserción. 
Subsequently, we observe the gradual expansion of this measure and the abrupt 
institutionalisation of a right-based minimum income scheme in this CA: the Renta 
Garantizada de Ciudadanía, and its ability to – at least partially – respond to some of the 
challenges posed by the increase of poverty during the Great Recession. 
 
2. The Eighties and the multi-level politics of Mip in Spain. 
At the end of the 1980s in Spain, there has been the concrete possibility that a national 
fully-fledged minimum income scheme would be introduced: the prime minister Felipe 
Gonzalez discussed it with his ministers and with relevant party leaders and 
representatives of the social partners.  In this paragraph we deal with the dynamics which 
have led for a brief period of time minimum income protection to the centre of 
government political agenda. We will proceed in this analysis firstly because it is useful to 
understand actor constellation and their methods of interaction in this social policy area in 
Spain. Secondly, because it is impossible to explain the evolution of anti-poverty policies at 
sub-national level – which is the core research objective of this thesis – without 
understanding the national dynamics. The introduction of regional minimum income 
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schemes is in fact – in our reading – strictly correlated to changing relationship between 
the national government and social partners in the second part of the 1980s, so that it is 
impossible to explain the latter without citing the former. 
Some elements of contextual nature constitute the necessary background to understand 
policy development at the end of the 1980s in Spain. In this phase Spain seems to have 
finally left behind the economic crisis that strongly hit at the beginning of the decade, due 
primarily to the delayed effects of the oil crisis and a difficult attempt to move ahead 
towards a post-industrial economy. Those years were in fact characterised by an intense 
economic growth: the unemployment rate, which in 1985 reached 21,5%, was at 16% in 
1990, and the GDP grew on average of 5 percentage points yearly. Moreover, in this period 
the labour market became more flexible as a result of the liberalisation of fixed-term 
contract introduced by Felipe Gonzalez government in 1984.   
In this context, religious associations - and especially Caritas - contribute to draw attention 
onto the last resort safety net. More precisely, in the "Conference on Unemployment", held 
in Madrid from the 25th to 28th January 1986, Caritas Spain officially supported a measure 
called "social salary" which has many of the features that today are commonly associated 
with minimum income schemes (SP CRT; MDR EXP)122. The decision to support a non-
contributive income protection measure for the working age population was followed by 
an intense advocacy at national and local level. Caritas magazines dedicated much 
attention to minimum income protection in subsequent years123, and several high-level 
conferences were organised on this topic124. Alongside these advocacy efforts, research 
centres close to Caritas have had an important role in spreading information on poverty in 
                                                          
122See “Comunicado de Caritas” in Documentación Social, n. 62, 1986. 
123See in particular “Rentamínima y salario ciudadano” (1989), in La Acción social. Cuadernos 
de Formación, nº 12; “Lucha contro la pobreza y cambio social. Renta Minima Garantizada y 
Salario Ciudadanio” (1989) in La Acción social. Cuadernos de Formación, nº 13; 
“Rentamínima y salario ciudadano vol. 1” (October 1989), Dossier, Servicio de Documentaciòn 
de Caritas; “Rentamínima y salario ciudadano vol. 2” (Febrero 1990), Dossier, Servicio de 
Documentaciòn de Caritas. 
124Among these, of particular importance is the Conference “Renta Minima y 
SalarioCiudadanio” held in Madrid between 1 and 4 March 1990. Participated to this 
conference trade unions secretaries, representatives of the main national political parties, 
political and administrative personnel from the Autonomous Communities, and several 
policy experts. Records of this conference have been published in Documentacion Social, 
N. 78, EneroMarzo 1990. 
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Spain, underlining that neither the increase in social spending, nor economic growth, had 
eradicated absolute poverty in Spain. 
“The economic crisis led us into a blind spot that requires to make a decisive choice between a 
society characterized by the dichotomy employment – unemployment and a new type of society, 
where solidarity replace individualism, and where paid/productive work, an increasingly scarce 
commodity, does not constitute the main occupation of all citizens; a society in which everyone has 
the right to receive a social basic income ("salario social").Caritas is firmly committed to the 
construction of this new type of society for the future125”. 
The approval of the Revenù Minimum d’Insertionin France (1988) and the subsequent 
introduction of a similar measure in the Basque Country deeply affected the evolution of 
the “anti-poverty” debate in Spain. In the Basque Country, in fact, after the publication of a 
report on poverty in Euskadi126, the PNV PSOE coalition government introduced in 
September 1988 a "Plan Integral de Lucha against Pobreza en Euskadi" which, among other 
policy initiatives, introduced a regional last resort safety net in the Basque Country, 
initially called Ingreso Minimo Familiar. Also in the light of the contested relationship with 
Madrid127, the Basque initiative had a national relevance and prompted a harsh reaction by 
the central government. As a result, the minister of Social Affairs then, Matilde Fernandez, 
strongly opposed the Basque plan and claimed on national newspapers the risks connected 
with "giving fish rather than teaching to fish" (Aguilar, Gaviria and Laparra, 1995).  
Unlike the government, both major Spanish trade unions - CC. OO. and UGT – were 
positively impressed by the Basque initiative, and more generally considered positively 
the introduction of a minimum safety net that would help to "complete" the system of 
income protection in Spain. This was due to the fact that the theme of non-contributive 
income protection for the population of working age entered in the political agenda in a 
moment of huge transformation of the relationship between government and trade unions 
(see Chapter 4). The general strike of 1988, which was very successful and saw the 
participation of a considerable part of the Spanish workforce, represented a point of 
                                                          
125“Comunicado de Caritas” in Documentación Social, n. 62, 1986. 
126La pobreza en la C.A. Vasca (Avance). Gabinete de Apoyo a la Viceconsejeríade E. y B.S., 1987. 
127  A means tested benefit was already introduced some year before in Navarra (Laparra, 1990; 
Aguilar et al., 1995), without causing a national debate. 
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inflection to this regard. In the first place, because it led to the breakdown of the Socialist 
family (Gillespie, 1990) – i.e. the progressive detachment of the General Union of Workers 
(UGT) with the Spanish Socialist Worker’s Party – and to the creation of a common front 
and a unity of intent between the socialist (UGT) and the communist (CC.OO.) trade 
union. Secondly, because from this moment trade unions departed from the logic of 
political exchange that had characterised the social pacts of the early 80s, denouncing that 
for workers the costs of wage restraint outweighed the benefits gained from an insufficient 
- at least from their point of view - increase in social spending (Molina, 2011). This shared 
reading of the concertation process of the previous decade, led to a change in trade unions 
strategy, a decision backed up by the great success of the mobilisation of 14 December. 
From this moment onwards, indeed, social partners are no longer prone to discuss issues 
related to social policies in all-inclusive social pacts as part of an exchange policy ensuring 
wage moderation, but are rather interested in smaller-scale specific agreements, with the 
aim of improving social protection, especially in the non-contributory field (Molina, 2011). 
Against this background, the introduction of a last-resort safety net became one of trade 
union’s request to the government. In the Propuesta Sindical Prioritaria (Union Priorities 
Proposals, PSP), signed on October 1989 and addressed to the national government and to 
all the Autonomous Communities, CC.OO. and UGT proposed, among other proposals in 
the field of unemployment, pension and health policies, the introduction of a 
comprehensive minimum income for all the individuals with an income below a 
predetermined threshold financed through general taxation. According to the trade 
unions, this measure should have been introduced at national level, even though it was 
provided with the possibility for the ACs to introduce improving amendments within 
their region. Furthermore, the introduction of parastatal bodies was requested, including 
trade union representatives that should guarantee a correct implementation of the 
measure. The great success of the general strike forced the government of Felipe Gonzalez 
to open negotiations with the trade unions, followed by the introduction of expansionary 
interventions, especially in the field of non-contributory pensions and disability benefits 
(Molina, 2011). As for the minimum income, however, the government maintained a rigid 
position and opposed the introduction of a national anti-poverty measure (SP CRT; SP 
SPM; MDR EXP). Partially, this was due to the fact that the Social policy minister openly 
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criticised the measure (introduced in the Basque Country), and within the government 
existed strong opinions against social assistance benefits, considered as a route towards 
welfare dependency (SP CRT and MDR EXP).  For this reason, it was preferred to develop 
the non-contributory protection only for those individuals unable to work, i.e. the elderly 
and the disabled, whereas for those potentially fit to work, the government intention was 
to enhance social services. So the “Informe sobre differentes prestaciones Sociales en la C.E.E. Y 
en Espana – Rentas de Insercion”  (Report on different social benefits in the C.E.E. and in 
Spain – Minimum insertion income) drafted by the Ministry of Social Affairs, concluded 
stressing "the risk that a direct provision by the Central government generates a new form of 
income without perspective or real commitment to social transformation", while the goal of the 
socialist government must be to "fight the cause and not the effect” by “creating a network of 
social services”. Furthermore, the government had some concerns about the 
constitutionality of a national intervention: it was actually feared a possible institutional 
conflict, especially with the Autonomous Communities that had already introduced 
specific anti-poverty measures (as in the Basque Country) or had expressed their intention 
to introduce them (Catalonia) (Interview SP SPM). 
As a consequence of those considerations, the central government preferred not to 
introduce a national Mis. At the same time – as it will be shown in the next paragraphs – 
not only some autonomous communities in the North had already introduced the first 
regional interventions, but some regional governments appeared more interested to 
negotiate last resort safety nets. It was thus natural for trade unions, with the more or less 
explicit consent of the national government, to address their demands to the regional level. 
As the former minister Matilde Fernández recalled in an interview:  
"There was a moment in which Nicolas Redondo, the secretary of UGT, told me: "Well, what we do 
not get here, we will make you look ridiculous because we are going to obtain it with your people 
locally." The negotiation over the social salary (Mis) was a moment of rupture, indeed"128. 
The opposition of the national government forced trade unions to negotiate the 
introduction directly with the Autonomous Communities. From this moment onwards, it 
                                                          
128 Interview realized by Pr. Ana Arriba González de Durana on September 25 1997. Published here 
by courtesy of the author. Own translation. 
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is at this level that we have to shift our attention if we want to study minimum income 
protection in Spain. 
3. Regional Mis in Spain: the case of the Community of Madrid 
3.1 Economy and labour market in the Community of Madrid in the Eighties 
Nowadays, the Autonomous Community of Madrid is one of the most dynamic economies 
in the entire European Union. Located in the geographical heart of Spain, this relatively 
small region is the third most populated Autonomous Community in Spain. Many of its 
inhabitants live in Madrid, the Spanish capital, the largest metropolitan area in the 
country, with a population of about 5 million people, a wide and diversified industrial 
production, and the largest service producers of the countries. Economic growth in the 
three decades before the Great Recession has been astonishing, and has made the 
Community of Madrid the leader of the Spanish economy - with a GDP per capita 
significantly above the national average and, since the mid-90s, higher than that of 
Catalonia – and has allowed it to rank amongst the small group of regions which have had 
the highest economic growth in the European Union. 
Figure 9 GDP pro capita in the Spanish Autonomous Community 1980,1990, 2000 (thousands of 
dollars). 
 
Source: Herrero, Soler e Villar, 2004 
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This period of steady economic growth has its starts in the 1980s, a decade of intense 
transformation for the Spanish economy and society, many of which have occurred with 
particular intensity in the Spanish capital and, as a consequence, in the entire Madrid 
region. In the early Eighties the Spanish economy was deeply affected by the negative 
effects of the protracted oil crisis, and it was entangled in a difficult process of industrial 
reconversion, with negative effects on economic growth and employment. From 1986 
onwards, this negative trend diverted: from 1986 to 1992 GDP saw an overall increase of 
33.5 percentage points, the most significant increase in the whole of Spain (Fig. 9). 
Unemployment rate, which at its peak during the crisis reached 21.1%, was 11.3% in 1990, 
five points lower than the national average. This unemployment depletion in such a short 
period of time is impressive, especially if we consider that in this period the active 
population in the labour market increased in absolute terms, as a result of the strong and 
impressive female entrance in the labour market and of the baby-boom generation. It has 
been actually calculated that in Spain at the end of the Eighties around 1 million female 
workers entered for the first time the official labour market (Delgado, 2009). In the Madrid 
Community, women shifted from representing 27% of the employed workforce in 1981 to 
33,5 in 1990 (Community of Madrid, 1992). 
In this period, the occupational structure of the AC changed dramatically, taking the shape 
and features that have characterised it up to these days. The primary sector is virtually 
non-existent, since less than 1% of the population is occupied in the agricultural sector. 
More relevant is industry, since 27,3% of the population is employed either in industry or 
in the building sector, even though the largest share (around 70%) of workers in Madrid 
are employed in the service sector. Among these, 14% is represented by public employees, 
a feature not surprising, considering the presence of the capital of Spain in this region 
(Community of Madrid, 1992, p.121). In this decade, along with a prevalently post-
industrial economy, the labour market in the Community of Madrid saw another 
transformation which would have long-lasting consequences: the growth of the so-called 
atypical workers, following the liberalisation of fixed terms contract passed by Felipe 
Gonzalez reform in 1984. According to the statistics of the Community of Madrid (1992), 
17,2% of the resident workers had a fixed term contract in 1990. 
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In a period of economic and employment growth, growing incidence of atypical 
employment does not constitute the only social problem: unemployment rates remained, 
as a matter of fact, rather high (around 11.6% in 1991), particularly among women (17.6%). 
Moreover, in this period became clear that a significant part of the population was not 
benefiting from economic growth: this phenomenon, already observed in the previous 
decade in many European countries, is particularly seen in metropolitan areas 
(Rosanvallon, 1995). Long term unemployment reached 7% in 1990, a higher incidence 
compared to 1980 (4,6), starting to represent a new and worrying problem not only in 
Madrid, but in the whole country. Poverty – despite being lower than national average 
both in relative and in absolute terms (Caritas, 1994) – is nevertheless widespread, mainly 
in the Capital. A report published by Caritas (1989) revealed that in the city of Madrid 
more than 90 thousand families were coping with increasing difficulties in order to 
maintain decent living standards, i.e with insufficient resources to meet food, clothing and 
housing needs. 
At the end of the 1980s the Madrid Community was therefore one of the richest region in 
Spain, which was experiencing a period of strong economic and employment growth, but 
it also accounted for some relevant signs of social distress, such as the growing 
significance of long-term unemployment and extreme poverty, especially in the suburbs. 
 
3.2 Party politics in the Madrid Community 
At the end of the Eighties the political system in the Community of Madrid was 
characterized by the presence of four parties: the PP, a political formation resulted from 
the gradual annexation of the smaller parties that made up the fragmented Spanish centre-
right; a centrist party founded by the protagonist of the Spanish transition, Adolfo Suarez, 
called the CDS; the PSOE and IU, a coalition of parties that placed themselves at the left of 
the PSOE. Reproducing the political dynamics at national level, since 1983 the government 
of the Autonomous Community of Madrid was in the hands of the PSOE, under the 
leadership of Joaquin Leguina (Tab. 12). The electoral victory of 1983 was reiterated only 
partially in the elections of 1987, when the PSOE obtained only the relative majority with 
39.1% of the votes. 
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Tab. 12: Electoral Results in the Community of Madrid, Years 1983, 1987, 1991. 
Parties Number of Seats % of votes Government Coalition 
 
 8 May 1983 
PSOE 51 50,7  
1983 – 1987 PSOE 
 
FAP 34 34,3 
PCE 9 8,9 
CDS 0 3,1 
    
 2 July 1987 
PSOE 40 41,6  
1987 – 1990 PSOE FAP 32 33,3 
CDS 17 17,7 
IU 7 7,3 
 
26 May 1991 
PP 47 46,5  
1991 – 1995 PSOE IU PSOE 41 40,5 
IU 13 12,8 
Source: Community of Madrid 
The formation of a second Leguina government was made possible by a legislative pact 
and the resulting external support of the centrist party CDS. This support did not however 
persist throughout all the legislature: the specific dynamics of the regional legislature, 
coupled with a change in strategy of the national CDS in the upcoming national elections, 
led to a withdrawal of external support and a motion of no confidence to the Asemblea de 
Madrid by the joint members of the PP and the CDS129, in the spring of 1989. Despite the 
motion was rejected - with a very narrow majority – from this time on the socialist 
government of the Community of Madrid was weaker and dependent on the external 
                                                          
129On 22 July 1989 only the unanimous support of the parliamentary members of the PSOE and IU - 
as well as the controversial abstention Nicolas Pineiro, elected with the Popular Party and passed 
to the Mixed Group in this occasion - allowed the center left majority to reject the no-confidence 
motion filed by the center-right, with only one vote more than the opposition. 
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support of IU. In the following regional elections in the spring of 1991, for the first time the 
Popular Party obtained the majority of votes, although an explicit agreement between the 
PSOE and IU allowed president Leguina to form his third (and last) government of the 
Community of Madrid. 
The first three terms in the community of Madrid were therefore characterized by 
governments supported by the PSOE. In this apparent continuity, it is nonetheless possible 
to observe three distinct phases. The first government was actually made up by an 
absolute majority of the PSOE, which faced opposition from the two extreme wings, the 
Communist Party and People's Alliance. The second Socialist government was externally 
supported by the centrist party, the CDS. Finally, in the third phase, the socialist 
government of Leguina depended on the external support of the United Left party. At 
first, from the spring of 1989 until the end of the second legislature, without a formal 
governmental agreement of the parties in power, IU voted in favour of the government to 
ensure its survival. In 1991 a formal agreement between the PSOE and IU allowed the 
formation of a new government Leguina, with a narrow majority over the main opposition 
party, the PP, now the leading player in the centre-right not only in Madrid but, more 
generally, in Spain. 
 
3.3The introduction of the first regional Mis: the policy making process in Madrid 
Also in the Community of Madrid, the issue of poverty and social exclusion reached the 
front pages of newspapers130 and influenced the political debate, after a report signed by 
EDIF Caritas. The alarming figures reported, indicating that in the community of Madrid 
about 90 thousand families lived in extreme poverty, led the IU spokesman at the Asemblea 
de Madrid to demand a parliamentary questioning to the Councillor for Social Policy on the 
initiatives in the region in order to tackle spreading poverty. In a passage of the 
parliamentary intervention was mentioned as a positive model the recent adoption in 
                                                          
130 As an example, see El Pais 7 October 1988: “90.000 families from Madrid cannot meet their 
basic needs”. Author translation 
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France of the Revenu Minimum d'Insertion, a measure that Izquierda Unida proposed to 
introduce at national level131.   
While agreeing with the general principle that “it is the responsibility of the Community of 
Madrid to introduce progressive policies of wealth (re)distribution”, Councillor Elena Vazquez 
announced that future government initiatives will be limited to further investigate the 
incidence of poverty in the Community of Madrid. In a national context in which the 
Basque Government announced its intention to introduce a plan to fight poverty and the 
national government sharply criticized the initiative (see above), the Councillor’s 
statements seem to indicate that, although there were no preliminary rulings within the 
government against a regional intervention of income support for individuals in condition 
of economic difficulties initiatives of this type were not currently planned. Rather, the 
initiatives of the Social Policy Councillor were directed towards strengthening the social 
services regional system, while at the same time carrying out various studies on possible 
measures to tackle social exclusion, at the beginning mainly directed to support single 
mothers in situations of social marginalisation (Arriba, 1999; MDR DSS). 
In the following months, however, substantial changes influenced the politics of minimum 
income scheme in Spain. In fact, the introduction of a fully-fledged non-contributive Mis 
was officially included in the bargaining platform of Spanish trade unions. As we have 
seen in the previous paragraph, although not yet formalised in a concrete policy proposal, 
demand for a universal means-tested benefit represented one of the claims of the general 
strike of 14 D, reiterated in numerous formal and informal occasions in the first half of 
1989. As an example, in April 1989 the Federal Commission of the UGT approved a 
resolution which required the introduction of a minimum income scheme and the creation 
of National Plan Against Poverty. 
Trade unions support towards this measure changed the attitude of the regional 
government. Only a few months after the parliamentary hearing, on May 2, 1989, from the 
stage of the celebration of the "Day of the Community of Madrid", the Regional Minister 
Elena Vazquez announced the intent of the Madrid government to introduce a regional 
safety net similar to the measure introduced in the Basque Country. 
                                                          
131Asemblea de Madrid, Diario de Sesiones, 18October 1988 
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When the announcement was made, neither feasibility study nor concrete draft policy had 
been prepared by the Social Policy Department (MDR DSS), and it would take several 
months for the formation of a team within the administration responsible for the design 
and subsequent implementation of this measure. The announcement of the councillor, 
which gained prominence in the front pages of national newspapers, needs to be inserted 
into the national and regional political context: it was a message to the trade unions that 
showed the will of the regional government to negotiate this type of measure, despite the 
opposition of the national government. For that matter, the regional president Leguina had 
already spent harsh words against the "breaking of the socialist family" (Gillespie, 1990) 
and the strategy of confrontation from the part of national government after the strike on 
14 December. In an interview with El Pais March 9, 1989132 he criticised the inability of the 
PSOE and UGT to reach an agreement, which he believed would be useful and natural for 
both organizations. 
Besides some general considerations regarding the importance to maintain the historical 
linkages between the UGT and the Socialist Party, some specific political dynamics allow 
to explain why for President Leguina was vital to begin a process of social concertation in 
this precise historical moment. The spring of 1989 was a moment of weakness for the 
second government of Joaquin Leguina, which, since he did not get the absolute majority 
in the 1987 election, was able to rule only with the external support of the Centro 
Democratico y Social (CDS) (see tab. 12). This party, however, in March 1989 decided to 
withdraw support to the government Leguina and to support a no-confidence motion 
presented by the Popular Party. For the government therefore it became absolutely 
necessary not only to have a compact support from its party, but also to have ensured the 
support of Izquierda Unida. A rapprochement with the trade unions was therefore crucial 
in this particular moment to ensure legitimacy and stability of the socialist government in 
the Madrid community. 
The introduction of regional Mis became therefore strategically relevant to reach an 
agreement with the trade unions and to find an agreement with IU – a party traditionally 
in favour of the introduction of a safety net (Maravall, 1990) and, more in general, of social 
                                                          
132 El Pais, 9 March 1989 “Leguina: I do not understand why PSOE and UGT have decided to suicide 
themselves” 
272 
 
dialogue. In this perspective, the decision to announce the intent to introduce a Mis in May 
1989 responded to the need of the President Leguina to open a dialogue with the social 
partners which fitted well with the desire of Councillor Elena Vazquez to introduce an 
innovative anti-poverty programme (MDR DSS; SP CRT; MDR EXP). 
In the months following the statement of the councillor, the social policy department 
realised the first feasibility studies concerning a regional minimum income scheme. Given 
the innovative nature of these measures in the Spanish context, the measures introduced in 
France and the Basque Country were regarded as the benchmark by the administration, 
that even organized meetings with the technicians of the French Ministry to study whether 
it was possible to introduce a similar measure (Arriba, 1999). Particularly interested in 
those policy developments was Caritas Spain, which in late 1989 created the first report on 
the “Social Salary in the Autonomous Communities”, analysing the evolution and the 
legislative proposals made in this period, not only in Madrid but also in Cataluña, 
Cantabria and in Asturias: in this report, it is reiterated the strong support from this 
organization to the introduction of a safety net, even if introduced at sub national level 
(Caritas, 1989). 
The period of consideration about whether or not to introduce a minimum income did not 
only concern the parties within the majority and the administration, but also the Popular 
Party which, while having some doubts about financial sustainability, posed no objection 
in principle to the introduction of an anti-poverty measure (MDR SW; see also El Pais, 2 
May 1989). 
In the winter of 1989 from the period of consideration and research in the Madrid 
Community we shift to the phase of policy choices. A fundamental impulse to this process 
was given by the official launch of the PSP by the Spanish trade unions. The 20 proposals 
that made up the common bargaining platform of the CCOO and UGT, including the 
guaranteed minimum income (or social wage, as it was called at the time) were officially 
delivered to the central government and the governments of the autonomous communities 
on Oct. 5, 1989. 
The Community of Madrid is the first autonomous community governed by the Socialist 
Party since the general strike of 1988 in which begins a process of social concertation. This 
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process concerned many different issues of regional policy, from regional transport to 
education and housing policies, moving to social inclusion policies. However, it was the 
latter topic especially which was regarded as key issue by the trade unions, which 
considered the introduction of a minimum income scheme as a turning point to open the 
negotiations with the regional government (MDR CCOO)133. In a policy environment 
which looking with interest at the introduction of innovative measures against poverty 
and social exclusion, trade unions requests generated a dramatic change in the regional 
administration, as explained by a manager of the then Department of social integration: 
"The then Councillor Elena Vazquez was interested in new policy initiatives: among us, in the 
department, we discussed frequently new needs and new social initiatives. But the key moment, in 
which the desire of the councillor took concrete form, is the concertation with the social partners in 
1989, when the most representative unions put on top of the table, as a fundamental point of this 
negotiation, the realization of what they called at that time "social wage". This is the moment when 
we start to work seriously on the issue: before there had been a mere declaration of intent. When the 
theme appears in the concertation with the trade union, there was already here an environment, an 
interest I would say, to do something in this direction. (...). But I think that the trade unions played 
a key role; they support this initiative and ensured that the entire government support it; because 
one thing is the idea of a Councilor, and another are the collective decisions of a government, and 
especially of the President of the government.”   (MDR DSS) 
The impact of the trade unions for the introduction and design of the policy was also 
acknowledged by the President Leguina, who in a parliamentary hearing in November 
1989 declared:  
"We will bring to the attention of this House the introduction of a minimum insertion income, but 
before discussing it here, I think it is fair to talk and negotiate it with the social partners, and 
especially with the trade unions, which have requested for some time the introduction of this type of 
benefit”134. 
The negotiation process was rather brief, but there were some conflicts between the 
government and social partners. Firstly, because trade unions and the regional 
                                                          
133 See also El Pais (25/11 and 21/12 1989). 
134 Diario de Sesiones de l’Asemblea de Madrid, n. 552, II Legislatura, 22 November 1989. 
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administration had a different vision of the minimum income protection. In particular, 
with respect to government plans, trade unions demanded a higher basic amount and the 
introduction of Commissions monitoring the effective implementation of the measure, 
composed also of trade unions members. But the greater problem was to overcome a 
political obstacle: it was indeed problematic, for the regional socialist government, to 
introduce a measure in blatant contrast with a national socialist government. 
In this phase, trade union made clear not only to government members but also to the 
public opinion that, without the introduction of a minimum income scheme there would 
be no agreement. The 21st December 1989 the regional leader of the UGT declared at El Pais 
that the minimum income was the only divergent point with the administration, but it was 
sufficient to break up the negotiation. 
"We are also willing to give up 2,000 pesetas (i.e. to decrease our demands about the generosity of 
the benefit) but either Friday is approved the minimum income scheme or we do not have a pact" 
The day after the government and the trade union signed a social pact which included, 
among other things, the introduction of a regional Mis, called Ingreso Madrileno de 
Integracion, probably after a meeting between the national and the regional prime ministers 
in which the former authorised, at least informally, the regional social pact. This 
agreement was particularly important not only for its content, but also because, in the 
words of Secretary of CC.OO. in the Community of Madrid, "paves the way for the Proposta 
Sindacale Prioritaria”135: as we will see in more detail in the section on Castile and Leon, the 
social pact signed in Madrid was the first, and the model, of a series of social pacts which 
were introduced at the end of the Eighties among ACs governments and social partners, 
and which included the first regional Mis in Spain. 
The achievement of an agreement between trade unions and regional government allowed 
the beginning of the phase of designing and planning the measure. The strong political 
support towards the social safety net guaranteed, at least at this stage, a considerable effort 
by the administration to design a measure capable of responding to the needs of the 
people of Madrid and overcome the many obstacles that existed towards the successful 
                                                          
135El Pais, 23 Diciembre 1989“Leguina firma elprimeracuerdo social en Madrid con UGT y CC OO” 
(“Leguina signs the first social agreement with UGT and CCOO in Madrid”). 
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implementation of a complex measure which requires not only the ability to estimate a 
plausible income and to deliver in time the monetary support, but also the planning and 
organization of the social integration measures (MDR DSS). In January 1990 within the 
social integration department a new team of experts was formed which had to plan the 
new measure: this was made up by the three main managers of the Social Integration 
Department of the Community of Madrid, by three academic experts from the University 
of Pamplona136 - hired specifically for the implementation of this measure - and by two 
engineers who had the task of creating the IT system to have an effective selection 
procedure. As further evidence of the importance of the introduction of a minimum 
income scheme for the trade unions in this period, in addition to the staff recruited by the 
administration, the delegates of the CCOO and UGT took part in weekly meetings, 
working closely with the administration in the design of the regional safety net (MDR DSS, 
Arriba, 1999). 
The creation of this team, which stood outside of the traditional structure and hierarchy of 
the public administration (Arriba, 1999), was a quite extraordinary event, which showed 
the importance and the strong political legitimacy it had in the first phase of the 
introduction of a regional safety net. Over the following year the team thus formed 
defined the different component of the Madrid last resort safety net: the means-test, the 
selection procedures and the vertical coordination among municipalities and regional 
government, as well as the social integration programmes (see next paragraph). As for the 
policy-making process, once reached an agreement with the trade unions, the only 
conflicting moment arose in the discussion for the Budget Law of 1990. At this stage in 
fact, mainly for budgetary reasons, the government tried to reduce the financial 
commitment and delay the introduction of the measure the following year. On this 
occasion, IU threatened to dismiss the external support to the government if the 
agreements with the social partners were not completely respected (Arriba, 1999). The 
government was therefore obliged to accept IU requests, and in February 1990, the budget 
law provided with 400 million pesetas the introduction of an “Ingreso Madrileno de 
                                                          
136 These are Mario Gaviria, Miguel Laparra and Manuel Aguilar, academics from the Escuela di 
Trabajo Social de la Universidad de Pamplona, which had just finished the first academic study on 
regional last resort safety net, with a special focus on the Navarra case, named ELSalario Social 
Sudado (1990). 
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Integracion” (Madrid Integration Income, Imi). In the following months, the legislative 
process proceeded quite straightforwardly, and the 19th July 1990 the Decree 73/1990 was 
approved, introducing in the Madrid Community the first minimum income scheme. Also 
during the final Parliamentary discussion before the definitive approval of the measure, 
very few oppositions – if any -  arose from political parties against the introduction of a 
measure to tackle poverty and social exclusion. In particular, the main opposition party -  
the Popular Party - never openly opposed an anti-poverty intervention, at any stage of the 
political process, neither in Parliament nor in the newspapers. 
 
 3.4 The Madrid Integration Income 
The Ingreso Madrileno de Integracion (Madrid Integration Income, Imi) is a minimum income 
scheme, therefore it aims to provide financial support to all individuals with incomes 
below a certain threshold established by law and to provide a series of social and labor 
services aimed at overcoming this condition of need. Drawing on the principle of 
“selective universalism” (Ferrera, 2000), this measure represents a particularly innovative 
one in a Southern European perspective, characterised by a very limited development of 
means-tested benefit. In the meantime, perhaps also in the light of its innovative nature, 
the Madrid Integration Income has some weaknesses and shortcoming related to the 
majority of European Mis which are typical of these regional interventions in Spain at the 
beginning of the Nineties (see Chapter 2; Aguilar et al., 1995; Arriba and Moreno, 2005).  
Firstly, it is a measure to combat "extreme" poverty (Preamble Decree 73/1990), therefore 
very residual and directed exclusively to individuals in conditions of social marginality. 
Access requirements are numerous and restrictive in a European perspective, even though 
they are less strict of many other laws introduced in this period by the other Spanish ACs. 
The access to the IMI was limited to individuals aged between 25 and 64 years,137, living in 
Spain for at least a year138, with an income below the amount of monetary support, or 
below the amount of the social pension or the disability benefit (see below). Also the 
                                                          
137 However, there are specific exceptions for would be beneficiaries under 25 years in the 
presence of children. 
138 Until 1994, only applicant with the Spanish Nationality could access to the benefit. 
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means-test is particularly restrictive: all possible earnings are taken into consideration, 
including disability or other kind of benefit. As an example, also family benefits for 
disabled children were sufficient to be excluded from the Imi. At the same time, it is 
important to underline that the Community of Madrid was the only AC in which existed 
exemption and deductions for social benefits in favour of dependent members. As for 
patrimonial requirements, the Madrid law required to take into consideration all the 
movable assets or property which could produce actual returns, with the exception of the 
property used as the household residence. The estimate of income and assets was made 
taking as a reference period the month in which the application was produced, and not, as 
in many national and regional pilot scheme in Italy (Spano et al., 2013), taking as a 
reference period the year preceding the application. In order to reconcile the need to 
respond quickly to the needs and be effective in the income estimate, the introduction of 
the Imi was accompanied by the introduction of a new IT system which allowed to cross-
check data with the Spanish Social Security system. 
The main weakness of the Madrid Integration Income is that it cannot be associated with a 
“second generation” social assistance program (Kazepov, 2011), since it does not give rise 
to an automatically enforceable social right, but it maintains some of the discretionary 
elements that had historically characterised social assistance benefits in Spain (Laparra, 
Aguilar, Begoña Pérez Eransus, 2001). Actually, on this issue the Decree 73/1990 is rather 
ambiguous, since it does not introduce specific budgetary constraints, as in most of the 
decrees introduced in the early nineties in other autonomous communities, but neither 
establishes that the budget would be automatically extended if needs are higher than those 
foreseen at the time of the budget forecasts, as would be required to guarantee an 
individual subjective right. Given this ambiguity, rather than a legal analysis we refer here 
to empirical observation to suggest that there were constraints - implicit or explicit - that 
prevented access to the measure to all individuals living in poverty. 
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Tab. 13: Evolution of Imi beneficiaries and of household without any income, 1992 – 1999. 
YEAR HOUSEHOLD 
BENEFICIARIES 
HOUSEHOLD WITHOUT 
ANY INCOME 
1992 7.994 30.300 
1993 7.328 31.700 
1994 7.215 42.500 
1995 7.405 42.500 
1996 7.274 29.000 
1997 7.915 28.800 
1998 8.682 33.000 
1999 8.538 35.500 
Source: Laparra, Aguilar and BegonaPerez, 2001 
 
In particular, Table 13 highlights that the in the first eight years, the number of 
beneficiaries were well below the number of residents in the Community of Madrid that, 
according to the Encuesta de Poblacion Activa (INE), did not have any source of income and, 
therefore, should be eligible to an anti-poverty measure. Certainly the existence of very 
strict access requirements and of complex administrative procedures limited the number 
of eligible applications, besides discouraging, probably, many potential beneficiaries to 
apply. However, these data seem to confirm the hypothesis advanced in some interviews 
that the regional administration limited the number of beneficiaries to the budget available 
(MDR DSS; MDR SW). In particular, the fall in requests granted in the years between 1993 
and 1995 - a period in which the number of people without income increased by almost 
30% (Table 13) - seems an evidence fairly consistent of the existence of budgetary 
constraints. In the interviews emerged that it was common practice, particularly in the first 
years, to "frozen" practices when the resources provided for in the budget were 
extinguished until the following year, when with new resources it was possible to meet 
pending requests. Even though there is no clear evidence of those practices, certainly 
waiting times for access to the Imi were quite long, according to an evaluation by experts 
on average equal to four months (Aguilar et al., 2001). 
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Some peculiar requirements – introduced in the regulations following the issue of Decree 
73/1990 -  favoured the existence of discretionary practices (Ayala, 2001). As an example, 
the regulation introduced in 1992 allowed social workers to reject the application in case 
the applicant “does not have a profile that can be assimilated to the Madrid Insertion 
Income”139. This requisite, which stressed that in the intention of the administration only 
individuals furthest away from the labour market and with severe social problems should 
have access to the Imi, for its ambiguity allows a discretional use of the faculty to deny 
access to income protection140. 
The discretional nature of the Imi induced some authors to define this programme, rather 
than a minimum income scheme, a periodic economic benefit associated with social 
inclusion measures (Aguilar, Laparra and Begoña Pérez, 2001).More relevantly, the 
absence of an automatic subjective right made the coverage rate of the Imi – from 1990 
until 1999 on average equal to 0,5% of the resident household in the Community of Madrid 
- although superior to the Spanish average, still lower than the one of the Basque Country, 
Navarra and Galicia, where this right was guaranteed (Ayala, 2001). 
A strong concern for financial sustainability influenced the definition of benefit amount, 
which was quite low, especially if we consider its evolution through time. In fact, if at the 
moment of its introduction the amount was among the most generous in the Spanish ACs 
(Aguilar et al., 1995) - approximately 70% of the minimum wage in 1990 and distributed 
over fourteen months - over time this generosity was drastically reduced. So, Ayala (2001) 
calculates that in 1999 the basic amount was equal to 15,6% of the average salary, against a 
Spanish average of 26,7%, a revealing data particularly if we consider that in the 
Community of Madrid wages and cost of living were among the highest in the Iberian 
Peninsula. Moreover, the criteria used to determine the generosity were unclear in Madrid, 
since benefit amount is not clearly associated with the minimum wage as in other ACs141 
and in other European countries (Netherlands), nor it corresponds to an estimate of goods 
                                                          
139 Decree 21/1992. Author Translation. 
140 In this sense, also the condition to “use the benefit for its purpose”, present in many regional 
schemes in Spain, for its generality and vagueness seems to encourage discretion by the public 
administration. 
141 In Andalusia e Castilla La Mancha it was respectively equal to 62% and 60% of the minimum 
wage.In Asturias, in the Valencian Community and in Galicia in this phase the benefit amount is 
equal to the non contributive pension benefit. 
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necessary to conduct a decent life, as in France or Germany. Furthermore, in Madrid there 
is no automatic indexing of benefit generosity allowing to maintain the benefit in line with 
changes of the cost of living. The absence of clear criteria for determining the amount and / 
or mechanisms of automatic indexing, while allowing the administration to maintain a 
strong control on public expenditure, strongly undermines citizens’ minimum income 
protection. 
The Madrid Integration Income aims to connect the economic benefit with social and 
labour market services. Unlike other measures carried out in this period in Spain (see, for 
instance, the example of Castile and Leon presented below) it has been modelled on the 
most advanced experiences in this policy field realized in some European countries, such 
as France or Luxembourg. The legislation envisages, therefore, that access is conditional 
not only to meeting certain age, residence, income and assets requirements but also to 
signing a so-called integration contract with municipal social services (art. 3) within 45 
days from the granting (art. 14). 
The content of the integration contract can vary, and should be modulated on the 
characteristics of the household, but should in any case aim at promoting the individual, 
supporting him- when possible -in the search for a suitable job or for a vocational training 
aimed at professional reintegration in the labour market, in addition to ensuring the 
education and care of dependent children. In addition to these more general services, the 
contract may include an additional Integration Plan made in accordance with Ngo and 
third sector organizations (see below). 
Municipal social services have the task to plan and realize the social integration plans. 
According to the D. 73/1990- and subsequent decrees and regulations - local services 
collect application with all the necessary documentation, prepare a report on the 
household conditions, before drawing up the customised social integration plan in 
accordance with the recipients. To make this feasible, in the period following the adoption 
of the decree, there was a strong reinforcement of social services staff – social services 
expenditure tripled during the Nineties (Aguilar et al., 2001) - in particular in the first 
years of Imi development (MDR SW; MDR DSS). 
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In this very early phase, the Community of Madrid was undoubtedly among the 
autonomous communities more committed in the actual realization of the integration 
component of the last resort safety net. For this purpose, it also introduced a process of 
constant evaluation of the training and social inclusion projects (Aguilar et al., 2001). 
Thanks to this study, we know that besides the economic benefit, about 40% of the 
households received guidance and support, 38.9% participated in a training course, while 
about 30.4% participated in work experience placements. Precisely, access to employment 
was the main critical element identified by the beneficiaries: 45% complained of not having 
access to any job opportunities, 32.3% did not meet the employment agencies and about 20 
% did not participate in any form of job orientation. Besides the difficulties in creating 
effective routes to the job market, also due to a complete lack of coordination with the 
employment centres, we observe also relevant limits in the “general” take charge of 
beneficiaries in more serious condition of social marginalization: in just less than one out 
of three cases social workers were able to carry out intensive work with the beneficiaries. 
Besides the “integration pact” and the traditional work with the social services, Decree 
73/1990 contemplated the possibilities for the beneficiaries to access to the so-called “Social 
Inclusion Projects” – work placement programmes organized directly by the region and 
carried out in shared management with “third sector” associations. These were targeted 
especially to those beneficiaries considered more easily employable. Those projects were – 
in a comparative term – quite successful in term of employment integration: once finished, 
almost 23% of participants were able to find an employment in the official labour market, a 
rate in line with the best European experiences (Sacchi, 2016). The main limitation of 
"Social inclusion Projects" lies in the low number of courses activated through time. 
Although those increased significantly - if in 1993 only 19% of beneficiaries participated in 
those programs, in 2000 those percentages were more than doubled (44%) (Laparra, 
Aguilar e Begona Perez, 2001) – they remained well below the number of potential 
claimants (SP CRT; MDR SW). 
A final important aspect of the governance of this measure is the establishment of an 
"Integrated Territorial Commission", which included representatives of regional and 
municipal government bodies and representatives of the main trade unions. Competences 
of this commission, established by Decree 73/1990 art. 20, were very generic, and included 
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monitoring and assessing the Imi, as well as planning and designing possible 
improvements. This bilateral body, which later would also include the employers' 
organizations, guaranteed the participation of the social partners in the policy-making 
process (see also Chapter 2). 
To sum up, the introduction of the Madrid Integration Income constituted an important 
step forward in the Community of Madrid, offering an important economic support to 
almost 120 thousand resident households and allowing at least one third of them to 
participate not only in social integration measures, but also in more intensive 
employment-related activities. Some critical aspects need however to be considered: 
through time benefit amount became inadequate, especially considering living standards 
in the Madrid Community: secondly, despite significant efforts, the administrative 
structure showed some weaknesses and difficulties in managing this complex measure – 
as shown by long waiting time before receiving a positive (or negative) response to the 
application. But the most relevant limit of this measure was the failure to guarantee access 
to all individuals who had formal right to access the benefit system. In this dimension the 
Imi, which ambitiously looked up to the recent introduction of innovative programmes at 
the time, in France and/or Luxembourg -  remained conversely a mainly discretional anti-
poverty policy. 
 
5.3.5 The shift from the Madrid Integration Income to the Minimum Insertion Income  
The Mii constituted for more than a decade (1990 – 2001) the most important policy to 
tackle poverty and social exclusion in the Community of Madrid. As we have seen in the 
previous paragraph, without further intervention by the regional government, this 
measure knew a rather contradictory development: from one side, in fact, there is a 
gradual – although limited – growth in public expenditure, total beneficiaries number, and 
of the number of social integration programmes activated by the government. On the other 
hand, however, it diminished the protective ability of the policy, in the light of a benefit 
amount less and less adequate to meet the crucial needs of the beneficiaries. In order to 
observe a substantial policy change, we have to wait the introduction of Law 15/2001, 
which ended the Madrid Integration Income to introduce the Minimum Insertion Income 
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(Renta Minima de Insercion, RMI). In this section, we intend to connect the specific policy 
changes that took places in the shift from the Imi to the RMI with the political dynamics 
that characterized this policy area in the Community of Madrid. 
As for the contextual factors, after a period of decline in the biennium 1992-1993, in the 
second half of the Nineties the Spanish economy started a growing period that would last 
until the beginning of the crisis in 2008.The Community of Madrid was one of the most 
interested regions caught up in this economic growth: in 2000 the regional GDP grew by 
24% compared to 1995, while unemployment fell to 11.6% in 1994 after reaching a peak of 
20.8%.This period of economic growth was accompanied by the usual contradictions of the 
Spanish economy: absolute and relative poverty rates consistently above the European 
average and an high proportions of workers with non-standard employment contracts of 
low protective capacity. 
This period was characterised, in the community of Madrid as at the national level, by the 
shift from centre-left to centre-right governments. The regional elections of 1995, put an 
end to the long period of dominance of the PSOE, and we observe the formation of the first 
government supported by the Popular Party in the Community of Madrid, under the 
guidance of Alberto Ruiz-Gallardón (Table 14). 
In the previous pages, we have seen how the introduction of the Imi was the result of a 
political exchange between the trade union and the regional socialist government. In a first 
phase, the changing colour of the government did not modify substantially the position of 
the regional government regarding the regional anti-poverty programme. The very 
existence of the last resort safety net was not put into question by the new regional 
government which, conversely, in a period of economic recovery, increased the budget for 
the Madrid Integration Income. 
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Tab. 14: Election results in the Community of Madrid, 1995, 1999, 2003. 
Political Party Number of seat % of votes Government 
Election on 8th May 1995 
PP 54 52  
1995- 1999 PP PSOE 32 31 
IU 17 17 
    
Election 30th June 1999 
PP 55 53,9  
1999 – 2003 PP PSOE 39 38,2 
IU 8 7,8 
    
Election 25th May 2003 
PP 55 49,5  
 PSOE 47 42,3 
IU 9 8,1 
    
Election26th October 2003 
PP 57 51  
2003 – 2007 PP PSOE 45 41 
IU 9 8 
Source: Asemblea de Madrid 
To this regard, the words of a manager of the Department for Social Policies at the 
Community of Madrid appear particularly explanatory:  
“Every year during the budget projection the Socialist government ensured earmarked funds for the 
Imi. I have to say that over the years this happened with increasing difficulties, because even in that 
period an economic crisis erupted, in 93, and funds began to decline (...) Then, we get to 95-96, 
when we have a People Party’s government. In one of the States of the Region - as they were called 
at the time - we begin to discuss about the Imi. We had already heard that there was no money, so 
we had prepared a document, one of the things we as technicians have to do, explaining what we 
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needed to give a rapid response to the problems of the program. Then, and this I can tell you as an 
anecdote, we were listening to the debate expecting the worst, and suddenly the President declared 
that funds for the social services will be guaranteed. We look each other wondering: what have 
happened? Was it a mistake? Indeed, the way he said, so it has been: the budget grew. There was an 
increase in the budget fund to finance the Imi. " 
(…) 
“That’s politics. In that moment, the President wanted to show that his government was inclusive, 
and that, despite being a right-wing government, it favoured the less fortunate part of the 
population ... therefore, he put pressure on the Finance Councillor to provide us with the necessary 
funds, and the budget increased " (MDR DSS – Head of Department of Social Services 
Community of Madrid) 
As we have seen in the previous paragraph, actually in the period between 1995 and 2000 
minimum income protection system in Madrid experienced a period of gradual expansion 
in terms of total expenditure and number of beneficiaries. The period of economic growth 
increased the resources available for the CAs, and definitely constituted a factor which 
facilitated the gradual expansion of the safety net. However, some political factors 
contributed to explain this trajectory. Firstly, as noted earlier, there is no opposition in 
principle within the Popular Party against this measure. The newly elected president 
Alberto Ruiz Gallardon during the election campaign, and in his inaugural speech, while 
not focusing especially on this topic, declared his intention to maintain the Madrid 
Integration Income. The strategy of the PP in Madrid, similarly to the national level 
(Balfour, 1995, Wood, 2009, Molina, 2011), was to position itself at the centre of the political 
spectrum and avoid confrontations with the trade unions, promoting the use of 
concertation as a tool for governing. In his inaugural speech in front of the Madrid 
Assembly the new president Gallardon defined the dialogue between the Autonomous 
Community and the social partners "an essential element for the realization of our policies and 
to make the Community of Madrid an extremely attractive space for investments "142. 
The main measures introduced by the previous administration, and especially those 
resulted in specific agreements with the social partners, are thus not called into question 
                                                          
142Asemblea de Madrid, Diario de Sesiones n.2 IV Legislatura, 27-28 June 1994. Author translation. 
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by the new government143, while concertation with the trade unions resumed few months 
after the election. In this phase however, the priorities of the trade unions were different 
from the past, aimed at employment creation, also through a reduction in working hours 
(the so-called 35 hours’ proposals) rather than the strengthening of the minimum income 
scheme (MDR DSS; MDR CCOO). The concertation between the government and social 
partners was therefore directed on the one hand to preserve the main measures introduced 
by the previous Socialist government, including the Imi, on the other, to ensure - if not to 
increase - the organizational resources of the trade unions. As a matter of fact, four new bi-
lateral commissions including trade unions representatives – the Commissions on 
Education, Development, Labour and the Financial Sector – were introduced by the new 
right government. 
Similarly to the unions, in this phase no party was particularly active on the issue of 
minimum income protection: while keeping a substantial support to the measure, they do 
not "compete" on this issue. The result of these dynamics was a period of substantial 
legislative inertia, in which no changes were made to the design of the social safety net in 
the community of Madrid. 
In this scenario, as we have seen in previous sections, far from the spotlight of political 
debate, social expenditure and coverage of the Imi slowly increased, even though the 
Madrid anti-poverty scheme remained comparatively modest, with an amount lower than 
that of other autonomous communities. The limited political interest in this phase for the 
regional Mis had however relevant consequences, especially regarding its implementation 
(MDR DSS). Government priorities were, in fact, different, so that the Council for Social 
Policies was absorbed by the Health Council – a factor that strongly diminished social 
policy relevance within regional government – while a new Plan Against Social Exclusion, 
prepared by  the social policy technicians and aimed at greater integration with the 
various department potentially involved in the fight against poverty, such as Health, 
Housing and Education department,  simply gathered dust (remained close in a drawer) 
during the entire legislature (MDR DSS). 
                                                          
143 See El Pais, 17 November 1995: “Ruiz-Gallardón signs a social pact which respects the main 
innovation of the socialist period”. Author Translation. 
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The period of substantial inertia and limited development of last resort safety net in 
Madrid ended with the regional elections in June 1999, which confirmed at the head of the 
regional government Alberto Ruiz Gallardon. His second term would be, indeed, much 
more attentive to social policies and characterized by a legislative intervention that 
radically changed the minimum income protection system in the Community of Madrid: 
the shift from the Madrid Integration Income to the Renta mínima de inserción (Minimum 
Insertion Income, Rmi). 
In the months following the victory of the Popular Party some factors contributed to place 
once again on the political agenda – and especially among the subjects of the concertation 
between the government and trade unions - minimum income protection. Firstly, Madrid 
experienced a new period of great economic growth, favouring the adoption of 
expansionary social policies. There was in fact a common perception shared among civil 
society actors that the fruits of this economic growth did not reach those at the bottom of 
the income scale, and that therefore there was the need to strengthen the last resort 
protection system (Caritas, 2001). 
Secondly, the bi-partisan overlapping consensus among political parties over a social 
safety net was preserved. In the inaugural address in front of the general assembly, the re-
elected governor Gallardon declared: 
"Out of solidarity, we introduced the Ingreso Madrileño de Integración, a fundamental tool for 
combating social exclusion in the Community of Madrid. (...). I am, ladies and gentlemen, among 
those who think that solidarity does not belong to any ideology. It does not belong, nor can belong, 
when it comes to ensure access to social benefits for all citizens, which must be a shared goal, an 
obligation for all ideologies. "144 
The new government decided to form distinct Councils for Health and Social policies, 
strengthening the relevance of social policies within the government. Moreover, the new 
Councillor Pilar Martinez soon expressed her intention to introduce innovative measures 
in this policy field, and resumed the Plan against Social Exclusion (MDR DSS). For this 
purpose, the new councillor summoned (again) the experts who had contributed to plan 
and design the Imi to carry out an assessment of the Madrid safety net almost ten years 
                                                          
144Asemblea de Madrid, Diario de las Sesiones,6 and 7 July 1999.  
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after its introduction and to develop a new plan to combat social exclusion (Laparra, 
Begona Perez and Aguilar, 2001). 
Notwithstanding this renewed interest in social policies, in the new programme of 
government there was no new legislative intervention in the minimum income protection 
field. Key points of the government programmes were, actually, economic growth and 
especially job creation (at least 225thousand new employment contracts) to be realized in 
accordance with the social partners. Social concertation was considered indeed useful, if 
not essential, to achieve these goals - as made public by the President Gallardon in two 
relevant speeches in front of the Assembly at the beginning of the new legislature: 
“The comprehension of the economy and society lead us to success over the last four years, and there 
is no doubt that the concertation that we have maintained with the social partners constitutes a key 
part of this success; for this reason, not only we will maintain it, but it will be reinforced in the next 
Legislature.”145 
“I have to admit that after four years heading this region I have made many thoughts and came to 
some conclusions, and of one thing I am absolutely certain: that the results obtained by this region 
in the field of employment would not be in any way possible if there had not been a permanent pact, 
despite the disagreements that are natural in this type of continuous negotiation, with the social and 
economic actors of our community146”. 
The importance that the Government attributed to concertation was particularly 
significant because at this stage the trade unions in Madrid were once again explicitly 
interested in strengthening last resort minimum income protection. Some specific 
dynamics within the most important unions in the Community of Madrid are relevant to 
understand this evolution and in particular the election as regional secretary of CC.OO., 
the most representative trade union in the Community of Madrid, of Javier Lopez. The 
new secretary, in addition to having historically demonstrated a special attention to the 
issue of social safety net and have been among those who had negotiated the Imi with the 
government of Leguina, during his election campaign had placed great emphasis on the 
issue of minimum income protection (MDR CCOO). Thus, CCOO submitted to the 
                                                          
145Asemblea de Madrid, Diario de lasSesiones, 6 e 7 July 1999. 
146Asemblea de Madrid, Diario de las Sesiones, 27 September 2000 
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signature of a new social pact for the reintroduction of a minimum income in the regional 
political agenda (MDR DSS; MDR CCOO; MDR EXP). In this regard, it is useful to quote 
an article that appeared on El Pais on May 20th 2000, significantly titled "The new secretary 
of CCOO demands Alberto Ruiz Gallardon a new social pact": 
“(CCOO) proposes a plan to promote employment for the youth, women and the long-term 
unemployed, a deep discussion about the reduction of working hours to 35 hours per week, more 
control of the implementation of the Law on the Prevention of Labour Accidents, an integration 
plan for immigrants, and two issues that cannot be postponed: improving benefits for the 
unemployed and a new law on Minimum Income Protection for the most disadvantaged.147” 
Differently from the previous legislature, trade unions posed as a condition to realize 
social pacts with the government the opening of a new table on minimum income 
protection, in order to face the major weakness of the Spanish safety net: the absence of an 
individual right to access public support in presence of a recognized need.  
The trade unions were not the only political forces that contributed to place attention back 
on the issue of a minimum income. In the decade after the introduction of Imi there was a 
substantial bipartisan consensus in favour of maintaining the programme. The election of 
1999 confirmed the political balance of the previous election between the majority and the 
opposition, but saw a strong growth of the PSOE against IU. The latter lost more than half 
of the seats compared with the previous elections. To this fall of consent, IU reacted also 
proposing to the Madrid Assembly a new law on a Guaranteed Minimum Income, which 
increased legal certainty and the generosity of the Madrid safety net, and eliminated the 
condition of being active in the job search to access this measure (interview 10). 
IU parliamentary initiatives, trade unions requests, combined with the activism of the new 
regional Councillor, resumed regional concertation within the Consejo de Madrid por el 
Desarrollo, el Empleo, y la Formaccion, a tripartite body composed of the most representative 
unions, the Madrid employer confederation (CEIM, Confederación Empresarial de 
Madrid) and the Government.  
                                                          
147 El Pais, 20 May 2000, “The new Secretary General of CCOO requires Ruiz-Gallardon a new social 
pact”. Author translation. 
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Trade unions requests were mainly two: the introduction of the subjective right and an 
increase in the benefit amount. As for the former, it was required the introduction of a law 
- rather than a decree, as before - and that the access to the measure was not conditional on 
participation to work-related activities. The concession of the subjective right was however 
cause of a deep tension within the government, in particular between the Finance and the 
Social Policy Councillor (Interview 1 and 6). The Finance Councillor was actually little 
inclined to introduce an unconditional right to income support for all individuals with an 
income below a certain threshold, supporting the principle of reciprocity between the 
beneficiary, which required support, and the administration. 
The compromise reached was expressed in the ambiguous formula of "doble derecho" 
(double entitlement), meaning that the introduction of the new law guaranteed the double 
right of beneficiaries to income support and social inclusion. This formula hid in reality the 
fact that the right to financial support was conditional to beneficiaries’ activation: the law 
in fact expressly subordinated access to monetary support on a path between the 
administration and the aspiring beneficiary concerning social inclusion paths (Article 
6.1.ge Article 12 of Law 15/2001). Thus also in Madrid, as in many countries in Latin 
America (Layton e Smith, 2015), access to Mip was made contingent upon beneficiary 
virtuous behaviours contribute to make those benefits ideologically attractive for 
conservative parties.  On the other hand, however, in the new pact were also severely 
limited the discretionary elements granted by the Madrid Integration Income to the social 
workers in the determination of who has the right of access to the measure: the means-test, 
as well as the possibility to leave out from the measure, were actually concentrated in the 
hands of the regional administration. On this basis the 4 September 2001 an informal 
agreement was reached between the government and the social partners, which would be 
then transformed into law on 15 of December 2001. 
The will of the President to reach an agreement with the trade unions, allowed to 
overcome the tensions within the majority and some doubts, which were present, on the 
advisability of introducing the legal right to a Mis (Interview 6). The introduction of a new 
law allowed also President Gallardon to claim credit in front of its electorate. In this 
regard, the speech at the Asemblea de Madrid on September 19th 2001 of the former 
President Gallardon was particularly meaningful: 
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“Our regional government is concerned, and is responsible, for migrants, women, families, the 
disabled, and individuals who live in areas that do not benefit yet of the general progress of the 
region (...). And I can assure you that the most disadvantaged sectors of our society knows that if 
there is an individual right, recognized by law, to minimum income protection this is the result of a 
reiterated and well-argued request by trade unions which, for the first time and after twelve years, 
has been assumed by the government of the Popular Party. ”148 
The introduction of the law is therefore the result of a process of concertation between the 
government and the main trade unions. The parliamentary debate during this phase was 
less relevant, also because the majority and the opposition, in particular between PP and 
PSOE, had very similar positions on the issue. IU instead presented an alternative bill, 
which differed for the higher coverage, a lower age limit (18 instead of 25 years), the lack 
of all forms of conditionality and greater generosity. However, once an agreement was 
reached between the trade unions and the government, also left parties supported the 
measure, and no parties voted against the introduction of the Law 15/2001.  
The approval of the Minimum Insertion Income constitutes a substantial change in anti-
poverty policies in the Community of Madrid, primarily because with its introduction it is 
finally guaranteed the subjective right to a benefit in case of a certified economic need.  
This implies two substantial changes compared with the previous Imi, both in the 
direction of guaranteeing higher protection to Madrid citizens. In the first place this 
measure was not subjected to budgetary constraints: if there was a need for more resources 
to deal with more requests than those initially planned, the administration could increase 
the budget automatically, without the need for further parliamentary passage. Secondly, 
Madrid citizens could apply to a court if this right was not recognized. It should be 
emphasised however that - unlike disputes relating to social security and national 
legislation - in case of failure to grant a minimum income benefits the beneficiary may 
appeal to the administrative court rather than the social court. This legal procedure is 
longer and more complex, an obstacle which – coupled with information asymmetries, 
and/or economic (and psychological) costs particularly burdensome for social assistance 
beneficiaries - severely limited the court appeals. 
                                                          
148 Diario de Sesiones Asemblea de Madrid, 19 September 2001. Author Translation. 
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Tab. 15. Entry Requirements, Ingreso Madrileno de Integracion vs Renta Minima de 
Insercion 
Requirements 
 
I.M.I. R.M.I 
Age Between 25 and 65 years old Between 25 and 65 years old 
 
Residency Permanent residency for at 
least one year in the Madrid 
Community 
Permanent residency in the 
Madrid Community 
Income – based 
 
 
To have an income lower than 
the IMI 
 
Impossibility of accessing 
other measures of income 
support 
 
To have an income lower than 
the PNC 
 
Possibility of additional social 
benefits and RMI if they are 
less than the its amount 5 
Asset - based Real estates (with the 
exception of the house where 
the residency is held) 
 
Personal property if its value 
is higher in the last three 
months to the value of the RM 
Real estates (with the 
exception of the house where 
the residency is held) 
 
Personal property if its value 
is higher in the last three 
months to the value of the 
RM 
 
Vehicles with a value higher 
than 12 thousand Euros 6 
Compliance To sign an agreement with the 
social services 
 
To take actively part actively 
in the agreed activities 
 
To guarantee education to the 
underage in the family 
To sign an agreement with 
the social services 
 
To take actively part in the 
agreed activities 
 
To guarantee education to the 
underage in the family 
 
The introduction of the subjective individual right also brought a change in the 
governance structure, in the direction of a strong centralization and a tightened selection 
procedure, as well as the introduction of a rather complex sanction system. 
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As for the first dimension, as a counterpart to the introduction of the subjective right, the 
selection process was strongly centralized, and made more burdensome for the 
administration. A closer inspection reveals that access requirements did not change 
significantly, even though there were some important changes in the means test (Tab. 15). 
To access the RMI, in fact, the income must be lower than the social pension – increased by 
25% for each additional person in the household – and not below benefit amount (Art. 9 
decree 147/2002). 
The changes substantially affected mainly the selection process and the control 
requirements. Although the task of collecting the documents remained in the hands of 
social services, however, it was taken from them the opportunity to make a first screening 
- often of a discretionary nature - as was the case with the Imi. The selection process 
occurred in a department created for this purpose within the Social Policy Councillor, 
which has the right to ask any further document to assess the financial situation of the 
applicant. Moreover, at the end of every financial year the same department had to collect 
again the necessary documents to check whether there were changes in the financial 
condition of the beneficiaries. Both of these tasks needed to be certified by fiscal control 
bodies, which had the task of checking all the expenditure of the Community of Madrid. 
This procedure - which required the same documents to be controlled by three different 
institutional bodies several times during the year - was extremely unwieldy, and it 
required a significant deployment of energy and human resources. Above all, it made 
extremely complex the access for applicants, who often saw their documents expire while 
still waiting for an answer, with the consequence of having to start over again: a true short 
circuit which resembled a Kafkaesque impasse. This procedure made the response to 
application long and uncertain. Theoretically Article 38 of Decree 147/2002 envisaged that 
the beneficiary should receive a response within a maximum period of three months. 
However, this deadline was often not met and, especially with the onset of the crisis, 
waiting times lengthened considerably (see next paragraph). 
Secondly, a specific sanction system was created in case the beneficiaries failed to fulfil 
obligations set forth in the decree. In case of repeated misconduct –i.e. several “minor” 
infringements in the last two years - the benefit was suspended for a period that went from 
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3 months to 6 months, and from 6 to 12 months in case of serious misconducts. Also in this 
case the sanctioning procedure was long and rather complex, since every time there was 
an infringement a Commission was created, and social serviced had to demonstrate 
beneficiaries’ faults. Also for those reasons, so far sanctions were rare in Madrid. 
Finally, the new law affected both the generosity and the governance structure of the last 
resort safety net. Benefit amount was higher than the Imi. However, in a comparative 
perspective, also limiting our analysis to the Spanish case, the Madrid Minimum Insertion 
Income represented a rather modest benefit. The government in fact, concerned that an 
overly generous benefit might foster the so-called poverty trap and discourage active 
search for a job, did not accept trade unions demands for a substantial increase. Moreover, 
law 15/2001 did not introduce any automatic indexation mechanisms, so that the choice of 
the amount remained firmly in the hands of the government, which every year by decree 
established the amount and the equivalence scale of the benefit (see tab. 17). 
As for the governance structure, the law introduced new organisms to encourage greater 
integration between institutions and actors potentially involved in the fight against social 
exclusion. This was the Coordination Commission, which had the task of promoting the 
integration between different governmental departments and levels, and the Evaluation 
Commission, which instead monitored the selection process and implemented sanctions. 
The tasks of evaluating and controlling the Rmi - previously carried out within the 
Territorial Commission - were taken by the new Supervisory Commission, composed of 
social partners and government representatives. This institution, which is present under 
different names in most of the ACs, is the main arena in which regional governments and 
social partners discuss the implementation of the regional Mis, exchange information and 
put forward any proposals for improvements. 
The introduction of the Rmi is followed by a phase (2003 – 2008) in which we observe a 
real improvement in the minimum income protection in the Community of Madrid, 
especially taking into consideration the guarantee of access, but also considering benefit 
amount. Beneficiaries grew by 36.5% in 2003 - the year of the actual transition from Imi to 
Rmi - and more generally, in a period of great economic growth, the number of 
beneficiaries grew constantly in the period between 2002 to 2006, and only then knew a 
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slight decline in the period 2006 and 2008. Even though this constituted a relevant increase 
– household beneficiaries were a little more than seven thousand in 2002, almost 10.5 in 
2008 – according to the official statistics of the Spanish statistical institute there was still a 
relevant part of the poor Spanish people – even extremely poor – who did not receive any 
benefits. 
However, if compared with the previous management of the Imi, it seems that this was 
due to the presence of strict requirements and / or of a particularly high non take-up rate, 
rather than caused by a discretionary management of the measure and or the presence of 
hidden budgetary constraints. Two factors allow to advance this hypothesis: from one 
point of view there were very few pending applications in this period. As shown by Figure 
11, in this period we have a substantial increase of the accepted applications, while we 
observe a steady decline of pending applications – while the long average waiting period 
was one of the main weakness of the Imi, and probably one of the stratagems used by the 
administration to disguise the existence budget constraints. Secondly, un these years, the 
funds allocated by the government in the budgetary projections were sufficient - if not 
sometimes superior - to meet the demand submitted to the administration (Table 16, MDR 
DSS2). From 2005 until 2008 the fund allocated to the Social Policy department to finance 
the Rmi were therefore larger than final expenditure, highlighting that budgetary 
constraints probably did not affect the policy-making process in this particular period, as 
also expressed by social assistance managers referring (exclusively) to this particular 
period. Also – as mentioned - benefit amount increased constantly in those years, even 
though it remained lower than Spanish Average (tab. 17). The basic benefit amount, which 
in 2000 was below 250 euro, in 2007 was equal to 354 euro. 
To sum up, with the shift from the Madrid Integration Income to the Minimum Insertion 
Income, anti-poverty policies in Madrid equalled European standards, since it was finally 
automatically guaranteed the right to access the Mip, and it was connected with a series of 
measures aimed at the socio-economic integration of the beneficiaries. This measure 
presents also some features that make it attractive also for the Popular Party. In fact, Rmi 
was a comparatively modest benefit – not to discourage beneficiaries in the job search – 
and had a strong conditional nature, further accentuated by the presence of a sanction 
mechanisms in case of non-compliance. 
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3.5 The Great Recession and the (weak) implementation of the RMI in the Community of 
Madrid 
The onset of the Great Recession impacted enormously on the economy and society of the 
Community of Madrid, with relevant consequences also for the Minimum Insertion 
Income. The condition of the labour market strongly deteriorated, badly affecting 
especially the low-skilled population. From 2008 to 2013, unemployment rate increased 
from 8,6% to 19,8%, and the percentage of the long term unemployed among the active 
population, which was almost irrelevant in 2007 (1.1%), was in 2014 equal to 10% (Eurostat 
online database).  Accordingly, the severe material deprivation rate grew from 2.5% in 
2007 to reach its historical peak on 2013 (7.3%). This situation deeply affected the 
implementation of the last resort safety net, because the number of potential and effective 
claimants grew exponentially. At the same time, available funds for the region decreased, 
especially after the introduction of the budgetary balance to the subnational and local 
governments in Spain. Consequently, regional budget slowly decreased in this recessive 
phase, especially in the period from 2010 until 2012. The Community of Madrid thus 
moved from an expansionary phase, characterized by growing resources and fewer 
applications, to an opposite one, in which there were less available resources and it had to 
cope with increasing social needs. 
In these conditions, the growth in spending and number of beneficiaries in the Community 
of Madrid was exponential. Between 2008 and 2013, the number of households receiving 
Rmi grew from 8567 to 19780 (plus 129.3%). In the same period Rmi expenditure went 
from about 44 million to over 89 million (plus 100.3%). 
The growth of beneficiaries, although significant, was however not sufficient to keep up 
with the growth of social needs due to the effects of the Great Recession: in the same 
period, the number of annual Rmi applications grew from 3467 to 12908 (plus 272%). The 
fact that the increase of demand was higher than the growth of beneficiaries, might shed 
some doubts concerning the right-based nature of minimum income protection in Madrid: 
in the presence of a subjective right, increasing (legitimate) request should correspond to 
an equal increase in granted benefits.   
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Tab. 16 – Budgetary provision and expenditure for the Rmi, 2004 – 2013. 
Year Budgetary provision Consolidated Rmi 
Expenditure 
2004 39.158.690 44.908.690 
2005 44.000.000 47.000.000 
2006 47.000.000 45.291.738,59 
2007 46.900.000 42.832.548,72 
2008 47.000.000 41.242.987,24 
2009 44.000.590,00 47.680.083,67 
2010 48.000.000,00 58.985.110,54 
2011 48.274.000,00 72.064.092,00 
2012 52.661.817,00 84.621817,00 
2013 81.919.817,00 85.408.796,03 
Source: Autor elaboration from Consejería De AsuntosSociales, Comunidad de Madrid 
At least partially, difficulties of the bureaucratic apparatus and of the social services in 
dealing with such an unforeseen rise of applications explain this difficulty. In less than 
four years, the administration of the Community went from managing around 12 
thousand to about 32 thousand practices - considering both the beneficiaries and pending 
applications (Fig. 10). 
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Figure 10 Evolution of requests for the Minimum Insertion Income, 2004 - 2013 
 
Source: Author elaboration from Consejería De AsuntosSociales, Comunidad de Madrid, several years 
 
A closer examination of the applications submitted enables to show that the bureaucratic 
machine found itself in extreme difficulty in managing the selection process which, as we 
have seen in the paragraph above, are quite complex and cumbersome. Indeed, if the 
transition from Imi to the Rmi had allowed to decrease significantly the phenomenon of 
long waiting periods and pending practices, in this second phase it assumed once again a 
relevant dimension: pending practices constituted 3.5% of all the applications in 2006, 
44.5% in 2013 (Fig. 10). 
Those data seem to confirm what emerge also in the interviews carried out with social 
workers and NGO: with the onset of the economic crisis and the sudden growth of 
applications, long waiting times to access to last resort safety net have started again to 
constitute a major problem for people experiencing poverty and social exclusion in the 
Community of Madrid (MDR SW; MDR DSS2; MDR DSS3; MDR EAPN). Qualitative 
surveys carried out interviewing the Rmi beneficiaries reveal that some applicants waited 
for a response for several months, sometimes for more than a year (EAPN, 2014). 
Beneficiaries and social workers complained that central offices during the selection 
process often asked for new documents, which meant to start over the entire procedure, 
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with the result that often documents previously delivered expired (EAPN, 2014, IMDR 
SW; MDR EAPN). 
Those facts, which point to problems in creating the right to access to minimum income 
protection solemnly declared by the law, allow to talk about a weak implementation – at 
least during the crisis – of the Rmi. Some interrelated factors allow to understand this 
evolution of anti-poverty policies in the Community of Madrid. In the first place, the 
exponential increase of applications, it was not accompanied by a strengthening of the 
administrative bureaucratic structure (MDR DSS3). In the years of the crisis it was not 
hired new staff neither in social services - which were (also)in charge of the front office and 
of collecting documents - nor in the social inclusion department, which as we have seen 
had the task of scrutinizing if new applications met the requirements and whether the 
beneficiaries were still in condition of need. As we have seen, however, in a few years’ 
practices increased from about 12 thousand to 32 thousand a year: in the absence of new 
personnel, the functional overload caused by such a dramatic increase of the workload 
made more complex to respond rapidly to the applications (MDR DSS3). Also because - 
and this is the second factor that helps to explain long waiting periods - the selection 
procedures in the community of Madrid were long and cumbersome. The law and the 
associated regulation established that the economic situation of the beneficiaries had to be 
checked several times during the year, by more than one institutional body, even if the 
recipient did not declare a change in their financial condition. In addition, the adoption of 
a new IT system, long awaited and which had several difficulties of practical and political 
nature before being finally implemented (MDR DSS2), did not seem to have had practical 
effects yet, and difficulties persisted in the capability to cross data between different 
administrations (EAPN, 2014) 
Lastly, budgetary constraints, although formally absent, seem to have played an important 
role. In the interviews often emerged the hypothesis that the inability to respond quickly 
to applications hid an implicit strategy of the administration to contain the costs of this 
measure, which as we have seen grew exponentially with the arrival of the crisis (MDR 
CCOO; MDR UGT). A more accurate analysis of applications allows to show that this 
explanation is plausible. In 2010, despite a considerable increase of applications compared 
to previous years (plus 101.2%), the percentage of pending practices was only about 4%, 
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while the accepted applications were close to the 50%. Three years later, pending request 
represented 44,7%, to the total detriment of the accepted applications, which went down to 
19.6%, while not granted application remained constant (Fig 3). The growth of applications 
awaiting an assessment was therefore almost totally at the expenses of “legitimate” 
applications, so that it seems plausible that budgetary constraints contributed to explain 
the particular evolution of last resort minimum income protection in Madrid. 
In reality, it is difficult to establish with certainty whether the exponential increase of 
pending practices was the result of precise directives by the political actors to keep under 
control spending in this policy area. But in any case, the failure to modify the Mis - 
changing the procedures and / or strengthening the bureaucratic-administrative structure - 
so that it is not able to respond to changing environmental conditions can be interpreted as 
a political choice (Mahoney e Thelen, 2010). 
Figure 11 Evolution of the accepted, denied or awaiting evaluation applications  
as a % of total application, 2004 – 2014.  
 
Source: Author elaboration from Consejería De AsuntosSociales, Comunidad de Madrid, several years 
 
The suspicion that budgetary considerations have been taken into account during this 
phase by the government in Madrid is confirmed observing the evolution of benefit 
amount in the Madrid Community. From 2008, the amount of the Rmi has never been 
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changed in order to maintain its (low) real value. Thus, if in 2013 the basic amount on 
average of regional Mis in Spain for a single member household was equal to 428 euro and 
the maximum amount for numerous families was – always on average – equal to 671 euro, 
in the Community of Madrid those were equal to 375,5 and 532,5 euros per month 
respectively, so that the Rmi could be deemed as the least generous safety net in Spain, 
with the only exception of LaRioja (Ministerio de Sanidad, ServiciosSociales e Igualdad, 
2014). Those data are particularly significant if we take into account that in this region both 
the per capita income and the living cost are the highest in Spain. 
 
Tab. 17 Mis amount, Community of Madrid vs Spain (average), 2004 2013 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
RMI 
Basic 
Amount 
 
305,7 
 
 
315 
 
326 
 
340 
 
354 
 
370 
 
370 
 
375,55 
 
375,55 
 
375,55 
Spanish 
Average 
324 337 351 375 405 409 418 422 422 434 
Source: Ministerio de Sanidad, ServiciosSociales e Igualdad, several years 
 
To conclude, as underlined previously, the growth in public expenditure for anti-poverty 
policies and minimum income schemes in the community of Madrid has been certainly 
significant. Expenditures and the number of beneficiaries increased exponentially as a 
result of the economic crisis and the deterioration of the labour market. However, a more 
careful analysis of its implementation shows that the legal right to access the measure has 
not been sufficiently guaranteed and that the protective capacity of this measure has been 
weakened in recent years. For this reason, considering the premise contained in Law 
15/2001, it seems that the actual implementation of the RMI is disappointing and 
inadequate to address the needs that emerged forcefully with the onset of the economic 
crisis. 
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3.6. The neo-liberal turn and the evolution of Mip in the Community of Madrid. 
The policy trajectory of last resort minimum income protection in the Community of 
Madrid present some peculiar characteristics. In the early 2000 a very promising policy 
innovation – placing this region among the very few CAs which adopted a right-based 
approach in this policy field – was introduced by the conservative government of Alberto 
Ruìz Gallardon. However, in the aftermath of the crisis, the implementation of this 
measure was less, and despite the increase in expenditure and beneficiaries, efforts to 
contain the growth in minimum income expenditure are rather visible. 
Also in this case, political dynamics are indeed important to understand the “weak 
implementation” of the Rmi in the comparatively wealthy Community of Madrid. In the 
years following the introduction of Law 15/2001 the Popular Party – which was in power 
since 1995 – was confirmed (in government), keeping the absolute majority in the Asemblea 
de Madrid both in the regional election in 2003 and 2007. Esperanza Aguirre however took 
over from Alberto Gallardon as President of the Community of Madrid, opening a new 
political phase in this AC.  The new President, although belonging to the same political 
party of his predecessor, was a leading exponent of the neo-liberal wing of the Spanish 
right, whereas Gallardon belonged to the centrist-conservative area of the Popular Party. 
“I have decided to be a politician to realize liberal ideas and policies. I am liberal because history and 
experience have taught me that liberalism is the ethic, political and economic doctrine that better 
matches aspirations and needs of an open and free society. I am liberal, because economic freedom 
and market exchange have always demonstrated to be much more effective to bring prosperity and 
wealth (welfare) rather than public intervention, economic nationalism or any other known variety 
of populism, from socialism to communism.”149 
The priorities of the Madrid government change accordingly with the shift from the 
Gallardòn to the Aguirre Government. In particular, as much as Gallardòn underlined the 
relevance of employment rates and considered positively concertation and social dialogue, 
the government programme of Esperanza Aguirre aimed at reducing taxes – and more 
precisely, to reduce by one point the autonomic part of the Spanish income tax (IRPF) and 
to abolish the inheritance tax – and to decrease expenditure and public intervention in the 
                                                          
149 Diario de las Sesiones Asemblea de Madrid, n.2, 18 June 2007. 
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economy, while social assistance policies – and in particular the Minimum Insertion 
Income – were no longer considered government priorities150 (MDR DSS2). This change of 
perspective was immediately perceived by the social partners, and although the first 
Aguirre government tried to maintain a social dialogue with the trade unions – in 
particular, in some specific fields such as economic competitiveness and employment – no 
comprehensive social pacts were signed on social policy issue – such as health, education 
or social services – as it was the case with the previous government. In such a political 
context, no substantial changes were made concerning the Madrid Minimum Insertion 
Income, which was conversely preserved and maintained in its universalistic although 
selective nature. 
The regional elections of May 2007 were characterised by a significant growth of the 
Popular Party both in votes and in the number of seats obtained in the Asemblea de Madrid, 
where the Esperanza Aguirre government obtained the absolute majority. In an economic 
context completely different characterised by the onset of the financial and later economic 
crisis in Spain, the second Aguirre government would push further in a neo-liberal 
direction its policies. The government programme is again centred on tax reduction; in 
particular, the programmatic goal of the new government was to reduce taxes on assets151, 
and a contested reform plan aimed at favouring greater private initiatives in the health 
sector in the Community of Madrid. The onset of the crisis did not modify government 
economic priorities, more and more aimed at reducing public expenditure, as summarised 
by these words of the President Aguirre in front of the Asemblea de Madrid: 
“In moments of crisis we need to be austere, and governments have to give a positive example. 
When government pursues austerity, societies are prosperous, and for this reason I intend to 
explain you in detail how our government intend to tighten its belts to reduce the possible effects of 
this crisis”152. 
At the same time, the policy-making process was characterized by a lesser and lesser 
participation of the social partners: institutional concertation, a well-established tradition 
of the autonomous government in Madrid, was completely abandoned. Aguirre and her 
                                                          
150 Diario de las Sesiones Asemblea de Madrid, n. 2, 19 e 20 November 2003. 
151 Diario de lasSesionesAsemblea de Madrid, n. 2, 18 June 2007. 
152Diario de lasSesionesAsemblea de Madrid, n. 262, 16 e 17 September 2008. 
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government did not even consult social partners to realize her government programme, 
not even concerning economic and labour policies. It was therefore the first legislature in 
this Autonomous Community where no social pacts between government and social 
partners were signed. Otherwise, also at national level the period after the crisis 
corresponds to a steady decline of concertation, and especially after the Rajoy election at 
the end of 2011, we observe the introduction of the first labour market reform in the 
history of democratic Spain introduced unilaterally, without even attempting to establish a 
social dialogue with the social partners (Molina, 2014). 
As for minimum income protection, even though it was not at the beginning of the 
legislature within government priorities, the onset of the crisis and the sudden explosion 
of application brought back minimum income at the very core of the political agenda. 
From 2011 government action in this policy field aimed especially at containing 
expenditure growth, and a greater emphasis was therefore posed on the theme of the so-
called false positive and frauds, with a consequent reinforcement of income controls (MDR 
DSS2). In this regard, particularly significant was the article 5 of the budget law n.8 of 
2012, which modified some relevant aspects of law 15/2001, reinforcing the conditionality 
of the Rmi to the participation to “insertion activities”, besides augmenting furthermore 
control procedures. More specifically, with the changes introduced by this law the 
checking of compliance with the requirements was done every six months and not every 
year, as it was before. This government decision, undoubtedly targeted at limiting 
perceived frauds, increased furthermore procedures and, as we have seen above, caused 
greater difficulties to respond rapidly and efficiently to the demand coming from the 
population, also because the administrative structure was not reinforced after the 
exponential growth of the applications and of the administrative tasks. This government 
choice was strongly criticized by the opposition and the trade unions, which underlined 
how it led beneficiaries in a sort of “bureaucratic hell”, where it is always possible to receive 
new demands to bring documents, and the certainty of the right to access is strongly 
reduced (MDR CCOO).  
It is also important to underline that, for the first time, changes in the legislation on 
minimum income protection were not negotiated with the social partners, strongly 
weakened during the crisis both at the national and at the local level (González Begega 
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and Luque Balbona, 2015). CC.OO. and U.G.T. criticized both the content and the method 
of the changes introduced with law 8/2012. Similar criticism came also from opposition 
parties, but the government preferred not to open a parliamentary debate on this theme 
(MDR IU; MDR EAPN). As noted by EAPN Madrid, “there has not been neither a public 
nor a political debate concerning the 2012 reform, and the reasons which have motivated it 
have not been explained; behind it there are no technical evaluations, nor a monitoring 
process and/or the considerations of the stakeholders153 (EAPN, 2014, p. 21). 
In such a context, in November 2013 Izquierda Unida presented a new bill, which aimed at 
increasing the monetary support and combining it with free access to public transportation 
and a reduction of the housing and of the school canteens costs. PP firm opposition 
hindered this proposal and it was not even discussed in the Asemblea de Madrid. In a 
context characterised by growing social needs – only partially answered by the Madrid 
Minimum Insertion Income – the Madrid government priorities were going in the 
direction of containing public expenditure rather than reinforcing minimum income 
protection. As a consequence, despite the Community of Madrid is the richest in Spain, 
policy expansion in terms of expenditure and coverage, although present, can be 
considered inferior compared to other autonomous communities, such as Asturias, 
Cantabria, La Rioja, Castile and Leon or Extremadura, not to mention the well-known case 
of Navarra and the Basque Country. 
 
4.“Politica consenduada”: minimum income schemes in Castile y Léon 
This paragraph looks at policy developments and political dynamics concerning minimum 
income protection from the introduction of the first safety net until present days in Castile 
and Léon. As we will outline below, this region is characterised by economic, social and 
political conditions different from the Madrid case. Moreover, in this region path 
departure, i.e. the introduction of the Ingreso Minimo de Insercion, followed the failure of 
the negotiation between the social partners and the Government over the possible 
introduction of a national minimum income scheme, and the subsequent introduction of 
regional programmes in relevant Autonomous Communities. It seems therefore interesting 
                                                          
153Author Translation. 
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to investigate whether the same factors, and mostly the economic trends and the relations 
between trade unions and the regional government, have influenced the introduction and 
the policy trajectories of the last resort safety net in this specific CA, or, conversely, we 
observe greater importance of institutional mimesis dynamics, i.e. policy diffusion and 
mutual learning dynamics between the different regional administrations (Arriba and 
Moreno, 2005).   
 
4.1 Economy and labour market in Castile and Léon in the Eighties. 
Castile and Leon is a Spanish Autonomous Community formally established in 1979 after 
the merger of the historical territories that made up the ancient crowns of Leon and 
Castile, on the north side of the Iberian meseta. Despite geographical proximity, the social 
and political structure of this community is profoundly different compared with the 
Community of Madrid. It is, actually, a particularly large community, with a very large 
number of municipalities (2248), most of them (80%) with a total population below/ of less 
that thousand inhabitants. Low demographic intensity and the absence/lack of metropolis 
make Castile and Léon, despite the large dimensions, only the sixth most populated 
Autonomous Community in Spain. Beside low demographic intensity this AC is 
characterized by the presence of a very large number of elderly people, which made the 
population of Castile and Léon one of the oldest in the whole Europe. In 1991 14,1% of the 
population in this A.C. was aged more than 65, against a national average of 11,3% 
(CESCyL, 1992). 
The economy of Castilla y Léon was heavily based (relied strongly) on traditional sectors, 
particularly agriculture and livestock, industry and tourism. As for the Spanish economy 
as a whole, the Eighties were a period of major transformations. Firstly, together with 
Spain, also the economy in CyL was hit (hard) by the downturn of the Spanish in the early 
eighties; regional GDP contracted severely and the unemployment rate grew from 7.8% to 
18.3% in 1985.The economic recovery in the second part the 80s was slower and more 
difficult than in other Spanish autonomous communities: while the economy grew at an 
average of 4.61% annually in Spain, the annual GDP growth in CyL was about a point 
lower, at 3.63%. This growth ranked the region in 1990 at the eleventh place among the 
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Spanish ACs in the index of economic development, with a GDP per capita equal to 86.6% 
of the national. Unemployment rate is below national average – 15,7% in CyL, 16,7% in 
Spain –but with a low activity rate – 40,3 in CyL, 42,3% in Spain (CESCyL, 1991). 
Secondly, in this period started a process of slow but steady transformation of the labour 
market. As mentioned, the economy of CyL was concentrated in the traditional and, in 
many ways, most mature sectors of the Spanish economy. In the late '70s, agriculture still 
played a major role in its economy, and almost a third of the working population was 
employed in this sector. Ten years later, though agriculture maintained a relevant role in 
the regional economy, a large proportion of these workers (about one third) moved to the 
construction industry (17% more than 1982) and even more so in the services. From the 
mid-80s, manufacturing started to employ about 20% of the population, particularly in the 
automotive and food industries (CESCyL, 1991). Service was the sector most contributing 
to job growth, employing about half of the working population, concentrated in particular 
in the tourism and catering (Ibidem). 
As for the spreading and seriousness of poverty in CyL, there are few available data 
concerning the early Eighties. Building upon the data of the Encuesta de Población Activa 
[Inquiry on the working population] carried out by the Spanish Statistical Institute, Caritas 
Spain shows that in 1991 in Castile and Léon there was a relative poverty rate close to 
27.2%, against a national average of 19.4% (FOESSA, 1994). 
Thus, when, in the late eighties, last resort minimum income protection entered into the 
public debate, Castile and Leon was a community with a level of economic development 
below the Spanish average, a traditional structure of the economy and poverty levels 
higher than average, albeit lower than the Spanish poorest ACs, such as Andalusia, 
Extremadura and Murcia. 
 
4.2 Party structure in Castile and Léon 
In the first democratic elections held in Castile and Léon, on December the 8th 1983, the 
Spanish Socialist Workers' Party obtained the majority (of votes), and formed a cabinet 
under the leadership of Demetrio Madrid (see tab. 18).  This first term was characterized 
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by some judicial scandals involving the president of the community which forced him to 
resign in 1986. Results and ruling coalition changed in the following elections in 1987.The 
important increase of votes for the CDS - the party founded by the protagonist of the 
Spanish Transition, Adolfo Suarez, and positioned at the centre of the political spectrum - 
at the expense of the Spanish Socialist Party, led to the designation of the rising star of the 
Spanish centre-right, José Maria Aznar, candidate of the alliance of right-wing parties that 
in a few years would create the Popular Party. 
Tab. 18: Evolution of electoral results in Castile and Léon, 1983, 1987 ,1991. 
Party Number of Seats % of votes GovernmentCoalition 
8 May 1983Elections 
PSOE 42 44,8  
1983 – 1986 PSOE 
1986 – PSOE 
FAP 39 40,04 
CDS 2 6,03 
PDL 1 3,63 
    
10 June 1987Elections 
FAP 32 34,9  
1987 – 1990 FAP 
1990 FAP – CDS 
PSOE 32 34,5 
CDS 18 19,7 
PDP 1 2,5 
    
26 May 1991Elections 
PP 43 44,25  
1991 – 1995 PP PSOE 35 37 
CDS 5 8,3 
IU 1 5,4 
Source: Cortés de Castilla y Léon. 
 
The 1987 elections constituted a turning point for the Castile and Leon political system. In 
all subsequent elections, prevailed the candidate backed by the centre-right PP, which 
would become the hegemonic party in this AC’s. Conversely the CDS would gradually 
lose support and votes to this party, up to decision to merge permanently into the PP in 
2005. 
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4.3 The introduction of the Ingreso Minimo de Insercion in Castile and Léon 
The introduction of the first minimum income scheme in CyL, named Ingresos Mínimos de 
Inserción (Minimum Insertion Income, IMI), occurred soon after the introduction of the 
Ingreso Madrileno de Integracion, in July 1990, with the approval of the Decree Law 132/1990. 
Despite this, the policy making process in Castile and Léon, with some similarities, 
presented also some relevant differences. It is, indeed, a much more rapid process, started 
only after the introduction of the measure in Madrid, which had little to do with the 
national debate and was only modestly affected by what happened in other Spanish 
regions. At the same time, some of the actors who have played an important role in 
introducing the measure in Madrid, and in particular the trade unions, played an essential 
role in order to understand the introduction of IMI in Castile and Leon. 
The presence of a particularly elderly population, combined with the administrative 
difficulties created by the presence of many small municipalities, made the construction of 
an efficient social service system one of the main concern and objective of Castile and 
Leon. This public policy area began therefore particularly developed since the 
establishment of this Autonomous Community.  
Within managers and experts of social assistance – what Ferrera (1993) called the policy 
environment - in the second half of the '80s began a debate on the necessity to strengthen 
measures to tackle poverty and social exclusion. By the mid-eighties, similarly to the rest 
of Spain, the main intervention in the anti-poverty field were the so-called Ayudas 
punctuales (lit. Ad hoc aids), measures of economic support granted by municipalities to 
respond to emergency situations. Those are benefits granted to low income families in case 
a particular event created serious needs, to allow temporarily the household to bear the 
costs for accommodation and food (in particular, expenses for rent or mortgages). A 
typical situation in which those aids were granted was to allow a household where the 
"breadwinner" is a long-term unemployed to face unexpected expenses. These forms of 
financial support - which still exist in Spain, in most cases called Ayudas de Emergencia 
Social (lit. Social Emergency Aids), - are regulated and managed by the municipalities and 
co-financed by the ACs. 
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The regional administration began to discuss the possible introduction of an anti-poverty 
measure at the end of the Eighties, while structuring one of the most efficient social service 
system in Spain (CYL DSS). This reflection never led to a concrete policy proposal, 
although it constituted a facilitating factor, allowing the proposals made in the following 
months to be received with some interest by the administration. 
The second fundamental factor concerned the development of a regional concertation in 
Castile and Léon. This – in CyL as in most Spanish CAs (but not in Madrid) – began to take 
place only after the success of the 14D general strike, the agreement on the definition of the 
PSP among the two most representatives trade unions, the failed attempt at national level 
to reach an agreement on the introduction of a national minimum income scheme, the pact 
with the Leguina government in Madrid and the decision of the trade unions to shift their 
request at sub-national level. It is only with the beginning of the negotiations between the 
government and the social partners, that for the first time in Castile and Léon we start to 
see a discussion on the possible introduction of a regional safety net (CYL DSS; CYL 
CCOO). 
The introduction of a minimum income scheme or, as they were called at the time in Spain, 
of a “salario social” (social wage) represented a break-up point for the social partners, a key 
point to reach a pact with the government of the Autonomous Communities (CYL CCOO; 
CYL UGT). Newspaper articles at the time agreed describing the IMI as an essential 
requirement presented by the unions to the regional government during negotiations: 
“Maroto (Secretary UGT Castilla y Leon) gives a positive assessment of the document, because "it 
is the best possible deal" in this region. However, he noted that there are negative aspects, such as 
the failure to agree on collective bargaining for public servants, on the economic development of the 
region and on vocational training (...). (As for the positives) the leader of the UGT considers 
particularly important, more than all the rest, the agreement for the implementation of a minimum 
income scheme in Castile and Leon”154. 
In the same article, it emerges how, besides the introduction of a last resort Mis, the second 
essential request in order to accept a regional pact was the introduction of a parastatal 
                                                          
154 El Norte de Castilla y Leon, 7 April 1990, “UGT decides to accept the agreement over 
concertation in Castile and Léon”. Translation by the Author. 
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body, in which trade unions and government representatives could monitor the effective 
functioning of the program. In this particular moment, trade unions and local 
representatives were available to renounce other requests, such as the development of a 
regional vocational training system, in order to reach an agreement over the introduction 
of a Mis that included the creation of a bilateral body. Both these conditions were 
respected in the social pact signed on April the sixth 1990 (point D and H), that would 
translate into the Decree 132/1990, which introduced the Minimum Insertion Income in 
Castile and Léon. 
As for the party politics, it is important to stress that, different from other regional 
contexts, before the beginning of the concertation with the trade unions neither the 
Government sustained by the Popular Party nor the other political forces in the Cortés of 
Castile and Léon had ever proposed the introduction of a regional safety net. 
Although they cannot be considered among the driving forces, parties do not object in any 
way to this path departure from the traditional anti-poverty model. The Popular Party, 
which had the relative majority in the Cortès, did not prevent the achievement of an 
agreement between the unions and the government over this issue. Some specific political 
dynamics allow to better understand the position of this party with respect of this 
measure. Firstly, similar to the Madrid case, it was a relatively weak government, seeking 
legitimacy and good terms with the social partners: for this reason, the regional 
government tried to reach an agreement with the trade unions, even without their effective 
strength after the success of the general strike of December 14, 1988.The centre-right won 
with less than 0.5 points margin against the PSOE, which at national level and in most of 
the other Spanish autonomous communities had an absolute or relative majority. In view 
of the regional elections that were to take place a few months later, accepting the proposals 
of the PSP and negotiating an agreement with the trade unions was considered crucial to 
maintain the government. 
The second reason – which is strongly correlated – lies in the political strategy followed by 
the PP since the end of the Eighties. At national level, José María Aznar, after resigning 
from the presidency of the Castile and Léon to become the President of the newly formed 
Partido Popular, in the congress held in early March of 1990 inaugurated the strategy that 
312 
 
would be defined by commentators and experts "conquering the centre"(Balfour, 2005). In 
particular, within the ten point of the new party programme, there was also “the 
construction of a more cohesive society, which included all of its member, workers and the 
unemployed, those who have more with those who have less155. 
Conquering the moderate electorate was particularly important in CyL, where in 1987 the 
centrist party CDS obtained almost 20% of the votes. This strategy was hard to reconcile 
with the opposition against an anti-poverty measure similar to that proposed by the trade 
unions, above all in a moment in which most of the other Autonomous Communities – 
very often ruled by the adversary socialist party – were introducing very similar 
programmes (see Chapter 2). The necessity to reach an agreement with the trade unions 
allied with the determination to present itself as a centre moderate party, made the PP in 
Castile and Léon give support to the introduction of a regional minimum income scheme. 
Those factors permitted that three months after the agreement with the social partners the 
Decree 132/1990 was approved, which introduced the Minimum Insertion Income in 
Castile and Léon. 
Although the name may suggest otherwise, the measure introduced in CyL had a passive 
nature, limiting its intervention to monetary support. It was, above all, a residual measure, 
characterized by very restrictive entry requirements. Individuals were actually 
automatically excluded if they accessed to any other social protection scheme 
(contributory or non-contributory pension, unemployment benefits, etc.) or other forms of 
aid, including private aid (or family or relatives legally obliged to pay alimony). To access 
it was necessary to comply with specific age (adults between 25 and 65 years)156and 
residency requirements (have resided for at least two years in the territory of CyL). 
Beneficiaries were exclusively households: thus, it was impossible for single individuals to 
access the IMI, while it was possible for married or de-facto couples, lonely parents, or for 
cohabitants linked/bound by family ties. In addition, specific behavioural requirements 
were present: beneficiaries had to ensure children school attendance, that the benefit was 
                                                          
155 Point 9 of the so called Aznar Decalogue in the X Congress of the Popular Party. 
156 One year later, with the introduction of Decree 286/1991 might access to the Imi also 
individuals below 25 with children. 
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“allocated to its purpose”, not to exercise begging, not to turn down any job offer, 
otherwise they would be excluded from the benefit. 
What made the measure particularly restrictive was the presence of specific time limits: 
you could access the IMI for a maximum of one year, from 1991 renewable for a maximum 
of two times. Moreover, it was definitely a non-generous benefit, amounting to 30 
thousand pesetas per month (about 180 EUR), with no equivalence scale, so that benefit 
amount did not change in relation to the type and number of family members. No 
indexing mechanism was provided so that, from 1990 to 1997 – when some legislative 
changes were introduced - benefit amount never changed. 
As for the selection procedures, the decree 286/1991 contributed to the definition of a 
decentralised model of governance, structured/based on three government levels. If the 
AC had the legislative function and was therefore responsible for establishing the 
requirements and financing the entire system, its implementation – and in particular the 
selection process – was based on the interaction between the municipal social services and 
the Servicio Territorial de Sanidad y Bienestar (Territorial Service of Health and Welfare), 
located at provincial level. The former had to organize the first meeting with the aspiring 
beneficiaries, create a first "social report" designed to indicate their core characteristics and 
collect the necessary documentation. The social report and the documentation had to be 
sent to the Servicio Territorial de Sanidad y Bienestar which had to collect all the applications 
and check the correctness of the documents. The entire process had to take place within 
ten days, then the provincial authority had further ten days in case it needed to request 
other documents or corrections. Once certified the actual presence of a necessity - both by 
the social worker and by the administration - it was up to the Chief of the Territorial 
Service to grant or deny the Imi, leaving untouched the presence of budgetary constraints. 
The decree 132/1990 explicitly introduced the absence of an individual right to access the 
benefit: the article 16.2 states that "in no case should be granted aids that make necessary 
to exceed the expenditure planned in the budget." 
A feature that distanced the safety net in CyL with the one introduced in Madrid was the 
low relevance of social inclusion and employment services. Although the decree 132/1990 
introduced the possibility that the municipal social services could put into practice 
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"supplementary or training measures”, and stated beneficiaries’ obligation to attend if they 
were made, the implementation of those measures was not required by the law. Unlike 
many of the measures introduced in this period in Spain, there was not in this programme 
a contractual element, so that it was not required the signing of an agreement between the 
beneficiary and the administration. Furthermore, the AC did not establish in any way how 
the insertion component – which was present at least in the name of the measure - should 
be organized, nor it established any connection with the Labour Department or, as in the 
Madrid case, with the third sector. 
It was, therefore, a mainly passive measure. The presence of such stringent entry 
requirements and the low investment on the activation component led Aguilar and 
colleagues (1995) – who introduced the first typology of regional minimum income 
schemes in Spain - to insert the case of CyL in the category "Programmes of lower 
protective ability" (see also Arriba and Moreno, 2002). 
This measure therefore is different from the schemes introduced in other more studied 
autonomous communities, such as the Mis in the Basque Country, Community of Madrid 
or in Cataluña. Moreover, as we have seen, the origin of this measure met the few points 
contained in the Propuesta Sindical Prioritaria rather than the complex programmes 
introduced in the Basque Country or in France. In Castile and Léon in fact trade union 
proposal did not start a policy debate within the community, and there was no empirical 
evidence of learning dynamics from the most interesting measures realized by other 
countries or Autonomous Communities. As an example, differently from the Madrid case, 
no expert academics or from other administration that collaborated to the construction of 
other regional safety nets were invited in CyL, nor comparative studies were 
commissioned on last resort safety nets in the other CAs. 
The policy “investment” of the regional government in the construction of a safety net was 
therefore in this phase rather limited, and in all case much lower compared with the 
Madrid case.  It was not even planned an evaluation and monitoring process, except for 
that provided within the Comision de Seguimento. Also for this reason, we have very few 
data to evaluate the strengths and limitations of the measure. However, from the brief 
reports carried out annually by the Consejo Economico y Social de Castilla y Léon [Social and 
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Economic Council of the Community of Castile and Léon, CESCyL], some interesting facts 
emerge. About half of the beneficiaries of the IMI were single mothers; the other relevant 
social group were the gipsies, who represented approximately 40% of the beneficiaries of 
the measure in 1996 (CESCyL, 1996). As for the total number of beneficiaries, on average 
between 1994 and 1997 it was around 0,26% of regional resident households; the coverage 
rate was therefore almost half of that of the Community of Madrid in the same period. 
To conclude, in this first phase the attention of the regional government on minimum 
income protection was rather limited. The measure was introduced mostly to reach an 
agreement with the trade unions, which considered it crucial to engage in a concertation 
process with the government. The scant interest of the government is evident not only 
looking at the design of the measure, with a strong emphasis on budgetary control and 
low investment in the enabling component, but also considering the low attention on 
implementation and evaluation. Thus, the first comparative study on regional minimum 
income schemes in Spain defined the “Ingresos Mínimos de Inserción in Castile and Leon the 
most inadequate, the one that creates more difficulties to access, that proportionally covers less 
citizens and has a smaller benefit amount, and the only one that do not foresee an amount increase 
for children living in the household "” (Aguilar et al., 1995, p. XX, Author translation). 
 
4.4 The gradual expansion of minimum income protection in Castile and Léon. 
The first phase – characterised by path departure, i.e. by the introduction and 
implementation of a residual anti-poverty measure of limited protective ability – ideally 
ended in 1997 when, with the introduction of Decree 164/1997, it opened another phase, 
characterised by frequent legislative interventions aimed at a gradual strengthening of the 
IMI. 
This phase, was propelled by a period of positive economic trend. Between 1996 and 2005, 
GDP grew at an average rate of 5.5 points yearly, below the Community of Madrid (6.3%) 
and the national average (6.3%), but still significantly. Unemployment fell gradually, from 
21.2% in 1995, to 13.7% in 2000, to reach in 2005 the lowest unemployment rate (8.7%) in 
the recent history of this autonomous community. It was therefore a period of sustained 
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economic growth, driven by the increasing productivity in agriculture, the growth of the 
building sector and the good performance of the automotive industry (CESCyL, 2005). 
From a political standpoint, in those years the hegemony of the Popular Party was 
reinforced in Castile and Lèon, which won the majority of seats in the three election of 
1995, 1999 and 2003 (Tab. 19).  
Tab. 19: Election results in Castille and Léon, year 1995, 1999, 2003. 
Party N. of Seats % votes Government Coalition 
28 May 1995 Election 
PP 50 53,2  
1995 – 1999 PP PSOE-P 27 30,2 
IU 5 9,8 
UPL 2 2,6 
    
13 June 1999 Election 
PP 48 52  
1999 – 2003 PP PSOE 30 33,9 
IU 1 5,6 
UPL 3 3,8 
    
25 May 2003 Election 
PP 48 49,6  
1991 – 1995 PP PSOE 32 37,6 
UPL 2 3,9 
Source: Cortés de Castilla y Léon 
 
Progressively, in CyL it took shape a not very competitive political system, where the 
victory of the conservative party was never seriously challenged and the electoral distance 
with the main opposing party, the Socialist Workers Party, remained steady. Niche parties 
contributed to enliven the regional party system. United Left, after winning almost 10% of 
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the votes in 1995 election, in the following elections saw this consent progressively erode. 
Conversely, the Union of the Leon People, a regionalist party which in the economic 
sphere have a centrist programme, slightly increased through time its share of votes.  
This period was characterised by frequent legislative changes in this policy field, all 
aiming at a gradual transformation of the IMI along three different dimension: gradual 
strengthening of its protective intensity, introduction of a social inclusion element 
complementing the monetary support, reinforcement of the administrative ability to 
manage this means-tested benefit. 
More precisely, the issue of minimum income protection reappeared in the political 
agenda in Castile and Léon in 1996 as a result of a bill proposed by Elena Pérez Martínez, 
spokesman for United Left in the Social Affairs Committee of the Cortés de Castilla y 
Leon. This law proposal aimed primarily to introduce a right to social inclusion in addition 
to the monetary benefits, to improve the benefit amount and to ease the bureaucratic 
procedure: 
“(We want a measure that) guarantees a minimum income for an indefinite period until the need 
condition persists - and not with time limits as it is now - and, above all, we want it coupled with 
mechanisms supporting beneficiaries’ social inclusion. This is something which is not being done in 
this Autonomous Community. Here, we give a Minimum Insertion Income and we do not realize a 
real path so that it can really be useful to find a place in society, to reach the socio-economic 
inclusion of the person who receives it. For this reason, not only my Parliamentary Group, but 
everyone interested in this topic demands a new program.”157 
The IU proposal, supported in the regional Parliament by all the opposition parties, was 
not hardly opposed by the PP which, even though it did not vote its approval, ensured 
through its spokesman that the points raised would be resolved by the new regulation, 
which was being finalised by the Department of Social Policy and that “once finished, will be 
perfectly adequate to respond to the new social necessities” (Ibidem).  
Indeed, the regulation approved with the Decree 164 of August 1997 specifically aimed at 
introducing an obligation for the beneficiary to sign an Individualized Plan for Social 
                                                          
157 Proposición No de Ley, 212-I, presented by the Councilor Elena Pérez Martínez, IU 
Parliamentary Group, on 2 october 1996. Author translation. 
318 
 
Inclusion - directed both to the person entitled to the Imi and to the other household 
members –went in the direction suggested by the opposition to include a social inclusion 
component in the design of the Minimum Insertion Income. Besides the introduction of 
what the administration itself called a “Poverty contract” (CEYSCYL, 1998), those changes 
introduced an equivalence scale that allowed numerous households to have a more 
generous benefit and made easier the administrative process allowing a quicker response 
to citizens’ applications.  
Legislative interventions in the field of minimum income protection did not end with the 
decree 164/1997. In the following years, in a period characterized by economic growth and 
increasing available resources for the autonomous Government, two new decrees were 
introduced, both preceded by agreements with the trade unions, and both having as an 
objective the strengthening of the safety net in CyL, in particular along two dimensions: 
increasing the generosity of the benefit amount and reinforcing the administrative 
structure. 
In particular, increasing the benefit amount and progressively connect it with the 
minimum wage – so that the IMI corresponds to a share of the minimum wage amount, 
indexed each year-  is one of the main requests of the trade unions in the negotiations that 
preceded the introduction of the decree 197/2000 (CYL CCOO; CYL UGT). This entailed 
that the basic amount of the IMI increased progressively from 2000 until 2003, to reach the 
73% of the (Interprofessional) Minimum Wage (Salario Mínimo Interprofesional, SMI). 
More precisely, it was envisaged that benefit amount increased gradually over time; in 
2000 was equal to 61.2% of the Minimum wage, 65.1% in 2001, in 2002 69% and in 2003 the 
73%. In the same pact were also relaxed some of the entry requirements, and more 
precisely those regarding the household composition and the necessity to be enrolled in 
the employment centres’. 
The agreement of the 12th February of 2004 – signed between trade unions and the 
Autonomous Government – entailed a further increase of the basic amount – from 2005 
equal to 75% of the minimum wage – and also of the equivalence scale. Means test was as 
well simplified and made more efficient: from this moment the administration took into 
consideration all the applicants’ earnings of the month preceding the application and not, 
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as it was done before, of the whole year. This is an important innovation for a measure 
which must be able to respond quickly to need situations, which often correspond to real 
social emergencies. 
Those type of intervention were possible because the administration of Castile and Léon 
strongly invested in improving the administrative capacities (CYL DSS) necessary to 
manage a complex measure such as a minimum income scheme. Since the introduction of 
IMI specific agreements were created - the first with the Institute of Social Security, then 
with the Public Employment Service - which allowed to rapidly check whether the 
beneficiary was eligible for other social benefits that would exclude them from receiving 
the IMI. At the same time, an agreement with the Finance Minister facilitated the income 
test of the applicants, which was done through a simple internet check. In this regard, 
particularly important was the realization of an elaborate IT system, which would be 
considerably reinforced over time, enabling the various administrations (municipal, 
provincial, regional) involved in the management of the Imi and in the implementation of 
the social inclusion programs to communicate in real time (CYL SW; CYL DSS). 
Tab. 20 – Evolution of the IMI in Castile and Léon, selected years. 
Year 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 
 
Basic Amount 
 
 
180€ 
 
198€ 
 
282€ 
 
345€ 
 
374€ 
HouseholdBeneficiaries  
2.291 
 
 
2.111 
 
 
2.901 
 
 
2.893 
 
 
2.147 
 
 
Expenditure 
(monetary component) 
 
5510000 
 
 
6914343 
 
 
9564934 
 
 
12053001 
 
 
11.855.520 
 
Source: Authors calculation, based on CESCYL, several years. 
The progressive increase of the benefit amount – and, consequently, of the access threshold 
– coupled with the enhancement of the selection process allowed total expenditure and 
beneficiaries numbers to slightly but constantly increase in this decade, in a period of 
enhancing/improving social and economic conditions in Castile and Léon. Total 
expenditure in absolute terms increased from around 5.5 million in mid Nineties to around 
12 million in 2007 (Table 20). 
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The second relevant change in this period was the greater investment in the social 
inclusion component of the Minimum Insertion Income in CyL. As shown in Table 21, we 
observe in this period a significant increase in resources directed to municipalities and/or 
third sector organizations for the implementation of social inclusion measures. Since the 
IMI was first of all a measure to tackle social exclusion, interventions were mainly of social 
character, aimed at resolving serious problems within the household. 
“Traditionally, we assisted groups with structural problems, so that we normally worked in 
particular on social integration, with a specific focus on issue such as alcoholism, addictions, child 
care, housing hygienic conditions, domestic violence. "(CYL SW -  Social Worker). 
 
Tab. 21 Regional Spending on services to tackle social exclusion in CyL, 1998 -2006 
Year Funding to municipalities for services to 
tackle social exclusion158 (in Euro) 
Funding to third sector to tackle 
social exclusion (in Euro) 
1998 967578 378638 
1999 1038950 N.a. 
2000 1055595 N.a. 
2001 1191199 963826 
2002 1443677 906070 
2003 1534707 1091197 
2004 1688116 1138375 
2005 1892271 1746457 
2006 1927915 2018017 
Source: Author elaboration from CESCyL data, several years. 
 
To sum up, in an age of sustained economic development, in agreement with the 
opposition and most of the time as a result of specific pacts with the trade unions, in the 
period between 1997 and 2007 minimum income protection system in Castile and Léon 
was gradually reinforced. Since 1997 the economic benefit was supported by a series of 
                                                          
158 Those are divided into three different funds: Services to combat social exclusion, Services in 
favour of ethnic minorities, Services to combat poverty (CESCyL, several years). 
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initiatives and services aiming at favouring social and economic integration, although 
social-enabling initiatives appear not adequately developed in a comparative perspective. 
In particular, horizontal integration with labour market services – where available – was 
completely lacking. Throughout this period, the benefit amount increased gradually as 
well and the selection procedures were simplified, while some of the bureaucratic 
obstacles that prevented beneficiaries access were eliminated.  
However, along some positive elements, some of the structural weaknesses of the IMI 
persisted. It was a strongly residual measure which, above all, did not guarantee the 
subjective right of access to potential beneficiaries: the measure was, indeed, still subjected 
to budgetary constraints, and if the number of applicants exceeded the available budget, 
legitimate applicants would remain excluded (CYL SW). 
 
4.5 The introduction of the Citizenship Guaranteed Income in Castile and Léon. 
The approval of the decree 126/2004, the last intervention modifying the Ingresos Mínimos 
de Inserción, ended the season of gradual and progressive improvement of the last resort 
safety net in CyL. The reform of the Statute of Autonomy of Castile and Léon, which 
introduced the right of the residents experiencing poverty and/or social exclusion to an 
economic support, and the subsequent implementing legislation, changed drastically 
policies to tackle poverty in this Autonomous Community. This section is dedicated to the 
process that led to this policy change, and to outline its main consequences in terms of 
policy. More precisely, it shows how a factor exogenous to the normal operation of the 
policy-making process - the need to introduce a new Statute of autonomy - has changed 
actors structure of opportunities. The political agency of the most important actors in the 
social assistance field in Castile and Léon has subsequently opened the doors to the 
introduction of a new Law. 
As for the first aspect, after winning the electoral contest the newly-elected President of 
Castile and Léon Vicente Herrera put in the first place of his election mandate the 
introduction of a new Statute of Autonomy in Castile and Léon. The process of fiscal, 
administrative and political decentralization that had characterised Spanish democracy 
since the early Eighties made actually necessary the definition of a new “chart of 
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autonomies” that would attest the assumption of new competences and responsibilities of 
the government of CyL, similarly to what was happening also in many other ACs, more 
than twenty years after the approval of the original statutes. 
This document, which can be regarded as a sort of Constitutional Chart of the Spanish 
Autonomous Communities, to be approved required the approval of two thirds of the 
regional assembly. This allowed the oppositions to negotiate certain conditions in 
exchange for the approval of the Statute. In particular, their main requests were the 
creation of a Consejo de Dialogo Social that would institutionalise regional concertation and 
the formal recognition of the individual right to access to minimum income protection in 
Castille and Leon (CYL PSOE; CYL UGT). 
Revealing is the reading of the Session Diaries of the Parliament of Castile and Léon of 11 
may and 19 June 2006, when respectively the regional General Secretary of UGT and the 
General Secretary of CC.OO. were invited at the Non-Permanent Commission for the Study of 
the Autonomy Statute Reform. In this official session, both unions required the introduction 
of a new Chart of Social Rights, containing the right to protection in case of poverty and 
social exclusion. In particular, the Secretary of CC.OO. required that the new chart would 
guarantee "protection against poverty, social exclusion and a Guaranteed Minimum 
Income to all citizens”159.  
The demands of the social partners were endorsed also by the PSOE, so much that this 
party subordinated the approval of the statute to the introduction of this provision (CGIL 
PSOE). The support for this proposal is clear also re-reading the proceedings of the 
parliamentary session, in which the Spokesman of the Socialist Group reiterates: 
"For this, we are very attentive to the proposals that have been made (by the trade unions), 
including - and I want to emphasize it because this group is interested in emphasizing it - the one 
that was presented concerning the minimum income, which we consider positively and with a good 
political willpower." 
                                                          
159Cortes de Castilla y Leon, Diario de Sesiones n. 474, 9 June 2006.  UGT requests are presented by 
the General Secretary of Castile and Léon Prieto González, in the Diario de Sesiones n. 450, 11 May 
2006. Author translation. 
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More cautious at this stage, the parliamentary group of the PP, little inclined to introduce 
in the Statute of Autonomy a social right – such as the minimum income guarantee - not 
included in the Spanish Constitution of 1978 (CYL CCOO; see also Cortes de Castilla y 
Leon, Diario de Sesiones n. 474, 9 June 2006). Despite those concerns, opinions openly 
against the reinforcement of minimum income protection did not exist in Castile and Léon. 
As shown in the previous paragraphs, the Popular Party in CyL pursued a strategy of 
conquering the centre of the political spectrum, careful about maintaining a dialogue with 
the social partners and not opposing public intervention against social exclusion. This 
political direction was accentuated with the election of Vicente Herrera as leader of the 
People’s Party and President of this AC in 2003 (CYL PP; CYL DSS; CYL CCOO; CYL 
UGT) Differently from his colleague in Madrid Esperanza Aguirre, Herrera belonged to 
the conservative current of the Spanish PP, and considered concertation and the 
development of a cohesive community key goals of the economic and social policy of its 
government. Thus in his keynote investiture speech on June 27, 2007, he proposed very 
different objectives from those of is colleague in Madrid: 
“People and families are the heart, the beginning and very end of all the policies that I want to 
realize here in Castile and Léon, which will have as a ultimate purpose three fundamental goals: 
firstly, to guarantee to all access to all fundamentals social rights, so education, work, health, and 
housing; secondly, to promote the effective realization in Castile and Léon of the values that define a 
qualitative and cohesive society; and thirdly, to strengthen policies targeted to the families” 
“I would like to address each of the jobless people, these women, these young people, to tell them, 
once again, to try to provide them a quality job will be the major concern of this government in the 
next four years; because all the inhabitants of Castile and Leon should have the opportunity to 
develop their own projects and family in this land, and we politicians have a duty to actually make 
this ambition reality” 
The governing years of President Herrera saw the approval of many different social pacts 
on several issues, not only on last resort income protection, but also employment (III, IV, 
V, VI Plan Regional de Empleo de Castilla León), housing and education policies. In the 
interviews, it constantly emerged how the direction impressed by Herrera to the PP in CyL 
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is particularly significant to understand the policy trajectory of minimum income 
protection in this AC: 
“We attribute (the numerous social pacts signed) to the political sensibility of the current president. 
Vicente Herrera has an absolute majority in parliament. Still, he prefers concerted decisions with 
social and economic agents. This is because he contends that these forces can help develop better 
policies. This is his political choice (…). Obviously, we also consider that the opposition, at the time 
when it was necessary to approve the statutes of autonomy, posed as a prerequisite the 
institutionalization of the social dialogue in this region.” (CYL UGT) 
“For our President the fundamental social public services are very important; while in Madrid, 
members of our parties discuss about privatizing the health sector, here, in CyL, it has always been 
said that we will never do anything like that. (…) The President has its own priorities, and he has 
always considered important social policies. In general, the PP obviously recognizes the importance 
of social policies, but … this route of pursuing the concertation with the social partners, you do not 
have it everywhere, it is a strong choice of our President” (CYL DSS – Head of the Department 
of Social Service) 
Arguments against last resort anti-poverty policies, as fears are that such measures 
discourage labour market participation, often advanced by liberal thinkers and politicians, 
are not frequent in CyL, as recognized by members of the regional PP: 
“We never had this type of concerns, with regard/against the so called “welfarism” or the poverty 
trap. In the electoral programs of the PP in CyL we always gave priority to social services, and this 
in particular with the current President, who considers the fight against social exclusion a 
particularly important point. (…). We are a party that always made effort to conquer the centre of 
the political spectrum, we are moderate, and we want to have an egalitarian and cohesive society. If 
during a crisis there are people who lose their jobs and are at risk of social exclusion, for us it is 
simply unacceptable that they have right to nothing. Because this help only creating social tension, 
which does not help in any way the good functioning of a society” (CYL PP). 
Therefore, the political direction impressed by Herrera ensured that there was a 
substantial consensus on anti-poverty policies in CyL: 
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“In general, about social exclusion, there in unanimity. All agree that we have to fight poverty, that 
we have to make the entry requirements less stringent: in the specific, in little details there are some 
conflicts, but on the general theme there is consensus among the political forces” (CYL SW Social 
Worker) 
The drive of the trade unions and of the oppositions parties and the positive attitude of the 
government of Castile and Léon towards social dialogue (CYL DSS; CYL UGT; CYL PSOE; 
CYL PP), allowed both requests to be successful. As a consequence, the new Statute of 
Autonomy of Castile and Léon establishes that the AC have to “promote the social 
dialogue as a mean to reach social and economic development” (Art. 16.4) and the "right to 
a Citizenship Guaranteed Income. All citizens of CyL who are experiencing social 
exclusion have the right to access a Citizenship Guaranteed Income" (Art. 13.9). 
The introduction of the article 13.9 opened the door to the introduction of a new legislative 
intervention in the anti-poverty field. In the following years, the regional government 
negotiated with the social partners the main characteristic of the new 
policy/measure/program. Being a complex law that aims to rethink from the beginning the 
minimum income protection system, the consultation process lasted long, about two years. 
As often occurs in this area of policy, the main points of contention concerned the 
generosity of the economic benefit and access requirements, considered too stringent by 
the trade unions (CYL CCOO; CYL UGT). On 29 December 2009 the Government, UGT, 
CC.OO. and CECALE signed a tripartite agreement called “Agreement of the Social 
Dialogue on the Guaranteed Citizenship Income”. The measure agreed with the social 
partners afterwards translated into a policy proposals and approved on the 30 August 
2010, when the Cortés of Castile and Léon approved Law 7/2010, which introduced the 
Renta Garantizada de Ciudadanía (Citizenship Guaranteed Income, RGC) in CyL. 
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4.6 The Great Recession and the implementation of the Renta Garantizada de Ciudadanía. 
The new programme introduced in Castile and Léon had many interesting features which 
differentiated the measure not only from its predecessor, the IMI, but also from many 
others minimum income schemes introduced over the years in the different autonomous 
communities in Spain. Some are fundamental features that modified the nature of the 
policy and the level of protection granted to the Spanish citizens residing in CyL. In 
particular, with law 7/2010 the government no longer needed the approval by the Regional 
Parliament to increase funds for minimum protection, but this could actually be done with 
a simple administrative decree. We speak therefore of extendable credit and of subjective 
right to access to minimum income protection: the absence of budgetary constraints – 
coupled with the possibility to appeal to a court in case of non-legitimate refusal -  meant 
that formally all citizens who met the requirements established by the law was 
automatically protected by the economic benefit and the social inclusion measures160.  
Moreover, in contrast with what happened before, the RGC was not exclusively targeted at 
individuals in condition of poverty and social exclusion, but it was a more comprehensive 
programme intended to protect individuals in case of economic distress, even if an 
individual was not in a condition of social disadvantage or had a job.  It thus became 
possible to accumulate earned income and guaranteed minimum income, if the former did 
not allow the entire household to have an income higher than the amount of the latter. 
This innovation came with a substantial change in the “activation” component: social 
services had from now the task to establish whether the beneficiaries possessed the so-
called conjunctural or structural problems. While the latter access traditional care services 
in order to contrast the specific problems existing in the household, the former access 
predominantly the employment related social inclusion activities. For the first time 
therefore the CA organised for RMG beneficiaries’ employment and career guidance 
services, competence and skills assessments, vocational training, and all the activities that 
might facilitate the encounter between the demand and the supply, in accordance with the 
employment centres.  Also the possibility to cumulate earned income and RCG was 
introduced to make more rapid (and convenient) the (re)entry in the regular labour 
                                                          
160 Art. 35 of the Law. N. 7: "In order to guarantee a sufficient economic coverage to the program, 
the funds can be expanded in accordance with the current legislation” Author translation. 
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market. All those changes aligned the minimum income system in CyL with European 
standards. In most European countries, for many years now the access to last resort 
income protection constitutes a social right held by all citizens and it has increasingly 
favoured the integration of income support, social services and active labour market 
policies (Bahle et al. 2010, Lodemel and Moreira, 2014). 
Beside those major transformations in the very nature of the income protection system, the 
shift from the IMI to the RGC entailed other relevant changes. Firstly, selection procedures 
changed and means testing procedures were made even more stringent in order to avoid 
the risk of frauds and “false positives” (CYL DSS). For this purpose – similarly to the 
Madrid case – to the introduction of the subjective right corresponded a centralization of 
the selection procedures: with the shift from the IMI to the RGC, the last word regarding 
the granting of benefits was that of the Department of Social Services of the Autonomous 
Communities. Some factors allowed, however, to avoid the delays and administrative 
overhead seen in the case of the Community of Madrid. The procedures for managing the 
regional safety net, as well as administrative capacities, were actually enhanced with the 
approval of Law 7/2010. This is because the administrative burden of the central offices in 
CyL was relieved by provincial agencies, which performed an initial screening of the 
applications that did not have all the formal requirements. Furthermore, the staff at the 
central office in charge of check and selection of the applications was strongly reinforced in 
order to permit a rapid response (CYL PP). Lastly, a new investment in the IT systems was 
made, which allowed not only all the various institutional body involved in the 
management of the RGC to communicate in real time, but also to carry out faster and more 
efficient investigations through specific agreements with the Ministry of Finance, with the 
Social Security System, with the state authority for motor vehicles and with the real estate 
registry office. 
Besides a scrutinized control of the correspondence with the income requirements, it was 
also envisaged an additional control over the living standards by the social workers, which 
had the task to meet the aspiring beneficiaries before the finalisation of the application, in 
order to create a personalised report that went together with the documentation. 
Tab. 22: Mis in Castile and Léon 
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 Ingresos Minimos de Insercion 
(Decreto 126/2004) 
RentaGarantizada de Ciudanania 
(Ley 7/2010, Decreto 61/2010) 
Nature of 
provision          
Discretional Right Based 
Beneficiaries Socially excluded Socially excluded 
Individuals living in poverty or in 
social exclusion for cyclical 
economic reasons (lack of income) 
Amount Min. 75% IPREM 
Max. 100% IPREM 
Min 80% IPREM 
Max 130% IPREM 
Requirements Age between 25 and 64161 
At least 1 year residency in CYL 
Impossibility to access to any other 
social service 
Earnings below IMI amount 
Possession of movable and 
immovable assets  
Age between 25 and 64162 
At least 1 year of residency in 
CYL 
Income from work, social benefit 
(with exception)163, or from 
movable and immovable assets 
(with exception164) below RGC 
amount 
 
Behavioural 
Requirements 
Communicate any personal change 
to social worker 
Take part in the activity of the 
Individualized Program 
To be registered at the Job Centre 
Not refuse any job offer 
Garantuee assistance and 
education to children 
Not exert beggary 
Communicate any personal 
change to social worker 
To take actively part in job 
seeking  
To be registered at the Job Centre 
To be present for job interviews 
Not refuse any job offer 
 
Governance 
Structure 
Decentralised Integrated 
Duration 1 year (renewable up to 3 years)                Indefinite 
Activation Local social services 
Third Sector 
Local services 
Job centres 
Third Sector 
 
                                                          
161 People under 25 years of age can access the measure if they are in charge of underage and / or 
if they are orphans of father or mother without the right to a pension (Decree 126 2004, Art, 8.b) 
162 People under 25 years of age can access the RGC if they have left the household with their 
parents for at least 3 years from the moment of the application, and for at least 2 of these years 
they have been supported by social services in case of underage in their charge, if they are 
orphans of father and mother without the right to a pension (Ley 7 / 2010, Art. 10.b) 
163 In the means-test are excluded scholarship and training contracts for people under the age of 
25, the so-called ‘child bonuses’ and social emergency aids. 
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Preventing episodes of fraud and false positives was thus a major goal pursued with 
insistence and strictness by the Administration, also to avoid scandals, since preventing 
that among the population spread the opinion that also not needy families access the 
benefit was considered essential to maintain popular support towards the measure (CYL 
PP; CYL DDS). Differently from Madrid however, this goal was not pursued even at the 
cost of reducing the ability to respond rapidly to the application. Increasing controls were 
in reality counterbalanced in CyL by a strengthened administrative structure. The law 
established a maximum of three months within which the application must receive an 
answer, otherwise it would be considered as not accepted, but the applicant may appeal to 
the administrative and / or judicial authorities (Art. 20). 
Law 7/2010 intervened also on the benefit generosity, increasing benefit amount and, more 
relevantly, locking it to the IPREM. This choice allowed that benefit amount increased 
automatically through time and it was not subjected each year - as in many ACs – to 
political decisions. Also time limits – still present with the IMI – were eliminated, and it 
was certified the right to receive the RGC as long as the need persisted. However, the 
possibility to receive the RGC was strongly dependent on the participation to social 
inclusion and labour market activities. Table 22 summarised the main changes introduced 
with the shift from the IMI to the RGC. 
To sum up, the introduction of the RGC constituted a fundamental change at least along 
three dimensions. Firstly, it increased the protective ability of the minimum income 
protection system in CyL; it was, in reality, a more generous scheme which guaranteed the 
access to all citizens meeting the requirements. In this regard, we have also to underline 
that those requirements were rather stringent, and that several bureaucratic impediments, 
especially for migrants, existed (CYL SW; CYL PSOE). Contextually, it improved the 
ability to manage the scheme, through an investment on the administrative structure and a 
greater integration between the various government levels associated, both for the means 
test and for the activation component, although for the latter there was room for much 
improvement. 
Finally, the boarders between social assistance and labour policies were relaxed, and for 
the first time last resort safety nets aimed at responding also to the growing share of the 
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low income workers who faced economic difficulties and could not access to other social 
benefits.    
If those were the changes brought about by the introduction of the RGC (Law 7/2010 and 
subsequent regulation introduced with the Decree 61/2010), it is necessary to underline 
that its implementation has been significantly influenced by the onset of the Great 
Recession also in CyL. After a period of sustained growth, from 2007 until 2012 the GDP 
did not grow in this region. According to Eurostat online database, (fig. 12) unemployment 
rate grew from 7,1% in 2007 to reach 21,7% in 2013. This meant that in 2013 around 
255thousand people were unemployed, almost half of them (48%) by more than one year.  
 
Figure 12 Evolution of the unemployment rate in Madrid, Castile and Léon and Spain, 2007 - 2014 
 
Source: Eurostat Online Database 
 
Thus, it is not a surprise that also in Castile and Léon, the period between 2008 and 2013 
was characterised by increasing demand for minimum income protection. In this AC, 
despite the constraints on regional expenditure, after the introduction of the RGC (2010) 
the number of beneficiaries and total expenditure increased significantly (tab 23). In 
particular, household beneficiaries, who were in 2006 0,27% of regional households, in 
2011 were 0,85% and in 2014 1,4%.  
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Furthermore, despite no data are available allowing a comparison with the IMI, it is 
possible to observe how, starting with the introduction of the Citizenship Guaranteed 
Income, the budget became effectively extendible, so that the budget would grow if there 
were more applicants than originally foreseen. Conversely, the expenditure for social 
inclusion programmes did not grow, so that the activation component, as confirmed also 
by the interviews, was not sufficiently presided. In particular, it seems still very limited the 
integration with active labour market policies, and very few the effective possibilities of 
vocational training and of employment offered by the employment centres to RMG 
recipients. (CYL SW; CYL DSS). 
 
Tab 23: Policy trajectory of Mis in CyL, 2007 - 2013 
Year Household 
Beneficiaries 
Budgetary 
provision 
Consolidated RMG 
Expenditure 
Expenditure for 
social inclusion 
programs 
2007 2.147 Not Available 11.855.521 6.116.251,34 
2008 2.235 NotAvailable 11.312.839 6.642.796,59 
2009 2.748 NotAvailable 13.820.525 8.368.940,58 
2010 3.444 NotAvailable 16.423.263 8.387.350 
2011 6.426 27000000 27.730.000 7.640.625,24 
2012 8.430 NotAvailable 32.000.000 7.219.025 
2013 10.372 32.254.523 46.587.170 7.461.013 
Source: Author eleaboration from CESCyL 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013. 
 
The second point that needs to be stressed is that in the light of the demand steady growth 
did not correspond a decrease in the ability of responding from the administration. 
Although we do not have long term period data regarding the number of applications 
presented, accepted and withdrawn, the data we have tell us something (Fig. 13), 
especially if compared with the Madrid case. With the introduction of the new measures in 
fact and the simultaneous worsening of social condition, the number of applications grew 
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considerably: from 18thousand in 2011 to more than 38 thousand in 2013. Despite this, the 
number of settled applications remained pretty high and constant, equal to 90% of total 
applications. It remained constant also the share of accepted claims, around 40% since the 
introduction of the new measure (CESCyL, 2014). The administration of CyL was therefore 
able to respond to the exponential growth of applications while, differently from the 
Madrid case, empirical evidence does not support the idea that there was also in CyL a 
more or less deliberate attempt to constrain the number of beneficiaries, as confirmed also 
in the interviews. 
 
Figure 13 Citizenship Guaranteed Income selection procedures in Castile and Léon, 2010 - 2013 
 
Source: Author elaboration from CESCyL 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014. 
 
In this regard, however, it is necessary to emphasise that in CYL some access requirements 
appear to constrain the possibility of access for some groups of potential beneficiaries, and 
especially of migrants (CYL SW; CYL PSOE). Even though there are no data showing the 
rate of access of migrants compared to Spanish citizens, from the interviews it emerged 
how some entry requirements were difficult to be complied by migrants. In particular, the 
request to present all the documentation concerning the assets in the applicant native 
country might have constituted an obstacle sufficient to discourage them to file in an 
application: those documents are actually in some case very difficult to obtain, often 
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requiring to travel back home - and having them officially translated in Spanish - a process 
which is very complicated and expensive. 
 
Tab 24. Evolution of Material Deprivation Rate, Spain, Madrid and CyL, 2008 - 2013 
GEO/TIME 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Spain 3,6 4,5 4,9 4,5 5,8 6,2 
Community 
of Madrid 
5,2 4,7 5,3 2,7 5,6 7,3 
Castile and León 0,8 2,1 2,9 3,7 2,2 1,8 
Source: Eurostat online database. 
 
To conclude, despite very stringent access requirements, the shift from the IMI to the RGC 
contributed to strengthen last resort safety net in Castile and Léon. Despite it is always 
hazardous to establish a direct link between policy output and social outcome, the trend of 
the Severe Material Deprivation rate appears rather revealing about the efficacy of the 
minimum income protection policies in this community. Starting from a very low level in 
2008, this index increased in the first years of the crisis but with the implementation in 
2011 of the RGC – despite still deteriorating economic and labour market conditions – 
deprivation was maintained under control, while it was mounting in the other Spanish 
CA’s and especially in the Community of Madrid (tab 24). Those data seem to confirm the 
general impression that emerges from the study of the evolution of the MIP system in 
Castile and Léon: in this region a good administrative capacity, combined with strong and 
constant demands for improving the regional safety net push promoted by the trade 
unions, have contributed to respond to situations of social distress that followed the Great 
Recession in Spain. 
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Chapter 8 
Explaining policy trajectories  
of regional Mis in Italy and Spain 
 
1. Introduction 
In his 1996 seminal work “The 'Southern Model' of Welfare in Social Europe” Ferrera 
included as a defining characteristic of the Southern European welfare regime the limited 
development of social assistance and the absence of a national minimum income scheme 
(Ferrera 1996; see also Saraceno, 2006). In the last twenty years, however, countries in this 
cluster have experienced relevant changes in this policy field (Lalioti, 2016, Jessoula, 
Matsaganis and Natili, 2015). In particular, the previous chapters have shown that 
minimum income protection in Italy and Spain has undergone major transformations, 
which have been almost unnoticed because they were not the result of a single reform 
process, but rather of an uncoordinated and fragmented trajectory of gradual institutional 
change (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010).  
Actually, in both countries, uncoordinated decentralization as well as path departure from 
the original model of subsidiarity and weak state intervention resulted from regional 
initiatives in the field of anti-poverty policies. In Spain, in the short period between 1988 
and 1995, all regions introduced regional Mis which, despite significant variation in 
generosity, coverage and governance, covered the whole country. In Italy, after the failed 
extension of the Minimum Insertion Income in 2002-4, only a few regions introduced these 
measures: we do not observe, thus, a similar diffusion of last resort anti-poverty programs. 
Moreover, the financial, economic and sovereign debt crises brought about divergent 
paths of regional Mis systems: in 2008-12, in Spain we observe a general, although 
territorially differentiated, strengthening of minimum income systems, whereas in Italy 
only the programs in the “Special Status” regions of the North and in Basilicata were 
maintained, and no other regions introduced such innovative programs. Two different 
questions therefore emerge as particularly relevant: how can we explain, in the two cases, 
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path departure from the original model? Why in Spain we observe a gradual expansion of 
the regional Mis, whereas in Italy neither spread nor institutionalized and they were often, 
subsequently, displaced? 
 
2. Explaining Path Departure: the key role of political exchange dynamics  
The reform process in Italy and Spain leading to the introduction of regional safety net was 
shaped by the specific interaction between the demand and the supply of the political 
system. In turn, those were conditioned by two contextual factors: problem pressure and 
the uncoordinated decentralization of social assistance policies. Problem pressures 
conditioned the demand, creating a socio-economic need in search for political 
representation. Decentralization offered peculiar incentives to the supply, i.e. to regional 
political parties and entrepreneurs. Both elements, as revealed by internal variation – i.e. 
the different role they had in different regional context and in the two national cases – 
have limited explanatory powers if not complemented with specific political competition 
dynamics. 
 
2.1 The role of contextual factors 
In order to explain the path departure, problem pressure – intended as the emergence of a 
new social need experienced by a large share of the population - should be taken into 
serious considerations. More in details, despite the different timing of the two processes - 
since path departure took place between 1988 and 1992 in Spain and in Italy between 2004 
and 2008 -  it is not by chance that the introduction of regional safety nets initiated short 
after the introduction of the first reforms aimed at a flexibilisation “at the margin” of the 
labour market in both countries. Already in 1984, the Spanish socialist government of 
Felipe Gonzalez, in order to combat rising unemployment level stemming from industrial 
crises, liberalized the usage of fixed-term contracts. As a consequence, in less than a 
decade the incidence of fixed-term contracts raised from less than 10% to over a third of 
the dependent workforce (Berton, Ricchiardi and Sacchi, 2012). Also Italy followed a 
similar strategy of reaching labour market flexibility through reforms at the margin, but it 
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did so a decade later. In fact, in Italy the turning point of labour market regulation are the 
Nineties (Vesan, 2012), and most notably the so called Treu Reform (D.Law 197/1997) 
introduced by the centre left Prodi government which, among other relevant issue, 
allowed temporary agency work in Italy and further liberalized the usage of fixed term 
and part time work. As a consequence, in the period 1995–2001 more than 60% of the new 
job contracts were atypical, and flexible employment almost doubled from the early 
Nineties to the mid-2000s, accounting for about 20% of total employment in 2005 (CNEL, 
2007). 
In both cases, labour market reforms were followed by an intense public debate regarding 
the social and individual consequences of labour market insecurity. Those reforms had in 
fact similar consequences, raising the issue of income security and non-contributory form 
of income protection in the political debate, especially among trade unions and social 
movements.   
The second contextual factor which has favoured path departure and the introduction of 
regional Mis was the uncoordinated decentralization of social assistance policies. Both in 
Italy and in Spain the dynamics of welfare state change actually collided with spatial 
policy rescaling, leading sub-national units to assume increasing importance. Over the last 
35 years, Spain and Italy have gone from being unitary, centralized countries to becoming 
highly decentralized states in which sub national units play an essential role in the 
provision of public services and take up a significant share of public revenues (Del Pino 
and Pavolini, 2015). Despite differences in timing – in Spain during the 1980s, the late 
1990s in Italy - and in the political nature of the decentralization processes, since the early 
2000s the allocation of social policy responsibilities across level of governments in Italy 
and Spain presents many similarities. The bulk of social insurance provisions, including 
pensions and unemployment benefits, rests strongly in the hand of the central 
government. Conversely, social policies with a strong component of service provision, 
such as health care, active employment and social services, are left largely in the hands of 
the sub national units. As for Mis, in neither country the national level has established a 
legislative framework, nor has ever introduced specific funds devoted to the creation of a 
regional system, thus letting regions free to legislate in the field.  
337 
 
Therefore, in both countries the allocation of responsibility across government levels 
present striking similarities. Also, it has provided sub-national political actors with 
positive incentives to introduce anti-poverty measures. Three factors appear particularly 
relevant in order to understand the positive incentives that regional political actors faced 
compared to nationals. Firstly, introducing minimum income schemes at the regional level 
did not result in a redistribution of resources from richer to poorer parts of the country, a 
politically salient issues that might have been vetoed in the national political arena. 
Secondly, at the regional level it was possible to introduce budgetary constraints on access 
to these measures, therefore allowing expenditure control, while the absence of a national 
measure and the support of European institutions towards those schemes provided for 
high visibility to regional political entrepreneurs “hungry for votes and recognition”. 
Therefore, those measures were highly visible at a limited cost, providing good 
opportunity for affordable credit claiming strategies for the regional élites (Bonoli, 2012). 
Finally, it is not by chance that the first regional measures were introduced by regionalist 
parties in the Basque Country and in Navarra in Spain, in Valle d’Aosta and in Trentino 
Alto Adige in Italy. In the subnational political arena, activism in the social policy realm 
was useful for “competitive region building purpose”, since social policy are powerful 
instruments in order to demarcate geographical spaces and to stabilize new forms of 
political organization (Banting, 1995, Ferrera, 2005). Under these conditions, the 
devolution of competences to sub-national units seems to have promoted change in this 
policy area. 
Therefore, the decentralization of social assistance competences to meso-governments has 
opened up new spaces of action and possibility for institutional change. However, those 
positive incentives lead to very different policy outputs in Italy and Spain. Similarly, 
problem pressures do not seem able to fully grasp the observed dynamics. In the Spanish 
case, the Autonomous Communities introducing for the first time Mis were not those with 
a higher incidence of unemployment, temporary contracts and/or poverty, but rather the 
richer Special Financing Autonomous Community of the North, the Basque Country and 
Navarra. Regional economic level is only able to explain to certain extent policy 
developments. Even though, as a general rule, poorest regions introduced less protective 
scheme, ACs with very similar GDP level or a similar labour market structure had very 
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different programs in terms of generosity and coverage, not to mention their activating 
component. Similar, if not more accentuated, divergences are observable in the Italian case. 
Regional Mis were introduced in some of the less developed regions of the South as well 
as in some of the richest regions of the North, suggesting that is difficult to link directly 
specific policy measures to resources availability, diffusion of atypical contracts and/or 
poverty incidence. The two case study analysed in Chapter 5 had very different 
institutional and socio-economic characteristics: Friuli Venezia Giulia before introducing 
the BIC was one of the richest Italian Region, with one of the most dynamic labour market 
supported by a strong and export oriented industrial sector, and comparatively low 
poverty rates; by contrast, Lazio had less resources, a service-based economy, and a 
significantly higher incidence of poverty.  
This is no to deny that institutional configuration and/or functional pressures were 
relevant for the evolution of Mis. The flexibilisation at the margin of the labour market 
created the condition for the emergence of a political demand, and the uncoordinated 
decentralization process for a political offer. However, in order to fully grasp the complex 
relationship between needs and policy responses, we have to focus also on the interaction 
between institutional and political competition dynamics. 
 
2.2 The introduction of regional Mis in Italy and Spain 
Structural changes – liberalization of the labour market, increasing poverty rates as well as 
periods of economic expansion or recession – do not automatically shape reform agendas. 
Similarly, the institutional configuration of welfare states does not necessarily lead to a 
particular policy output. In the theoretical part of this dissertation, we argued in favour of 
the relevance of political exchange as a major determinant of social policy reform. In 
particular, we contend that in order to understand policy evolution in the minimum 
income protection field, especially in the age of austerity, we need to set the preferences of 
the most relevant interest groups and the key features of the party system.  In the 
empirical chapters we observed that Italy and Spain are characterized by differences in 
these particular dimensions, which actually led to different political exchange dynamics 
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between the demand and the supply side of the political system and, as a consequence, to 
very differentiated policy trajectories of regional Mis. 
The Spanish case 
At the end of the 1980s relevant interest groups – and most notably, some third sector 
(religious) associations and the trade unions – strongly supported the introduction of a last 
resort safety net. In official documents, Caritas Spain and both trade unions – UGT and 
CC.OO. - supported the introduction of a Mis. The refusal of the Socialist government to 
negotiate the establishment of a national comprehensive scheme led trade unions to shift 
down negotiations to the regional level.  
As a consequence, minimum income protection entered regional political agenda in Spain. 
In the Community of Madrid the socio-political demand was particularly strong. The debate 
over anti-poverty policies was launched by a Caritas report issued at the end of the 1980s. 
Trade unions – which were in a particular position of strength after the remarkable success 
of the December 1988 general strike – explicitly subordinated social dialogue at the 
regional level to the introduction of a last resort safety net.  
On the supply side, the party system of the Community of Madrid was a typical case of 
moderate pluralism with only the left-right cleavage represented. The Socialist Party had 
been in power since the first regional election in 1982. However, after the general strike, 
the government was particularly weak and it even had to face a motion of no confidence, 
which was finally rejected with a very narrow majority thanks to the entrance of a radical 
left party, IU, in the government coalition. This latter party was very supportive of the 
trade unions, especially after the general strike. A rapprochement with the unions was 
therefore crucial in this particular moment to ensure legitimacy and stability to the 
socialist government in the Madrid community. 
The decisive impulse to the policy-making process was given by the official launch of the 
Union Priorities Proposals (PSP) by the Spanish trade unions. They made up the common 
bargaining platform of the CCOO and UGT including a minimum income scheme. At the 
beginning of October 1989, trade unions officially delivered these proposals to the Madrid 
government, as well as to the rest of the ACs. 
340 
 
This event prompted the beginning of a process of social concertation that included many 
different issues, from regional transport to education and housing policies, up to social 
inclusion policies. This latter topic was regarded as key issue by the trade unions, which 
considered the introduction of a last resort safety net decisive to open the negotiations 
with the regional government. The process was rather brief, and on December 1989 a social 
pact was signed which included the introduction of a regional Mis, called Madrid 
Integration Income (Imi).  
The participation of CCOO and UGT delegates in the design of the regional safety net 
together with the administration provides additional evidence of the importance of this 
introduction for the trade unions as well as of the weakness of the administration in front 
of their requests (Arriba, 1999). Besides, as part of the political deal, a bilateral body - the 
"Integrated Territorial Commission" which included trade unions representatives – had 
been constituted with supervisory functions. During this process that led to path 
departure and the introduction of the first safety net in the Community of Madrid, the 
main opposition party -  the Popular Party - never opposed an anti-poverty intervention. 
At the end of the 1980s in Castile and Léon, the demand was strong, although probably less 
pressing than in the previous case, since catholic organizations were less present in the 
public debate. As for the supply side, also in Castile and Léon the party system can be 
classified under the moderate pluralism typology. Differently from the Community of 
Madrid, at the end of the 1980s IU had a marginal role, and in 1987 a centre-right PP 
government had replaced the PSOE after two consecutive mandates. In this phase, the 
party system was also characterized by the presence of a centre party called Democratic 
and Social Centre (CDS). 
Similarly to the previous case, it is with the inclusion of a Mis in the trade unions 
bargaining platform (PSP) that a safety net entered the political agenda in the late 1989. 
The regional government, which prior to the negotiations had not realized a plan on this 
particular topic, accepted the firm request of the social partners.  
Accepting the proposals of the PSP and reaching an agreement with the trade unions was 
in that moment considered crucial by the PP, also in view of the regional elections that 
were to take place one year later. The party had won with less than 0.5 points margin the 
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previous election against the PSOE, which had either an absolute or a relative majority at 
both national level and in most of the other Spanish autonomous communities. 
Furthermore, in that particular phase the PP was struggling to become the main centre-
right competitor of the PSOE – i.e. to complete its transformation from a post Francoist 
right party to predominantly centre positioned catch-all party (Balfour, 2005, Linz and 
Montero, 1999). Conquering the moderate electorate was particularly important in CyL, 
where in 1987 the centrist party CDS obtained almost 20% of the votes. This strategy was 
hard to reconcile with the opposition to an anti-poverty measure similar to that proposed 
by the trade unions, above all in a moment in which most of the other Autonomous 
Communities – often ruled by the adversary socialist party – were introducing very similar 
programmes. 
Just like in the Madrid case, in CyL there was a relatively weak government, seeking 
legitimacy and fearing the political costs of a conflict with the social partners. The 
necessity to reach an agreement with the trade unions added up to the determination to be 
seen as a centre moderate party, led the PP in Castile and Léon to support the introduction 
of a regional minimum income scheme. These factors allowed to sign a social agreement in 
April 1990, and, three months later, to approve the Decree 132/1990, which introduced the 
Minimum Insertion Income in Castile and Léon. 
In both our study cases therefore, the presence of a strong socio-political demand coupled 
with the absence of any opposition, with a moderate pluralist party system with no additional 
politically-activated cleavages, resulted in path departure and in the introduction of a 
minimum income scheme. The introduction of regional Mis were a result of non-contentious 
competitive credit claiming dynamics: in absence of opposition, those measures were crucial 
to reach an agreement with the social partners.  Political exchange dynamics - i.e. the 
adoption of a measure strongly supported by the social partners as well as by relevant civil 
society organizations like Caritas, provided in exchange for legitimacy for regional 
governments and the political forces that supported them - are crucial to understand the 
introduction of regional safety nets in Castile Léon and in the Community of Madrid. 
These dynamics seem to recall the general pattern in Spain (see also Lalioti, 2016) – at least 
if we do not consider those special CAs where it is activated in the party system the 
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territorial cleavage (the Basque Country, Cataluña, and Navarra). In particular, after the 
1988 general strike, the demand was strong - Mis were supported by both trade unions and 
faith-based organizations – and the supply characterized by moderate pluralism. In all 
these cases, in the short period between the end of 1989 and 1991165  social partners and 
subnational governments signed social pacts including the introduction of regional safety 
nets (Tab. 25).  
As a further evidence, the regional programs approved in this period introduced also new 
institutional bodies, generally named Comisión de Seguimiento and/or Comisión de 
Coordinación, composed by representatives of the regional government and of 
municipalities, and both trade unions and employers' organizations. These institutions – 
which had the formal role of guaranteeing the proper functioning of the programs and of 
making legislative ameliorative proposals – are particularly important because they 
strengthen organizational resources within the ACs of the trade unions. Moreover, the fact 
that they were explicitly requested in the PSP and afterwards introduced in all regional 
laws – with the exception, at least in this phase, of the Canaries – reveals the common 
origin of the regional Mis: these programs were the result of a political exchange between 
trade unions – looking for social policy expansion and for a greater role in the policy 
making process at the subnational level – and government – looking for legitimacy and 
support. 
In this context, partisan politics was not decisive, as path departure followed a non-
contentious credit claiming logic. With a strong socio-political demand and moderate 
pluralism, no political actors oppose the introduction of these schemes, and even right 
wing governments promote safety nets – as it was the case in Aragon, Canarias, and La 
Rioja. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
165 Exception are Aragon and the Balearic Island. 
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Tab 25. Path departure in Spain 
Autonomous 
Community 
Safety Net Social Pact Decree Government 
Coalition 
Andalusia Programa de 
Solidaridad 
1990 Decree 
142/1990 
PSOE 
Aragon Ingreso Aragones 
de Insercion 
- Law 1/1993 PA – PP 
Asturias Ingreso Minimo 
de Insercion 
1990 Decree 28/90 PSOE – IU 
Balearic Islands  Suporte 
Transitorio 
Comunitario 
----   
Canarias 
Islands 
Ayudas 
Economicas 
Basicas 
1990 Decree 
133/1992 
CDS - PP - AIC  
Cantabria Salario Social 1989 Decree 40/1989 PP 
Castilla-
LaMancha 
Plan Regional de 
Solidariedad 
1990 Decree 
141/1990 
PSOE 
Castilla y Léon Ingreso Minimo 
de Insercion 
1990 Decree 
132/1990 
PP 
Cataluna Renda Minima 
d'Insercio 
1990 Decree 144/90 CiU 
Extremadura Ayudas para la 
Integracion  
(AISES) 
1990 Decree 66/1990 PSOE 
Galicia Medidas Basicas 1990 Law 9/1991 PP 
Madrid 
Community 
Ingreso Madrileno 
de Integracion 
1989 Decree 73/1990 PSOE 
Murcia Insercion y 
proteccion social 
1990 Decree 
101/1991 
PSOE 
Navarra Renta Basica -- Decree 
168/1990 
UPN – PSOE 
Basque Country Ingreso Minimo 
de Insercion 
-- Decree 39/1989 PNV- PSE 
La Rioja Ingreso Minimo 
de Insercion 
1989 Decree 68/90 PP – PRP 
Valencian 
Community 
Medidas de 
Insercion Social 
1990 Decree 
132/1990 
PSOE 
Source: Author Elaboration on Aguilar et al., 1995. 
 
A distinct path led to the introduction of regional safety nets in the Basque Country, 
Cataluña and Navarra, where the supply side is different, characterized by fragmented 
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pluralism in reason of a particularly relevant territorial cleavage. In these cases, our 
hypothesis is that regionalist centre parties – which had strong organizational ties with the 
Catholic movement – strongly supported the introduction of regional safety nets (Cortinas, 
2010; Sarasa et al., 2000; Arriba, 1999) also with a region building purpose, i.e. for the 
possibility to use minimum income scheme as an instrument to demarcate geographical 
spaces and to stabilize new forms of political organization (Banting, 1995; Ferrera, 2005). 
Much empirical research is needed in order to confirm this hypothesis, which however 
would be consistent with the theoretical framework. 
 
The Italian case 
Rather different dynamics led to policy change and path departure in Italy, where the 
demand for minimum income protection – despite strong and similar functional pressures 
– remained weak and fragmented in the period under consideration, and only the presence 
of strong competition dynamics within the left allowed the introduction of regional safety 
nets, exclusively in some region ruled by centre-left coalition.  
In fact, the introduction of the Revenu Minimum d'Insertion in France in 1988 prompted in 
Italy a debate within left parties and trade unions about the possibility to expand non-
contributory protection for working age individuals. However, religious and social actors 
in Italy remained rather indifferent towards this measure, while Italian trade unions did 
not support a national Mis (Kahl, 2009; Nigro, 1989; Saraceno, 2006). Only some social 
movements were in favour of these measures. In particular, proposals to introduce an 
unconditional basic income – strongly opposed by trade unions - in the late Nineties 
became a central claim of some social movements, and in particular of the so-called 
movement of the Tute Bianche (Fumagalli and Lazzarato, 1999; Iglesias Turrion, 2003; 
Mattoni, 2009). 
The fragmented nature of the Italian party system even allowed this dispersed and 
organizationally weak interest to be represented in the political arena. In particular, in 
2004 in Friuli Venezia Giulia some radical leftist parties (PRC, but also the smaller Verdi 
and Partito dei Comunisti Italiani) - which had developed over the years a strong 
connection with some of the above mentioned social movements, especially those 
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associated with the Casa della Cultura di Trieste (Trieste House of Culture) - were part of 
the government coalition. Also in reason of some case specific dynamics - as for instance 
the creation of a regional research centre directed by one of the first and most important 
advocates of unconditional minimum income in Italy, as well as a militant and leading 
theoretical inspirator of the above mentioned social movements - these parties were able to 
introduce into the regional political agenda a region-wide unconditional minimum income 
scheme.  
This proposal triggered the interest of the left coalition in a universal but selective 
minimum income scheme conditional to participation in social and labour inclusion 
programs. Some parties, in particular the main government coalition party, DS (Democrats 
of the Left), became strong advocates of this kind of measure in Friuli Venezia Giulia. The 
decision of the DS to support the measure depended also on the reactions of the social 
actors to government proposals. CISL was the firmest opponent of a Mis, arguing that 
income support measures should be confined to supporting workers, whereas it is a duty 
of society as a whole, and not of the government, to address poverty. CGIL position was 
initially less sharp, as the proposal to introduce a minimum income scheme triggered a 
heated internal debate between those in favour and those against it. The proposal to 
introduce a Mis encountered extreme cautiousness also on the part of diocesan Caritas in 
FVG. In order to overcome these barriers, the government and the centre-left coalition 
started a long concertation process in the attempt to strike an agreement with the social 
partners, the third sector and opposition on the definition of a Mis in FVG. An agreement 
was reached - with trade unions accepting scheme implementation only if subject to actual 
participation to active labour market policies. In particular, once established that income 
support would be conditional on job-search activities, CGIL supported this measure, while 
CISL maintained its substantial opposition.  
The agreement between CGIL and the government guaranteed the approval of the so 
called Basic Citizenship Income (BIC). The name of this policy measure is particularly 
telling.  In fact, the BIC is a well-designed minimum income scheme in all aspects, but the 
name is particularly appealing for the social movements. As for centre-right parties, there 
was strong opposition throughout the policy-making process. This might be partially 
explained by the lack of interest of centre-right parties towards this particular demand. 
346 
 
However, some parties mobilized against this measure. FI activated the Church-State 
cleavage, openly declaring its opposition towards public intervention in the anti-poverty 
field. LN acted instead as a radical right party, criticizing the measures because it favoured 
“non-deserving” migrants: using resources for anti-poverty policies is defined as 
equivalent to “pouring money onto immigrants and artful dodgers”. 
Similar dynamics are evident also in the Lazio case. The demand was weak. Social 
movements were actually both particularly active on the issue of basic income and able to 
mobilize efficiently in this regional context. However, the main Italian union 
confederations remained cautious. From the start, CISL doubted whether universal safety 
nets could be viable, and declared its preference to channel resources to extend social 
shock absorbers in derogation (CIG in deroga). CGIL opposed the proposal of the social 
movements to introduce an unconditional minimum income not subject to the pledge of 
beneficiaries to re-enter the labour market, but was open to the possibility of a Mis. 
As for the supply, the party system in Lazio was an extreme form of fragmented (bi)polarism 
(Cotta and Verzichelli; see Chapter 4). Following the elections, in the centre-left alone, no 
less than eight centre-left parties were able to obtain at least one seat on the Regional 
Council, without counting that one of these, Uniti nell’Ulivo, is merely an electoral list 
made up of four different political groupings. It is within this highly-competitive and 
highly-fragmented context that the debate on the introduction of an Mi measure took 
place. 
The pressure exerted by the social movements captured the attention of PRC and 
especially of the PRC Regional Councillor of Labour, who became the privileged 
interlocutor of the social movements and launched a proposal to introduce a (peculiar) 
Mis. The fragmentation of the party system in Lazio produced a particularly competitive 
environment, with different political forces competing to become the privileged 
interlocutors of interest groups, even the ones without strong organisational resources like 
the social movements: no less than seven legislative proposals on Mis were advanced by 
different groups.  Although less relevantly than in Friuli Venezia Giulia the policy-making 
process was also characterized by the opposition of some centre-right actors, actively 
opposing the introduction of a Mis on the basis of the principle of subsidiarity. 
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At the end of this competitive process, a peculiar selective but almost unconditional 
measure was approved: the Reddito Minimo Garantito (GMI). The consultation with the 
social partners over the implementing regulation started right after the approval of the 
regional law. In this phase, CGIL – clearly the most important interest group for the DS – 
was able to change the formulation of the law according to its preferences and, at the same 
time, ensure additional financing. As a result, the measure become a hybrid that mostly 
resembled an anti-poverty measures, rather than the originally envisaged unconditional 
income to “counteract precariousness”. 
In both Italian regional cases, the demand was weak and fragmented, with social 
movements actively supporting an (unconditional) minimum income, the CGIL (re)acting 
to promote a Mis associated with active labour market policies, while CISL and faith-based 
organizations were not interested in the measure. As for the supply, the Italian fragmented 
bipolarism was characterized by the presence of several parties and within coalition 
competition, and the political activation of an additional cleavage, the religious one. As a 
result, both in Friuli Venezia Giulia and Lazio path departure followed a contentious credit 
claiming logic. Competitive dynamics within the left favoured the introduction of these 
measures, which were strongly opposed by the centre-right. 
In general, in Italy the weak demand – i.e. the mobilization of social movements - 
encouraged the radical-left party Rifondazione Comunista (PRC) to broaden its policy 
proposals and to include means-tested benefits among them. The participation of PRC in 
most regional governments ruled by centre-left coalitions in the 2000s allowed the 
introduction of an (unconditional) minimum income scheme in the regional policy agenda. 
In this context, intra-coalition dynamics and within-parties’ mediations allowed the 
introduction of innovative regional anti-poverty schemes associated with social and labour 
market (re)insertion measures in some governments ruled by centre-left coalition, and 
most notably in Campania, Basilicata, Lazio, Friuli Venezia Giulia and Sardegna. 
The presence of a centre-right government was a sufficient condition to prevent path-
departure, since no centre-right coalition ever introduced a Mis. Even though further 
research is needed, these evolutions are in line with our theoretical expectations: in 
presence of a weak socio-political demand together with fragmented pluralism, the policy-
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making process in this field follows a contentious credit claiming logic, and partisan politics 
becomes crucial: while centre-left coalition promoted path departure, right coalitions 
opposed those measures or did not intervene in the field (policy inertia), with the Catholic 
right and radical right parties opposing Mis. 
 
 3. Policy reversal versus gradual institutionalization of regional Mis: why is 
Spain different? 
 
The programs introduced between 1989 – 1995 in Spain and 2005 - 2009 in Italy were very 
similar: these were residual anti-poverty schemes, associated with social and labour 
market programs, and they were all subjects to severe budgetary constraints. Furthermore, 
they had to face similar pressures within comparable institutional framework. Yet their 
policy trajectory was very different: while in Spain those programs were gradually 
expanded and in most cases now follow a right-based approach, in Italy Mis were very 
often displaced.  This paragraph, highlights how some specific political exchange 
dynamics are crucial to understand the differentiated policy evolution of regional safety 
net in Italy and Spain. 
 
3.1 The role of contextual factor 
Contextual factors are important to understand the evolution of regional Mis in both cases, 
therefore it is important to control – as much as possible – if problem pressures and the 
institutional framework remained similar over time. A problem arises because in Spain, 
regional minimum income schemes have a longer history compared to Italy. A plausible 
explanation to divergent trajectories might be precisely timing: at the moment of the Great 
Recession, Spanish Mis were more institutionalized, and therefore more resistant to policy 
reversal. 
Yet this explanation does not seem able to fully capture the observed dynamics. Soon after 
the introduction of regional Mis (1989 – 1995), Spain had to face the social consequences of 
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the 1992 – 1994 “exchange rate mechanism” crisis. In particular Spain experienced a severe 
recession in 1993, with unemployment mounting from 16% to 24% and GDP decreasing by 
one percentage point. This crisis – which led to increasing budgetary constraints on 
regional spending, also because the public deficit was above 7% – influenced the early 
development of regional Mis. In some CAs the effective implementation of regional safety 
net was delayed and those programs remained almost exclusively on paper (Aguilar et al., 
1995). However, despite the crisis, no CAs displaced Mis and Aragon and Balearic Islands 
even introduced their safety nets. 
The evolution of the Spanish safety nets confirms that functional pressures cannot capture 
adequately the result of the policy making process. The period 1995 - 2007 was 
characterized by intense economic growth in Spain: real GDP grew on average of 3.8 
percentage points per year. Unemployment felt at the historically lowest rate of 8.2% 
(Eurostat). Increasing fiscal autonomy coupled with economic growth ensured that 
regional resources and expenditure could increase extensively (Bosch, 2008, Fig. 3). 
Notwithstanding positive performance of the economy, experts have referred to the 1995-
2005 decade as a travesía del desierto [lit. journey across the desert] (cfr. Laparra, 2004; 
Natili, 2015), because the most critical nodes of the regional Mis were left almost 
untouched and very few regions removed the budgetary constraints that severely limited 
the possibility to access to those measures. In this phase, Madrid was one of the very few 
ACs – together with Cataluña and Navarra – which has transformed its residual and 
discretionary safety net into a right-based minimum income scheme.  
This period of economic growth come to an abrupt end in 2008, when Southern Europe 
governments had to face the consequence of the economic and (later) sovereign debt crises. 
This phase is particularly relevant because it is precisely in this period that we observe the 
divergent trajectories of regional Mis in Italy and Spain. In Spain programs were actually 
expanded – though possibly not sufficiently – in terms of coverage, generosity and 
expenditure, whereas in Italy, the regions that had in place those programs in most cases 
rapidly displaced regional Mis. This differentiated trajectory is puzzling because 
functional pressures were similar in the two countries, which experienced a period of 
economic recession coupled with an intense growth of social needs, in particular for those 
individuals at the bottom of the income scale. 
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The GDP fell respectively by 7.9% in Italy and 6% in Spain from the pre-crisis peak (i.e. 
2007 or 2008) to trough (i.e. 2013 or 2014). The unemployment rate more than doubled in 
Spain – from 11.3% in 2008 to 24.5% in 2014 – and in Italy increased from 6.7% to 12.7%.  
Importantly, in both countries, the social consequences of the collision between the advent 
of the economic crisis and an incomplete social safety net have been particularly harsh for 
those individual with greater needs, i.e. for people living in extreme poverty (Baldini, 
Giarda and Olivieri, 2014, Jessoula, et al., 2015). Severe poverty rate – i.e. the number of 
people with an income below the 40% of the national median, instead of the 60% as it is 
usually done - have increased substantially in both countries in the period from 2006 to 
2013 - the most relevant increase in the EU 28 excluding Greece (Fig. 14).  
Figure 14 Severe Poverty Rate, 2005 – 2014, selected countries. 
 
Source: Eurostat Online Database. 
 
Similarly, the growth of material deprivation rate166 has been much more pronounced in 
those two countries compared to the European average (Fig. 15). Such dramatic increase 
reveal that the consequences of the Great Recession have been particularly harsh precisely 
for those individuals which are traditionally the “core” of minimum income scheme 
beneficiaries, the extremely poor.   
                                                          
166 The Material Deprivation Rate depicts the share of people living without four of the nine items 
considered by the European Union necessary to live a decent life 
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Figure 15 Material Deprivation Rate during the Great Recession, Italy, Spain, EU 27 
 
Source: Eurostat Online Database 
 
Such outstanding growth in poverty and social exclusion is not exclusively consequence of 
the economic crisis and the incomplete safety nets, but also of ensuing austerity measures 
(Pavolini et al., 2015). As it has been noticed, an overall assessment of welfare state reforms 
in Italy and Spain at the national level during the crisis period reveals a process of 
retrenchment of workers and citizens’ rights with very few (if any) traces of recalibration 
for the less protected group and uncovered social risks (cfr. Pavolini and Guillén, 2015). 
Two different phases can be actually detected. In the initial phase, 2008-10, neither 
countries introduced restrictive welfare reforms. The initial reaction of both governments 
was actually to use social protection as an instrument to mitigate the adverse effects of the 
crisis on the population.  
Major reforms and welfare cutbacks were introduced in the 2011-14 period, defined by 
Pavolini and Guillén (2015) the “harsh austerity” phase, characterized by retrenchment 
reforms of traditional core social policy areas, namely pensions and labour market policies. 
Moreover, also other policy fields – health care, the underdeveloped social assistance and 
family policies - were affected by severe cuts (Ibidem). In particular, in Italy the already 
underfinanced national fund for social policies167 declined from 1.3 billion in 2008 to 115 
                                                          
167This corresponds to the sum of the various earmarked central funds for social policies for the 
regions: the Fund for Unaccompanied Minors, the Equal Opportunity Fund, the Fund for Youth 
Policy, the Fund for the Family, the Fund for Dependants and the Fund for Social Policy. 
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million euros in 2012. After 2012 we observe a slight recovery, but in 2014 total national 
fund for social assistance were 42% less than in 2008 (Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche 
Sociali, several years). In Spain, the newly elected Rajoy government in 2012 introduced 
rationalizing measures in the field of health and education – both of regional competence - 
with the aim of reducing public expenditure by more than 10 billion (Colino and Del Pino, 
2014). 
Since those policy fields are regional competences in the two countries, those cuts resulted 
in decreasing resources for Italian and Spanish regions. In general, in both countries 
regional welfare systems have been under great pressures during the crisis, especially in 
the period from 2010 to 2014 (cfr. Del Pino and Pavolini, 2015). Furthermore, respectively 
in 2011 and 2012, Italy and Spain reformed their Constitution introducing an institutional 
threshold for public debt, a potentially strong incentive to cost-containment in social 
policies. This was accompanied in both countries by strict monitoring and sanctions for 
non-compliance of the targets set by central government (cfr. Del Pino and Pavolini, 2015). 
Not surprisingly, these pressures have resulted in significant cuts in regional budgets. 
Trend in regional public expenditure are in this sense enlightening (Fig. 16). The long term 
trend towards decentralization and increasing share of expenditure by sub-national level 
came to an end with the crisis, and especially from 2010 we observe a neat decline of 
regional expenditure (Fig. 16).  
As a consequence of social and public finance conditions, regional governments had to 
face during the crisis contradictory pressures. On the one hand, poverty was increasing, 
resulting in a growing need of minimum income protection. On the other, declining GDP 
and tax revenues, coupled with central government implementing austerity measures put 
strong budgetary constraints on the possibility of regional governments to implement anti-
cyclical measures and expand last-resort safety nets. 
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Figure 16 Regional expenditures and revenues in Italy and Spain, Mln. of Euro, 2006 - 2012 
 
Source: Author Elaboration on ISSiRFA (Istituto di Studi sui Sistemi Regionali Federali e sulle Autonomie) 
and Ministerio de Hacienda Y Administraciones Públicas 
 
In this context, the reaction of Italian and Spanish subnational government was very 
differentiated. In Spain, these programs were expanded, and in many regional contexts we 
observe the institutionalization of minimum income rights, i.e. the shift from a discretionary 
to a right based approach in the provision of anti-poverty benefits. In Italy, most of 
regional programs were displaced, and no new initiatives were launched in the period 
2009 – 2014 to counteract increasing poverty rates. This differentiated response is hardly 
understandable in terms of institutional differentiation: as previously underlined, both 
countries lacked a national legislation or earmarked fund especially devoted to the 
establishment of regional safety net. The uncoordinated and fragmented nature of 
minimum income protection – in both countries - left open to the sub-national units the 
possibility to legislate in this policy field, introducing expansionary and/or subtractive 
reforms. 
Since the institutional configuration and the socio-economic context were indeed 
comparable, we have to look at the role of political exchange dynamics, i.e. actor 
preferences and strategies, and their interaction in the social assistance political arena.   
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3.2 Italy: the emergence of new political divisions within the right and policy reversal 
As outlined above the so called “season of regional innovations” in Italy was short-lived 
and it was followed by a phase in which regionally based Mis were all but reinforced. 
From 2009 until 2014, in a context characterized by pressures to contain public expenditure 
and a sharp increase in absolute poverty rate (Madama, Jessoula and Natili, 2014), sub-
national governments did not introduce any new initiative. Moreover, in all the regions 
where a centre-right coalition replaced the former centre-left coalition, these measures 
were rapidly dismissed: Campania, Friuli Venezia Giulia, Lazio and Sardinia experienced 
a neat “policy reversal” path (Tab. 26).  
This outcome is extremely interesting because countries where path departure and the 
introduction of a minimum income scheme occurred at the sub-national level – Spain as 
well as Austria, Canada or Switzerland – policy reversal never occurred.  Rather path 
departure in one region was followed by similar initiatives in all other regional contexts, 
following processes known as policy diffusion and/or spill over effects (Arriba and 
Moreno, 2005; Obinger et al., 2005). The question can be therefore re-framed in that way: 
why in Italy the presence of a centre – right coalition was so detrimental not only for the 
introduction but also – perhaps more comparatively puzzling – for the continuity of last 
resort safety nets? 
 
Tab. 26: Regional government composition and the evolution of regional MIS policy in 
Italy 
Region Path Departure Policy Reversal   Continuity 
Basilicata Center Left  Center Left 
Campania Center Left Center Right  
Friuli Venezia Giulia Center Left Center Right  
Lazio Center Left Center Right  
Sardegna Center Left Center Right  
Valle D’Aosta (Regional party)  (Regional party) 
Trentino Alto Adige Center Left  Center Left 
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The Friuli Venezia Giulia and Lazio case studies provide us with fertile insights to answer 
this question. The measures introduced in these two Italian regions – as a result of 
different political competition dynamics but also of contrasting administrative capacities – 
differed considerably in their design and effectiveness in constituting an actual and rapid 
response to monetary poverty. Moreover, it is important to highlight that the two cases 
present considerable differences in term of “timing”, i.e. if we consider the type of 
exogenous challenges that the new elected centre-right governments had to face when it 
replaced the centre-left coalition. Friuli Venezia Giulia in April 2008 was a still growing 
economy – although the first signs of the economic crisis were already visible - and the 
conditions of regional finance were excellent. Conversely Lazio, where regional elections 
were hold in March of 2010, can be considered as a region experiencing economic 
difficulties, with unemployment and poverty on the rise, and in a poor financial condition, 
mainly due to protracted crisis of health expenditure. Despite these differences, Lazio and 
Friuli Venezia Giulia were remarkably similar in one crucial aspect: minimum income 
schemes were rapidly dismissed few months after the change of government majority.  
In Friuli Venezia Giulia, both the evaluations realised by different independent experts 
(IRS, 2009, Spano et al., 2013) and the interviews realised with regional social assistance 
managers (FVG DSP; FVG SW) agree on the fact that the program was well designed – 
especially considering the innovative nature of means-tested benefit linking income 
support measures with social services and active labour market policies – and the 
administrative structure was able to implement it effectively. Moreover, this program had 
a strong activation requirement, therefore possessing many of the features that might 
appeal to a centre-right liberal government.  
However, in presence of a weak socio-political demand, the key features of the Italian party 
system made the Mip field contentious. In Friuli Venezia Giulia, competitive dynamics and 
political exchange led to “overlapping consensus” over minimum income protection 
exclusively within the centre-left coalition. Centre–right parties – and especially NL and FI 
– strongly criticized this program already during the legislative discussion.  In a note 
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published in the Messaggero Veneto168,  Forza Italy executive stated that BIC is "evidence of 
a culture that still believes in state supremacy over the individual, that generates the culture of 
vested rights and that equates people making sacrifices and saving money for their future with those 
that don't”. The other two parties belonging to the right coalition – the Centre Union and 
the National Alliance – adopted a more cautious position, and during the parliamentary 
hearings defined the intervention "legitimate”, despite having some doubts regarding the 
financial viability of the measure. 
Partisan conflicts on minimum protection emerged vigorously during the 2008 electoral 
campaign in Friuli Venezia Giulia. However, the introduction of the BIC was not so much 
used by the governing parties with a credit claiming purpose, but rather by the opposition 
to criticize the leftist government. Request to abolish the Basic Income for Citizenship 
indeed constitute one of the cornerstones of the centre-right electoral campaign. Some 
headlines are indicative of the communication strategy of both coalitions in Friuli: the day 
of the launch of the electoral campaigns of the two major candidates, the most diffused 
local newspaper, Il Piccolo, headlined: " Illy: Third A4 lane ready by 2013. Tondo: No to 
minimum income, support should be given to pensioners". In particular, the Northern League 
strongly criticized the newly introduced regional MIS, citing the risk of welfare 
dependency and contending that it would ultimately benefit “non-deserving” immigrants. 
Also Forza Italia criticizes the regional program, opposing public intervention in the anti-
poverty field. Therefore, it comes by no surprise that the just appointed Councillor for 
Health and Social Policy – from Forza Italia - in Friuli Venezia Giulia declared: “Public 
institutions cannot substitute for charities and vice versa. For this reason, we plan to replace the 
Basic Income with other types of intervention”169. 
Once in office, Northern League took a public position requiring the immediate 
elimination of the regional Mis170: accordingly, the removal of the so-called Basic 
Citizenship Income (BCI) was one of the first acts of the new Tondo administration in early 
2009, a few months after the new regional government entered office. The decision to 
                                                          
168 Il Messaggero Veneto, 9 September 2005, “Forza Italia: the Citizenship Income must be rejected. 
Lega: aids who benefit only migrants”. Author translation.  
169 Declaration from a local newspaper article, Il Piccolo (12 May 2008). Author’s translation. 
170 As seen thoroughly in chapter 5, other political forces composing the government – AN and CU - 
opposed to a complete removal of the measure, also because the administration supported 
continuity.  
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eliminate the anti-poverty program should be therefore framed in a credit claiming 
perspective. Northern League used its opposition towards Mis to differentiate its political 
message in front of the electorate not only compared to the centre-left coalition, but also its 
political allies within the centre-right.  
Politics thus allowed to overcome the inertial effects of policy decisions theorized by neo-
institutionalists scholars (Pierson, 2000). The introduction of the BIC had, in fact, required 
a significant institutional investment by the Region171 which however did not affect the 
decision to repeal the BIC. 
As for the socio-political demand, the reaction of interest groups was limited in FVG, and 
few mobilized against this decision. Faith-based organizations strengthened their strategic 
cooperation with the government, and the change of the Regional Government was 
followed by the creation of an observatory on poverty and annual reports co-drafted by 
the Region and Caritas, as well as increasing regional funding for their initiatives. CISL 
sided with the Tondo government on its use of social policy resources. Conversely, CGIL 
did complain about the drastic reduction of the anti-poverty funds. 
The dynamics that led to policy reversal in Lazio are partially different. Indeed, already 
during the hearings on the Guaranteed Minimum Income, the voices against redistributive 
measures were significantly less intense although there were common concerns within 
centre-right parties about the financial sustainability of a regional safety net. Also the 
electoral competition was rather different in Lazio, primarily because minimum income 
protection was not considered a very important issue in the public debates. Furthermore, 
in this case the establishment of a safety net was (weakly) introduced in the electoral arena 
by the centre-left rather than by its opponent. The new centre left candidate, Emma 
Bonino, praised the introduction of the regional Mis, considered one of the main merits of 
the centre-left government in the previous five years, declaring its intention to maintain 
the regional safety net, defined a "a unique measure in Italy, which needs to be refinanced." 
Conversely, minimum income protection was never addressed by the candidate of the 
                                                          
171 The FVG Region had constructed a new means-test indicator to target efficiently poor people, 
introduced a new IT system that allowed for a rapid communication between municipalities and 
regional government, trained specialized personnel and designed innovative procedures for the 
horizontal coordination between income support measures, social services and active labour 
market policies (cfr. Cap. 5). 
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centre-right Renata Polverini (National Alliance), not even to criticize the work of the 
previous centre left government. At the same time, a regional safety net was not included 
in its electoral program nor it was mentioned a possible refinancing of the existing Mis. 
Once elected, the new Polverini government rapidly discontinued the scheme and 
abandoned the vision of a public anti-poverty system in favour of a stronger relationship 
with the third sector, in particular with Catholic organizations. Consequently, few months 
after elections, the government signed a Protocol of agreement with the Community of 
Sant'Egidio – an important Italian faith-based organization - for the establishment of a 
“Regional observatory to study and develop policies to combat poverty and social 
exclusion”. Moreover, the first budget bill signed by the Polverini government re-directed 
part of the funds originally planned for the Mis to the so-called Plan Against Poverty, an 
agreement made with 18 non-profit Catholic organizations to finance a range of services 
for certain groups at risk of poverty and social exclusion. The GMI remained formally in 
place but, without proper funds, the procedures for the 2011 call – as well as for the 
subsequent years - were not anymore activated. In other words, in Lazio the centre-right 
coalition restored – in accordance with the main social assistance stakeholders – the 
traditional Italian social assistance model, centred on the family and third sector 
organizations rather than on public intervention in case of economic need. Policy reversal 
is hardly understandable in terms of necessity to contain public expenditure, since 
resources initially stored for the GMI were redirected to other groups, so that the removal 
of the Rmg did not result in overall financial savings for the social assistance department.  
The different configuration of the party system in Lazio – still fragmented and bipolar, but 
contrary to FVG with no radical right parties represented – made electoral competition 
dynamics less relevant. Therefore, in Lazio the conservative government did not openly 
campaign against minimum income protection, neither proceeds directly to repeal the law 
introducing the regional safety net, but it preferred to redirect the resources previously 
allocated for the Gmi to third sector organizations.  
The decision by the centre-right government to obfuscate the removal of the Mis is 
explained by the absence of electoral motivations behind this choice and by the presence of 
a demand in Lazio, although weak. Actually, the abolition of regional measures was 
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facilitated by the absence of mobilization by the beneficiaries, not able to organize an 
effective protest nor to put pressures on political actors. However, the reaction of social 
groups to the elimination of regional Mis in Lazio was significant. In the absence of protest 
by the vast world of the third sector, social movements mobilized against these decisions, 
even though with very limited results. In Lazio, in November 2010, during the discussion 
of the new budget law that displaced the Mis, social movements launched a new wave of 
mobilization that ended up with the occupation for few days of the roofs of the Regional 
Council of Lazio. Also the CGIL organized a campaign entitled "Precarity does not pay, 
the Minimum Income Guarantee does", which aimed to collect signatures in favour of the 
regional safety net, and mobilized against the policies of the Polverini government. CISL 
position remained different, supporting the decision to discontinue regional Mis, 
particularly in reason of the simultaneous expansion of so called social shock absorbers ‘in 
derogation’, considered a sort of functional equivalent. To this regard, the Lazio case 
presents many similarities with Friuli Venezia Giulia: the CGIL’s protest was in fact unable 
to counteract the government's decision, also because it was not supported by the CISL. 
Therefore, both in Lazio and Friuli Venezia Giulia, the policy trajectories of regional Mis 
conformed to the contentious competitive claiming logic. A divided trade union movement 
coupled with the presence of a centre-right coalition favourable to the traditional Italian 
social assistance model led to neat policy reversal path. The presence of several parties at 
the right side of the political spectrum and of relevant interest group supporting 
“subsidiarity” in the social policy arena enabled in fact new divides to emerge over the 
introduction of minimum income scheme, alongside the traditional conflict between left 
and right. Both in Lazio and Friuli Venezia Giulia, the Church – State cleavage was 
activated in the regional political arena by Forza Italia, which opposed the introduction of 
entitlements linked to citizenship and preferred to re-direct the (limited) resources towards 
religiously based voluntary associations. Further, and in contrast with predictions, the 
regionalist party, LN, was anything but favourable to regional Mis. Rather than activating 
the Centre-Periphery cleavage in a region-building vein, in Friuli Venezia Giulia, LN acted 
as a radical right party, criticizing those measures as favouring non-deserving migrants. 
Therefore, despite effort by other parties in the centre right coalition to maintain the 
program, the LN successfully prevented any attempt at improving the last-resort safety 
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net. As suggested in the theoretical section, electoral competition within the right camp 
appears particularly relevant to understanding this puzzling policy choice. The removal of 
the regional Mis was considered particularly rewarding in the electoral arena for the LN 
because it allowed the party to politicize its opposition to migration and, consequently, to 
emphasize the distinctiveness of its policy proposals as specifically designed to protect 
nationals against migrants, in contrast to the other centre-right parties.  
 
3.3 Spain: non-contentious competitive credit claiming and the institutionalization of Mis   
The policy trajectories of regional minimum income schemes in Spain were very different. 
In fact, in no case regional safety nets were displaced and over time it is possible to detect 
a gradual expansion of these measures in terms of total expenditure, generosity and 
coverage levels, particularly pronounced during the Great Recession. In most cases172 Mis 
was properly institutionalized with the shift from discretionary anti-poverty measures to 
right-based minimum income schemes. How can we explain this trajectory of gradual 
institutionalization? Why were these programs significantly expanded in a period of 
severe budgetary constraints – and also a period of harsher competition among social 
groups for decreasing resources - when the limited political resources of Mis beneficiaries 
should prevent policy expansion in this policy field? 
In this thesis we focused on the political dynamics that led to gradual institutionalization 
of Mis in Castile and Léon and Madrid. Those cases were considered particularly 
significant since those two Autonomous Communities were ruled by the centre-right 
Popular Party, which, according to the traditional power resource theory, should have 
limited public effort in the anti-poverty field. In Chapter 7 we observed how in both cases, 
original safety nets were deeply transformed over time through a number of relevant 
policy changes. Two legislative variations were crucial to transform the residual and 
discretionary programs introduced in the early 1990s into right based minimum income 
schemes: the introduction of the Ley 15/2001 in the Community of Madrid and of the Ley 
7/2010 in Castile and Léon. These legislative interventions, which marked the shift 
respectively from the Madrid Integration Income to the Minimum Insertion Income (Rmi) 
                                                          
172 Exception are Balearic Island, Canaries, Murcia and Valencian Community. 
361 
 
and from the Minimum Insertion Income to the Guaranteed Citizenship Income (RGC), 
introduced in both regional contexts the legal right to access to minimum income 
protection, eliminating the budgetary constraints that conditioned de facto the functioning 
of the previous regional safety net. Those changes significantly enhanced level of 
protection and were followed by an increase in regional expenditure and number of 
beneficiaries, particularly pronounced in the case of Castile and Léon. Furthermore, since 
they shift from a discretionary to a right-based approach, they are considered particularly 
relevant because they constitute good examples of institutionalization of regional Mis in 
Spain.  
In both cases, political exchange between the government and the social partners was 
crucial to strengthen residual safety nets. In the Community of Madrid trade unions, after 
the second consecutive electoral victory of PP in 1998, subordinated the signing of social 
pacts to the introduction of a new law aimed at guaranteeing a right based approach to 
anti-poverty policies in Madrid. In a phase of strong economic growth and without having 
consolidated yet its position as dominant party in the AC, the former President Gallardón 
valued indispensable reaching an agreement with the trade unions in order to obtain 
legitimacy and consensus. Furthermore, regional concertation was considered a useful tool 
for economic development. As a consequence, the regional government negotiated with 
the social partners the introduction of the Rmi, a measure that allowed also President 
Gallardón to claim credit with powerful social groups and in front of its electorate. 
Partially more complex is the case of Castile and Leon, where the shift from the IMI to 
RGC is a consequence of the decision of local PP to introduce a new Statute of Autonomy. 
This document, which can be regarded as a sort of Constitutional Chart of the Spanish 
Autonomous Communities, requires to be approved two thirds of the regional assembly. 
This allowed social partners and PSOE to negotiate certain conditions in exchange for the 
acceptance of the Statute, in particular the formal recognition of the individual right to 
access to a Mis in Castile and Léon (CYL PSOE; CYL UGT; CYL CCOO). As a consequence, 
the new Statute of Autonomy of Castile and Léon establishes the "right to a Citizenship 
Guaranteed Income" (Art. 13.9) and three years later Law 7/2010, following the signing of a 
new tripartite agreement called “Agreement of the Social Dialogue on the Guaranteed 
Citizenship Income”, introduced the new RGC. This new measure was considered an 
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important achievement by the centre-right government, one of the flagship initiatives of its 
mandate. 
While presenting significant differences, both in the policy making process and in the 
policy output, the two reforms indicate that expansive reforms were result of a political 
exchange between the government and trade unions, where the latter obtained the 
expansion of last resort safety nets and the former legitimacy and sharing responsibilities 
regarding public policies. The presence of a centre-right government is not necessarily an 
obstacle to conclude such agreements, since in Spain all political actors agree on the 
necessity to have a public scheme to contrast poverty. Therefore, also centre-right parties 
introduce and/or institutionalize Mis to obtain consensus, according to a non-contentious 
competitive credit claiming logic.  
Those two reform processes are in line with our theoretical expectations: under moderate 
pluralism, the presence of a strong demand favours the institutionalization of minimum 
income schemes, following a non-contentious credit claiming logic. It is not always the case 
that minimum income protection constituted a priority for Spanish trade unions. As an 
example, in bargaining agreements in the period between 1994 until 1998 in the 
Community of Madrid strengthening safety net was not the first concern of the unions, 
and the protective ability of the Imi was limited. In those periods, the presence of faith-
based organizations pressuring for increasing benefits was not a sufficient condition to 
introduce ameliorative legislative changes. At the same time, no political actor pursed 
policy reversal strategy; with a weak demand under moderate pluralism we observed 
policy inertia.  
This path is clear until the Great Recession, when for the presence of a strong demand was 
not always sufficient condition to have policy expansion. A closer examination of the 
policy making process in that period reveals that in Madrid the onset of the crisis marked a 
sharp decrease in the use of regional social pacts and, despite expansion in terms of 
beneficiaries and expenditure, also some effort to contain public expenditure for the 
regional Mis. Moreover, the government was not willing to open new negotiations to 
further reinforce the RMI in reason of the advent of the crisis. This might be because the 
Great Recession weakened trade unions power resources as well as the need of regional 
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governments to reach agreements with the social partners (Molina, 2014, Gonzalez Begega 
and Luque Balbona, 2015). As a consequence – despite the seriousness of the social 
conditions and the comparatively high resources of the rich Community of Madrid – 
during the crisis the RMI was not reinforced, so that administration faced several 
difficulties in responding adequately to growing social needs. Considering standards 
dimension such as generosity and coverage, in 2015 the social safety net in the capital 
region is not among the most protective schemes in Spain. Conversely, in Castile and Léon 
a policy making process that involved constantly social partners allowed not only the 
institutionalization of the anti-poverty scheme, but also a gradual expansion of the 
measure during the crisis.  
At the same time, it is crucial to underline that in no case political actor in Spain demand 
the abolition of minimum income scheme, also in difficult time such as the crisis. The 
absence of political competition within the right camp and of stakeholder supporting 
subsidiarity – i.e. greater involvement, if not a complete devolution, of faith-based 
organization in the anti-poverty sector – limit political incentives to pursue a policy 
reversal strategy in the Spanish case. As a consequence, in Spain expansionary reforms 
have path dependent consequences and in this policy field, no retrenchment initiatives 
have been launched by Spanish ACs so far. Therefore, in Spain some political actors within 
the centre right proposed and sometimes enacted a stronger workfare approach, 
emphasizing the necessity of a stricter link with the labour market and to introduce 
stronger penalties for non-complying beneficiaries, but none of the social or political actors 
suggested to abolish minimum income schemes. 
This path is in line with our theoretical expectations: under moderate pluralism, the presence 
of a strong demand favours the institutionalization and prevents the displacement of 
minimum income schemes, following a non-contentious competitive credit claiming logic. In 
Spain, centre-right governments played a very different role in the introduction and 
evolution of regional Mis compared with the Italian case: not only they never displaced 
those programs, but occasionally they favoured their expansion. The absence of 
competition within the right – coupled with the support of third sector organizations 
towards minimum income protection – prevent the political activation of the State/Church 
cleavage in the social assistance arena. This has favoured an overlapping consensus 
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between centre-right and centre-left parties regarding minimum income protection, 
downsizing the contentious nature of social assistance policies, and allowing the 
institutionalization of a regional system of minimum income protection. 
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Conclusions 
 
Over the past twenty years, in Europe, minimum income protection models have 
undergone major transformations (Lodemel and Moreira, 2014, Marx and Nelson, 2012). 
Also Italy and Spain, two typical laggards in this field, introduced regional programs 
which might potentially constitute a path-departure from their traditionally weak and 
fragmented minimum income protection model through the provision of a last resort 
safety net in the form of minimum income for individuals and households lacking 
sufficient resources.  
Against such backdrop, this study had three main aims. First, to assess whether these 
regional Mis consolidated over time, thus adding up to a paradigmatic change in one of 
the defining features of the Mediterranean Model: the absence of a minimum income 
scheme. Second, to identify which factors allow explaining this gradual transformation – 
or, viceversa, the resilience of the traditional model - through an in-depth analysis of 
policy trajectories of regional minimum income schemes in four selected Italian and 
Spanish regions. Finally, third, to contribute to the development of an undertheorized area 
of welfare state research, the politics of social assistance, a policy area for long considered 
less affected by partisan dynamics in reason of the low political resources of would be 
beneficiaries and limited relevance on overall welfare budget. 
The policy trajectories of regional Mis in Italy and Spain have been divergent. In Italy, 
those programs where introduced only in a number of regions in the period 2005 – 2009. 
This season of regional innovation (Lumino and Morlicchio, 2013) was short lived and did not 
lead to the institutionalization of a regional Mi system in Italy. Actually, in the following 
years (2010 – 2014), most of these programs were displaced and no other regions 
introduced new programs. 
Conversely, in Spain, all CAs introduced regional anti-poverty measures in the short 
period between 1989 and 1995. In the last twenty years, those programs have been 
strengthened, although with territorial differences and poor coordination, becoming an 
important tier of protection for hundreds of thousands Spanish citizens. In particular, 
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during the Great Recession, we observed a remarkable expansion of Mis in terms of 
generosity, coverage and total expenditure in all CAs. Even more importantly, in most 
CAs those programs were transformed from discretionary to right-based minimum 
income schemes over time173.  
Broadening the picture, a similar differentiated trajectory is observable in Portugal and 
Greece. While in Portugal a fully-fledged minimum income scheme has been introduced in 
1997 which, is still entirely in place despite drastic cuts during the Great Recession, in 
Greece in 2014 a pilot Mis has been introduced in selected municipalities and so far its 
extension to the whole country is still uncertain (Jessoula, Matsaganis and Natili, 2015). 
These developments show that relevant changes are occurring in the countries presenting 
a Southern European Model of welfare, but the direction is still uncertain, at least for two 
countries in the group. Actually, countries appear to move in different directions in this 
policy field, with Spain and Portugal making more steps forward as compared to Italy and 
Greece. This pushed us to investigate what are the main drivers behind those 
differentiations.   
The second aim of this work was actually to explain the differentiated trajectory of 
regional Mis in Italy and Spain. In all the four cases analysed in-depth – Friuli Venezia 
Giulia and Lazio in Italy, Castile and Léon and the Community of Madrid in Spain – the 
empirical research based on careful process tracing revealed that “political exchange” 
dynamics between social actors and political parties were crucial for the introduction of 
regional safety nets (path departure), the shift from discretionary anti-poverty programs to 
right-based Mis (institutionalization), or the elimination of social safety nets (policy reversal) 
after their introduction. These different outcomes were thus interpreted in light of actor 
strategies and interactions, which were significantly different in the two countries.  
In Spain, a unified coalition of trade unions and faith-based organizations constituted a 
strong socio-political demand for the introduction and the subsequent institutionalization of 
minimum income schemes. Furthermore, in the period under consideration the Spanish 
party system in the observed cases was a typical case of moderate pluralism (Sartori, 1976), 
characterized by the absence of additional political cleavages beyond the left/right, limited 
                                                          
173 Exceptions are Balearic Islands, Canaries, Castile La Mancha and the Valencian Community. 
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within pole competition and mainly centripetal drives. Under those conditions, partisan 
politics and government colours were not key to have path-departure and/or 
institutionalization. Right wing governments in Castile and Léon and in the Community of 
Madrid introduced and gradually institutionalized minimum income schemes following a 
logic of non-contentious competitive credit claiming – i.e. competitive credit claiming on a 
non-contentious issue: since no political actor opposed the very existence of last resort 
safety nets, governments introduced and/or reinforced those schemes in order to obtain 
consensus among powerful social groups and the electorate.  
Political exchange dynamics were very different in Italy. The socio-political demand for 
minimum income protection was weak and fragmented: the only social actor pushing for the 
introduction of an (unconditional) Mis were some social movements. Furthermore, trade 
unions were divided on this issue: while CGIL accepted the introduction of minimum 
income only if conditional to job-search activities and active labour market policies, CISL 
opposed public intervention in the anti-poverty field and supported the traditional model 
based on the principle of horizontal subsidiarity. Faith based organizations never actively 
supported Mis in the two regions analysed here. On the political supply side, the 
fragmented nature of the Italian party system – i.e. fragmented pluralism, characterized by 
the presence of several parties both at the right and at the left side of the political spectrum 
and by the presence of additional cleavage beyond the left/right dimension- made the 
politics of minimum income scheme highly contentious, and government colour key to 
understand policy developments. On the left side, the presence of “radical left” parties 
aiming to become privileged interlocutors of social movements ensured that minimum 
income protection entered the regional political arenas. This prompted competitive 
dynamics between radical and reformist centre-left parties around these those innovative 
measures, whose credit claiming potential increased after CGIL started to support them. 
Competition within the left camp ultimately led to path-departure and the introduction of 
regional minimum income schemes of a European flavour. This type of political exchange 
was possible only in presences of centre-left regional governments. Parties of the centre-
right coalitions severely opposed Mis in Italy. In Lazio and Friuli Venezia Giulia, FI 
politically activated the Church/State cleavage against state intervention in the anti-poverty 
field, supported by the presence of relevant interest group favouring “subsidiarity” in the 
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social policy arena. In FVG, opposition towards Mis was reinforced by the presence of LN, 
which acted as a “radical right” party, criticizing those measures as favouring non-
deserving migrants, and required the immediate withdrawal of the programme once in 
government. As a consequence, centre-right coalitions not only never introduced Mis, but 
they rapidly repealed the schemes and re-direct the (limited) resources towards religiously 
based voluntary associations as soon as they replaced the centre-left coalitions which had 
introduced the program. In Italy, the policy trajectory of Mis thus followed a contentious 
competitive credit claiming logic, with centre-left governments promoting path-departure 
(and, where possible, institutionalization) and centre-right inertia – policy reversal. What 
appears peculiar about these dynamics, it is that not only the introduction of new social 
policy programs, but also policy reversals followed a credit claiming logic. 
This brings us to the third main goal of this work: to contribute to the development of a 
theory regarding the political dimension of social assistance policies and especially anti-
poverty means-tested benefits. Despite the limited relevance of the social assistance sector 
in the overall welfare budget and the scarce political resources of would be beneficiaries, 
these policy trajectories support the politics matters hypothesis, while expressing the need 
to go beyond the traditional power resources theory.  
In all Mi reforms analysed in this work it was actually possible to identify the specific 
political exchange between some social actors - acting as pressure groups for the 
introduction and/or strengthening of Mis – and political actors – looking for political 
support. The mobilization of social groups, in particular trade unions, appears as a 
necessary condition to have path-departure and/or scheme institutionalization. In general, 
the stronger the demand the more probable is strengthening Mis. The Spanish case is 
particularly interesting because it highlights that trade unions might also pursue a pro-
outsider strategy, adopting a policy agenda which favours the interest of social groups 
beyond their core membership, thus calling for a more precise investigation of trade union 
strategic choices in the social policy arena, as suggested by Clegg et al. (2010) 
Relatedly, the introduction and/or the institutionalization of Mis followed a credit claiming 
logic. In all the reforms analysed political actors introduced measures to obtain support 
from a social group in particular, and sometimes also the electorate. In the Italian regional 
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cases, however, the introduction of Mis prompted the opposition of right wing coalitions. 
This is because the fragmented pluralist Italian party system favoured the political activation 
of the Church/State cleavage as well as the emergence of “radical right” parties.  
What would have happened in Italy if the demand was strong, that is if all the trade unions 
were in favour of a Mis and also the faith based organization supported those requests? 
The political exchange dynamics characterizing a strong domand in a fragmented pluralist 
party system are uncertain and additional research is needed. Yet, it is plausible to 
hypothesize that, at least in contexts were the LN was part of the right coalition, the 
opposition of the centre-right coalition would have been equally strong. This is one of the 
peculiarities of this policy field: electoral competition is more relevant to explain policy 
reversal than path departure. In fragmented pluralist party systems, the political weakness 
of the would be beneficiaries allow political entrepreneurs to propose the elimination of 
needs-based safety nets for strategic reasons – i.e. to show their their opposition towards 
migration, since migrants are a relevant share of Mis beneficiaries, and/or to appeal to 
traditional values activating the State/Church cleavage. This is particularly true for radical 
right parties, which have generally less structured relationships with powerful interest 
groups, and may propose the abrogation of Mis – or the introduction of stricter eligibility 
requirements - to politicize their anti-migration stances. This might have relevant 
consequences also because competition and/or coalition dynamics within the right may led 
to policy reversal and/or, more likely, to retrenchment. The recent evolution of the social 
assistance sector in the U.K., in Denmark and/or Netherlands reveals that this dynamic 
could be not exclusively a Southern European prerogative: the presence and 
competition/coalition dynamics within the right camp appears therefore a particularly 
relevant factor for those interested in the social protection of low income individuals with 
a weak attachment to the labour market.  
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septiembre). 
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Decreto 88/1991, de 22 de abril, por el que se modifican determinados artículos del Decreto 
132/1990, de 12 de julio, sobre Ingresos Mínimos de Inserción de la Comunidad Autónoma 
de Castilla y León (BOCyL 79, 26 de abril). 
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Catalonia 
Decreto 228/1995, de 25 de julio. Regulación del Programa Interdepartamental de la Renta 
Mínima de Inserción (DOGC núm. 2087, 11 de agosto).  
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Decreto 384/2011 El objeto de este Decreto es desarrollar la Ley 10/1997, de 3 de julio, de la 
renta mínima de inserción, modificada por la Ley 7/2011, de 27 de julio, de medidas 
fiscales y financieras. La finalidad de la RMI es prestar el apoyo adecuado a todas las 
personas que lo precisen para atender las necesidades básicas para vivir en la sociedad, 
con los recursos convenientes para mantenerse y para favorecer su inserción o la 
reinserción social y laboral. 
 
Extremadura 
Decreto 66/1990, de 31 de julio 1990. Ayudas para la Integración en Situaciones de 
Emergencia Social (AISES) (DOE núm. 65, 16 de agosto).  
Decreto 2/1997, de 9 de enero. Regulación de las Ayudas para la Integración en Situaciones 
de Emergencia Social (DOE núm. 7, 16 de enero). 
Decreto 281/2011, de 18 de noviembre, por el que se establecen las bases reguladoras de las 
Ayudas para la Integración en Situaciones de Emergencia Social (AISES) en la Comunidad 
Autónoma de Extremadura, y se aprueba la convocatoria de dichas ayudas para 2011-2012. 
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junio) 
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Galicia 
Lei 9/1991, do 2 de outubro, galega de medidas básicas para a inserción social. DOG núm. 
191, 3 de octubre).  
Ley 1/1999, de 5 de febrero, por la que se modifica la Ley 9/1991, de 2 de octubre, de 
medidas básicas para la inserción social 
Ley 16/2004, de 29 de diciembre, por la que se modifica la Ley 9/1991, de 2 de octubre, de 
medidas básicas para la inserción social 
Ley 10/2013 de 27 de diciembre de inclusion social de Galicia (DOG Núm. 249, 31 de 
diciembre) 
 
Community of Madrid 
Decreto 73/1990, de 19 de julio, por el que se aprueba el Ingreso Madrileño de Integración. 
(BOCM del 25) 
Ley 15/2001, de 27 de diciembre, de Renta Mínima de Inserción de la Comunidad de 
Madrid (BOCM núm.310, 31 de diciembre).  
Decreto 147/2002 Se aprueba el Reglamento de la Renta Mínima de Inserción de la 
Comunidad de Madrid, cuyo texto se inserta a continuación. 
Ley 8/2012, de 28 de diciembre, de Medidas Fiscales y Administrativas. 
 
Murcia 
Decreto 39/1992, de 30 de abril. Plan Regional de Inserción y Protección Social (BOM núm. 
108, 11 de mayo). 
Ley 3/2007, de 16 de marzo, de Renta Básica de Inserción de la Comunidad Autónoma de 
la Región de Murcia. 
 
Navarra 
Decretos 168, 169 y 170/1990, de 28 de junio. Regulación de las Prestaciones y Ayudas 
Individuales y Familiares, las Contraprestaciones Laborales como medidas de Inserción y 
las Contraprestaciones de Renta Básica en la modalidad de Empleo Social Protegido (BON 
núm. 87, 20 de julio). 
Ley Foral 9/1999, de 6 de abril. Carta de Derechos Sociales (BON núm. 43, 9 de abril).  
Decreto Foral 120/1999, de 19 de abril. Renta Básica (BON núm. 54, 3 de mayo). 
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Ley Foral 15/2006, de 14 de diciembre, de Ser vicios Sociales, dispone que el instrumento 
en el que se establecerán las prestaciones del sistema público de servicios sociales será la 
Car tera de Ser vicios Sociales. 
Ley Foral 1/2012, de 23 de enero, por la que se regula la renta de inclusión social. (BOE 39, 
15 de febrero) 
 
Pais Vasco 
Decreto 39/1989, de 28 de febrero. Ingreso Mínimo Familiar (BOPV núm. 44, 6 de marzo) 
Ley 2/1990, de 3 de mayo. Ingreso Mínimode Inserción. (BOPV núm. 106, 30 de mayo). 
Ley 12/1998, de 22 de mayo. Contra la Exclusión Social (BOPV núm. 105, 8 de junio). 
Ley 8/2000 y Ley 9/2000, de 10 de noviembre. Modificación de la Ley Contra la Exclusión 
Social. (BOPV núm. 1, 2 de enero). 
Ley 18/2008, de 23 de diciembre, para la Garantía de Ingresos y para la Inclusión Social 
(BOPV num 250) 
Ley 4/2011, de 24 de noviembre, de modificación de la Ley para la Garantía de Ingresos y 
para la Inclusión Social. 
 
LaRioja 
Decreto 24/2001, de 20 de abril, por el que se regulan las prestaciones de inserción social 
Ley 7/2009, de 22 de diciembre, de Servicios Sociales de La Rioja (BOE num. 14, 16 de 
jenero) 
Decreto 31/2011, de 29 de abril, por el que se aprueba  la Cartera de servicios y 
prestaciones del  Si stema Público Riojano de Servicios Sociales 
 
Valencian Community 
Decreto 132/1990, de 23 de julio. Plan de Medidas de Inserción Social (BOV núm. 1376, 7 de 
septiembre). 
Ley 9/2007, de 12 de marzo, de Renta Garantizada de Ciudadanía de la Comunitat 
Valenciana (BOE num 95, 20 de abril) 
Decreto 93/2008, de 4 de julio, del Consell, por el que se desarrolla la Ley de Renta 
Garantizada de Ciudadanía de la Comunitat Valenciana. (num 5801, de julio) 
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